(November 5, 1993) An accident occurred at the Beloyarsk nuclear facility in the Russian Urals on 6 October during which a leak in the primary coolant system of the facility's fast breeder reactor (a BN-600 FBR) resulted in a release of radioactive sodium.

(400/1.3910) WISE Amsterdam - Although the Russian authorities claim that the accident was a 1 on the International Atomic Energy Agency scale and that there was no danger to personnel or the surrounding area, the reactor had to be shut down and personnel evacuated.

According to a spokesperson from the IAEA (who had no details on the accident itself), evacuation was necessary because of the danger of a possible explosion. Sodium can explode if it comes in contact with water or oxygen. The IAEA claims that the responsibility for classification on the IAEA scale lies totally with the Russian authorities and that the IAEA has no possibility to verily it. The agency is entirely dependent on the Russian authorities for details of the accident and its possible consequences.

According to a Greenpeace expert, the Russian classification should be treated with suspicion: evacuation is not a normal procedure and the past shows that nuclear authorities have a long tradition of playing down the possible dangers and consequences of 'minor' accidents.

Source: die tageszeitung (FRG), 9 Oct. 1993.
Contact: Greenpeace Russia, P0 Box 60, 121002, Moscow, CIS; tel: + 7-095- 293-3261.

(November 5, 1993) The present safety problems in the emergency cooling systems of Sweden's five oldest boiling water reactors (BWRs) are the most serious in the history of Swedish nuclear power.

(400/1.3909) WISE Copenhagen - These are problems which have been caused by a combination of a construction faults and an unforeseen age weakness; problems which, throughout their operation have caused all five reactors (including the two 600 MW units at Barsebäck) to run at the risk of a core melt ten times higher than Sweden's seven more recently built nuclear reactors. And even though the problems existed from the beginning, operation only came to a halt in September 1992 when the Statens Kärnkraftinspektion (SKI, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate) admitted the problems.

In June 1989 the Swedish government called upon SKI to investigate whether safety judgments could influence the order in which some of the reactors could be closed down. The report of this investigation showed that an accident at Barsebäck would cause the most serious consequences because it is situated only about 20 kilometers away from the cities of Malmö and Copenhagen, and there are a little less than two million inhabitants within a radius of 40 kilometers from the plant. Yet despite this, it concluded that all twelve of Sweden's operating reactors could be evaluated on equal terms in regard to safety. In a more recent safety report (December 1992), SKI has admitted that the conclusion was wrong, especially in light of present problems such as those relating to Barsebäck's emergency cooling system. The seriousness of the matter is such that this misjudgment by responsible authorities has strongly contributed to Swedish politicians continually ignoring Danish demands and refusing to close Barsebäck down.

The present safety problems have not only put a question mark against the safety of Swedish nuclear power. It has also caused Denmark to again approach Sweden about Barsebäck. Considering the seriousness of the problems, it would have seemed natural for Swedish politicians to have been affected by the situation and actually begin the procedure for having the plant closed down on their own. But this has not been the case.

Sweden's discussion around closure is guided by an energy agreement which was brought into force by a political majority in 1991 on the initiative of the Social Democratic Party. The idea was to ease the discussion by establishing a long-term, general agreement which could stand up to future elections but which could also hold up in the event of new nuclear accidents. At the Social Democratic Party's Congress in 1990, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson said that if we experience a new accident in either the USA or Japan, or in the middle of Europe, panic will break out along with demands for an immediate halt to the use of nuclear power even though substitutes have not been found. Therefore we have to carry out a long-term and reasonable change in the energy supply. We have to create an energy policy which will be valid even after a third [sic] nuclear accident.

The attitude of Swedish politicians towards nuclear power and the starting point for the process of closing down the plants seem to be unaffected. Still, Sweden's demonstrated safety problems resulted in a reconvening of Parliament for an extra debate in November and a hearing in December 1992 on the vulnerability and safety in connection with nuclear power. But, sadly enough, the closure of Barse-back does not seem to be any closer. This, in spite of the fact that after the hearing the Swedish Minister for the Environment told the press that he was under the impression that it was possible to do without the electricity supply from some of the reactors.

Before the hearing the Minister for the Environment had promised that whatever came to light would be of decisive weight. And after the hearing the Minister promised that the Swedish government would discuss what initiatives should be taken to speed up the closure process. So far, though, the only thing that has been achieved is that the government has ordered an investigation into the total costs of nuclear power. The government wants to know whether they have set aside sufficient money for the costs of decommissioning the plants and the handling of the nuclear waste.

The parliamentary discussion held in May over the closing down of nuclear power plants in relation to the energy agreement of 1991 did not bring any significant new initiatives for an early closure of Barsebäck either. On the contrary, everything points in the direction of the government keeping all 12 reactors in operation until the year 2000, or even longer. The government will not decide on when to close down the first reactors before the end of the nineties, at the earliest.

Summarizing the last year, we can say that it is not electricity supply problems that prevent the closing down process from starting, but rather juridical and economic problems. It is obvious that if Barsebäck is to be closed "prematurely", the pressure from Denmark has to be intensified. Politically it is not sufficient that only two out of seven parties in the Swedish Parliament support starting the closure process, and it is only the small "Vänsterpartiet" that argues unambiguously in favor of closing Barsebäck now. The other party with an anti-nuclear platform, the "Center-partiet", has decided to support closing down at least one reactor next year, but only on condition that the juridical aspects are solved. In addition, the Centerpartiet is split on whether or not to demand that one of the Barse-back units be the first to be closed. One group in the party argues for the closure of one of the Ringhals reactors, and as recently as August, a branch of the party demanded that a reactor at Oskerskamn be stopped for good.

In Denmark the minister responsible for Barsebäck matters, Minister for the Interior Mrs. Birte Weiss, has stated that she will "torment" the Swedish into closing the plant. Up until now, the only result has been a decision that the Swedish Minister for the Environment and the Danish Minister for the Interior must meet twice yearly. According to the schedule, the next meeting was supposed to be held in September.

In June representatives from OOA (The Danish Movement on Energy and Environment, of which WISE-Copenhagen is a part) met with the Minister of the Interior. Our main impression of the meeting was that the minister is very sympathetic to our points of view. She suggested that we meet two or three times a year - an idea we find positive. It will enable us to express our points of view directly to the minister, which we find advantageous in our continuing work to have Barsebäck closed down immediately. We have told Mrs. Birte Weiss that the critical information about Barsebäck will continue to have first priority in our work, but that OOA's resources are scarce, both money- and activist-wise, which makes it difficult to keep up with all aspects in our area. But we are more than willing to contribute with the resources we have got.

We have also told Mrs. Birte Weiss that we find it important that Denmark as such, and not only the envi-ronmental organizations, keeps up a thorough level of information on all aspects of Barsebäck and acts accordingly. The Danish authority responsible for this area has stated that it will neither study nor take a stand in the present case on the safety problems at Barsebäck. We have criticized this attitude very strongly. We have now told Mrs. Birte Weiss that even though OOA is invited to meet the ministers two or three times a year, we will keep arguing for a body of some kind, which, of it own accord, keeps up a thorough level of information about Barsebäck.

If the Danish Minister of the Interior is going to succeed in "tormenting" Sweden into closing Barsebäck, we need others in addition to OOA and Danish environmental organizations to keep track of what is happening. A critical and scrutinizing body with an official status and access to expert assistance when necessary, as well as the power to get unlimited access to technical information about the safety regulations concerning Barsebäck is needed. It should also be given re-sources - in terms of both money and workforce - which enables the continuous work for a Danish argumentation that Sweden cannot refuse.

If Mrs. Birte Weiss is to be taken seriously in both Denmark and Sweden, we expect her to do everything in her power to get hold of new and stronger arguments for an immediate closure of Barsebäck. Whether the minister lives up to expectations, only time can tell.

Nobody said it would be easy to make the Swedes close down Barsebäck. And it isn't. In OOA we continue our work on all levels in both Denmark and Sweden.

[Note: Since sending in this article, OOA has received new information about new, serious defects at the Barsebäck reactors. This time it has to do with leakages in the containment at reactor 2. We will have a report on this later.]

Source and Contact: WISE-Copenhagen, do OOA, Ryesgade 19, 2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark; tel: +45 31 35 55 07; fax: 31 35 65 45.

(November 5, 1993) For the first time, industry and government experts from all over Europe met for a conference on management of radioactively contaminated sites.

(400/1.3899) WISE Amsterdam - The symposium was organized by the EC commission on 11-15 October 1993 in Antwerp, Belgium. The meeting focused on the management of sites contaminated by nuclear weapons production and use, by nuclear fuel cycle facilities or other industries handling radioactive material. The following are highlights from this conference.

Phosphogypsum Waste Enters Field of View
The phosphate industry produces large amounts of a waste which has some characteristics in common with uranium mill tailings. Most phosphate ores contain elevated levels of natural radioactivity; typical values for uranium-238 are 1000 - 1500 Bq/kg. The decay products of the uranium series are present at the same levels. During processing, the uranium is generally transferred to the final product (e.g. fertilizer), while its decay product, radium-226, concentrates in the phosphogypsum waste. The phosphogypsum is either released to surface waters or dumped in surface deposits.

As a consequence of the practice of release to surface waters, a five- to 10-fold increase in levels of radium-226 was found in harbor sludges in the Netherlands: While normal soils contain 134.77-35 Bq/kg, these sludges contain up to an additional 120 Bq/kg. Problems have arisen, since these sludges were removed and used for landfill in polders and houses were built on this underground. According to what is considered to be an acceptable risk in the Netherlands, the additional radium-226-load introduced into soils through the phosphate industry must not exceed 1 Bq/kg. In actual fact, it is up to 120 times higher.

An example of the dumping of phosphogypsum waste is the Huelva dump in southwestern Spain which covers a surface of 800 hectares and contains several million tonnes. There, the elevated radium-contents of the waste caused a 20-fold increase of radon-222 gas release from the surface. Inhalation of radon increases lung cancer risk.

Radiation Standards for Reclamation
Large discrepancies became evident regarding the radiation standards applicable for reclamation of radio-active contaminated sites: The German participants involved with the reclamation of the Wismut uranium sites promoted the use of an additional annual dose of 1 mSv (100 mrem) caused by the reclaimed site for individuals of the general population. They justified this value by the bandwidth found for exposure to natural radiation.

All other participants dealing with this question (from Finland, UK and the Netherlands) used an acceptable risk of 1 in 1 million per year in conformity with ICRP recommendation No.26, implying an additional risk of only 0.1 mSv (10 mrem), one tenth of the German value. The 0.1 mSv value also leaves a margin for radiation doses resulting from multiple sources.

Longterm Reclamation Standards
Since the hundreds of millions of tonnes of wastes discussed here cannot be dumped in geologic formations, reclamation not only has to assure safety at the time of completion of the work, but also in the longterm, due to their contents of long-lived radio-nuclides and toxic substances (e.g. thorium-230, radium-226 and arsenic in uranium mill tailings). Otherwise erosion could cause failure after only a short period of time.

Unfortunately (or deliberately?), the best experts in this field, the US experts involved in the uranium mill tailings reclamation program, were not invited to this conference. The US Congress had already in 1978 passed the UMTRCA code requiring a long-term stability of reclaimed uranium mill tailings sites for a period of 1000 years (but in no case less than 200 years) without active maintenance. Subsequently, US experts developed and applied management methods meeting this requirement.

But at least one reclamation project conducted following US standards was presented during the meeting: a uranium mill tailings deposit at Andujar (Spain) containing one million cubic meters. Reclamation costs amounted to about US$15 per tonne. This example shows that a longterm reclamation following US standards is possible at reasonable cost also under European conditions. Longterm safety without active maintenance also was the design goal in the reclamation of a similar deposit in Ranstad (Sweden) and was realized at comparable cost.

Former Soviet Union: Disaster Area
A considerable part of the presentations was dedicated to the enormous contamination problems on the territory of the former Soviet Union:
uranium mining, nuclear weapons production, atmospheric and underground nuclear bomb explosions, nuclear fuel facilities and nuclear power plants have left vast highly contaminated areas. But most of them were limited to descriptions of the situation and to presenting contamination data. Only a few contributions considered management methods, but most of these were limited to methods of lowering the doses received in face of the contamination given.

The reclamation efforts reported were emergency measures performed in the areas worst affected by Chernobyl fallout: Highly contaminated material was gathered and dumped in preliminary deposits which do not meet any longterm or ground water protection requirements. Contamination of soils is being "lowered" by plowing and by so-called natural self cleaning processes; i.e. the contamination is being dispersed into deeper layers and not removed.

The decontamination of contaminated agricultural soils is the objective of a cooperative project of Eastern and Western European Scientists initiated by the EC-Commission: On a first test plot of some hundred square meters, more than 95% of the deposited radioactivity was removed. This year the test plot was extended to half a hectare. But the task to be accomplished is huge: Chernobyl alone has contaminated around 5 million hectares...

The Producers of the Wastes: Now the Reclamation Experts?
A strange common practice showed up at this conference: In many cases the same companies which have over the last decades produced the wastes without care for health and environment (as e.g. the Wismut uranium mining company in Germany) now perform the reclamation of the same sites and present themselves as the best reclamation experts. As producers of the wastes, they undoubtedly know best the locations and kinds of wastes they dumped, but it remains dubious as to whether and how they have gamed their reclamation expertise.

Moreover, companies involved in producing such wastes at some sites (and not always leaving them in a most desirable condition), present themselves as reclamation consultants at other sites. Examples are the French state-owned company COGEMA, involved worldwide in uranium mining; it now offers reclamation expertise through its German consulting subsidiary DSR GmbH. Another example is the German uranium wining company Uranerzbergbau GmbH with uranium mining activities in Canada, USA and Australia: Now it is involved as a consultant in uranium mine and mill waste reclamation projects at the Wismut sites and in Bulgaria.

Source and contact: Peter Diehl, Schulstr.13, D-79737 Herrischried, Germany; phone & fax: +49 7764 1034.

(November 5, 1993) Plans to add a fifth nuclear power plant to the existing four in Finland have - again - been halted. On 24 September 107 Members of Parliament voted no while 90 voted yes.

(400/1.3903) WISE Amsterdam - This latest vote was the second to have been held by Finland's parliament in less than a year, which is a bit frustrating for Finland's anti-nuclear activists. They have been fighting a 13 year campaign by the industry to build a fifth plant. Nevertheless, activists said that at least last year's vote (3 November) opened up public discussion on the issue, allowing the possibility for people to more clearly develop alternatives to the plant.

The week prior to the vote was filled with activities organized by groups opposing the plant. Included was a lottery on how the MPs would vote which was organized by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation. The prize is a holiday week in the Tropical Bath of the Kunsamo Hotel (which is heated by wood chips).

A campaign using electronic mail to send protests to individual MPs was also organized prior to the vote. In a letter posted on various electronic networks, organizers of that campaign said that a lot of pressure had been put on the MPs during the year following the 1992 vote. This pressure, they charged, included bribery.

Sources:

• Energy Political Association/ WISE-Helsinki, 23 Sept. 1993
• Mikael Book (Helsinki) (GreenNet, gn:gn.nu-clear, 1 and 24 Sept. 1993)

Contact: EVY/ WISE-Helsinki, Mechelininkatu 36, SF-00260 Helsinki, Finland; tel: + 358 0 406 889; fax: 446 604. Mikael Book and Pirkko Lindberg, e-mail address: finnadm@nordnet.se.

(November 5, 1993) In early October France's nuclear waste negotiator, Christian Bataille, toured the nation's sunny south talking to local officials about accepting a "laboratory" for "research" into underground disposal of High Level Waste (HLW).

(400/1.3897) WISE Amsterdam -

About two dozen sites will be visited by the negotiating team in time for preparation of a status report by 15 December. At present the campaign is focused on Marcoule, a center for reprocessing and plutonium reactors near Avignon in the southern Rhône valley.

As a Socialist member of Parliament from Lille in the far north of France, Bataille produced a report on the waste repository issue in 1990. That report served as a basis for the government's HLW law that was passed a year later. A more recent decree calls for the creation of local/national "public interest groupings" (GIPs) which will receive 60 million francs (US$9.9 million) per year in infra-structure and development akL A total of 1.5 billion francs will be put into the initial investment. These large sums are obviously intended to help avoid a repetition of the vigorous protests that greeted a similar initiative for a geologic repository in 1989 and 1990.

Bataille's siting strategy also closely resembles the attempts by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to gain a foothold for underground HLW disposal at the WLPP and Yucca Mountain facilities in the United States by setting up an elaborate "research" facade for these projects. No doubt Bataille has had much to discuss with his US counterpart, Richard Stallings, a former congressman who has been chosen as the new US nuclear waste negotiator.

Yet another feature of the US HLW program that may become common in France is "temporary" surface storage of spent fuel using the NUHOMS concrete bunker system. This design by Pacific Nuclear, a company that has become very prominent in the US HLW program, has been planned or built at six US nuclear plants. The NUHOMS design was also licensed this year to Framatome, the French nuclear power agency, with a pro-vision allowing for the further use of the Framatome license in Russia, eastern Europe, and South Africa. The NUHOMS license has also been acquired by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Japan.

The NUHOMS inner canister, which is inserted into the concrete bunker horizontally, weighs 20 (non-metric) tons when loaded with 24 spent PWR fuel assemblies. Its 100-ton lead-lined overpack, which is used in on-site transfers, is being reviewed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval as a long-distance rail cask. At its destination, the inner canister would then be placed into a container designed for ultimate geologic storage.

Pacific Nuclear has recently announced a process for solidifying "low" level waste into a vitrified form called Enviroglass. The first Enviroglass plant is to be built in Washington State not far from DOE's Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, which cooperated closely in its development. The company says the process is attracting attention abroad also.

Pacific Nuclear has also been in the forefront of the effort to create an intermediate holding area for high level waste - a staging ground near the proposed deep geologic repository for thousands of spent fuel casks (or NUHOMS bunkers) called a Moni-tored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility. This concept, which is being pursued at the Mescalero Apache reservation in New Mexico, is also being considered in the French HLW program (see WISE NCs 399, In brief, p.8 and 398.3878).

Thus with the help of DOE and the ExIm Bank, the US nuclear industry is beginning to achieve a pioneering position in the global marketplace for radwaste technology. The industry's European ambitions are reflected in the launching of a recent series of expensive trade publications with titles like Post-Soviet Monitor and Nuclear Safety and Cleanup Report. Backing the effort also is the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which was originally founded by the US industry association INPO and now has offices in London, Tokyo, and Moscow.

Sources:

• Nuclear Fuel (US), 11 Jul. and 11 Oct. 1993
• Tri-City Herald (US), 17 Sep. 1993

Contacts: South West Nuclear Alert, 10011 Hickory Crossing, Dallas TX 75243 USA; tel: + 1 (214) 235-1467; fax: (213) 783-1956. Silence, 4 rue Bodin, 69001 Lyon France; tel: 78.39.55.33.

(November 5, 1993) On 30 September, the news first broke out about the one-inch-deep fully circumferential crack in the core shroud within the most malfunctioning reactor in the US, Brunswick 1 near Wilmington, North Carolina.

(400/1.3908) WISE Amsterdam - By 7 October, the story had reached the New York Times newspaper as operators of other GE Boiling Water Reactors began checking the metallurgic integrity of this three-inch-thick cylinder that surrounds the fuel core.

Even as the news accounts multiplied, Carolina Power & Light, Brunswick's owner, was attempting to suppress the story by announcing to the media that the crack would be repaired with clamps within a month. The public will hardly be satisfied by such a temporary measure in the first level of defense in containing the fuel in these reactors.

At issue is the carbon 304 series stainless steel used in the following BWR core shrouds in the US: Duane Arnold; Fermi 2; Hatch 1 and 2; WNP 2; Clinton; Brown's Ferry 1, 2, and 3; Fitzpatrick; Monticello; and Oyster Creek. Also of concern are Taiwan's Chinsan 1 and 2 and Kousheng 1 and 2. Three smaller cracks of the same type had also shut down the Unit 2 reactor at Brunswick this summer.

Source:

• Nucleonics Week (US), 7 Oct. 1993
• New York Times, 7 Oct. US
• NRC Weekly Information Report, 1 Oct.

Contact: Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 1616 P Street NW, Suite 160, Washington DC 20036, USA; tel: + 1-202-328-0002.

(November 5, 1993) A report by the Bundesrechnungshof (Germany's federal Government Accounting Office) has determined that spent fuel reprocessing is no longer legally justifiable because it's more than twice as expensive as direct disposal.

(400/1.3901) WISE Amsterdam - The Federal Atomic Act (Title 9), the legal basis for spent fuel management policy, mandates reprocessing and recycling of nuclear materials when those operations are "justified on technical and economic grounds". Because of the high costs of reprocessing ("at least twice as expensive as direct disposal of spent fuel"), the Bundesrechnungshof "reached the conclusion that, under the Atomic Act, reprocessing is no longer qualified" as a spent fuel management option, the 23-page report stated. "It should also be taken into account that reprocessing does not reduce the volume of waste but increases it."

In reaction to the report, an executive at one of the German nuclear electric utilities said that the federal government in Bonn "should pay less attention to what Britain, France and Japan think about what we are doing, and more attention to the requirements of our own nuclear program."

A spokesperson for the Research and Environment section of the Ministry in Bonn said that the Bundesrechnungshof's criticism is "nonsense" and that according to the Atomic Act, reprocessing is necessary because nuclear power plants must have a reprocessing contract in order to obtain an operating license). The section claims that because there is not yet a final storage facility in operation, the costs are unknown and therefore it cannot be proven that reprocessing is more expensive.

In 1985 at Wackersdorf (Bavaria), Germany started building a reprocessing plant. The result was massive resistance over the next five years, during which two people and nearly 10,000 were arrested. Construction stopped in 1990 when some of the nuclear utilities stopped backing the project and signed reprocessing contracts with the facilities in Sellafield and La Hague instead.

Sources:

• Nuclear Fuel( US), 13 Sept. 1993
• Sueddeutsche Zeitung (FRG), 9 Sept. 1993

Contact: BUND, Dunantstr.16, 79110 Freiburg, FRG; tel: + 49-761-885950.

(November 5, 1993) The present system for dumping "Low" Level Radioactive Wastes (LLW) in the US was authorized by the Congress in 1985 and consists of a dozen state and regional compacts that will oversee the "disposal" of tens of millions of cubic meters of radioactive materials in surface concrete bunkers.

(400/1.3898) WISE Amsterdam - At the leading site at Ward Valley in southern California, however, a proposed open trench facility similar to the radwaste dumps of previous decades is at a critical decision point, with quasi-judicial hearings about to begin. The scope of the hearings has been drastically limited by Gov. Pete Wilson, even though the city of Los Angeles and many other official bodies have opposed the dump. Surrealistic billboards are now appearing throughout the Southwest. (See accompanying picture!)

However, even before the battle is joined over the first of the new facilities, it is becoming evident that the presently planned system is going to have to expand greatly. US Senators Joseph Lieberman and Chris Dodd have been overseeing a federal analysis of additional LLW disposal needs which is being conducted by Congress's General Accounting Office (GAO). Letters have been sent out to state governors about this "sensitive and important" matter. In addition, new contracts are being signed by states for "interregional access" throughout the LLW system. Far from being a system built on tightly contained autonomous regions, the US LLW regime is inevitably becoming a national, or indeed international, system without borders.

 

Source: Minutes of the 19 August meeting of the Northwest Interstate LLW Compact, released 8 Oct. 1993 (with member states reaching from Colorado to Alaska to Hawaii, this compact has jurisdiction over a vast area of the Pacific Rim).
Contact: Abalone Alliance, 2940 16th Street #3 10, San Francisco CA 94103, USA; tel: + 1 (415) 861-0592; fax (415) 558-8135. Internet: Roger.Herried@F616.n125.zl .FIDO NET.ORG.

Finland prepares nuclear transport to Russia.

(November 5, 1993) The Finnish state-owned nuclear company Imatran Vioma (IVO) is presently preparing a transport of waste from its nuclear power reactors at Loviisa. Twenty-five tonnes of spent nuclear fuel will be sent by rail to Mayak, one of Russia's reprocessing complexes, situated in the area known as Chelyabinsk. Mayak is already one of the world's most radio-actively contaminated areas. IVO has been transporting spent nuclear fuel to Mayak since 1981 without having detailed technical knowledge about the plant. It was only in 1990 that it was discovered that the Finnish waste actually ends up at Mayak's military complex, where uranium and plutonium are separated. The world's most serious nuclear accidents took place at Chelyabinsk in 1957 and 1967. Radiation levels 20 times normal back-ground levels were recorded there in 1992. Greenpeace (GreenNet gn:gp.press, topic: Finland Rad Waste to Russia, 28 Oct. 1993.

 

Norway's nuclear waste exposed. In September activists from the Norwegian environment group, the Bellona Foundation, exposed the activities of the country's small, but important nuclear industry and the environmental and health threats from its radioactive waste. Bellona uncovered some of the 1,000 barrels of low and intermediate/medium level wastes, including plutonium, at the Kjeller research plant at Akershus, in southeast Norway, close to a residential area. Contamination has been found in a nearby draining pit and traces of plutonium are in the sediment of a nearby river. Bellona said the waste disposal was "a scandal" and it should be raised and disposed of according to international standards. Seven Bellona activists were arrested in the action and fined between 6000 to 8000 Norwegian kroner (UK~550-700). Contact: Bellona, P.B. 8874 Youngstorget, 0028 Oslo 1, Norway; tel: + 47-2-3824 10; fax; 2-383862. NENIG Briefing No. 70 (Shetland), Oct. 1993

 

UK N-waste threat. A top government adviser has warned that radioactive waste dumps in the UK are a danger to both nuclear workers and the public. Details of a letter from Professor John Horlock, chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, to the British government was published in the Observer newspaper (10 Oct. 1993). Horlock warns that many radioactive waste stores are "deteriorating" and "unsatisfactory", increasing the chance of accidental releases of radiation. The problem is so urgent that he suggested the government rush through controversial plans for a deep underground waste dump near Sellafield, ignoring the already limited opportunity for public debate. NENIG Briefing No. 70 (Shetland), Oct. 1993; NENIG Briefing No. 70 (Shetland), Oct. 1993

 

"No reason" for Superphénix not to re-start. The public inquiry into the licensing of the Superphénix fast reactor near Lyons has found no reason why the thing should not be re-started. It has been shut since July 1990 because of safety concerns and expiry of its license. Environmental groups have not expressed much surprise as the result of the inquiry which they had already condemned as a sham. However, with repair and safety work still required at the reactor, together with regulatory authority investigations, it is unlikely that any final decision will be taken on the reactor's future until next summer. Then, the decision is likely to be as much a political one as a decision on safety. Superphénix is a joint European project owned by the nuclear industries in France (5 1%, Italy (33%) and 16% by Germany, the Netherlands and UK. Contact: Opposition to the reactor is being organized by Europeans Against Superphénix, c/o Comité Malville, 4 rue Bodin, 69001 Lyon, France; tel: + 33 78 28 29 22. NENIG Briefing (Shetland), Oct. 1993, p.6

 

Renewable news: Algae provides new way of generating power
Researchers at the University of the West of England have come up with a completely new way of generating power from the sun. Sunlight is used to grow algae in a tank. The algae are then filtered out, dried, ground up and fed into a reasonably conventional internal combustion engine. The engine drives a generator to produce electricity.
A small proportion of the electricity is used to grind the algae. Waste heat from the engine is used to dry them. And carbon dioxide from the exhaust is fed to the algae in the growing tank. The only inputs to the system are light and nutrients.
The coil used to grow the algae was originally developed to treat sewage, so presumably the nutrients for the energy algae could come from the same source. The developers have built a 25 kW prototype and project an eventual electricity cost of around 3 pence per kW hour - cheaper than a new coal power station. Source and contact: Clean Slate: The Magazine of Sustainable Technology, Machynlleth, Powys, SY2O 9AZ, UK; Centre for Alternative Technology, tel: +44 654-702400.

 

Decommissioning costs: Greifswald. Decommissioning and storage costs for the Greifswald nuclear complex in the former GDR are estimated at DM 7.7 billion (US$ 5.2) for the next 18 years. After reunification the German government refused to grant permission for the complex to continue operation for safety reasons. From 19% on, the Soviet-type nuclear reactors and 5,000 fuel elements are to be decommissioned and stored. A total of eight reactors had been planned for the Greilswald complex. Numbers 1-4 (VVER-440/230 reactors) were closed in the autumn of 1990. Reactor 5 was finished but was never put into ope-ration. Construction work was started on reactors 6-8, but was never finished. Current plans for the site include an interim nuclear waste storage facility and a conventional power plant. In addition, the owners of the complex have offered the site as a possibility for the new European Community nuclear fusion reactor ITER. die tageszeitung (FRG), 14 Oct. 1993 & 11 Sept. 1991; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FRG), 27 Oct. 1992

 

US energy department given 10 more years to begin Hanford cleanup. With no hope of meeting deadlines for cleaning up highly radioactive wastes at the Hanford nuclear weapons plant in Washington State, the US DOE has pushed for, and gotten, a new agreement with environmental regulators. The new agreement will give them another 10 years just to get started. In return for being allowed the further delay, the department has promised to embed lower-level waste in longer-lasting materials...Under the old agreement, signed in 1989, cleanup was to begin by 1999 and DOE had agreed to stabilize highly radioactive liquids in Hanford's aging, and leaking, tanks by embedding them in glass. The new accord also agrees to this but now low-level waste will also be put into glass. The new agreement covers a 40-year time span and the cleanup of liquids and sludges in 177 underground tanks. The tanks range in size from 55,000 gallons to one million gallons. Sixty-seven tanks have already leaked, and more will do so before their contents can be embedded in glass. No costs were attached to the new agreement, but under the old schedule they ran to US$50 billion, and this new agreement covers more. New York Times (US), 3 Oct. 1993, p.32

 

Kazakh nuclear victims on hunger strike. On 27 Sept. forty-two victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe who are being treated in a military hospital in Kazakhstan, went on hunger strike. The Moscow news agency ITAR-Tass reported that they want to push the Kazakh government to enact a law giving sufficient assistance to Chernobyl victims. The strikers, who are suffering now from radiation diseases, had been part of a fire brigade working at the site of the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe. die tageszeitung (FRG), 28 Sept. 93

 

Japan announces official plutonium stocks. The Japanese Agency for Science and Technology have announced the total Japanese plutonium stocks. On December 1992 Japan had 4,500 kilo Pu: 1,600 kg stored in Japan and 2,900 kg stored outside the country at reprocessing plants. die Tageszeitung (FRG), 4 Oct. 1993

 

Westinghouse gets spanish contract. In mid-October the US company Westinghouse Electric Corp. announced that it had been awarded a US$88 million contract to supply power equipment to a Spanish nuclear power station. The corporation is supposed to assist the Asociación Nuclear ASCO of Barcelona to modernize two of its units by providing and installing turbine rotators, electrical generators and generator control systems. The installation is expected to begin next year and end in mid-1997. New York Times (US), 14 Oct. 1993

 

Burying uncertainty: Risk and the case against geological disposal of nuclear waste, K. S. Shader-Frechette, 326 pages, University of California Press. USA. Focusing on the Yucca Mountain project in Nevada, Shrader-Frechette, who holds degrees in mathematics, physics, and philosophy, demonstrates the weaknesses in the claims of the professional risk-assessors and proposes that all geologic disposal of HLW should be postponed for at least a century. Available from: California-Princeton Fulfillment Services, 1445 Lower Ferry Road, Ewing NJ 08618, USA ($15.00 paper plus $3.00 shipping).

Aging nuclear power plants: managing plant life and decommissioning, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA-E-575). As the first generation of large nuclear plants reaches the end of its service life, the industry is having to spend billions of dollars on end-of-life problems like steam generator replacement in PWRs, pipe thinning, and pressure vessel embrittlement. One third of US reactors (primarily older BWRs) will be decommissioned over the next decade, and the remainder are undergoing refurbishment for extended service at a cost of many hundreds of millions of dollars. All of these choices - maintenance, decommissioning, and refurbishment for extended service - face rapidly escalating waste management costs. Available from: US Government Printing Office, North Capitol and G Streets, Washington DC 20502 USA, tel. +1 (202) 783-3238.

 

The limits of safety: organizations, accidents, and nuclear weapons, Scott D. Sagan, 286 pages. With the downturn in the arms race, secrecy barriers are slowly being lowered in the West, allowing a sharper picture of the formative events of the Cold War. This exhaustive investigation of the 1%2 Cuban Missile Crisis by a Stan-ford University political scientist presents a detailed account of how war plans, warning systems, and bomber alerts functioned - and frequently malfunctioned - while the world stood on the brink of Armageddon.
U-2 overflights and test launches of ICBMs continued through the crisis, causing several self-generated false alarms. On repeated occasions, US nuclear-armed interceptor jets crossed into Soviet airspace, leaving individual pilots to make split-second decisions that could have triggered World War III. With NATO missiles in an alert state, Europe and Canada would have been quickly drawn into the retaliatory spiral. Sagan points no fingers of blame, but this book should bring new shudders to those who remember the chill of those October weeks. Available from: Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton NJ 08540 USA (US$29.95).

(November 5, 1993) Angry workers at a US oil exploration company working off the Indian shore dumped 1500 gin of radioactive material into the Coouni river in Tamil Nadu (South India).

(400/1.3902) WISE Amsterdam - Five workers, including the foreman-cum-safety officer, have been arrested for taking the material from a device used by the company for well-logging operations. Two news reports, both carried by the Calcutta Telegraph (10 and 11 Oct. 1993), give differing descriptions as to what was actually contained in the device. The earliest report claims it contains americium-beryllium while the later report says it contains 1500 gin of radioactive cesium. Both reports say the material is sealed within a double-walled steel container and that there is no danger of contamination to the river.

Officials from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and the Tamil Nadu police believe they have located the container, but say that murky waters and 15 feet of accumulated slush are preventing them from retrieving it. Until they can figure out how to get it out they have inserted a large steel pipe into the area to keep the container from being washed away into the Bay of Bengal.

The workers say they dumped the material into the river as a way of protesting a decision by the company to transfer their foreman, Alister d'Monte, to Bombay. The company says it transferred d'Monte as "a disciplinary action for misbehavior and obstructing other employees from doing their duty".

According to Indian officials, the company had reported the radioactive device as missing on 23 September, although the material was, according to another report, actually dumped into the river six days earlier. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has asked the company to stop any further exploratory and drilling operations involving use of radioactive sources.

One of our readers has requested information on the company involved - the Halliburton Offshore Inc based in Houston, Texas. If you have any relevant information, please contact him at the address below.

Sources:

• Telegraph (Calcutta), 10 & 15 Oct. 1993
• Katmandu Post (Nepal), 15 Oct. 1993

Contact: Xavier Dias, Village Duccetai, P.O. Noamunddi, Bihar 833217, India; tel: + 91-65883-3428.

(November 5, 1993) Along with its request to be integrated into the European Economic Community dated 17 July 1989, the Austrian government presented an application for membership in the European Atomic Community (EURATOM). This action is having effects, yet has still not been a subject for public discussion in Austria.

(400/1.3905) WISE Amsterdam - In 1978 Austria passed its 'nuclear prohibition law" which forbids the construction of power plants based on designs using nuclear fission. In addition, the Austrian government has publicly supported the idea of a nuclear free Europe. Nevertheless, the government is financing the nuclear expansion program of the EC/EURATOM and other nuclear institutions with billions of shillings in tax monies. For that reason the Austrian organizations "Anti Atom International" (AAI) and "Platform Against Nuclear Dangers" (PLAGE) have jointly published a booklet about the foreseeable as well as the possible consequences of an accession to the EC and EURATOM treaties. Among other things, the booklet is meant to confront the authorities responsible for making decisions regarding the EC-Euratom accession with the full spectrum of the problematic aspects of their actions, as well as to stimulate public discussion. So far, say the two groups, the authorities have done nothing more than make soothing, and false, statements, and public discussion has been non-existent: this in a country where, 15 years after the "nuclear prohibition law" was enacted and seven years after Chernobyl, more than 80% of the population disapproves of nuclear energy.

The booklet is a clear and easy-to-read survey - divided into eleven chapters - of just what will result if national law is replaced by EC-law in Austria.

For instance, in spite of Austria's nuclear prohibition law, future membership in the EURATOM treaty could mean the obligation to allow reprocessing, fuel rod production, final storage and nuclear research on Austrian national territory. This is because of the way in which the nuclear prohibition law is worded, as it only refers to "nuclear power plants operating on the basis of nuclear fission". However, a supplementary protocol could clarify the situation and Austrian anti-nuclear activists are demanding that just such a protocol be negotiated before Austria enter into the treaty.

If the Euratom treaty is signed by Austria, its population will be immediately reminded of the fact that nuclear energy is, quite simply, incompatible with a democratic society. On the pretext of defence interests, the EURATOM gives its member states rather arbitrary possibilities with regard to secrecy. And a political union which is structured according to a centralized model such as the EC would favor the nuclear industry by means of information control, in other words, some information would be less than transparent. Further, Jacques Delors, the EC High Commissioner, hopes to take the EC structure to the point where 80% of all decisions regarding the community will be taken in Brussels, favoring the nuclear industry even more. Austria, which within the EC holds a minority position with regard to nuclear decisions, would have little hope of influencing the process.

Moreover, in a chapter called "EC and the nuclear east", the report points out that Austria is already financing, through the European Bank for Re-construction and Development and with enormous amounts of money, the up-grading of the dilapidated reactors in Eastern Europe. With an accession to the EC, these financial contributions would increase automatically. Austrian taxpayers are paying for these projects without being asked if they are willing to do so.

Austria won't escape "Euro-dictation" with regard to irradiated food, either. From this year on, Austria must guarantee that its citizens can have irradiated food dished out to them. (In fact, it is probable that irradiated foods were being imported before that time, as there were never any controls to check this.) AAI is also fearful that, with the accession to the EC, the systematic irradiation of food would sooner or later take place in Austria. There already exist facilities, such as the Austrian reactor center in Seibersdorf, that would be interested in seeing this happen. And, in the scope of the EC's "freedom of choice for the place of business", firms from EC member states could settle easily in Austria.

Moreover, with the new EC standards Austria's yearly limits for radiation doses would be exceeded. Legally there would be nothing to prevent this from happening because EURATOM law overrides the national radiation protection order. The EURATOM treaty regards one of tasks of the Community to be to create basic standards which should provide what it considers to be 'sufficient safety". As to what "sufficient safety" means, the opinions of the EC and Austria are distinctly different. Austria 's radiation protection order forbids e.g. pregnant women and young persons working in radiation areas; the EC allows it. As an EC order regarding the permissible limits for radiation doses is compulsory for any member state, Austria's current plans for an amendment of its national radiation protection order reflects an adaption of the EC standards.

As for nuclear waste, it is still unclear what Austria can expect with the EURATOM treaty. In general, though, Austria will discover that EC policy with regard to the treatment and storage of nuclear waste does not pursue the goal of minimizing the amount of nuclear waste. And instead of making phase-out possible, it will in fact guarantee the increase of nuclear wastes. (The target according to the EC commission: 60% more nuclear electricity by the year 2000.)

The report expresses apprehension that the more completely the EC is realized, and the more centralized the upcoming "European State" becomes, the more likely it is that one final storage facility will be planned for the whole EC. On the assumption that Austria will accede to the EC the country then also becomes one of the candidates for such a facility. Nor will Austria be able to maintain a general import prohibition for radioactive wastes under the terms of the "free merchandise traffic". If Austria accedes to the EC it will be impossible to forbid the passage of certain radioactive wastes because, in the EC market, national borders no longer exist.

Source and contact: The booklet, published only in German (which is unfortunate, as the information is also interesting to folks outside Austria and Germany!) is available from:Anti Atom International, Franz-Josefs-Kai 51, 1010 Vienna, Austria; tel: +43- 222-53475-208/209; fax: 279.

(November 5, 1993) Nordic Environment Ministers have agreed to protest both collectively and individually to the UK over its refusal to accept Paris Commission (Parcom) policy on discharges from the new THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield.

(400/1.3900) WISE Amsterdam - Meeting in Kalmar, Sweden, at the end of September the Environment Ministers of Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark agreed to demand consultations with the UK over THORP. They are protesting against the UK's apparent refusal to apply the June 1993 Paris Commission decision on radioactive discharges from reprocessing plants to THORP (see WISE NC 393.3831). The policy includes a full environmental impact assessment (EIA) and examination of alternatives to dealing with spent fuel before any new or revised authorization to discharge to the environment is approved. In addition, states planning new discharges should fully consult other Paris Commission members.

 

"THORP: THE WHITEHALL NIGHTMARE", an 86-page report by Crispin Aubrey. For ten years, a workforce of 5,000 has labored at the construction of the most monstrous "white elephant" presently on the world nuclear agenda, the huge Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield on England's northwest coast. UK officials are determined to go ahead with this plant which would reprocess plutonium from reactor spent fuel, primarily for use in Japanese breeders, despite the isolation of the Major government on the issue. Among other excellent reasons for condemning THORP to the nuclear graveyard is the estimate that its operation would multiply the already scandalous radioactive releases from the Sellafield complex by a factor of 6 (also, 27 million curies of krypton-85 would be added annually to the global atmosphere with untold consequences). Author-journalist Crispin Aubrey has presented the issues with admirable clarity just as they are coming to a critical juncture. Available for: £5.99 plus £1 postage and handling from Jon Carpenter Publishing. P 0 Box 129, Oxford OX1 4PH England (US distributor: Inbook, P 0 Box 120261, East Haven CT 06512).

 

(November 5, 1993) An official of the Russian Pacific Fleet has confirmed that during the weekend of 16 October 1993, Russia dumped 900 tons of liquid nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan.

(400/1.3896) WISE Amsterdam - According to Greenpeace, whose ship "MV Greenpeace" had been shadowing the dumping convoy of three ships throughout the operation, it was clear that the waste was pumped from tanks on board one of the ships through a pipe directly into the sea under the ship. There was no containment of the waste.

The dumping took place at a site 295 nautical miles west of Hokkaido, Japan and 105 nautical miles southeast of Vladivostok at around midnight. The waste involved is generated during refuelling the ageing nuclear-powered submarines of Russia's Pacific Fleet. It was dumped despite an international moratorium on radioactive waste dumping at sea.

 

THE COLD WAR'S RED HOT LEGACY Greenpeace, which had anticipated the Russian dumping operation, began circulating a briefing paper on the day the dumping resumed. The briefing includes information on a report of a commission headed by Boris Yeltsin's environmental adviser, Alexei Yablokov. That report stated that from the late 1950s to at least the late 1980s, the Soviet Union secretly dumped 2.5 million curies of radiation at sea, including 18 reactors from submarines and a reactor core from the Lenin icebreaker. Sixteen damaged submarine reactors, six of them still containing their fuel, were dumped off the Arctic islands of Novaya Zemlya. Two other reactors, a reactor screen and several tanker-loads of liquid radioactive waste were dumped into the Sea of Japan. According to Greenpeace, one of Yablokov's most startling findings was that the Russian Navy continues to dump its radioactive waste at sea and will attempt to continue it at least until 1997. The report also admits that the Navy is so short of storage space for highly radioactive waste from its submarine fleets that the Navy can no longer guarantee the safe operation of the undersea fleet. The briefing paper, "Russia's Radioactive Waste Crisis - The Cold War's Red Hot Legacy", is available from: Greenpeace International, Keizersgracht 176, 1016 DW Amsterdam, the Netherlands; tel: + 31-20-523-6555.

 

(November 5, 1993) On 12 October 1993 the district government of Upper Bavaria announced that it has licensed the regional planning procedure for the FRM-2, a 20 MW research reactor.

(400/1.3906) WISE Amsterdam - There-upon Bavarian Minister for the Environment Gauweiler has ordered the procedure for the licensing under the German Atomic Law to begin. This opens up the possibility for the construction of the first new nuclear reactor in Germany since the Chernobyl accident in April 1986.

The first German nuclear reactor for generating neutrons for scientific investigation was built in Garching, near Munich, nearly thirty years ago. For safety reasons, this reactor will be shut down in the near future. In the meantime, several other German research reactors have been shut down and scientists have begun to complain there was a lack of neutrons for research. The problem was compounded when the search for technical alternatives to generate neutrons was stopped in 1985 for financial reasons. Thus, without any public discussion, the Technical University of Munich (TUM) and the State Ministry for Science and Art began planning a new research reactor for the Garching site.

The authority to license the project lies with the Bavarian Ministry of State for National Development and Environmental Questions. This means that the Bavarian government is at the same time the proposer and the licenser. The German company Siemens (Interatom) is the general contractor for the construction of the whole reactor, and has taken an active part in its planning since 1988.

The plans for the FRM-2 have reached an advanced stage. In November 1992 a citizen's action committee, Citizens against nuclear reactor Garching passed a list with more than 2000 signatures to the Bavarian Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs Hans Zehetmair protesting the construction. (Officially, it is the Bavarian government which owns the facility, but it is this ministry that is the responsible authority).

So far the group's actions have not met with success, but they still have time to do something. From 29 October to 29 December 1993 material about the FRM-2 which is relevant to the atomic licensing procedure can be inspected by everyone at the Garching town hall as well as the Bavarian Ministry of State for National Development and Environmental Questions in Munich. It is possible to raise objections to the project during this period, but only during this period!! Meanwhile, the NGO Umweltinstitut München e.V. in Munich has, together with several other towns and commu-nities, publicly protested the planned new reactor. It also intends to inspect the licensing material and prepare a model objection.

An expert opinion from the Öko-Institut in Darmstadt proves that the safety risks of the new research reactor is comparable to that of a nuclear power plant, but a nuclear plant wouldn't even be considered for a license in the urban district of Munich.

Öko-Institut's calculations show that an accident would involve the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of resi-dents living in the center of Munich alone. If the research reactor were to catch fire, leading to a release of radioactivity of even just one per cent of the radioactive material, that would be more radioactivity than former West Germany received from Chernobyl's fallout.

The reactor is anyhow five times as big as the old one, reported Mrs Wurzbacher, a physician working with the local group, Mothers Against Nuclear Power. It will thus produce much more radioactive waste. The plan calls for the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for fuel. Not only can it be used in nuclear weapons, but it will have to be imported from the US, involving long and complicated transportation procedures. Transports will be 1-3 times per year and will have to go through the city of Munich itself, thus exposing Munich residents to further danger. How the resulting waste is to be managed is still unclear.

In general, research reactors are subjected to less thorough safety analyses than nuclear power plants. The FRM-2 will be mantled with a one-meter thick wall which is, for example, not protected against airline crashes, a distinct possibility due to the nearby Munich airport.

The costs for the new construction are estimated at DM 525 million (approx. $US 330 million). A retrospective view of the costs which were assessed in 1988 at DM 360 million (225 mil-lion US$) shows that a steady rise in price has to be expected. Considering the Bavarian government's lack of money, it is worth questioning how such an immense sum of money can be spent on this little part of scientific investigation.

Altogether there is an impression that the Bavarian government plans the first reactor in Germany since the Chernobyl disaster not for scientific research but for the revival of the nuclear industry in Germany. As the Umweltinstitut München e.V. reported m October 1991, the German nuclear industry has high expectations from the operation of the new reactor: in effect, it would be a state-subsidized training reactor.

Those who wish to express their anger have the opportunity to do so: on 13 November 1993 a protest demonstration will be held in Garching near Munich (for further information, con-tact BUrger gegen Atomreaktor Garching at the address below).

Sources:

• Süddeutsche Zeitung (FRG), 24 Nov. 1992
• die tageszeztung (FGR), 13 Oct. 1993
• Umweltnachrichten (FRG), 14 & 19 Oct. and 24 May
• press release from Umweltinstitut MUncben e.V., 20 Oct. 1993

Contact:

• Christina Hacker, Umweltinstitut München e.V., Elsässerstralle 30, 81667 München, Germany; tel: +49-89480 29 71; fax: 89-448 60 05;
• Öko-Institute, Bunsenstraiße 14, 64279 Darmstadt, Germany; tel: + 49-615 1-81910;
• Local citizen's action committee: Burger gegen Atomreaktor Garching e.V., Danziger Str. 19, 85748 Garching, Germany; tel: + 49-89-3203021.

(November 5, 1993) Virtually unknown before 1990, the smuggling of Soviet-origin nuclear materials has increased to the extent of nearly one new case a day. German authorities are active in about half of all these cases, according to Interpol.

(400/1.3907) WISE Amsterdam - In 1990 the BKA (the domestic investigation agency in Germany) registered only four cases of smuggling nuclear material. In 1991 the number increased to 41, and in 1992 the BKA recorded 158 cases. Of those 158 cases, one-third involved fraud: people trying to find buyers for nuclear goods that they did not possess. Police were able to actually recover radioactive materials in less than 20% of the other cases. Laws in Germany are now being amended to close loopholes; for instances the possession of cesium-137 is not regulated by environmental laws.

In Western Europe the list of Eastern European- and former Soviet-origin nuclear materials includes osmium, niobium, scandium, californium, cobalt, deuterium, cesium, strontium, natural uranium in the form of U3O8 (yellowcake), milligrams of plutonium in smoke detectors, and pelletized UO2 enriched up to 5% U-235. Most of the cases involve small quantities of materials; a few involve lager amounts. For instance, in Lithuania criminal investigation agencies are now investigating reports that seven metric tons (!) of manufactured fuel from Ignalina is missing.

Laboratory analyses have traced low-enriched uranium found in Europe to two fuel fabrication factories in the former-USSR: Elektrostal near Moscow and the Ulbinski Chemical Combine in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan.

Several metric tons of UO2 (the form of uranium commonly used as fuel in nuclear power reactors) are believed to have been stolen from the two factories. Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy for the Russian Federation) has acknowledged thefts of material to safeguard officials but will not disclose details. Russian officials do say, however, that concern has been raised about the possibility that plutonium fuels also might have been stolen and diverted from a pilot-scale MOX-fabrication facility.

In the Netherlands approximately 60 cases have surfaced in 1992 in which people have been known to have offered nuclear materials. But in none of the cases was radioactive material actually involved.

Meanwhile, Turkish police seized five pounds of highly enriched uranium hidden in a plastic bag, reportedly bound for Iran. They arrested eight people, including four Iranian agents. The Iranians, arrested on 5 October in a hotel in Istanbul, led police to four Turkish businessmen who were also taken into custody. The bomb-grade material was believed to have been smuggled from Russia and could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

At Frauenfeld in Switzerland, seven people were arrested in mid-October when they tried to sell natural uranium. The quantity was not mentioned in the press reports.

On 28 October the Ukraine authorities made public that parts of two fuel rods had been stolen from the Chernobyl reactor: a total of 124 grams of uranium-235, enough for a chain reaction. They kept the disappearance secret for more than a week.

Sources:

• Nuclear Fuel (US), 13 Sept. 1993, p.3
• GreenNet (gn:nuc.facilities, 19 Oct. 1993)
• De Morgen (Belgium), 21 Oct. 1993
• Dutch 8 o'clock television news, 28 Oct. 1993
• Gelderlander (NL), 10 Apr. 1993
• Nuclear Words and Terms, revised and expanded edition, Oct. 1990.

(November 5, 1993) On 21 October the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine overruled its own October 1991 decision about closure of the remaining reactors at Chernobyl at the end of 1993.

(400/1.3904) WISE Amsterdam - At the urging of the government the parliament decided to continue operation of the three remaining reactors 'as long as the technical situation permits'. Reactor number 4 exploded, as we all know, in April 1986.

The official reason being given for the life-time extension is the expected electricity shortage this winter in the Ukraine. But that's not the entire truth: it's more a shortage of the hard currency needed to buy gas and oil from Russia. As the spokesperson from Chernobyl, Sergej Akulinin, put it, "90% of the electricity generated in Chernobyl is exported". That's US$ 300 million. The main contract for supply is with the Austrian Elektrizitätswirtschaft AG. Even the spokes-person for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans-Friedrich Meyer, had to agree this spring that the Ukraine produces much more electricity than their domestic demand.

Together with this decision the parliament also voted (221 in favor, 38 against) to remove a 3-year old construction moratorium at six nuclear reactor blocks at Rovno, Zaporoche, Chelmizki and South Ukraine.

The Green Party of Ukraine has sent a letter of appeal to the European Greens Federation as well as Green Parties and environmental and anti-nuclear groups all over Europe. "The lessons of 1986 are not accepted by Ukrainian authorities, but memory about victims and damage of the crash is alive for Greens, for citizens of European countries," says the appeal. The "Chernobyl problem is not internal only. It is in the field of interests of hundreds of millions of people all over the continent.

"So, the Greens' Party of Ukraine asks about support in anti-nuclear struggle. Support us with letters of protest, with a mailing and faxing campaign.

Europe is too little for RBMK reactors usage!"

Please send your letters or faxes to the following addresses:

Mr. Ivan Plushtch, Speaker of the Supreme Rada, 252021 Kiev-21, Grushevskyi str.5, UKRAINE; fax: + 7-044-2938968

and

Mr. Leonid Kravtchuk, President of Ukraine, 252024 Kiev-24, Bankova str.II, UKRAINE.

Sources:

• Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 22 Oct. 1993
• Wall Street Journal (US), 19 Oct. 1993
• Green Party of Ukraine, 25 Oct. 1993

Contact: Political Council of Green Party Ukraine, tel: + 7-044-293-6909; fax: 044-293-5236; e-mail: glas:ukreens.

(November 5, 1993) The first of two Canadian environmental assessment review panels examining the expansion of the uranium industry in northern Saskatchewan released its final report on 29 October.

(400/1.3895) WISE Amsterdam - The three projects reviewed by the joint Federal-Provincial panel are McClean Lake, Midwest Joint Venture, and the Dominique-Jamne extension at the Cluff Lake mine. Of the three, only the Cluff Lake extension was approved subject to the implementation of sixteen conditions. The report is a major victory for anti-nuclear groups in Saskatchewan, Canada and around the world. This panel's mandate also includes reviewing the Cigar Lake and McArthur River developments, but the Environmental Impact Statements for these proposals have not been completed.

Although the final report has been issued, pressure must still be applied to the federal and provincial governments to accept the recommendations in the report. According to the environmental assessment laws in Canada, panel recommendations are not legally binding, and therefore the province and/or the federal government have the power to reject the report. Letters urging both levels of government to accept this report are now needed.

This is a crucial time for the New Democratic Party (NDP) which currently holds power in Saskatchewan.
At its provincial convention in November of 1992, the party reversed its phaseout policy of nine years to adopt one of accepting the recommendations made by the review panel. The province will not make its decision until after 29 November to allow time for the public to comment on the report. The uranium issue has historically divided the NDP in Saskatchewan and it will be faced with the wrath of many long standing party members if it does not adhere to last years decision at convention.

Report Recommendations
The only project approved is the Dominique-Janine extension at Cluff Lake operated by COGEMA, wholly- owned by the French government.

Approval of the project is subject to sixteen conditions, some of which are:

1. agreement on a form of revenue sharing that is acceptable to the majority of the impacted communities;
2. provision of a financial guarantee to cover decommissioning and post- de-commissioning costs;
3. adoption of the exposure standards recommended in Publication 60 of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP-60) without allowing the collective dose to increase;
4. establishment of mechanisms for conducting an epidemiological study of the health of current and former workers at the Cluff Lake mine;
5. evaluation of alternative methods of tailings disposal, with the goal of closing down the present tailings management facility as soon as possible.

The panel recommended that the McClean Lake project be delayed for at least five years to allow time to obtain more experience with previous surround tailings management, acquire comprehensive community health in-formation, maximize employment opportunities to the people of northern Saskatchewan through education and training, discuss further the larger issues and assess cumulative biophysical and socio-economic impacts.

 

The Inter-Church Uranium Committee would like to express deep gratitude for support and encouragement we have received from the international community. The fight here is not over, but we have taken a big step forward. We look forward to continued connections and further victories!!!