USA

An analysis released on October 22 shows that if the FitzPatrick nuclear reactor in New York is shut down, the plant's entire output could be replaced with energy efficiency retrofits and wind power for less money, leaving extra funds free to lower electricity rates or develop even more renewables to replace fossil fuels.¹

The analysis is timely: Entergy announced on November 2 that the loss-making reactor will be shut down in late 2016 or early 2017.²

The key findings of the White Paper, co-authored by Alliance for a Green Economy (AGREE) and the Nuclear Information & Resources Service (NIRS), include:

• FitzPatrick's electricity generation could be replaced with energy efficiency and wind at less than the current cost of electricity from the nuclear plant.
• Diverting all of FitzPatrick's revenue to clean energy could result in additional reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, equivalent to a 264 MW coal plant or 330 MW combined cycle natural gas plant.
• Replacing FitzPatrick with efficiency and wind could create more than twice the number of jobs (1400) currently provided by Entergy at FitzPatrick (600).
• Municipalities and workers affected by FitzPatrick's closure could be supported through the economic transition for a lower cost than subsidizing FitzPatrick, if the state proactively negotiates with Entergy for a responsible and immediate decommissioning.

NIRS Executive Director Tim Judson said: "Aging reactors like FitzPatrick are becoming uneconomical and uncompetitive, even as they are becoming less safe and reliable. Raising costs on electricity customers to keep FitzPatrick from closing would be enormously expensive, and could cause negative economic impacts throughout the region. Our analysis shows FitzPatrick can be replaced with renewable energy and efficiency, at a lower cost than current electricity prices, without subsidies. And it doesn't need to stop there. More fossil fuel and nuclear power plants could be replaced the same way. New York has an enormous opportunity to become a leader in the clean energy economy, build new industries, and create employment both in Oswego and throughout the upstate region."

Local elected officials and supporters of FitzPatrick have been rallying to try to save FitzPatrick. In letters to the Governor and to the Public Service Commission, they are calling for a subsidy like the one proposed for the Ginna reactor in neighboring Wayne County (which is currently estimated at about US$70 million a year), or a change to market rules to favor nuclear power over other energy sources. Either way, consumers would likely foot the bill if the state were to decide to subsidize the reactor. AGREE and NIRS conservatively predict that subsidy could cost National Grid customers at least US$40 million a year, totaling at least US$760 million if FitzPatrick operated that way until 2034, when its operating license expires.

A petition to shut FitzPatrick, pursue renewables, and provide for a just transition for workers and local communities has been launched by AGREE and can be found at www.beyondFitzPatrick.org.

Pilgrim reactor in Massachusetts

On October 13, Entergy announced that the Pilgrim reactor in Massachusetts − which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had downgraded to one of the worst performing reactors in the country − will close in or before 2019.

Michael Mariotte from NIRS wrote on the safeenergy.org blog:³

"A generation or so ago, New England was one of the most nuclear-dependent regions in the nation. If one defines New England as including New York, then that relatively small corner of the U.S. map was home to 15 commercial nuclear reactors 25 years ago − only the state of Illinois had a more concentrated nuclear presence; regionally, no other area is even close to that concentration on a square-mile basis.

"Today, New England is leading the nation away from nuclear power, and toward the energy efficient, renewables-powered system of the 21st century. The news from Entergy that it will close its Pilgrim reactor by mid-2019 – and probably a whole lot sooner – is just the latest manifestation of that process, and it's a process that is accelerating.

"It is probably not a coincidence that for the past 25 years, New England has been home to the most active anti-nuclear movement in the U.S. The shutdowns started with Yankee Rowe in 1992, which wanted to become the first reactor in the U.S. to receive a 20-year license extension and instead closed for good when Citizens Awareness Network proved it was too unsafe to operate. Then came Millstone-1, followed by Connecticut Yankee and Maine Yankee in 1996. Last year, it was Vermont Yankee that ended operations.

"In Pilgrim's case, Entergy admits it is losing US$10−40 million (and think the higher figure) per year just trying to run that obsolete Fukushima-clone reactor. And actually trying to bring Pilgrim up to basic Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety standards, which it does not meet − the NRC has rated Pilgrim and two other Entergy reactors in Arkansas as the worst in the nation − would cost many millions more. So for Entergy, the decision was easy: cut its losses now, and avoid spending money to make the safety improvements."

References:

1. AGREE and NIRS, 22 Oct 2015, 'Replacing FitzPatrick: How the Closure of a Nuclear Reactor can Reduce Greenhouse Gasses and Radioactive Waste, while Creating Jobs and Supporting the Local Community', www.nirs.org/neconomics/replacingthefitzpatricknuclearreactor.pdf

2. www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Entergy-to-retire-FitzPatrick-plant-211157....

3. Michael Mariotte, 13 Oct 2015, http://safeenergy.org/2015/10/13/pilgrims-closure-and-whats-next-for-new...

In the last issue of the Nuclear Monitor we reported on the smoldering underground fire that has come within 350−400 metres of a radioactive waste dump, the West Lake Landfill, in the U.S. state of Missouri. The site has been in the news again with an above-ground brush fire on October 24, started by a faulty switch inside the landfill's perimeter. The fire was doused before it reached the area containing radioactive waste. The EPA sent a letter reprimanding site operator Republic Services for the incident.¹

On October 26, about 300 local residents attended a 'Community Advisory Group' meeting to discuss the West Lake Landfill smoldering fire (which has been burning since 2010) and the October 24 fire. Many are sceptical about the reassurances provided by government and company representatives. "I'm scared," said Darlene Hartman, a life-long resident. "You try to eat healthy, you try to be good citizens. And you don't know who to trust."²

Nevada fire

On October 18, a fire broke out at a radioactive waste dump in southern Nevada. The fire followed flash flooding that shut down the town's escape routes: U.S. 95 and Highway 373. County officials and law enforcement agencies declared an emergency. The site, operated by U.S. Ecology, is home to 22 low-level radioactive waste storage trenches that range in size from shallow holes to chasms hundreds of feet deep and wide as football fields.³

Associated Press reported on October 25:⁴

"The operator of a closed radioactive waste dump that caught fire in southern Nevada last weekend was troubled over the years by leaky shipments and oversight so lax that employees took contaminated tools and building materials home, according to state and federal records.

"A soundless 40-second video turned over by the firm, U.S. Ecology, to state officials showed bursts of white smoke and dirt flying from several explosions on 18 October from the dump in the brown desert, about 110 miles north-west of Las Vegas.

"In the 1970s, the company had its license suspended for mishandling shipments – about the same time state officials say the material that exploded and burned last weekend was accepted and buried.

"Nevada now has ownership and oversight of the property, which opened in 1962 near Beatty as the nation's first federally licensed low-level radioactive waste dump. It closed in 1992. State officials said this week they did not immediately know what blew up.

"A state fire inspector, Martin Azevedo, surveyed the site on Wednesday. His report, obtained on Friday by the Associated Press, described moisture in the pit and "heavily corroded" 55-gallon drums in and around the 20ft-by-30ft crater. Debris from the blast spread 190ft. Two drums were found outside the fence line. ...

"In 1979, the then Nevada governor Robert List ordered the Beatty low-level waste facility shut down and launched an investigation after a radioactive cargo fire on a truck parked on U.S. Highway 95, at the facility gate.

"The fire came three years after employees were dismissed for stealing radioactive building materials, tools and even a portable cement mixer, according to a 1994 report prepared by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

"Operations at Beatty resumed "only after assurance was given by the federal government that the rules governing shipments … would be enforced," according to the Idaho lab report.

"List expressed doubt that anyone will ever know what is really underground at the site. 'Good luck with that," he said. "What we found when we did our investigation was they had very, very skimpy records about what was there.'"

The Nevada Department of Public Safety said in an October 19 statement that high altitude and intermediate altitude testing resulted in negative readings for radiation.
The Department said it would initiate an investigation to determine the cause of the fire.⁵

WIPP fire

The underground chemical explosion at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Nevada on 14 February 2014 has generated huge public and media interest ... so much so that a fire that occurred nine days earlier has been all but forgotten.⁶ A truck hauling salt caught fire on 5 February 2014. The fire consumed the driver's compartment and the truck's large front tires. Six workers were treated at the Carlsbad hospital for smoke inhalation, another seven were treated at the site, and 86 workers were evacuated.

A March 2014 report by the Department of Energy's Accident Investigation Board blamed Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP), the contractor that operates the WIPP site. The Accident Investigation Board said the root cause of the fire was NWP's "failure to adequately recognize and mitigate the hazard regarding a fire in the underground. This includes recognition and removal of the buildup of combustibles through inspections, and periodic preventative maintenance, e.g., cleaning and the decision to deactivate the automatic onboard fire suppression system."⁷

In 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent advisory board, reported that WIPP "does not adequately address the fire hazards and risks associated with underground operations."⁸

Spent fuel pools and reactors

Fire could result in a catastrophic accident if it compromised spent nuclear fuel pools. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff calculated that if even a small fraction of the inventory of a Peach Bottom reactor pool were released to the environment, an average area of 9,400 square miles (24,300 square kilometers) would be rendered uninhabitable, and that 4.1 million people would be displaced over the long-term.⁹

Reactors are also at risk. The Union of Concerned Scientists noted in a 2013 paper: "Fire poses significant risk to nuclear power plant safety. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimates that the risk of reactor meltdown from fire hazards is roughly equal to the meltdown risk from all other hazards combined − even assuming that plants comply with fire protection regulations, which many do not. Because of this risk, the NRC established a set of fire safety regulations for nuclear plants in 1980 and an alternate set in 2004. However, today − more than 30 years after those regulations went into effect − nearly half of U.S. operating nuclear reactors do not comply with either set of regulations.¹⁰

A report found that there were around 100 fire incidents at nuclear sites in France in 2011 − reactors, reprocessing plants and other nuclear sites. The dangers must be "taken very seriously", said Jean-Christophe Niel, managing director of national nuclear safety regulator ASN. About 10 of the 100 fires were considered significant in terms of nuclear safety, Niel said.¹¹

A 2013 report by the U.S. Department of Energy details many of the interconnections between climate change and energy. It noted that power lines, transformers and electricity distribution systems face increasing risks of physical damage from wildfires that are growing more frequent and intense.¹²

Peaceful nuclear explosions

The nexus between fire and nukes is an altogether unhappy one. If there is an exception, it is this unlikely yarn about 'peaceful nuclear explosions' from the science and culture blog io9:¹³

"All in all, nuclear civil projects were a massive mistake. There was one use, though, that seemed to work. The Soviet Union tried it several times, and actually had some success: it turns out nuclear bombs are great ways to put out fires. That's not as unimpressive as it sounds! Underground fuel reserves are vast stores of combustible material that cannot be reached by human firefighters, but can quite merrily burn. Coal, peat, and gas fires can burn for decades. Centralia, Pennsylvania had a coal seam that caught fire in 1962 and is still burning. The Urtabulak gas field caught fire in 1963. It burned steadily for three years. In 1966, the Soviet Union decided to do something about that.

"The gas fire was ventilated by the holes that had been drilled to harvest the gas; if the holes could all be sealed shut, the fire would go out. Naturally, no one could go into a vast gas fire to shovel earth into a deep hole. Geologists and physicists calculated that a nuclear explosion equal to about 30 kilotons of TNT could seal shut every hole within about 50 meters. The rock would basically melt over the fire. In the fall of 1966, a special nuclear bomb was detonated in one of the holes, and fire was out in 23 seconds.

"But if it's not one thing, it's another. Within a few months of that fire going out, a new fire, in another gas field, erupted. In 1968, the Soviets dropped a bomb into that one. This took longer. For a few days, rock and other earth flowed into the holes, but eventually it worked. The fire went out. In 1972, another well was sealed off after it caught fire. The last known attempt at sealing a gas fire with a nuclear weapon was done in 1981, and it did not work out. The scientists couldn't get accurate data on the location of the vents in the well. The bomb went off, but the well never entirely sealed shut."

Finally, if there is a nukes-and-fire story more bizarre than the use of 'peaceful nuclear explosions' to put out underground gas fires, it involves U.S. shipyard worker Casey James Fury, who in May 2012 was having problems with his ex-girlfriend and wanted to leave work early. So, naturally, he set fire to a nuclear submarine. The USS Miami sustained US$450 million damage in the blaze, and Fury was given a 17-year jail sentence.¹⁴

References:

1. www.cbsnews.com/news/st-louis-community-fed-up-over-dangerous-landfills-...

http://fox2now.com/2015/10/24/brush-fire-at-west-lake-landfill-sparks-co...

www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_047a3e46-7b6d-11e5-8519-f751...

2. http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/anger-and-frustration-bridgeton-comm...

3. Kyle Roerink, 20 Oct 2015, 'Beatty residents call for transparency after nuclear fire', http://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/oct/20/beatty-residents-call-for-transp...

4. Associated Press, 25 Oct 2015, 'Radioactive waste dump fire reveals Nevada site's troubled past', www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/25/radioactive-waste-dump-fire-reve...

5. Nevada Department of Public Safety, 19 Oct 2015, 'Media Release: Update on the U.S. Ecology Industrial Fire in Nye County', dps.nv.gov/media/PR/2015/Update_on_the_U_S__Ecology_Industrial_Fire_in_Nye_County/

6 June 2014, 'Fire and leaks at the world's only deep geological waste repository', Nuclear Monitor #787, www.wiseinternational.org/node/4245

7. http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f11/Final%20WIPP%20Undergroun...

8. www.dnfsb.gov/board-activities/reports/staff-issue-reports/fire-protecti...

9. www.nirs.org/radwaste/atreactorstorage/fuelstoragepetition21314.pdf

10. Union of Concerned Scientists, June 2013, 'NRC's Failure to Enforce

Reactor Fire Regulations', www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/ucs-nrc-fire-regulations-5...

11. Platts, 28 Aug 2013, 'French nuclear power plants must improve fire safety measures: regulator', www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/london/french-nuclear-power-pl...

12. U.S. Department of Energy, July 2013, 'U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather', http://energy.gov/downloads/us-energy-sector-vulnerabilities-climate-cha...

13. Esther Inglis-Arkell, 27 March 2015, 'How To Fight Fire With Nuclear Bombs', http://io9.com/how-to-fight-fire-with-nuclear-bombs-1694002958

14. Daily Mail, 8 Aug 2013, 'Nuclear submarine set alight by worker who wanted to go home early will be scrapped because of military budget cuts', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2386909/Nuclear-submarine-USS-Miami-set...

A radioactive waste dump in Missouri, USA, is under threat from an underground fire. The fire at Bridgeton Landfill, near St. Louis, is as close as 350−400 metres from the West Lake Landfill. The West Lake facility was contaminated with radioactive waste from uranium processing. The waste was illegally dumped in 1973 and includes material that dates back to the Manhattan Project.^1,2

The cause of the fire is unknown. It has been burning since 2010. The issue has received media attention recently because of the release of a St Louis County emergency plan.³

The emergency plan states that if the underground fire reaches the waste, "there is a potential for radioactive fallout to be released in the smoke plume and spread throughout the region." The plan calls for evacuations and the development of emergency shelters, both in St. Louis County and neighbouring St. Charles County.

Last month, Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster said he was troubled by new reports about the site. One found radiological contamination in trees outside the landfill's perimeter. Another showed evidence that the fire has moved past two rows of interceptor wells and closer to the radioactive waste. Koster said the reports were evidence that Republic Services, operator of both the Bridgeton Landfill and the West Lake Landfill, "does not have this site under control."⁴

Four school districts near the radioactive West Lake Landfill recently sent letters to parents explaining their plans for a potential emergency at the site. "We remain frustrated by the situation at the landfill," wrote Mike Fulton, superintendent of the Pattonville School District. Rhonda Marsala, a local who has two children at nearby schools, said: "We prepare our kids for tornadoes, fire drills, intruder alerts, but how do you prepare them for something like this? The fact that these young children know about it, and they have anxiety over it, it's very unfair to them."⁵

The state of Missouri is taking legal action against Republic Services, initiated in 2013, alleging negligent management and violation of state environmental laws. The suit is set for trial in March 2016.⁴

Missouri Coalition for the Environment wants the radioactive waste removed, saying that the EPA's 2008 decision to "cap and leave" means the wastes will remain a constant threat to drinking water, public health, and the environment.⁶

The 'Just Moms St Louis' group wants responsibility for the site passed from the EPA to the US Army Corps of Engineers and for it to be managed under its 'Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program'.⁷ That call has also been made by St. Louis-area members of Congress and both of Missouri's U.S. senators.²

Underground smouldering is common, especially in abandoned coal mines. At least 98 underground mine fires in nine states were burning in 2013, according to the U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement. Perhaps the most notorious was the fire that began in 1962 and burned near and beneath the town of Centralia, Pennsylvania, for more than 50 years. Only a few people remain in a town that once had 1,000 residents.¹

References:

1. 10 Oct 2015, 'Underground fire outside St. Louis has burned since 2010, nears nuclear waste dump', www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-st-louis-underground-...

2. Editorial Board, 10 Oct 2015, 'Editorial: Help residents near West Lake and Bridgeton landfills breathe easy', www.stltoday.com/news/editorial-help-residents-near-west-lake-and-bridge...

3. St Louis County, Oct 2014, West Lake Landfill Shelter in Place / Evacuation Plan, https://cbsstlouis.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/3062_001.pdf

See also Kevin Killeen, 5 Oct 2015, 'St. Louis County Releases Disaster Plan for West Lake Landfill', http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2015/10/05/st-louis-county-releases-disaster...

4. Attorney General's Office, 3 Sept 2015, 'AG Koster releases new expert reports concluding radiation and other pollutants have migrated off-site at Bridgeton Landfill', www.ago.mo.gov/home/ag-koster-releases-new-expert-reports-concluding-rad...

5. Blythe Bernhard, Oct 2015, 'School districts prepare for West Lake Landfill emergency', www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/school-districts-prepare-for-west-lake...

6. http://moenvironment.org/program-areas/radioactive-landfill-fire-risks

7. www.stlradwastelegacy.com/our-missio/

More information:

Missouri Coalition for the Environment: http://moenvironment.org/program-areas/radioactive-landfill-fire-risks

Just Moms St Louis: www.stlradwastelegacy.com/

EPA: www3.epa.gov/region07/cleanup/west_lake_landfill/index.htm

It's no great revelation to say that the mainstream media, fractured though it may be these days, holds great power. It's not direct power; the media can't make actual decisions. Rather, the media grabs a theme − a meme if you want − and holds on to it, and repeats it, and provides slight twists to it so it can be repeated again, until it becomes accepted wisdom. While the media, especially the mainstream media, is often behind the curve, behind reality, once it catches up and snares and spreads that meme, it doesn't take long for it to establish itself. And once a concept becomes accepted wisdom, then the actual decisions tend to follow in unison. As a group, politicians rarely stray far from accepted wisdom.

For many years, from the 1950s through the '70s, the accepted wisdom was that nuclear power was safe, advanced, and a great asset to society. Then reality crashed the party with Three Mile Island and the nation's most trusted person Walter Cronkite's terrifying (although incorrect) statement that radiation was coming through the walls of the containment building, and the accepted wisdom began to turn away from nuclear power; Chernobyl was too distant in both distance and political structure to end the industry entirely, but it was icing on the cake. And thus nuclear power began a period of decline that reached a nadir in 2000 when there was not a single reactor under construction anywhere in the western world.

But then, the media − which loves a man bites dog story − latched onto the idea pitched by nuclear PR flacks and backed by a couple dozen (in retrospect, mostly bogus) construction application licenses, that a nuclear "renaissance" was in full swing. Once again, nuclear was not only acceptable, it was a preferred energy source, free of carbon emissions. That notion − and forced payment from ratepayers by Public Service Commissions more supportive of industry than those same ratepayers − was enough to get the construction cranes set up at Vogtle and Summer at least. Limited reactor construction also resumed in Europe, and China joined the pack too.

Reality showed its cruel face again, however, as costs for those reactors spiraled upward and construction schedules indicated that for each month of construction, the utilities gained nothing − they were still the same amount of months away from completion. Adding to the crush of the "renaissance" was Fukushima, which brought the legitimate fears of the nuclear age to a new generation.

While the "renaissance" fizzled, at least the industry could take comfort in the fact that it could continue to rely on, and make money from, its large number of paid-off reactors. Except as those reactors aged and as they confronted new costs from required Fukushima-related upgrades (although those have been extremely modest, especially in the U.S.), their operating and maintenance costs increased. Even more importantly, the costs of competing electricity generation sources plummeted at the same time. The result was an ever-increasing number of existing reactors are either now losing money or on the verge of doing so.

And the mainstream media has finally picked up on that reality: that it's not just that nuclear reactors have safety issues and radioactive waste problems and the like but that nuclear power can no longer compete with the alternatives. Moreover, the changes in energy costs that cause that reality are not only making nuclear power obsolete, they are making the entire utility system and its reliance on baseload power obsolete. And the more that reality is repeated and becomes accepted wisdom, the more real decisions reflect that.

Thus, you get the EPA's Clean Power Plan dropping its intent to prop up existing reactors. The EPA's Gina McCarthy may still be giving lip service to the nuclear industry¹, but where it counted the EPA did what clean energy advocates wanted, not the nuclear industry.

That's one example of a real decision.

So was the Washington DC Public Service Commission's scuttling of the proposed Exelon takeover of Pepco. Behind that decision was sincere concern both about Exelon's reliance on a failing fleet of nuclear reactors and its hostility to renewables. Exelon is now trying to sweeten the deal² but what it doesn't seem to understand is that its roadblock is Exelon itself − perhaps the epitome of the utility of the past.

Recently there have been a plethora of articles picking up the same theme: alternatives to nuclear are cheaper than existing reactors, and that means big changes ahead for the entire utility industry.

Consider this passage from an article in U.S. News, once the most staid and Republican of the three big weekly news-magazines: "Cheap natural gas, together with plummeting prices for wind and solar, has upended the energy sector – not only making nuclear plants' huge upfront costs, endless regulatory approvals and years-long construction especially prohibitive, but undercutting the very idea of a centralized power system."³

That's exactly the kind of sentence that sparks nightmares in utility suites, especially those most dependent on nuclear and coal power.

The previous accepted wisdom, that if nothing else nuclear reactors are "carbon-free" or nearly so, and that closing them would mean giving up on fighting climate change, is also beginning to bow to reality. Because while cheap and dirty gas is indeed a competitor today, in the longer run (and not much longer), the real competition is clean renewables.

A piece from Politico − about as mainstream as it gets − focused on the perspective of a UBS analyst on Entergy's troubled Fitzpatrick and Ginna reactors. Consider how this article ended:

"The loss of the Ginna plant alone could drive the state's air emissions up 7 percent, that earlier analysis found. Losing another plant, or possibly two, will make it harder to meet tough new federal pollution standards. However, to offset the loss of New York's nuclear facilities, the state could place increasing emphasis on growing the renewable industry. 'If retirements move forward as contemplated, we see a real corresponding uplift to the renewable industry as this becomes the growing source of 'plugging' for any further holes in meeting prospective carbon targets,' he wrote."⁴

In other words, we don't need to worry that carbon reduction goals can't be met if reactors like Ginna close. Renewables will take their place, and will do so quickly. Indeed, the shutdown of reactors actually opens up the market for a deluge of new renewables.

There were other articles with a similar bent − one from Motley Fool, for example. The mainstream media have finally caught on. It's not just GreenWorld and a few other clean energy blogs anymore. Nuclear power can't compete. Moreover, there is no downside to that. In fact, it's all upside. Closing reactors will hasten the clean energy future and the transformation of electric utilities generally.

The long-sought phase-out of nuclear power began in 2013. It's taken a short break since then, but it's about to resume (indeed it has resumed with Entergy's October 13 announcement that the single-reactor Pilgrim plant in Massachusetts will close by mid-2019). Over the next 18 months or so, state legislatures and regulatory bodies will be making decisions about bailing out a host of troubled reactors. But for the nuclear industry, those decisions are coming too late. Their timing couldn't be much worse. It's not just that bailing out big baseload reactors (and old coal plants for that matter) no longer makes economic sense, it's that the very existence of those obsolete reactors stands in the way of clean energy expansion. Understanding that, and for politicians knowing that it is accepted wisdom, makes the decisions very easy.

References:

1. www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/EPA-Chief-Reiterates-Clean-Pow...

2. www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2015/09/25/exelon-to-refile-bid-to-ac...

3. www.usnews.com/news/special-reports/the-manhattan-project/articles/2015/...

4. www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2015/09/8577897/analyst-tighter-em...

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has abruptly ended a study¹ that it had commissioned from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that was purportedly being set up to determine whether cancer rates near nuclear reactors are higher than elsewhere and thus, supposedly, whether there is reason to be concerned about routine reactor operation.

Well, we actually already know the answer to that question. Studies from Europe show that cancer rates, especially among children, are definitely higher near nuclear power facilities.² The biggest culprit appears to be refueling of reactors − an operation necessary every 12-18 months depending on the particular reactor's cycle. When the top is taken off the reactor vessel to allow access to the core, and extraordinarily radioactive fuel rods are taken out of the core and moved to fuel pools, extremely high levels of radiation are freed from the reactor vessel. And some of that radiation does manage to get out into the environment.

Reactor containments are robust buildings, but they're not as solid as perhaps they look. There are large numbers of penetrations − places where pipes and electrical wires come in and out of the building − that provide a much easier escape route for radiation than through several feet of concrete. That radiation is, of course, toxic. And the European studies show that it kills.

Reaction to the NRC's announcement, even among clean energy groups, has been widely varied. Beyond Nuclear was outraged. The Radiation and Public Health Project said it was a good thing, since any study by the NRC would be set up to show nothing.

And indeed, the NRC certainly prefers studies designed to show nothing. With the cancellation of the NAS study, the NRC says it is back to relying on a 1990 study that was deliberately designed to show nothing. For instance, that study looked only at cancer fatalities, not incidence, thus potentially downplaying real health effects.

That study also looked at county-wide data, rather than focusing on areas closest to the reactor and areas where the predominant winds blow. And it counted the cancers based on where they were treated, rather than where they occurred. All of which was, deliberately I'd argue, intended to bury actual effects under many layers of statistical white noise and static.

The question is whether the new study would have been any better. And the involvement of NAS does lead to some skepticism in that regard. While NAS' BEIR-VII study on radiation did confirm, as radiation researchers had long averred, that there is no "safe" level of radiation exposure, the nuclear industry has been able to stack other NAS panels on nuclear issues with its own cherry-picked apologists. And there was little evidence, despite the efforts of Beyond Nuclear and others to help choose participants and define study parameters, that this study was going to be set up − as the European studies were to a larger degree − to get past statistical noise and find anything if it's there.

And, if it were, it seemed likely to us that the NRC would either a) disavow it or b) end it before completion. Seriously, did anyone really think the NRC would pay for and release a study showing health effects from nuclear power?

Since b) is exactly what happened, however, it's hard not to suspect that even the preliminary results (the study had completed Phase I of three phases) were so explosive that the NRC felt it had to end the study before it really even got off the ground.

That suspicion is only amplified by the NRC's pathetic rationale for ending the study: that it was too expensive and would take too long.

Too expensive? It would have cost only US$8 million to complete Phase 2 of the study³, which was to entail a detailed examination of the areas around seven reactor sites. Phase 3, involving all of the remaining 50 or so sites, would have cost about US$60 million and taken 8-10 years. So, that's US$6 million/year for an agency with a budget of about US$1 billion.

Too expensive? That excuse is simply laughable. And too long? Well, yes, 8-10 years for full completion is a long time. On the other hand, it's been 25 years since the last, hysterically-deficient study; another few years doesn't seem like such a terrible burden, especially since it could have been conducted faster with more money spent per year. Even US$12 million/year doesn't seem far-fetched considering the NRC's budget. Moreover, the seven-site Phase 2 of the study might have done the job on its own. Especially to answer a question that is rather fundamental: are the facilities the NRC is spending that US$1 billion/year regulating killing Americans?

Even though we already know the answer to the question; which, again, is yes, these facilities are killing Americans. We know that because of European studies that were properly conducted. The problem, and the real reason the NRC killed the study, is that most Americans − including their elected officials − don't know that the question already has been answered affirmatively. European studies of cancer around nuclear power plants don't get much media attention in the U.S. But a U.S. study, paid for by a U.S. government agency and conducted by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences? A study like that, that found anything at all, would be big news.

That would be news too big for the NRC to handle. So the agency once again chose the interests of its real constituents − nuclear power utilities − above the interests of the public it is supposed to serve. The NRC felt that this time it couldn't take the chance that it could ensure the study would be designed intentionally to find nothing, and thus − afraid the study might find something − the NRC decided some bad publicity now (as in an excellent editorial⁴ from the Asbury Park Press) over killing the study beat a lot of potentially worse publicity later if the public learned that yes, they and their children are in danger of dying because they live near nuclear facilities.

After all, the public outcry from that kind of publicity might lead to the NRC quickly having nothing left to regulate.

Still, it has to be said that no study at all would be preferable to the kind of study the NRC wanted. Another deliberately-designed whitewash would be even worse than the status quo. The danger is that if the backlash now causes the NRC to reconsider, but demand its own changes to the parameters, whitewash is exactly what we'd get. Caveat emptor: be careful what you ask for. Especially from an agency, like the NRC, that has powerful reasons not to uncover the truth.

References:

1. www.ocregister.com/articles/nuclear-682289-nrc-cancer.html

2. http://safeenergy.org/2015/07/02/powerful-new-study-shows-radiogenic-risks/

3. http://nas-sites.org/cancerriskstudy/analysis-of-cancer-risks-in-populat...

4. www.app.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/09/09/editorial-let-nrc-halt-c...

A non-existent reactor type called the 'integral fast reactor' (IFR) has some prominent champions, including climate scientist James Hansen. Supporters are beguiled by the prospect of nuclear waste and weapons-usable material being used as fuel to generate low-carbon power − helping to address three problems at once.

The theoretical attractiveness fades away when the real-world history of fast reactors is considered: they have proven to be accident-prone, expensive white elephants, and they have contributed to weapons proliferation.

Both the US and the UK governments have been considering building IFRs. The primary purpose in both countries would be to provide a degree of proliferation resistance to stockpiles of separated plutonium. For Hansen and other IFR supporters, the significance of the US and UK proposals is that the construction of IFRs in those countries could kick-start a much greater worldwide deployment.

However, it seems increasingly unlikely that IFRs will be built in the US or the UK ... and no other country is seriously considering building them.

The latest report on US plutonium disposition options signals a shift away from using mixed uranium/plutonium (MOX) fuel in favor of disposal − and it didn't consider IFRs to be worthy of detailed consideration. The study − commissioned by the Department of Energy (DoE) and produced by a 'Red Team' of experts from US nuclear laboratories, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the commercial nuclear power industry − was leaked to the Union of Concerned Scientists and has been posted on the UCS website.^1,2

The plutonium in question is 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium from the US nuclear weapons program (with Russia having also agreed to remove the same amount of plutonium from its military stockpile). The partially built MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina has proven to be an expensive white elephant. The DoE Red Team report details the "difficult, downward spiraling circumstances" that have plagued the MOX program and contributed to the delays and massive cost overruns at the MOX facility.

The UCS notes that the estimated life-cycle cost of the MOX facility has ballooned from US$1.6 billion (€1.43b) to more than US$30 billion (€26.9b), and the DoE report notes that the cost of the MOX approach for plutonium disposition has "increased dramatically".

The World Nuclear Association has crunched the numbers: "Despite being 60% built, the MOX plant still needs some 15 years of construction work, said the leaked report, and then about three years of commissioning. Once in operation the plant would work through the plutonium over about 10 years with this 28-year program to cost $700-800 million per year − a total of $19.6−22.4 billion on top of what has already been spent."³

The DoE Red Team report states that it may not be possible to get sufficient reactors to use MOX fuel to make the approach viable − and that it may struggle get utilities to use MOX fuel even if it is given away for free (!) and even in markets where additional costs (e.g. licensing costs to enable the use of MOX fuel) can be passed directly on to consumers.

The DoE Red Team report promotes a 'Dilute and Dispose' option − downblending or diluting plutonium with adulterating material and then disposing of it. The DoE has already used that method to dispose of several tons of plutonium. DoE proposes disposal of the 34 metric tons of downblended plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.

WIPP would also be required if the MOX approach is pursued. WIPP has been closed since a February 2014 underground chemical explosion but the Red Team anticipates that it will re-open in the coming years and could be available for downblended waste (or MOX waste).

Don Hancock from the Albuquerque-based Southwest Information and Research Center opposes the MOX project but is sceptical about disposal at WIPP, saying the DoE should review other options including storing the plutonium at the Savannah River Site or the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, where thousands of plutonium pits are already warehoused. Hancock said: "The Red Team or the Union of Concerned Scientists may be confident that WIPP will reopen in a few years, but I don't see any real basis for that. Going from one bad idea to another bad idea is not the solution to this problem."⁴

Integral fast reactors

IFRs − also called PRISM or Advanced Disposition Reactors (ADR) − have been considered for plutonium disposition in the US. The ADR concept is similar to General Electric Hitachi's PRISM according to the DoE.

Last year a DoE Working Group concluded that the ADR approach would be more than twice as expensive as all the other options under consideration for plutonium disposition; that it would take 18 years to construct an ADR and associated facilities; and that the ADR option is associated with "significant technical risk".⁵

The 2014 DoE Working Group report stated:

"Irradiation of plutonium fuel in fast reactors ... faces two major technical challenges: the first involves the design, construction, start-up, and licensing of a multi-billion dollar prototype modular, pool-type advanced fast-spectrum burner reactor; and the second involves the design and construction of the metal fuel fabrication in an existing facility. As with any initial design and construction of a first-of-a-kind prototype, significant challenges are endemic to the endeavor, however DoE has thirty years of experience with metal fuel fabrication and irradiation. The metal fuel fabrication facility challenges include: scale-up of the metal fuel fabrication process that has been operated only at a pilot scale, and performing modifications to an existing, aging, secure facility ... Potential new problems also may arise during the engineering and procurement of the fuel fabrication process to meet NRC's stringent Quality Assurance requirements for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."

In short, the ADR option is associated with "significant technical risk" according to the 2014 DoE report, and metal fuel fabrication faces "significant technical challenges" and has only been operated at the pilot scale.

If the August 2015 DoE Red Team report is any guide, the IFR/ADR option is dead and buried in the US. The Red Team didn't even consider IFR/ADR worthy of detailed consideration:¹

"The ADR option involves a capital investment similar in magnitude to the MFFF [Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility] but with all of the risks associated with first of-a kind new reactor construction (e.g., liquid metal fast reactor), and this complex nuclear facility construction has not even been proposed yet for a Critical Decision (CD)-0. Choosing the ADR option would be akin to choosing to do the MOX approach all over again, but without a directly relevant and easily accessible reference facility/operation (such as exists for MOX in France) to provide a leg up on experience and design. Consequently, the remainder of this Red Team report focuses exclusively on the MOX approach and the Dilute and Dispose option, and enhancements thereof."

The DoE Red Team report states that the IFR/ADR option has "large uncertainties in siting, licensing, cost, technology demonstration, and other factors". It states that the IFR/ADR option "could become more viable in the future" if fast reactors were to become part of the overall U.S. nuclear energy strategy.

IFR/PRISM/ADR advocates argued in 2011 that the first PRISM could be built in the US by 2016.⁶ However the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to receive a licensing submission from General Electric Hitachi and there are no concrete plans for PRISMs in the US let alone any concrete pours.

IFRs in the UK?

The UK government is also considering building IFRs for plutonium disposition. Specifically, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) is promoting 'Power Reactor Innovative Small Module' (PRISM) fast reactors.⁷

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) released a position paper in January 2014 outlining potential options for future management of separated plutonium stockpiles.⁸ The NDA report stated that reuse in Candu reactors "remains a credible option", that MOX is a "credible and technically mature option", while PRISM "should also be considered credible, although further investigation may change this view."

The NDA report stated that the facilities required by the PRISM approach have not been industrially demonstrated, so further development work needs to be undertaken with the cost and time to complete this work yet to be defined in detail. GEH estimates that licensing these first of a kind PRISM reactors would take around six years. GEH envisages first irradiation (following development, licensing and construction) in 14−18 years but the NDA considers that timeframe "ambitious considering delivery performance norms currently seen in the UK and European nuclear landscape".

As in the US, the likelihood of IFR/ADR/PRISM reactors being built in the UK seems to be diminishing. An August 2015 report states that the Canadian Candu option seems to be emerging as a favorite for plutonium disposition in the UK, and that GEH is 'hedging its bets' by working with Candu Energy to develop the Candu approach.^9,10

References:

1. Thom Mason et al., 13 August 2015, 'Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team', for the US Department of Energy, www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/final-pu-disposition-r...

2. UCS, 20 Aug 2015, 'DOE Study Concludes MOX Facility More Expensive, Much Riskier than Disposing of Surplus Plutonium at New Mexico Repository', www.ucsusa.org/new/press_release/doe-mox-study-0521

3. World Nuclear News, 21 Aug 2015, 'Disposal beats MOX in US comparison', www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-Disposal-beats-MOX-in-US-comparison-210815...

4. Patrick Malone and Douglas Birch, 22 Aug 2015, Sante Fe New Mexican, www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/report-pressures-congress-to-k...

5. US Department of Energy, April 2014, 'Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon Grade Plutonium Disposition Options', www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/SurplusPu...

6. 'Disposal of UK plutonium stocks with a climate change focus', http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/06/04/uk-pu-cc/

7. http://gehitachiprism.com

8. UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Jan 2014, 'Progress on approaches to the management of separated plutonium – Position Paper', www.nda.gov.uk/publication/progress-on-approaches-to-the-management-of-s...

9. Newswire 29th June 2015 http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/1563539/ge-hitachi-nuclear-energy-canada...

10. August 2015, 'Slow Progress on Plutonium Stockpiles', nuClear news No.76, www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/nuclearnews/NuClearNewsNo76.pdf

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report on the status of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other new reactor concepts in the US.

Let's begin with the downbeat conclusion of the GAO report:

"While light water SMRs and advanced reactors may provide some benefits, their development and deployment face a number of challenges. Both SMRs and advanced reactors require additional technical and engineering work to demonstrate reactor safety and economics, although light water SMRs generally face fewer technical challenges than advanced reactors because of their similarities to the existing large LWR [light water] reactors. Depending on how they are resolved, these technical challenges may result in higher-cost reactors than anticipated, making them less competitive with large LWRs or power plants using other fuels. ...

"Both light water SMRs and advanced reactors face additional challenges related to the time, cost, and uncertainty associated with developing, certifying or licensing, and deploying new reactor technology, with advanced reactor designs generally facing greater challenges than light water SMR designs. It is a multi-decade process, with costs up to $1 billion to $2 billion, to design and certify or license the reactor design, and there is an additional construction cost of several billion dollars more per power plant.

"Furthermore, the licensing process can have uncertainties associated with it, particularly for advanced reactor designs. A reactor designer would need to obtain investors or otherwise commit to this development cost years in advance of when the reactor design would be certified or available for licensing and construction, making demand (and customers) for the reactor uncertain. For example, the price of competing power production facilities may make a nuclear plant unattractive without favorable rates set by a public authority or long term prior purchase agreements, and accidents such as Fukushima as well as the ongoing need for a long-term solution for spent nuclear fuel may affect the public perception of reactor safety. These challenges will need to be addressed if the capabilities and diversification of energy sources that light water SMRs and advanced reactors can provide are to be realized."

Many of the same reasons explain the failure of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the US Department of Energy (DoE) was to deploy a prototype 'next generation' reactor using advanced technology to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, or both, by the end of fiscal year 2021. However, in 2011, DoE decided not to proceed with the deployment phase of the project.

Small modular reactors

Four companies have considered developing SMRs in the US in recent years. NuScale has a cost-sharing agreement such that the DoE will pay as much as half of NuScale's costs − up to $217 million (€194m) over five years − for SMR design certification. NuScale expects to submit a design certification application to NRC in late 2016, and may begin operating its first SMR in 2023 or 2024. (However the timeframe is unrealistic, and the project may be abandoned − as other SMR projects have.)

The other three companies are a long way behind NuScale:

• mPower, a subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox, enjoyed a cost-sharing agreement with the DoE but in 2014 scaled back its R&D efforts because of a lack of committed customers and a lack of investors.
• Holtec says it is continuing R&D work, but does not have a detailed schedule.
• In 2014 Westinghouse suspended its efforts to certify its SMR design, because of a lack of committed customers (and the lack of a DoE cost-sharing agreement).

The GAO report states that the development of light water SMRs may proceed without serious difficulties as they are based on existing light water reactor technology. That said, standardization is a key pillar of SMR rhetoric, and members of an expert group convened by the GAO noted that component standardization has proven challenging for the construction of the larger Westinghouse AP1000 that has some modular components.

Another pillar of SMR rhetoric is mass production (to make them economic), and the development of a massive construction chain to allow for mass production is a radically different proposition to NuScale's plan to build just one reactor over the next decade.

Not-so-advanced reactor concepts

According to the GAO report, SMRs and new reactor concepts "face some common challenges such as long time frames and high costs associated with the shift from development to deployment − that is, in the construction of the first commercial reactors of a particular type."

The report notes the US government's generous financial support for utilities developing SMRs and advanced reactor concepts − DoE provided US$152.5 million (€137m) in fiscal year 2015 alone. Advanced reactor concepts attracting DoE largesse are the high temperature gas cooled reactor, the sodium cooled fast reactor, and to a lesser extent the molten salt reactor (specifically, a sub-type known as the fluoride salt cooled high temperature reactor).

DoE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials do not expect applications for advanced reactors for at least five years. In other words, an application may (or may not) be submitted some time between five years and five centuries from now.

Advanced reactor designers told the GAO that they have been challenged to find investors due to the lengthy timeframe, costs, and uncertainty. Advanced reactor concepts face greater technical challenges than light water SMRs because of fundamental design differences. Thus designers have significantly more R&D issues to resolve, including in areas such as materials studies and fuel certification, coolant chemistry studies, and safety analysis. Some members of the expert group convened by the GAO noted a potential need for new test facilities to support this work. Furthermore, according to reactor designers, certifying or licensing an advanced reactor may be particularly time-consuming and difficult, adding to the already considerable economic uncertainty for the applicants.

The process of developing and certifying a specific reactor design can take 10 years or more for design work and nearly 3.5 years, as a best case, for NRC certification. Even that timeframe is more hope than expectation. Recent light water reactor design certifications, for the Westinghouse AP1000 and the GE Hitachi ESBWR, have taken about 15 and 11 years respectively. Both the AP1000 and ESBWR are modifications of long-established reactor types, so considerably longer timeframes can be expected for advanced concepts.

The cost to develop and certify a design can range from US$1−2 billion (€0.9−1.8b). Developers hope that costs can be reduced as they move from certification to the construction of a first-of-a-kind plant to the construction of multiple plants. But the GAO report notes that those hopes may be unfounded:

"[S]ome studies suggest that existing, large LWRs have not greatly benefitted from industry-wide standardization or learning to date for reasons including intermittent development and production. In fact, some studies have found that "reverse or negative learning" occurs when increased complexity or operation experience leads to newer safety standards. On a related point, another reactor designer said that the cost and schedule difficulties associated with building the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades − the Westinghouse AP1000, a recently designed large LWR − have made it harder for light water SMRs to obtain financing because high-profile problems have made nuclear reactors in general less attractive. ... The AP1000 was the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades. However, construction problems, including supply chain and regulatory issues, have resulted in cost and schedule increases."

US Government Accountability Office, July 2015, 'Nuclear Reactors: Status and challenges in development and deployment of new commercial concepts', GAO-15-652, www.gao.gov/assets/680/671686.pdf

Thousands joined the nuclear-free, carbon-free contingent at last September's People's Climate March in New York City. The unexpectedly large turnout − followed by tens of thousands of comments and petitions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) − helped open the agency's eyes to first understand our position and then realize it made a lot of sense.

On August 3, an amazing thing happened. President Obama released the first real climate action policy in the U.S. ever. But that's not all. The incredible thing − the one that will be most important in the years to come − is ... they got it basically right!

Including on nuclear power. President Obama just made it the policy of the United States that nuclear power is not a viable climate solution. And not just that, but renewable energy can replace nuclear power just like it can replace fossil fuels.

This is a game-changer, both for reducing carbon emissions in the US, and for discrediting the deceptive 'Nuclear Matters' greenwashing bailout campaign (nuclearmatters.com). What is more, going into December's global climate treaty negotiations in Paris, the U.S. government just declared that we are moving forward, and we are going to do it with renewables, not nuclear.

The upshot is that the EPA appears to have done a total 180 on nuclear in the Clean Power Plan (CPP), and their rationales reflect the concerns raised by the public in the streets of New York City, in tens of thousands of comments, letters, and petitions, and by NIRS and other clean energy groups in conversations and a key meeting with EPA officials who listened and ultimately agreed with our position. After all, with all due modesty, it was a pretty reasoned and well thought-out approach to the climate issue.¹

Clean Power Plan

Here is a quick synopsis of what the CPP rule actually does with respect to nuclear power:

1. Not only are nuclear reactors under construction not counted on in setting emissions goals, but neither are existing nuclear plants. By the same token, relicensing nuclear reactors won't count either.
2. Just as significantly, EPA recognized that there is no need to "preserve" nuclear reactors that are "at risk" of closure, because they can be replaced with renewables just as fossil fuels can.
3. EPA will only allow actual, new / increased nuclear generation to count toward complying with the emissions goals. That means, states can only count new reactors that actually operate before 2030 (the five in construction or any others) and power uprates of existing reactors toward meeting their emissions goals.
4. That means there is no incentive under the CPP to keep uneconomical reactors operating and no incentive to complete building new reactors. States can meet their goal with new nuclear (but not with existing nuclear), but they are given no justification for preferring nuclear over renewables. In fact, there are several statements in the rule that indicate just the opposite.
5. And only those new / additional amounts of nuclear can qualify to sell emissions offset credits in cap-and-trade programs. Existing reactors cannot qualify as emissions offsets for fossil fuel generation, because they do not actually reduce carbon emissions.
6. The CPP does not prevent states from creating subsidies for nuclear, but there is absolutely no incentive for them to do so.

The impacts of the EPA's decision are already being felt far and wide. The industry is upset, to put it mildly.² Pro-nuclear commentators don't seem to know how to react: absurdly try to claim victory despite the plain language of the regulation, like Forbes columnist James Conca³; or go on the attack against the Obama administration as a bastion of anti-nuclear activism⁴, as did Breakthrough Institute founder and propaganda film spokesman Michael Shellenberger.⁵

In contrast, another Forbes columnist provided a much more objective report on the changes to nuclear in the Clean Power Plan, noting in particular that it "does not include aid to existing nuclear power plants at risk of closing because they can't compete with cheaper natural gas and renewables."⁶

For over a year now, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service has detailed concerns about the draft version of the Clean Power Plan that the EPA put out last summer:⁷

• Promotion of nuclear power as a climate solution.
• Underselling the demonstrated potential of renewables.
• Continued overreliance on fossil fuels, especially natural gas.

We have reported most on how the rule deals with nuclear power and the nuclear industry's initial embrace of it, both because that is where our greatest expertise is, and it was the part most overlooked in the CPP.⁸ But the draft rule's promotion of natural gas was a very real problem: it could have blocked renewables just as much or more than nuclear and it terribly underestimated the climate change impacts as well as the environmental impacts of fracking. The final rule addresses a number of those problems, as well. For instance, new natural gas plants will not count toward reducing carbon emissions, recognizing the global warming impact of methane releases and forcing states to rely on renewables and energy efficiency to meet most of their emissions reduction goals. The natural gas industry is just as upset as the nuclear industry.⁹

And that is the other truly remarkable thing about the Obama administration's decision: essentially to take on the nuclear, coal, and natural gas industries head-on, rather than try to play favorites among them and pit powerful corporations against each other. Maybe the President recognized that, in the end, the whole energy system needs to change, so we might as well get on with it. Or maybe he realized that the fossil fuel and nuclear industries are all just different heads of the same hydra, and those corporations were going to resist change no matter what.

Either way, the fight is on, and we have a real Clean Power Plan to fight for. We are sure as the dust settles, there will be things that need to be fixed to strengthen the CPP. When the German government first adopted its Energiewende plan to reduce emissions and phase out nuclear, the plan wasn't strong enough. The politicians weren't committed enough to really close nuclear plants. The energy companies all resisted it, even putting new coal plants on order just to try and derail the government's plans.

But over a decade or more, the idea set in. Renewable energy became popular and affordable, created hundreds of thousands of jobs and new industries, and people got used to owning their own solar panels and making their own energy. And then, after the horror of Fukushima struck, even conservative leadership in the government realized that they just had to go for it.

To be sure, Germany still doesn't have it totally right, and it won't be an unqualified success until we actually get to a nuclear-free, carbon-free, sustainable energy world. Our counterparts in Germany still have to fight to keep the Energiewende on track. And the CPP is not an anti-nuclear policy. It's not even anti-fossil fuels, really. But it is a plan that promotes sustainable, renewable energy as the best solution to the climate crisis. And that is a good place to start.

References:

1. www.nirs.org/climate/background/backgrndhome.htm

2. www.fierceenergy.com/story/nei-ceo-cpp-nothing-without-nuclear/2015-08-03

3. www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/08/04/only-one-loser-in-obamas-clea...

4. www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/08/03/final-clean-power-plan-drops...

5. www.beyondnuclear.org/pandoras-false-promises/

6. www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/08/03/final-clean-power-plan-drops...

7. http://safeenergy.org/2014/06/02/epas-proposed-carbon-rules/

8. http://safeenergy.org/2014/08/11/industry-says-epa-rule-needs-more-nuke/

9. www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/03/obamas-clean-power-plan-will...

The AP1000 is the next generation design being developed by Westinghouse, a subsidiary of Toshiba. Westinghouse constructs the AP1000 projects in partnership with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), probably the world's most experienced builder of large power stations.

The AP1000 is a 1.1 GW plant using a design based on a much smaller power station developed by Westinghouse 20 years ago. One important fact is that no stations using the original design were ever built. However, the advantages of the AP1000 are said to include a relatively simple design, a high level of passive safety and modular construction.

Modular construction means that components can be manufactured elsewhere and then shipped to the power station site. However US sites have had 5,000 workers on site at the same time, posing the some of the same huge management challenges that were experienced at the Finnish EPR site.

Four AP1000 reactors are in construction in the US and four in China. The US plants are at two separate sites in the state of Georgia ('Plant Vogtle', two AP1000s) and South Carolina ('Summer', two AP1000s).

I focus here on the experience in Georgia, but note that similar three-year delays have also happened at Summer in South Carolina, where serious cost overruns have also taken place.

Plant Vogtle - construction times more than doubled

Vogtle 3 and 4 are being built in the same complex as two earlier nuclear power stations. After delays in final design approval, they were finally licenced in February 2012. Near-concurrent construction of the two plants started in May 2013 with completion of the first planned for April 2016.

Original estimates for the total price to the utilities buying the power stations were about US$14bn (about £9.5bn). The price to be paid was essentially fixed, meaning that most of the construction risk is borne by Westinghouse and CB&I.

The most recent announcement of construction delays came in February 2015 when the station's eventual 45% owner (Georgia Power) told the state regulator that the partnership building the station had recently estimated that the eventual completion date for Vogtle 3 would be June 2019. Vogtle 4 would be finished in June 2020.

The expected delay for Vogtle 3 is now 39 months, more than doubling the initially expected construction time. The project is not yet half complete.

Costs are rising

Although the contract price has not risen significantly because it is largely fixed, the cost to electricity customers in the state of Georgia has increased. This is because the utilities that will eventually own the two new stations have been granted electricity price increases by the state regulator to cover the higher financing costs of Vogtle 3 and 4.

The utilities have been paying for individual elements of the two new plants as they are completed. The long delays mean that the interest costs are higher than expected and the regulator has already granted rate increases to compensate the eventual owners.

People in Georgia are already paying a supplement of 6% of their bills to finance the new nuclear station − Indeed Friends of the Earth US suggests that as much as 11% of their electricity bills may be supporting the project.¹

Although the deal was a fixed price contract, the company buying the largest share of the finished plants is in legal battles over extra costs that the contractors claim that the purchasers should bear.

We can reasonably expect that the cost to construct the stations has also increased. However industry estimates of the eventual final cost to the contractors are vague and imprecise. They currently seem to be around US$18bn (~£12bn). This seems low to me, given that the total project is now expected to take more than twice as long as originally expected.

CB&I says that Westinghouse will eventually pay most of the overrun costs but we can safely presume that this issue will also end up in court.

Georgia Power is losing faith in its contractors

Until recently the main buyer, Georgia Power, was reasonably content with the progress of the construction. However its 2015 submissions to the Georgia regulator have become increasingly concerned in response to the latest estimates of delay.

Note that Georgia Power has a difficult line to steer: it cannot be too critical of the contractors because otherwise the regulator that oversees it and grants its rate increases will question why it agreed to build the first new nuclear plant in the US for several decades in the first place!

Most recently, the company's May 2015 testimony² prepared for a hearing has been openly critical of the contractors Westinghouse and CB&I:

"In general, the Company, like the other Owners, has been disappointed with the Contractor's performance under the revised IPS (project plan). The Contractor has missed several key milestones since the publication of the revised IPS in January 2015, including several milestones relating to critical-path or near-critical-path activities such as the assembly of CA01 (part of the central reactor), the delivery of shield building panels, and work on concrete outside containment.

"The Contractor has also encountered difficulties in ensuring that new vendors produce high-quality, compliant components per the IPS projections." (p.15)

Georgia Power is now indicating that it has little faith in the contractor's ability to keep to the new delayed timetable.²

"The Contractor's schedule performance on critical path work such as concrete placements to start shield building installation and inside containment installation are challenges to the Contractor's ability to adhere to the revised IPS.

"The Contractor must continue to improve its schedule performance, maintain these improvements, and successfully resolve RCPs / squib valves / CMTs (components with severe quality or delivery problems) in order to complete the Facility by the currently projected substantial completion dates." (p.15)

China's AP1000s - a three year construction delay

Cost data from the Chinese construction projects is difficult to find. But they have also experienced significant construction difficulties. Building at Sanmen began construction in August 2009 and was originally expected to be finished by August 2013.

As with Vogtle, construction was said to be on schedule a year into the project and even in March 2012 completion was still officially planned for 2013. Recent updates suggests that completion will actually take place in 2016, also a three year delay.

The design used in China is simpler than that used in the US, and it may well be possible for Chinese constructors to build much more quickly and cheaply. However the modifications are unlikely to be acceptable to Western regulators. For example, the power stations are not designed to survive a direct hit from an airliner, a US requirement.

The questions in the minds of all concerned are surely these:

• How many of the problems at Vogtle, Summer and elsewhere are inherent to the construction of a large third generation nuclear power station?
• And how many simply arise because these are 'first of a kind' projects?
• Will new nuclear projects around the world avoid the major problems that have affected the first eight AP1000s because the construction companies have learnt how to build these huge projects more efficiently?
• Or is a safe third generation nuclear power station beyond the capacity of even the most experienced contractors to build to a tight timetable and at a predictable cost?

I'm afraid I don't think the answer is at all clear.

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change. He blogs at Carbon Commentary (www.carboncommentary.com).

Abridged from The Ecologist, 17 July 2015, www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/Blogs/2952108/moorsides_ap1000_n...

References:

1. www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2240101/toshibas_nu...

2. www.psc.state.ga.us/factsv2/Document.aspx?documentNumber=158302

In Germany it's called the Energiewende − the energy transition. It's a deliberate decision to move away from nuclear power and fossil fuels in favor of renewables and energy efficiency. And it's working. Renewables are skyrocketing, nuclear reactors have closed and more shutdowns are on the way, and coal use is declining too¹, despite the misleading claims of renewable energy haters.

Here in the US, it isn't called anything −  if we have an "official" government policy at all it's "all of the above", which is the same as saying meaningless. But an ad hoc energy transition is nonetheless taking place in the U.S.

In April, 100% of all new electric generating capacity in the US was wind and solar –511 MW of wind and 50 MW of solar.² For the year so far, renewables account for 84.1% of new capacity, with natural gas supplying the rest. The amount of solar is understated, however, since it doesn't account for rooftop solar and other distributed generation. Nor, of course, do these numbers, compiled by the Energy Information Administration, attempt to quantify the effect of energy efficiency on avoiding the need for new generating capacity. There has been no new capacity from nuclear, coal or oil.

This is an energy transition already underway, quietly, with some government support but without an actual transition policy − indeed, with a policy that is inherently hostile to the transition.

As Ken Bossong of the Sun Day Campaign points out, "Renewable energy capacity is now greater than that of nuclear (9.14%) and oil (3.92%) combined. In fact, the installed capacity of wind power alone has now surpassed that of oil. In addition, total installed operating generating capacity from solar has now reached and surpassed the one-percent threshold −  a ten-fold increase since December 2010."

But it's an energy transition with a long ways to go. Germany is the clear global leader in solar power −  despite its relatively low solar potential −  with 38,200 MW of solar installed as of the end of 2014. The US ranked fifth then with 18,280 MW of installed capacity, also behind China, Japan and Italy −  although the US likely has passed Italy by now. Given solar's low capacity factor, that's only about 4.5 large nuclear reactors worth of power installed in the US.

And it looks worse when you look at solar from a per capita basis.³ The US barely cracks the top 20 of installed solar capacity per person, at 19th in the world, the US is behind nations like Bulgaria (8th), non-nuclear Austria (13th) and even nuclear-dominated France (15th).

Still, the US is a big country with a lot of generating capacity (China is even bigger, and thus doesn't even make the top 20 on a per capita basis). It takes a while to install that amount of any form of generating capacity. And solar is growing faster than any other form. Remember that 10-fold increase in solar capacity in less than five years. With no indications of slowing down, there's good reason to believe that before the end of this decade another ten-fold increase will occur. That would put solar alone above 10% of our electricity generation, and wind will provide even more.

Another ten-fold increase after that would be impossible of course, since it would make solar the only generating source in the US. But this is how the energy transition in the US is occurring: without formal policy, without significant government support. Even though the nuclear and fossil fuel industry hacks continue to carp about subsidies for renewables, the reality is that their industries have been far more heavily subsidized over the years than renewables. If renewables do get the majority of the subsidy crumbs left on the table by the budget-slashers these days, and that's by no means clear, it's simply because it's their due for being ignored so long while untold billions of dollars were heaped on dirty energy technologies.

The US can, must, and all indications are will continue to bring renewables online rapidly. And as that happens, higher-cost and dirtier nuclear and coal plants inevitably will continue to close. The rationale for keeping them open with ratepayer bailouts becomes thinner and thinner even to those expected to be warm to utilities clinging to expensive and outdated dirty power plants. In the last week of May alone, the Illinois legislature deferred action on Exelon's 18-month pursuit of a nuclear bailout⁴, while the Ohio Public Utilities Commission has put off its action on a similar request from First Energy to bail out the Davis-Besse reactor and some coal plants.⁵ Whichever way those entities end up deciding on those issues, it's clear that the old arguments aren't working for the utilities. Even skeptics are now having to acknowledge the economic and environmental benefits of clean energy technologies.

And so the transition continues, largely out of sight to the average American and perhaps even less so to the average politician. But that doesn't make it any less real.

Michael Mariotte regularly writes at www.safeenergy.org

References:

1. http://reneweconomy.com.au/2015/nuclear-isnt-the-only-energy-phase-out-h...

2. www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2015/05/wind-and-solar-account-for...

3. http://breakingenergy.com/2015/05/25/actually-the-us-is-a-dismal-solar-p...

4. www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150527/NEWS11/150529874/springfield-ne...

5. www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2015/05/28/issue-of-coal-plant...

It should surprise no-one that a utility that relies on dirty energy to make its money also plays dirty when its money is threatened or when a state legislature is considering whether to bail out the company with its constituents' money.

So don't be surprised that yes indeed, gasp, Exelon is playing dirty in Illinois. And just about everywhere else too.

Dave Kraft of Illinois' Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS) reports that some NEIS members have received unidentified robocalls on their home phones, urging them to call their state legislators to "support clean renewable energy."

The problem is, the bill the robocalls support is Exelon's bill to establish a "low carbon portfolio standard" − that's the bill that was written to bail out Exelon's uneconomic reactors in Illinois and prevent the expansion of "clean renewable energy" in the state.¹

NEIS, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) and those honestly in favor of clean energy are supporting a different bill also before the legislature, SB 1485/HB 2607, that actually would encourage clean energy in the state − and wouldn't bail out Exelon's failing nukes in the process.

Crain's Chicago Business, which continues to be the best source of reporting on Exelon and its machinations, recently reported that Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison − the state's largest distribution utility − "wants to make it illegal in Illinois to count the benefits of lowering energy prices when deciding which energy efficiency projects should qualify for ratepayer-funded financial assistance."²

In other words, while even Commonwealth Edison can't discount the fact that energy efficiency is cleaner than electricity generation, it wants the other main benefit of improving efficiency − lower electricity prices for ratepayers − to be ignored entirely.

Why? Because holding back gains in energy efficiency would help out Exelon's six uneconomic reactors. Improving efficiency means less generation is needed. By attempting to sabotage the state's efficiency programs, Commonwealth Edison is trying to ensure that electricity demand goes up, making it at least somewhat more likely those reactors would be useful. In fact, those reactors still wouldn't be needed; but the numbers conceivably could be manipulated enough to make it appear so.

It is vital that we reach everyone possible in Illinois to counter Exelon's proposed nuclear bailout. That's a bailout that would cost ratepayers hundreds of millions of dollars and provide them with nothing but the electricity they would receive even without the bailout. But instead of coming from cleaner energy sources, and helping to expand Illinois' clean energy programs, the bailout would ensure that Illinois' power would continue to come from dirty, aging and expensive nuclear reactors.

Stopping Exelon's efforts to promote nuclear power at the expense of renewables and energy efficiency is the most important state action this year − and the outcome will have national implications.³

If you have any friends at all, any relatives, business colleagues, if a part of any e-mail list you're on, includes anyone from Illinois, please send them this link to the NIRS action page: http://tinyurl.com/exelon-nukes

References:
1. http://safeenergy.org/2015/03/02/exelons-nuclear-bailout-dream-scheme/
2. www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150401/NEWS11/150339933/is-comed-doing...
3. http://safeenergy.org/2015/03/16/the-most-important-state-action-this-year/

Back in 2008, when presidential candidate John McCain was calling for construction of 45 new reactors in the U.S. (and presidential candidate Barack Obama was calling for "safe" nuclear power), Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander outdid his colleague: he issued a call for construction of 100 new nuclear reactors.

In 2008, the nuclear "renaissance" was in full swing. McCain's call didn't seem − at least to nuclear backers − far-fetched in the least. After all, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the time already had some 30 applications for licenses for new reactors.

Nearly seven years later, McCain doesn't talk much about nuclear power. President Obama's Department of Energy approved a taxpayer loan for two new reactors at Vogtle, a move the Department of Energy may be beginning to regret as construction costs spiral and the schedule delays keep pushing the project further back. Otherwise, the President these days talks about promoting renewables.

Most people are able to adjust to reality − in this case the reality that the short-lived nuclear "renaissance" is over.

But not Senator Alexander, who is now chair of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development. In his first hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's budget, Alexander recently repeated his call: "I have proposed that we build 100 new reactors, which may seem excessive, but not if about 20% of our current capacity from coal goes offline by 2020 as projected by the Energy Information Administration. If this capacity were replaced entirely by nuclear power it would require building another 48 new, 1,250-megawatt reactors – which, by the way, would reduce our carbon emissions from electricity by another 14%. Add the reactors we may need to replace in the coming decades due to aging and other factors, and my proposal for 100 may not seem so high."

Actually, 100 new reactors not only seems high, it's pure fantasy. With the experience of Vogtle, and the similar experience at two reactors under construction at the Summer site in South Carolina, no one is lining up to build new reactors. At this point, it's unlikely even the four under construction will be online by 2020, much less 96 more new ones.

If, by Alexander's logic, that 20% of coal plants going offline by 2020 needs to be replaced (and we certainly hope he's right that at least 20% of coal will be shut down by then), then nuclear reactors aren't going to replace it. For that matter, it's entirely possible 10−20% of our dangerous, aging and uneconomic reactors will close by then too.

So what's left? Perhaps some natural gas, but mostly the energy sources Alexander hates: solar and wind power. Alexander has been the Senate leader in trying to get rid of the production tax credits for renewables, especially for wind. Why? Because wind is cheaper than nuclear power, faster to install, and is pushing nuclear aside. As solar continues its rapid growth, you can be sure Alexander will go after it with the same passion. Both would reduce carbon emissions even more than nuclear power.

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed last May, Alexander made his position clear: he opposes wind power's tax credit because "The wind subsidy undercuts reliable "baseload" electricity such as nuclear and coal." Yep, wouldn't want to displace dirty energy with clean energy, would we now, Senator?

It is disconcerting to have someone so disconnected from reality as Senator Alexander possessing such great power over the NRC's budget and energy policy generally. But, in a way, it's almost reassuring. A powerful nuclear advocate who isn't living in fantasyland might be able to consider small steps that might actually help the nuclear industry. Small steps aren't part of the fantasy, however. Alexander's dream may be America's nightmare, but it is just fantasy. And in the world we actually live in, reality trumps fantasy every time.

According to James Conca, a nuclear enthusiast who writes for Forbes, the nuclear industry in the US is "abuzz" with the potential of small modular reactors (SMRs).¹

Conca promotes pseudo-research from the 'Small Modular Reactor Research and Education Consortium', according to which a single SMR has the potential to result in US$892 million (€844m) in "direct economic benefits". In other words, the capital cost estimate is US$892 million. The Consortium estimates that the potential economic benefits from the establishment of an SMR construction business in the US could range from US$34−250 billion (€32.2−236.7b) or more.

Better grounded in reality is a report produced by Nuclear Energy Insider, drawing on interviews with more than 50 "leading specialists and decision makers". The report attempts to put a positive spin on the future development of SMRs, but an air of pessimism is all too apparent, even in the report's title: 'Small Modular Reactors: An industry in terminal decline or on the brink of a comeback?'²

Pessimism is also apparent in comments by the report's lead author, Kerr Jeferies: "From the outside it will seem that SMR development has hit a brick wall, but to lump the sector's difficulties together with the death of the so-called nuclear renaissance would be missing the point."³

In the US⁴:

• Babcock & Wilcox has greatly reduced its investment in SMR development, despite receiving US$111 million (€105m) from the Department of Energy. B&W CEO Jim Ferland said that he sees the future of SMRS as "still being up in the air."

• Westinghouse abandoned its SMR development program in February 2014.
• Warren Buffet's MidAmerican Energy abandoned plans to build an SMR in Iowa after consumer groups prevailed in a legislative battle over 'construction work in progress' legislation that allows utilities to charge higher rates to cover reactor construction costs, even if the reactor is never built.
• NuScale is the only company in the US with any forward momentum − it is aiming to submit documentation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2016 for design review.

Glenn George from KPMG recently discussed SMR development in the US with Nuclear Energy Insider: "I think that investors are in a wait-and-see mode regarding development of the SMR market. ... Investors will want to see SMR learning-curve effects, but a chicken-and-egg situation is at work: Decreased cost comes from production of multiple units over time, yet such production requires investment in the first place. So it's not surprising that, in the absence of commercial orders, Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have slowed SMR development."⁵

Outside the US, just a few first-of-a-kind SMR projects are under construction − in Argentina (CAREM-25), Russia (KLT-40S) and China (HTR-PM).

The Nuclear Energy Insider report restates the familiar SMR rationale about mass production and streamlined supply chains bringing down costs. But it also calls into question the underlying logic: "SMR concepts face a real challenge in ensuring cost and energy efficiency. Making a power unit smaller also increases the need to have five, ten or even twelve modular reactors working in unison to create the same level of base load electricity as the large PWR's and fossil fuel plants they will replace. In reducing the size of reactor modules you also reduce the amount of thermal energy produced, if an SMR only has an energy efficiency of 30−40% then you require even further units to make up the shortfall."

The report also qualifies the usual SMR rhetoric about economies derived from mass factory production: "Factory assembly of small reactors is one of the core benefits of SMR's. They can be built off site in 'bulk', easily transported and then plugged into an infrastructure network promising a far quicker and cheaper alternative to large PWR's. However, in order to ensure a smooth transition from the drawing board to the construction site there are key questions to be faced in separating the expertise held in a reactor factory and the expertise required to install an SMR when it arrives on site. For an effective SMR supply chain to be developed it will need to be localized − despite the reactors being built off site, a great amount of the on-site infrastructure and materials will still require precision assembly."

If there was any remaining doubt that SMRs are not the 'game changer' they are so often portrayed to be, the report concludes: "Six decades of nuclear development have shown that nuclear energy can only be progressed if 'long-term' strategies are employed across the industry. In an economic climate where there are alternative energies offering far quicker returns on investment, clear questions need to raised and frank discussions held in order to ensure that SMR's do remain a realistic alternative for energy provision."

The report states that notwithstanding the "pervasive sense of pessimism" resulting from abandoned and scaled-back SMR programs, "we believe a more accurate picture is that 2014 has been a teething year, and that the SMR story hasn't even really begun."

Therein lies the problem − the story hasn't begun: no supply chains, no factories churning out identical reactors, and precious few customers. And another familiar problem that has long plagued the nuclear industry: a bewildering array of proposed designs.

SMR push in the UK

The UK has been bitten by the SMR bug. The National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) has produced a feasibility study which argues that SMRs might eventually prove cheaper than large reactors, while also noting unresolved 'detailed technical challenges'. The House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change has urged the government to spend public money to develop a demonstration SMR.⁶

Academics Gordon MacKerron and Philip Johnstone from the Sussex Energy Group write: "It [NNL] then suggests a potential UK market of between 7GW and 21GW in 2015, the latter number being frankly not credible under any conceivable circumstances. These hoped-for UK markets are also linked to the idea that the UK could become a major technological player in SMR technology, a view that seems tinged almost with fantasy, given that all significant SMR development to date has been outside the UK."⁶

South Korea's SMART reactor

South Korea may have found a model to unlock the potential of SMRs: collaboration with a repressive Middle Eastern state, extensive technology transfer, and if that fans proliferation risks and tensions in a volatile region, so be it.

On March 3, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) to carry out a three-year study to assess the feasibility of building two first-of-a-kind 'System Integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor' (SMART) reactors.⁷

SMART is a 100 MWe pressurized water reactor design which could be used for electricity generation and desalinization. The cost of building the first SMART reactor in Saudi Arabia is estimated at US$1 billion (€947m).⁷

Among other obstacles, the development of SMART technology has only lukewarm support from the South Korean government; it is no longer financially backed by Korea Electric Power Co. (Kepco); there is no intention to deploy SMART reactors in South Korea; and plans to build a demonstration plant in South Korea stalled.

South Korea launched 'SMART Power' on January 29 − an organisation tasked with marketing SMART technology overseas, conducting joint feasibility studies with interested customers, and continuing design work to make the reactor technology "more economically feasible".

KACARE says that SMART intellectual property rights will be co-owned and that, in addition to the construction of SMART reactors in Saudi Arabia, the two countries aim to commercialise the technology and to promote it world-wide.⁸

KACARE states: "Undisputedly, human capacity building for the production of nuclear power within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a national pursuit of paramount importance as it will essentially contribute to the sincerely devoted endeavors to devise a sustainable development future for Saudi generations."⁸

Failing that, the joint partnership − and the extensive technology transfer and training it entails − will take Saudi Arabia a long way down the path towards developing a latent nuclear weapons capability. Saudi officials have made no secret of the Kingdom's intention to pursue a weapons program if Iran's nuclear program is not constrained.⁹

Wall Street Journal reporters noted on March 11: "As U.S. and Iranian diplomats inched toward progress on Tehran's nuclear program last week, Saudi Arabia quietly signed its own nuclear-cooperation agreement with South Korea. That agreement, along with recent comments from Saudi officials and royals, is raising concerns on Capitol Hill and among U.S. allies that a deal with Iran, rather than stanching the spread of nuclear technologies, risks fueling it."¹⁰

A bilateral nuclear trade agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia has stalled because of the Kingdom's refusal to rule out developing enrichment or reprocessing technology. "We've been pressing them to agree not to pursue a civilian fuel cycle, but the Saudis refuse," said Gary Samore, a US government official working on nuclear issues during President Obama's first term.¹⁰

References:

1. James Conca, 16 Feb 2015, 'Can SMRs Lead The U.S. Into A Clean Energy Future?', www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/02/16/can-smrs-lead-the-u-s-into-a-...
2. Nuclear Energy Insider, 2014, "Small Modular Reactors: An industry in terminal decline or on the brink of a comeback?", http://bit.ly/smrscomeback
3. March 2015, 'SMRs "back on the agenda next year", says new report by Nuclear Energy Insider', www.prweb.com/releases/2015/03/prweb12549421.htm
4. Dan Yurman, 1 March 2015, 'Be careful about rose colored glasses when viewing the future of SMRs', http://neutronbytes.com/2015/03/01/be-careful-about-rose-colored-glasses...
5. Peter Taberner, 3 March 2015, 'SMRs: private investors call for track record and big government orders', http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/small-modular-reactors/smrs-pri...
6. Gordon MacKerron and Philip Johnstone, 2 March 2015, 'Small modular reactors – the future of nuclear power?', http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/2015/03/02/small-modular-rea...
7. WNN, 4 March 2015, 'Saudi Arabia teams up with Korea on SMART', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Saudi-Arabia-teams-up-with-Korea-on-SMART-...
8. KACARE, 3 March 2015, 'MOU's Signature', www.kacare.gov.sa/en/?p=1667
9. 18 Sept 2014, 'Saudi Arabia's nuclear power program and its weapons ambitions', Nuclear Monitor, Issue #791, www.wiseinternational.org/node/4195
10. Jay Solomon and Ahmed Al Omran, 11 March 2015, 'Saudi Nuclear Deal Raises Stakes for Iran Talks', www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-nuclear-deal-raises-stakes-for-iran-talks-142...

For over 30 years, Michael Mariotte − President of the Nuclear Information & Resource (NIRS) in the US − has helped build the movement to stop nuclear power, end the creation of radioactive waste, and hasten our sustainable energy future. Over a dozen organizations in the US recently presented Michael with a Lifetime Achievement Award, with the highest praise for his work.

But now Michael needs our support. For two years, he has been fighting his way through an aggressive form of cancer. Despite his illness, it has actually helped keep him strong to continue working throughout − just see the safeenergy.org blog for his prolific activity and inimitable voice. In honor of his incredible dedication and service, NIRS is committed to providing Michael whatever support he needs, just as he has sustained the movement all these years.

Therefore, NIRS is raising funds to ensure Michael has the support he needs and that his work continues. The funds raised will serve three purposes: to ensure Michael receives his full salary and benefits, regardless of whether he is able to continue working; to ensure NIRS has the capacity to advance the mission to which he has dedicated his career; and, at Michael's specific request, to ramp up NIRS' work on nuclear power and climate.

If you can donate, please visit: http://legacyfund.nirs.org

The conventional wisdom scribes have been falling all over themselves since US Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid announced last month that he won't run for re-election to spout what is obvious to all of them: Reid's exit means Yucca Mountain will finally open.

After all, Super Harry has been single-handedly preventing Yucca from becoming the nation's single most lethal plot of land.

If you've never seen conventional wisdom in action, then you're in for a treat. Here it is, in all its shining glory, in The Hill: 'Reid's exit removes obstacle to Yucca nuclear waste site'.¹

Ignore the 880, mostly inane, comments to the piece and focus on the intro: Reid's retirement "is removing one of the biggest obstacles" to Yucca. Find an anonymous Hill staffer to quote, preferably a Republican:

"There's no question that people are looking around and saying, 'Yeah, this news is good for solving the nuclear stalemate and having Yucca be part of that solution,' a Senate GOP aide said of Reid's planned departure in 2017. There's no reason to oppose Yucca beyond a political calculation, and the math on that just changed."

And make sure to get a quote from Yucca's biggest booster, Illinois Republican Rep. John Shimkus and add the tantalizing possibility that some Democrats support Yucca Mountain (as a few always have).

Bury the actual facts late in the story, after the ads. Like, the fact that likely Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton also opposes Yucca Mountain. As does the state's other Senator Dean Heller, a Republican. And the Republican Governor, Brian Sandoval, as well. Oh, wait, the article does forget to mention that one.

Oh, and some environmental groups also oppose Yucca Mountain.

Actually, it's not just some; it's essentially all environmental and clean energy organizations across the country. When we tallied it up in 2002, more than 50 national organizations and 700+ regional, state and local organizations from across the nation had publicly stated their opposition to Yucca.²

So it's not just Nevadans either. And it's not like the number has gone down since 2002; if anything, the number has gone up.

Why is there such widespread opposition to Yucca? It's not because Harry Reid doesn't want the project. It's not blind support for President Obama, who began ending the project as soon as he came into office in 2009. It's because as one of the most studied places on Earth, it's the one place on Earth we know will leak if it becomes a radioactive waste dump − a fact NIRS and other environmental groups have been pointing out, with greater and greater scientific backing, for decades.

I mean no disrespect for Senator Reid here. He's done a terrific job on Yucca Mountain, on renewable energy and on a lot of other things. In fact, I have tremendous respect for Senator Reid.

But I remember when he was the junior senator from Nevada, and Senator Richard Bryan was the senior senator, and very effectively led the Congressional opposition to Yucca which culminated in the 2000 veto by President Clinton of a Yucca/Mobile Chernobyl bill − a veto that was sustained by one vote.

It was Bryan who spoke from the stage at our 1997 anti-Yucca concerts in Washington with Bonnie Raitt, Jackson Browne, Indigo Girls and more. Not Reid.

During the debate on that 2000 legislation, I watched C-Span on my computer and fed Reid's office with information every few minutes to counter the pro-Yucca statements. Reid wasn't as ready then to effectively take on Yucca; Bryan, nearing the end of his political career, didn't need any help.

Indeed, it wasn't until after Bryan retired, and Reid and I had a private meeting in his office, that we became fully comfortable with him in his new role as the lead anti-Yucca spokesperson on the Hill. And he went on to far surpass all of our expectations.

But the opposition to Yucca isn't − despite the conventional wisdom − about Harry Reid. It's about the fundamental fact that putting the nation's lethal high-level radioactive waste in a highly seismically-active zone, where radioactive materials from weapons tests that went into the mountain in the 1950s have since leaked back out of the mountain, makes no sense.

It's about the fundamental fact that even the Department of Energy admits that the mountain provides essentially none of the required prevention of leakage of the waste; the casks − which will rust and decay and the unbuilt and quite possibly unbuildable titanium shields the DOE now says are essential − provide 95% of that protection. If that's the case, and it is, then the waste could go anywhere. Like underneath any of the nuclear reactor sites in the country.

That would be a stupid idea, of course; but it's no less stupid at Yucca Mountain. If we're going to have a permanent waste repository, and we need one sooner or later − sooner if we can end radioactive waste generation sooner − it should at least offer some measure of protection. We know it won't at Yucca Mountain.

The opposition to Yucca Mountain is deep, broad and national. It also has proven its effectiveness over the years. And it's not going away. Senator Reid knows that. That's why he can confidently say, as he did the day after his announcement, that "Yucca Mountain is dead."

The Las Vegas Sun knows that too; that's why their front page article last month on the opposition didn't focus on Reid, it focused on the grassroots.³ By the way, the Sun also put a kind article about me and the NIRS' Legacy Fund as a sidebar on the front page too.⁴

Heck, even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff know it. They won't even recommend that the project be pursued any longer.

The nuclear industry and its backers are persistent. That's why some battles have to be fought over and over again. But we're just as persistent. Yucca was named as the nation's only high-level radioactive waste site by an ignorant Congress in 1987, to be operational by 1998. It didn't happen, and it won't happen in 2018 or 2028 or any other date either.

We all owe Senator Harry Reid a lot for his efforts over the years. We owe each other a round of thanks too.

For some background on why Yucca Mountain is scientifically unsuitable as a high-level radioactive waste site, and a bit of history on the opposition, visit the NIRS Yucca Mountain page.⁵

References:
1. http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/237845-reids-exit-removes-o...
2. www.nirs.org/radwaste/yucca/yuccaopponentslist.htm
3. www.lasvegassun.com/news/2015/mar/06/preparing-renewed-battle-keep-yucca...
4. www.lasvegassun.com/news/2015/mar/06/yucca-opponents-fighting-old-friend...
5. www.nirs.org/radwaste/yucca/yuccahome.htm