You are here

EPR

UK nuclear program - not dead yet as government tries to save face

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#753
4263
03/08/2016
Pete Roche
Article

The Times reported on July 15, that, according to “well placed industry sources”, EDF Energy wants a subsidy of £2.8 billion (US$3.6bn or 3.5bn euro) a year for the next 25 years to build two new nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point in Somerset, England at a cost of £14 billion. The French, mostly state-owned company, will only build the two European Pressurised Water Reactors (EPRs) with huge subsidies, paid for through fixed levies on electricity bills.

In May the UK Government published a Draft Energy Bill see (Nuclear Monitor 750, June 1) which details plans for so-called Electricity Market Reform. The proposals include the introduction of a complicated support mechanism for low carbon electricity called “Contract for Difference” (CfD). Basically if the market price for electricity falls below a guaranteed “strike price” the nuclear or renewable energy operator would be paid the difference, but would also have to pay money back if the electricity price goes above the strike price. The Government doesn’t expect the Energy Bill to be passed into legislation until towards the end of next year, and strike price rates won’t be finalized until then.  However, under the terms of the draft Bill, the government can issue a likely strike price in advance of formalizing the rate and introducing CfD in 2014.

EDF Energy and its junior partner Centrica want to make their final investment decision on Hinkley before the end of 2012. So talks have begun between the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the two companies to provide them with some firmer guarantees in order to make sure plans for Hinkley Point go ahead. With RWE and E.ON having recently dropped their UK nuclear plans, EDF Energy has the Government over a barrel, and will no doubt be telling DECC what strike price it wants before going ahead – in effect writing its own subsidy cheque from the electricity consumer.

According to The Times, EDF says it needs about £165 per megawatt hour (£/MWh), almost four times the existing wholesale price of electricity, if it is to go ahead. This works out at a subsidy of £68 billion over 25 years, or an average of about £50 extra a year on every household bill. 

Let’s not forget that the Coalition Agreement between the Tories and Liberal Democrats pledged to not subsidize nuclear power.(1) Despite this, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Liberal Democrat Ed Davey, now seems to be prepared to agree a high strike price with the nuclear industry, whilst pretending the Government is not planning to subsidize dangerous new reactors at all.

The Times says the Government has warned EDF Energy, and its junior partner Centrica, that nuclear power subsidies must be lower than offshore wind power, but EDF is arguing that the giant new offshore wind projects planned for the North Sea will cost £180/MWh, making nuclear slightly cheaper. In fact currently under the UK Renewables Obligation, offshore windfarms now being installed are being paid around £135 per MWh. According to senior lecturer on Energy Policy at Birmingham University, David Toke, EDF has been forced to come clean on nuclear costs, so now it is making dubious claims about offshore wind.(2) A Government and Industry taskforce set up to reduce offshore wind costs says offshore wind costs can be reduced to £100/MWh by 2020.(3)

Ed Davey says “nuclear will not receive a higher price than comparable gene-ration technologies whether they be renewables or indeed gas generation once its emissions have been abated by carbon capture and storage.”(4) If it is more expensive to get electricity from new nuclear power stations than offshore wind then the government’s commitment to nuclear will become dif-ficult to maintain – we might as well just build more offshore wind farms.(5)

Toke asks “will the British Treasury sign off on this plan to increase average British electricity prices by 8 per cent for 25 years to produce 6 per cent of UK electricity from nuclear power?” The Government claims that energy bills will have to go up whatever we do. Its answer to this was supposed to be The Green Deal. But this now looks incre-asingly unlikely to deliver the savings to consumers promised. The plan is to offer Green Deal loans of up to £10,000 to help consumers insulate their homes and reduce fuel bills, but the interest charged will be at the usual rate of around 7.5%. So consumers will have to spend £22,000 to pay the loan back over 25 years requiring households to deliver energyefficiency savings of £900 a year to cover the cost of annual loan repayments.(6)

In contrast, in Germany, where nuclear power is being phased out by 2022, loans at very low interest rates of 1-2%, have helped insulate over 2m homes, employing 200,000 people a year in the process, and German homeowners can borrow up to €75,000 to give them a very cosy and efficient home indeed. (7)

Greenpeace and WWF wrote to The Times pointing out that the costs of nu-clear power are going up not down. The EPRs at Flamanville and Olkiluoto are now £2.7 billion and £2.6 billion over-budget respectively. The huge subsidy of £2.8 billion per year being sought for two reactors at Hinkley was in stark contrast to another fight within Whitehall over levels of support for onshore wind power with the Treasury pushing for a reduction in support for wind power that would save less than £20 million per year. (8) (The Treasury lost the battle, but only after DECC made concessions on gas).

EDF denied that it was negotiating for a strike price of £165/MWh. It said it expects to reach a transparent agreement with the Government that is fair and balanced. It will show that nuclear is affordable and cost-competitive. (9) The Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) said “if it were true, the figure of £165/MWH would make new nuclear virtually untenable. Fortunately, it is not true. Ra-ther, it is spectacular speculation.” (10) But NIA does not speculate on what the real price might be.

The cost of the EPR being built at Flamanville, has already doubled to €6 billion (about £4.5 billion) from €3 billion and the project is four years behind schedule. Flamanville-3 is the reference design for the UK EPR. At £5 billion, Ian Jackson of Chatham House estimates that EDF would need £91.50/MWh just to break even on a Hinkley Point reac-tor. In addition to breaking even, EDF is expecting to earn a return on its invest-ment which would bump the final strike price up to about £148/MWh. Other analysts, notably Peter Atherton of Ci-tibank, have publicly projected a strike price of between £150 and £200/MWh.(11) The Financial Times says a person close to the negotiations on the level of government support energy companies should receive reckons that EDF Energy and Centrica will need a price of at least £100/MWh – more than double the present wholesale power price of about £41/MWh – to justify the huge investment needed in new nuclear plants. He said the upper limit of any such support would be about £130-£140/MWh – the cost of electricity generated by offshore wind farms. “If you can’t do [nuclear] for that price, then you might as well build more wind farms”. (12)

David Toke says the Government could hardly set the strike price any higher than £100/MWh because this is the figure the Treasury wants offshore wind power to come down to. This would be a soft landing for a policy retreat. The Government may say that £100/MWh is profitable for nuclear power, but it is unlikely to lead to any being built. Lots of rumors, hopeful stories, yes, because the British Government (and the nuclear industry) does not want to admit that nuclear power is a dead duck.(13) 

The latest news is that the chief execu-tive of General Electric, has described nuclear power as so expensive com-pared with other forms of energy that it has become “really hard” to justify. (14) And now EDF says it is considering looking for more partners for its UK nuclear projects to help it share costs and limit its debt burden – an admission perhaps that French state owned industry is no longer able to afford the huge nuclear costs on its own.(15)

Sources:
(1) Spinwatch, 22 May 2012 www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-ca-tegory-mainmenu-8/67-nuclear/5501-when...
(2) David Toke’s Green Energy Blog, 16 July 2012 http://realfeed-intariffs.blogs-pot.co.uk/2012/07/its-official-nuclear-p...
(3) Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Task-force Report, June 2012 www.bwea. com/pdf/publications/Offshore_Task_ Force_Report.pdf 
(4) Liberal Democrat Voice, 20 April 2012 www.libdemvoice.org/there-will-be-no-public-subsidy-for-nu-clear-28150.h...
(5) Left Foot Forward, 18 July 2012  www.leftfootforward.org/2012/07/lea-ked-report-nuclear-energy-ed-davey/ 
(6) Business Green, 17 July 2012 www. businessgreen.com/bg/news/2191949/exclusive-which-warns-of-green-deal-s-devastating-impact-on-efficiency-efforts (7) Guardian, 24 May 2012 www. guardian.co.uk/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2012/may/24/green-investment-bank-energy-efficiency 
(8) The Times, 18 July 2012 www. thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/arti-cle3478465.ece 
(9) The Times, 19 July 2012 www. thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/arti-cle3479871.ece
(10)NIA Blog,  18 July 2012 http://uknu-clear.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/lies-damned-lies-and-speculat...
(11) i-Nuclear, 19 July 2012 www.i-nu-clear.com/2012/07/19/edf-says-repor-ted-strike-price-of-165mwh-...  
(12) Financial Times, 23 July 2012 www. ft.com/cms/s/0/3dda6692-d29d-11e1- 8700-00144feabdc0.html 
(13) David Toke’s Blog, 24 July 2012 http://realfeed-intariffs.blogspot.
co.uk/2012_07_01_archive.html 
(14) FT, 30 July 2012 www.ft.com/cms/s/60189878-d982-11e1-8529- 00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html 
(15) Reuters, 31 July 2012 www.reuters. com/article/2012/07/31/edf-results-idUSL6E8IV2LX20120731

Contact: Pete Roche
Email: rochepete8[at]aol.com
Web: www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk

 

EPR fiasco unravelling in France and the UK

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#812
4501
15/10/2015
Jim Green − Nuclear Monitor editor
Article

French utility EDF has once again pushed back the estimated start-up date and upped the cost estimate of the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) under construction at Flamanville, France. There was no attempt to sugar-coat the fiasco by the World Nuclear Association, which noted that the estimated cost has more than tripled − from €3.3 billion (US$3.7b) to €10.5 billion (US$11.8b) − and the estimated six-year construction timeline has nearly doubled to 11 years.1

Concerns were revealed earlier this year about the structural integrity of pressure vessels in EPRs under construction in France and China. WISE-Paris has released a briefing on the problems.2 Drawing on information from the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and its technical support organisation, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), WISE-Paris states:

"Available analysis released by the French nuclear safety authorities confirms the serious and exceptional nature of the defect found on the head and bottom of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) of the EPR reactor at Flamanville, in France, and most probably those of Taishan 1 and 2 in China. All three units are under construction.

This defect consists in a "major positive segregation", which describes an area where the carbon concentration is found to be higher than the limit expected and requested under technical specifications in the steel that was used for fabrication. The excess in carbon reaches up to 50% higher levels than expected in the affected area, which covers more than one meter in diameter and spreads through more than half of the head thickness. This appears to be much higher in scope than any other known segregation on similar components within the French operating nuclear fleet.

The mechanical properties will be affected in the segregated area, which could therefore jeopardize the possibility to exclude with certainty the risk of RPV rupture in some operational conditions. This certainty is one of the fundamentals of the reactor's safety assessment.

The presence of the segregated zone results from the choice that Areva made regarding the forging process of the concerned components by its daughter company Creusot Forges. The analysis shows that another process, which has been used by Japan Steel Works (JSW) to forge similar components for the EPR reactor under construction in Finland, would most likely have allowed to avoid such segregations. In the case of the bottom, which is a little less thick than the head, it also appears that yet another process (directed solidification ingot), which is used by Creusot Forges for other pieces, could have been used to avoid the problem.

According to the analysis of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and its technical support organisation, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), Areva therefore chose, contrary to regulatory guidelines, a fabrication process which had not received technical qualification beforehand and which did not use the best available technology. ASN says that it warned Areva on various occasions against the industrial risk that it took when proceeding with fabrication despite those concerns. Moreover, according to the same analysis, Areva's technical assessment of the risk and characterization of a segregated zone forming in the pieces was wrong.

While there is no indication of any dissimulation at this stage, the reasons why the parts could be forged in 2006-2007, welded with other components of the RPV, and why this RPV could be received by the operator EDF, installed in the reactor building and welded with other components of the primary circuit in 2014, without any stop-point of any sort, remain to be understood. ...The programme of studies and tests that Areva proposed is expected to deliver its results in the first half of 2016, allowing for the Advisory Group to discuss them by mid-2016 at the earliest. ASN could therefore not make its final decision about the acceptability of the RPV before the second half of 2016, even if the study and testing results were conclusive."

If remedial action is required, it could be extremely expensive and time-consuming. The pressure vessel problems could kill the Flamanville project and destroy Areva's already bleak chances of securing further overseas orders for EPRs.

UK EPR

Pierre-Franck Chevet, head of ASN, said the two EPRs planned for Hinkley Point in the UK could be affected as pressure vessels for those reactors have already been manufactured using the same techniques.3

Delays with the Flamanville EPR − arising from the pressure vessel fiasco, or any of the other fiascos that have plagued the project, or any fiascos that have yet to emerge − could directly impact the planned EPRs at Hinkley Point. The European Commission's conditional support4 for the extraordinary subsidies on offer from the UK government to get the project moving are subject to a legal challenge launched by Austria and others. Moreover, the EC ruling was conditional, and one of the conditions is that if the Flamanville reactor is not operational by the end of 2020, the UK government's financial guarantees become invalid. The complexities of the arrangement were recently explained by Oliver Tickell in The Ecologist.5 The EC noted that its conditions were intended to ensure that shareholders and not the guarantor (British taxpayers) "retain the principal exposure to the viability of the EPR technology until such time as there is objective evidence for confidence through the success of precedent projects such as Flamanville 3 and Taishan 1."

The UK government is still trying to rescue the Hinkley Point project despite a growing chorus of criticism. British utilities pulled out of the project long ago. The capacity of French utilities EDF and Areva to fund the project is constrained by Areva's massive debts (and a restructure which will likely see EDF take on some of Areva's risks and liabilities).

The two Chinese utilities with a stake in the project − China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) − seem to be reluctant to increase their stake in the project. The Chinese are playing hard-ball: their asks include options for Chinese involvement in planned reactors at other sites in the UK (Bradwell and Sizewell are the two sites mentioned in media reports), and some sort of agreement for the UK to consider licensing Chinese reactor technology in the UK (e.g. the Hualong One design6).

The Guardian newspaper opined: "In short, the Chinese have [UK Chancellor George] Osborne over a barrel. One wonders what other incentives have been offered to avoid a humiliating U-turn on Hinkley. The final deal, assuming it is agreed, should be published in full: and parliament should comb every line."7

EDF hopes to sign an agreement with the Chinese utilities while Chinese President Xi Jinping is in the UK from October 20−23. But if any agreement is signed, much of the detail will be missing and it would not amount to a formal, binding agreement to proceed.8

A chorus of criticism

The Hinkley EPR project is now under sustained attack − and not just from the traditional anti-nuclear voices.9,10 The project is opposed by British Establishment figures such as Lord Turnbull (former head of the UK civil service), Lord Lawson (former Chancellor), Lord Howell (former Energy Secretary), and London Mayor Boris Johnson. It is also opposed by most of the mainstream and conservative UK newspapers.

Increasingly, nuclear power advocates are voicing outright opposition. Lady Barbara Judge, former chair of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, said the project is too expensive and uses unreliable technology.11 Vocal nuclear advocates George Monbiot, Mark Lynas and Chris Goodall say that the Hinkley project is an overpriced white elephant and should be abandoned in favour of "other low carbon technologies, both renewable and nuclear."12

Bipartisan support for Hinkley may soon be a thing of the past. The Opposition Labour Party's new Shadow Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Lisa Nandy, wrote to the Public Accounts Committee in late September calling for an investigation into the Hinkley project. Nandy said: "I have serious concerns about the value for money this deal provides for bill payers, the likely impact of such a deal on the most vulnerable in society, and have serious questions about the bid process itself."13

Two credit ratings agencies have warned EDF and its Chinese partners that they face rating downgrades if they press ahead with Hinkley Point. Moody's said the project would have a "credit negative effect" because of the risk of large cost overruns and delays. Standard & Poor's warned of the impact on EDF's balance sheet of the Hinkley project.14

References:

1. World Nuclear News, 3 Sept 2015, 'Flamanville EPR timetable and costs revised', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Flamanville-EPR-timetable-and-costs-revise...

2. WISE Paris Briefing, 1 Oct 2015, 'EPR Flamanville 3: Justification Case of the Pressure Vessel', www.dropbox.com/l/s/lg10Xgg8YAPm3ckhDHUgjq

See also the EnerWebWatch website which has numerous documents regarding flaws with EPR pressure vessels: www.enerwebwatch.eu/EPR-t44.html

3. John Lichfield, 18 April 2015, 'UK nuclear strategy faces meltdown as faults are found in identical French project', www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-nuclear-strategy-faces-meltdo...

4. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251157/251157_1615983_22...

5. Oliver Tickell, 2 Oct 2015, 'Flamanville nuclear safety fail sounds death knell for Hinkley C', www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2985650/flamanville_nuclear_safe...

6. www.stophinkley.org/PressReleases/pr150922China_File.pdf

7. 27 Sept 2015, 'Hinkley Point: what price avoiding humiliation?', www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/27/hinkley-point-what-price-avoidi...

8. Reuters, 2 Oct 2015, 'China president's UK visit is chance for EDF to clinch Hinkley Point deal', www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3257301/China-presidents-UK-vi...

9. nuClear news No.78, October 2015, 'The Hinkley Saga is a National Embarrassment', www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/nuclearnews/NuClearNewsNo78.pdf

10. Ian Fairlie, 21 Sept 2015, '30 Media Comments Opposing Hinkley C', www.ianfairlie.org/news/21-media-comments-opposing-hinkley-c/

11. Infrastructure Intelligence, 25 Sept 2015, www.infrastructureintelligence.com/article/sep-
2015/french-nucleartechnology-too-expensiveand-unproven-says-iod-boss

12. George Monbiot, Mark Lynas, and Chris Goodall, 19 Sept 2015, 'We are pro-nuclear, but Hinkley C must be scrapped', www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/18/we-are-pro-nuclear-but-hinkl...

13. Lisa Nandy, 28 Sept 2015, 'We need an investigation into Osborne's plans for nuclear power stations', http://labourlist.org/2015/09/we-need-an-investigation-into-osbornes-pla...

14. Robin Pagnamenta, 3 Oct 2015, 'EDF faces threat of credit downgrade over Hinkley Point'

www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/utilities/article4574734.ece

About: 
Hinkley Point-B2

European Pressurized Reactors − a negative learning curve on steroids

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#803
4467
07/05/2015
Jim Green − Nuclear Monitor editor
Article

The French European Pressurized Reactor (a.k.a. Evolutionary Power Reactor) was the first Generation III design to win orders, first in Finland in 2003 (Olkiluoto 3 − the first reactor order in Western Europe in 15 years), France in 2006 (Flamanville) and China in 2007 (two EPRs at Taishan).

Since then, EPRs have faced one problem after another. All three EPR construction projects have suffered cost blowouts or delays or both.

Since the contract was signed in 2003 for a new EPR in Finland, the estimated cost has risen from €3.2 billion (US$3.6b) to €8.5 billion (US$9.5b). Areva has already made provision for a €2.7 billion (US$3.0b) writedown on the project, with further losses expected.1 French and Finnish utilities have been locked in legal battles over the cost overruns for several years.1,2 The project is nine years behind schedule − the start-up date has been pushed back from 2009 to 2018.3

The estimated cost of the Flamanville EPR in France has increased from €3.3 billion (US$3.7b) to at least €9 billion (US$10.1b).4,5 The first concrete was poured in 2007 and commercial operation was expected in 2012, but that timeframe has been pushed back to 2017 (with further delays likely).6

The British Daily Mail characterised the Flamanville EPR project as one "beset by financial mismanagement with rocketing costs, the deaths of workers, an appalling inability to meet construction deadlines, industrial chaos, and huge environmental concerns", and notes that "it continues to be plagued by delays, soaring costs, and litigation in both the criminal and civil courts."7

The two EPRs under construction in China are 13–15 months behind schedule.8

Since the Fukushima disaster, a number of countries that might have considered EPRs pulled back from earlier interest in new reactors − the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, among others.8 In 2012, new-build tender processes in Finland and the Czech Republic rejected the EPR.

In the US, a total of seven EPRs were planned at six sites.9 Four EPR construction licence applications were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) − Unistar's Nine Mile Point (New York), Ameren's Callaway (Missouri), PPL's Bell Bend (Pennsylvania) and Constellation's Calvert Cliffs (Maryland). All of those applications have been abandoned or suspended. In February 2015, Areva asked the NRC to suspend work on EPR design certification until further notice.10

EPRs were considered at various sites in Canada − including Alberta and Darlington, Ontario − but those plans were shelved and a generic licensing process by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission was terminated.11

In 2009, Italian utility Enel and EDF planned to build four EPRs but that plan was scrapped after Italy's June 2011 referendum which rejected nuclear power. In 2012, Enel pulled out of the Flamanville EPR project.12

The United Arab Emirates chose South Korean reactor technology over EPRs. Reflecting on that decision, former EDF head Francois Roussely concluded that while the EPR is "one of the best" third-generation designs, the complexity of the design is a "handicap". Likewise, Cambridge University nuclear engineer Tony Roulstone said in an October 2014 lecture that the EPR design is very safe but extraordinarily difficult to build − he described it as "unconstructable".13

According to the US NRC, EPRs have four sets of active safety systems, each capable of cooling the reactor on its own, and other safety features including a double-walled containment and a "core catcher" for holding melted reactor core materials after a severe accident.14 But the safety of some EPR design choices has been questioned by the French government's Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety15, and the EPR licensing process in the UK has been criticised.16

Pressure vessel problems

On 7 April 2015, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) announced that fabrication defects had been found in the reactor pressure vessel of the Flamanville EPR. Tests revealed areas with high carbon concentration resulting in "lower than expected mechanical toughness values".17,18

Pierre-Franck Chevet, head of ASN, said: "It is a serious fault, even a very serious fault, because it involves a crucial part of the nuclear reactor."19

The results of further tests are expected by October 2015. In one scenario, ASN will not require any remedial action and there will be minimal consequences for Areva. But if remedial action is required, it could be extremely expensive and problematic for Areva, all the more so because the pressure vessel has already been installed in the Flamanville EPR. Asked what would happen if tests were negative, Chevet said: "Either EDF abandons the project or it takes out the vessel and starts building a new one ... this would be a very heavy operation in terms of cost and delay."20

In a worst-case scenario for Areva, the pressure vessel problem would kill the Flamanville reactor project. A former senior nuclear safety official told Le Parisien: "If the weakness of the steel is proved, I don't hold out much hope for the survival of the [Flamanville] EPR project."19

Actually there are even worse scenarios for Areva − the latest problems could hasten the demise of EPR projects altogether, and might even tip Areva into bankruptcy. Areva posted a €4.83 billion (US$5.4b) loss for 2014 and is negotiating a rescue package with the French government. Areva's CEO Philippe Knoche said in response to the 2014 financial loss: "The scale of the net loss for 2014 illustrates the two-fold challenge confronting Areva: continuing stagnation of the nuclear operations, lack of competitiveness and difficulties in managing the risks inherent in large projects. The group understands how serious the situation is."21

Energy specialist Thomas Olivier Leautier from the Toulouse School of Economics said: "Areva's financial situation is critical, the EPR is as crucial to them as the iPhone was to Apple. Their failure in Finland and now the problem in Flamanville could prove fatal."21

French environmental minister Ségolène Royal congratulated ASN on its speedy reaction to the pressure vessel problem.4 Others are asking why the problem was not discovered before the vessel was installed. It is believed the problem involved an inaccurate material inspection device used between 2009 and 2014.22

ASN's Pierre-Franck Chevet acknowledged that "mistakes had been made". He said: "It is more than 15 years since the last nuclear power stations were constructed in France. The expertise in some trades has not been sufficiently passed on from one generation to the next."19

Chevet said the two planned EPRs planned for Hinkley Point in the UK could be affected as identical safety casings have already been manufactured for those reactors using the same manufacturing techniques.19

The two EPRs under construction in China might also be affected since the pressure vessels for those reactors were forged by Areva subsidiary Creusot Forge, as was the Flamanville vessel.23 China will not load fuel at the Taishan EPRs until safety issues have been resolved, China's environment ministry said.24

A senior manager of a Chinese nuclear company, speaking anonymously to the South China Morning Post, said: "The people responsible for this need to be sacked. It shouldn't have happened. All materials must be checked thoroughly before use − that's a basic requirement. The urgent task is to launch a quality inspection in Taishan as soon as possible. Each batch of materials varies slightly. We will cross our fingers and pray for the best."25

It is unlikely that the EPR under construction in Finland is at risk of a defective pressure vessel, as the vessel was forged by Japan Steel Works. Nevertheless, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has instructed energy utility TVO carry out new tests of the durability of the pressure vessel.26

A future for EPRs?

An immediate priority for Areva is to keep the UK Hinkley Point EPR project moving ahead. That project faces a legal challenge under EU regulations against the massive subsidies being offered by the UK government. Areva also has to sort out unresolved issues with its Chinese project partners. And it needs to find additional partners to cover capital costs.

Ironically, Areva itself may not have the resources for its expected 10% stake in Hinkley Point. Chief executive Philippe Knoche recently declined to
commit to the 10% figure, and the head of Areva's reactors and services division said: "Our current financial situation obviously will make things more difficult."

Bloomberg noted in an April 16 article that Areva's EPR export ambitions are now in "tatters". Bloomberg quoted former World Nuclear Association executive Steve Kidd, who said "everyone was laughing" at Areva's projections for EPR sales. Kidd blames the EPR saga in part on the French government's 80% ownership of Areva: "Everyone in the know could tell the chickens were going to come home to roost. I don't think that would have happened in a private business."5

According to trade union sources, Philippe Knoche said in February that the utility was likely to sell only about a dozen EPRs in the years up to 2030, down from 25 predicted previously.27

If Areva is to secure a dozen orders by 2030, it will need further orders from China − which seems increasingly unlikely. Steve Thomas from Greenwich University says reactors built by Areva and Westinghouse "are just too expensive for the Chinese."5

Philippe Knoche says Areva will emphasise growth in China, which he described as the "new frontier" of global nuclear power.10 The two EPRs under construction at Taishan will likely be completed (unless the pressure vessel problem becomes a major obstacle). It is doubtful whether two additional EPRs planned for the same site will proceed, and still more doubtful that EPRs will be built at other sites.

An agreement (but not a binding contract) to build two EPRs at India's Jaitapur site was signed in 2010. The project has moved at snail's pace. Construction was to start in 2013 but unresolved issues (including financial arrangements) continue to delay the project.28

Perhaps Areva will secure further orders in France. That will depend in part on debates over future reliance on nuclear power and other electricity sources, and a debate over permitted lifetimes for the current fleet of reactors.

Areva is involved in developing a 1.1 gigawatt pressurized water reactor called ATMEA. But in March 2015 Areva recognized an €80 million (US$89m) impairment for its share of ATMEA development costs "following the downward revision in the number and schedule of potential sales of this reactor outside Turkey, in the absence of tangible progress in the selection processes of the countries involved at the end of 2014."

The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014 states:

"The smaller PWR design, ATMEA, developed in collaboration with Mitsubishi, has been mentioned as an option for Jordan, Hungary, Argentina, and Turkey for the Sinop project. However, these are all, at best, long shots and unless ATMEA attracts interest in more prestigious markets and get comprehensive safety approval from a highly experienced regulator, it appears to have little future."8

Lessons from the EPR saga

What to make of the EPR saga? Areva is backing the wrong horse − the outcome of current political debates will result in a declining role for nuclear power in France, coupled to the growth of renewables.

Areva has also backed the wrong-sized wrong horse: a giant reactor with a giant price-tag.

Areva has backed the wrong-sized wrong horse at the wrong time − the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath, stagnant energy demand, the liberalization of energy markets, the political fallout from the Fukushima disaster and other factors have dampened demand for new reactors and made it more difficult to secure finance (or government subsidies) for huge projects.

The EPR saga undermines the rhetoric of standardised, simplified reactors designs ushering in a new era of nuclear growth.

The EPR might have demonstrated the potential for mass production to drive down costs − but in reality it is demonstrating the opposite.

The EPR saga shows that developing modified versions of conventional reactors (in this case pressurized water reactors) can be complicated and protracted and can end in failure. How much more difficult will it be to develop radically new types of reactors?

The EPR saga shows that even countries with extensive nuclear expertise and experience can mess things up.

Even before the EPR fiasco, the large-scale, standardised French nuclear power program was subject to a negative economic learning curve − costs were increasing over time.29 The EPR represents a negative learning curve on steroids. That point is emphasised by construction cost estimates of £16−24.5 billion (US$24.3−37.2b; €21.7−33.2b) for two planned EPRs (with combined capacity of 3.2 gigawatts) in the UK.30 In the mid- to late-2000s, the estimated construction cost for an EPR was £2 billion31; current estimates are 4−6 times higher.

Private companies have pulled out of EPR projects in several countries (Italy, the US, the UK, etc.). Thus the EPR fiasco reinforces points made in the International Energy Agency's World Economic Outlook 2014 report − that nuclear growth will be "concentrated in markets where electricity is supplied at regulated prices, utilities have state backing or governments act to facilitate private investment," and conversely, "nuclear power faces major challenges in competitive markets where there are significant market and regulatory risks".32

References:

1. World Nuclear Association, April 2015, 'Nuclear Power in Finland', www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Finland/

2. World Nuclear News, 6 July 2012, 'Partial ruling on Olkiluoto 3', www.world-nuclear-news.org/-Arbitration_court_rules_on_Olkiluoto_3-06071...

3. Reuters, 1 Sept 2014, 'Finland's nuclear plant start delayed again; Areva, TVO trade blame', www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/01/finland-nuclear-olkiluoto-idUSL5N0R20...

4. 21 Apr 2015, France's nuclear calamity has UK worried, www.thelocal.fr/20150421/flamanville-frances-own-nuclear-nightmare

5. Carol Matlack, 16 April 2015, 'Areva Is Costing France Plenty', www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/france-s-areva-falters-in-rea...

6. World Nuclear Association, March 2015, 'Nuclear Power in France', www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/France/

7. Steve Bird, 26 Oct 2013, 'Deaths, chilling safety lapses, lawsuits, huge cost over-runs and delays: Why we can't trust the French with Britain's nuclear future', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2477202/Deaths-chilling-safety-lapses-l...

8. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, www.worldnuclearreport.org/-2014-.html

9. Beyond Nuclear, Feb 2015, 'Epic Fail: Électricité de France and the "Evolutionary Power Reactor"', http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/25937356/1423508130603/Epic...

10. World Nuclear News, 6 March 2015, 'US EPR plans suspended', www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-US-EPR-plans-suspended-0603157.html

11. World Nuclear Association, Feb 2015, 'Nuclear Power in Canada', www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Canada--Nuclea...

12. World Nuclear Association, Nov 2014, 'Nuclear Power in Italy', www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Italy/

13. Carbon Commentary, 22 Oct 2014, 'Cambridge nuclear engineer casts doubt on whether Hinkley Point EPR nuclear plant can be constructed', www.carboncommentary.com/blog/2014/10/22/cambridge-nuclear-engineer-cast...

14. US NRC, Aug 2014, 'New Nuclear Plant Designs', www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/new-nuc-plant-des-bg.pdf

15. Louis Germain and Martin Leers, 21 Jan 2015, 'EDF's chaotic approach of French EPR reactor safety', http://journaldelenergie.com/nucleaire/edfs-chaotic-approach-french-epr-...

16. Emma Bateman, 26 Dec 2013, 'Hinkley C: the Generic Design Assessment has failed', www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2209776/hinkley_c_t...

17. Yves Marignac, WISE-­Paris, April 2015, 'Fabrication Flaws in the Pressure Vessel of the EPR Flamanville-3', http://bit.ly/EPR_WISE-Paris

Summary posted at: http://safeenergy.org/2015/04/13/the-epr-anamoly/

18. WNN, 20 April 2015, 'Flamanville construction continues while vessel tests due', www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Flamanville-construction-continues-while-v...

19. John Lichfield, 18 April 2015, 'UK nuclear strategy faces meltdown as faults are found in identical French project', www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-nuclear-strategy-faces-meltdo...

20. Reuters, 17 April 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/04/17/areva-nuclear-idUKL5N0XE1132015...

21. Liza Malykhina, 17 April 2015, 'France's nuclear power giant beset by setbacks', www.france24.com/en/20150417-french-nuclear-company-faces-major-setbacks/

22. Nadya Masidlover, 22 April 2015, 'Areva reassures on nuclear-reactor components', www.marketwatch.com/story/areva-reassures-on-nuclear-reactor-components-...

23. World Nuclear News, 22 April 2015, 'Areva reviews forging inspections', www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Areva-reviews-forging-inspections-2204156.html

24. Reuters, 16 April 2015, 'China says no fuel loading at Areva-designed reactor until safety issues cleared', http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/04/16/china-nuclear-areva-idINL4N0XD3...

25. Stephen Chen, 10 April 2015, 'French warning on nuclear reactors being built in China's Guangdong', www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1762861/french-warning-nuclear-reactors-...

26. YLE, 18 April 2015, 'Nuclear watchdog seeks re-check of Olkiluoto 3 reactor', http://yle.fi/uutiset/nuclear_watchdog_seeks_re-check_of_olkiluoto_3_rea...

27. Reuters, 27 Feb 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/us-areva-strategy-idUSKBN0LV1IA20150227

28. World Nuclear Association, 17 April 2015, 'Nuclear Power in India', www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/India/

29. Arnulf Grubler, September 2010, 'The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing', Energy Policy, Vol.38, Issue 9, pp.5174–5188, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510003526

30. The higher estimate is from the European Commission and includes finance costs. European Commission, 8 Oct 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1093_en.htm

31. Steve Thomas, Mycle Schneider, and Antony Froggatt, 21 Aug 2014, 'The saga of Hinkley Point C: Europe's key nuclear decision', www.energypost.eu/saga-hinkley-point-c-europes-key-nuclear-decision/

32. International Energy Agency, 2014, 'World Economic Outlook 2014', www.worldenergyoutlook.org

About: 
Olkiluoto-3Flamanville-3Taishan-1Taishan-2

South Africa signs nuclear cooperation agreement with France

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#793
4429
30/10/2014
Article

Weeks after signing a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, South Africa has signed a similar agreement with France on October 14. The agreement covers areas including skills development, localisation of nuclear technology as well as research and development in South Africa.1,2

French nuclear company Areva said it "is ready to support this development, notably through its Generation III+ EPR reactor technology."1

South Africa's two operating nuclear power plants at Koeberg, operating since the mid-1980s, were built by French company Framatome (now Areva).

The NeutronBytes blog notes: "However, it is unlikely Areva, which has worked hard to land business in South Africa, will see any contracts for new reactors there. The reason is the Russians have offered to finance their deal, and Areva, which just dodged a "junk" rating of its stock, has committed to significantly cut back on new capital expenditures, by over 600 million euros over the next four years, to retain "investment grade" status. For its part, South Africa does not have the money to finance eight new reactors on its own."3

After earlier reports that Russia and South Africa had struck a US$50 billion (€39b) deal for eight reactors, fanned by inaccurate and overblown comments by Rosatom and contradicted by South African officials, Rosatom has acknowledged that the bilateral agreement contains "nothing concrete" in terms of actually financing and building reactors.3

It is doubtful whether Rosatom can finance a large reactor program in South Africa given its other commitments. According to the World Nuclear Association, Russia has 14 reactors planned or under construction in export markets for which it is providing at least 80% of the finance: in Belarus, Hungary, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Turkey.

South African government officials said nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries − France, China, South Korea, the US and Japan − were likely to follow.2

 

References:
1. www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-South_Africa_and_France_sign_nuclear_accor...
2. www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/us-safrica-nuclear-france-idUSKCN0HZ1...
3. http://neutronbytes.com/2014/10/12/nuclear-news-for-101214-is-a-mix-of-p...
See also http://neutronbytes.com/2014/10/05/areva-stock-facing-junk-status-from-s...

UK nuclear power deal − much ado about nothing?

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#771
02/11/2013
Jim Green - Nuclear Monitor editor
Article

The UK Government and French utility EDF have reached initial agreement on terms of a proposed contract for the Hinkley Point C (HPC) nuclear power station in Somerset, paving the way for the construction of the first new nuclear plant in the UK since Sizewell B began operation in 1995. Operation of the first of two 1.6 gigawatt (GW) HPC reactors is scheduled to commence in 2023. The government's October 21 announcement says HPC will "begin the process of replacing the existing fleet of nuclear stations, most of which are due to close in the 2020s."[1]

However the HPC project faces many hurdles and potential delays. The government said the agreement with EDF is not legally binding.[1] EDF said it will not give the go-ahead for construction until and unless the European Commission clears the government/EDF agreement under state aid rules designed to prevent the distortion of Europe's electricity market. EDF said it would make its final investment decision by July 2014, but the European Commission examination may take longer.

Stop Hinkley spokesperson Nikki Clark said the "announcement was much ado over nothing and despite all the fanfare and visits of the rich and famous to Hinkley, there is no legally binding agreement, nor will there be until the government get their plans past the European Commission which, according to various media outlets, would be summer 2014 at the earliest."[2]

Labour MP Alan Whitehead said "it's not much of a deal, more a kind of semi crayoned-in statement of intent and a very expensive one at that. ... At the moment there seem to be a lot more things that we don't know than things we do know about this deal." Whitehead notes that in 2009, EDF said it planned to start producing power at Hinkley C in 2017.[3] So with the current 2023 start-up date, the project is already six years behind schedule.

It may be that economics, along with the myriad implications of the Fukushima disaster, kill off the current HPC project just as Margaret Thatcher's plans for HPC were killed off by economics and Chernobyl.[4]

The government's October 21 announcement states that project partners would be required to start putting money into a fund from the first day of electricity generation to pay for decommissioning and waste management costs associated with HPC.[1] However it is silent on where the waste might be disposed of. Martin Forwood from Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment said: "The Government's fetish for nuclear power, which has seen Ministers scraping the world's barrel for investors to support its craving, is only matched by its determination to see the industry's nuclear wastes dumped in suspect geology in Cumbria."[5]

EPRs

EDF plans to build EPRs (European Pressurized Reactor) at Hinkley and Sizewell. No EPRs are operating − or have ever operated − anywhere in the world. The construction of two EPRs in China appears to be on schedule and largely untroubled [6] − though of course the Chinese state is not known for its transparency.

The other two EPR projects − one reactor each in Finland and France − have been disastrous. When the contract was signed in 2003 for a new EPR in Finland, completion was anticipated in 2009. Now, commercial operation is not anticipated until 2015 — six years behind schedule.[7] And utility TVO recently announced that it is "prepared for the possibility" that the plant may not start up until 2016 − seven years behind schedule.[8] The estimated cost has ballooned from 3 billion euros to 8 billion.[9] Project partners Areva and TVO have been engaged in extensive, ongoing litigation regarding cost overruns.[10]

EDF's Flamanville 3 EPR reactor in France is behind schedule — it was originally meant to enter service in 2012 but that date has been pushed back to 2016.[11] Its estimated cost has grown from 3.3 billion euros to 8.5 billion.[12]

The Daily Mail characterised the French EPR project as one "beset by financial mismanagement with rocketing costs, the deaths of workers, an appalling inability to meet construction deadlines, industrial chaos, and huge environmental concerns", and notes that "it continues to be plagued by delays, soaring costs, and litigation in both the criminal and civil courts." A report by France's nuclear safety authority in 2011 found 13 incidents of below-standard safety measures. In 2011, two former EDF employees were jailed for spying on anti-nuclear campaigners and the company was fined £1.2 million for the crime.[13] Italian utility Enel pulled out of the project last December.[14]

Chinese partners

The EDF Group has announced the intent of two Chinese companies, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Corporation (CGN), to invest in HPC as minority shareholders, following the signing earlier in October of a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear energy cooperation between the UK and Chinese governments.[1]

EDF has been working as a partner with CGN and CNNC for 30 years, including a joint venture to build two EPRs in Taishan, China.[15]

According to Nuclear Energy Insider, EDF will have between a 45% and 50% stake in the project, CNNC and CGN will take 30-40% between them, Areva will take 10%, and EDF is discussing with interested companies about the remaining 15%.[16] The sovereign wealth funds of Kuwait or Qatar are rumoured to be in the running; in 2010 the Kuwait Investment Authority paid 600 million euros for a 4.8% stake in Areva.[17]

Of the four major partners − EDF, Areva, CNNC and CGN − three are 100% state-owned and one is 85% state-owned; two are French and two Chinese.[18]

No UK firms are involved after Centrica pulled out of the HPC project earlier this year. Centrica chief executive Sam Laidlaw said that since its initial investment the "anticipated project costs in new nuclear have increased" while the construction timetable "has extended by a number of years".[19] Other utilities have also given up on the UK nuclear program; for example German utilities E.on and RWE reneged on their promise to invest in new nuclear at Anglesey.[20]

Former Labour Party chancellor Alistair Darling said the government should look at publicly funding new nuclear plants: "It will be the next generation that pay for these very high wholesale prices of electricity and the point is, you need to ask yourself would it be better for the state to do it as opposed to what looks like quite an expensive deal?"[21]

Chinese investment in the UK nuclear program has generated some consternation. Consultant John Large said: "We can see that even with the French operatorship of UK nuclear power stations [through EDF] that there are differences in the regulatory regimes in France and the UK. But these problems would be much more profound with the Chinese, who like the Russians, are rooted in a government system without independent [safety] regulators."[22]

A GMB union leader said it was "almost Orwellian" to allow a country like China, which has been linked to allegations of corporate hacking, to be allowed access to highly sensitive energy infrastructure. A survey of 75 companies in major emerging economies by Transparency International found that Chinese companies were the least likely to publish financial information and vital details about corporate structure that allows them to be held to account.[22]

China's domestic nuclear power program certainly leaves much to be desired. He Zuoxiu, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said earlier this year that "to reduce costs, Chinese designs often cut back on safety".[24]

Li Yulun, a former vice-president of CNNC, said in October that Chinese "state leaders have put a high priority on [nuclear safety] but companies executing projects do not seem to have the same level of understanding." Li Yulun noted that Westinghouse has yet to receive approval from British authorities for a modified version of the AP1000 reactor design, while Chinese nuclear safety regulators approved it several years earlier.[25]

In August 2009, the Chinese government dismissed and arrested CNNC president Kang Rixin in a US$260 million corruption case involving allegations of bid-rigging in nuclear power plant construction.[26]

The first reactor designed and built entirely by the Chinese — in 1990 at Qinshan — had to be torn down and rebuilt because of faults in the foundation and the welding of the steel vessel that contained the reactor itself.[27]

In 2011, Chinese physicist He Zuoxiu warned that "we're seriously underprepared, especially on the safety front" for a rapid expansion of nuclear power. Qiang Wang and his colleagues from the Chinese Academy of Sciences noted in April 2011 that China "still lacks a fully independent nuclear safety regulatory agency."[27] They also noted that China's nuclear administrative systems are fragmented among multiple agencies; and China also lags behind the US, France, and Japan when it comes to staff and budget to oversee operational reactors.[28]

Cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011 highlight the secrecy of the bidding process for nuclear power plant contracts in China, the influence of government lobbying, and potential weaknesses in the management and regulatory oversight. Westinghouse representative Gavin Liu was quoted in a cable as saying: "The biggest potential bottleneck is human resources – coming up with enough trained personnel to build and operate all of these new plants, as well as regulate the industry."[29]

The UK government / EDF agreement has reinvigorated cross-channel rivalries. The Daily Mail explained "why we can't trust the French with Britain's nuclear future" and complained that "huge profits are expected to be milked from British consumers to go to the French."[13]

Economic jiggery-pokery

Most reports estimate a total construction cost of £16 billion for the two 1.6 GW reactors at Hinkley Point, while World Nuclear News gives a cost estimate of £14 billion.[30] The £16 billion estimate equates to £5 billion / GW (US$8.1 b / GW).

EDF (and its partners) will be guaranteed a minimum price − a 'strike price' − for the electricity generated by HPC. If wholesale market prices are below the strike price, the government makes up the difference; if market prices are higher, EDF will have to pay back to government. The government announcement nominates a strike price of £89.50 / megawatt-hour (MWh), fully indexed to the Consumer Price Index, or £92.50/MWh if EDF does not take a final investment decision on proposed new reactors at Sizewell, Suffolk.[1] Those figures are around twice the current wholesale price.

The government announcement flags various circumstances which would lead to upwards or downwards movement of the strike price. The guaranteed minimum price will apply for 35 years.[1]

Paul Dorfman from University College London's Energy Institute says the deal ties consumers into subsidising one energy source for a whole generation − potentially at a very high level. In contrast, renewable energy sources' shorter contracts mean the subsidy can be cut if the costs of building wind turbines or solar panels fall. Dorfman predicts that the cost of nuclear "will flatline or hike, while renewables will do nothing but go down".[31]

Dorfman said the government/EDF agreement "is essentially a subsidy of what we calculate to be £800 million to £1billion a year that the UK taxpayer and energy consumer will be putting into the deep pockets of Chinese and French corporations, which are essentially their governments."[32]

In addition to the strike price deal, the government has offered to provide a loan guarantee for HPC of up to £10 billion under a scheme whereby the government uses its balance sheet to provide guarantees for major infrastructure projects.[19]

Previous promises that nuclear power would not be subsidised have clearly been breached, notwithstanding disingenuous government claims that the strike price deal and the loan guarantee do not represent subsidies. A number of expert witnesses voiced scepticism at a recent hearing of the UK Environmental Audit Committee. "This is a huge public contribution towards yesterday's energy thinking," said Alan Simpson, a former Labour MP. "I just wonder what we are inhaling."[33]

The government has been indulging in creative accounting and jiggery-pokery. The October 21 announcement asserts that the HPC project "will ... reduce consumer bills over the long-term" [1] but on the same day turncoat LibDem minister Ed Davey said: "I can't guarantee that. There are huge uncertainties here. It would be absurd to say we can guarantee everything in the 2020s."[32]

Since the 2010 promise that there would be "no public subsidy" of new nuclear, ministers have bundled up nuclear with green energy sources to claim that there would be no "unfair" subsidies for nuclear compared to other green sources. That intellectual contortion will need to be unravelled in the coming months as Prime Minister Cameron plans to reduce green levies ... without reducing subsidies available to the nuclear program.

Government claims about job creation have been equally disingenuous. Nuclear critic Tom Burke said: "The Prime Minister proudly boasted that this would create 25,000 jobs. He forgot to mention that only 900 of them will be permanent and that most of the high value jobs will be abroad. He also forgot to mention that the cost per job is over £600,000. This compares rather badly with the 320,000 jobs that could be created spending the same amount on really delivering energy efficiency improvements for British energy consumers."[34]

The government/EDF agreement "is another disgraceful example of profit being privatised and risk being socialised," Burke said.

Greenpeace UK executive director John Sauven said: "Hinkley C fails every test – economic, consumer, and environmental. It will lock a generation of consumers into higher energy bills, via a strike price that's nearly double the current price of electricity, and it will distort energy policy by displacing newer, cleaner, technologies that are dropping dramatically in price."[35]

A Greenpeace briefing paper states that the HPC strike price is not only almost double the current market price for electricity, but also well over twice the Department of Energy and Climate Change's original cost estimate for nuclear power of £38/MWh.[36]

Antony Froggatt from the Chatham House think-tank noted that in 2006, EDF's submission to a government energy review said that EPR-produced electricity would cost £28.80 / MWh in 2013 values. "This more than threefold increase [to £92.50], over eight years, puts the cost of nuclear electricity at about double the current market rate – higher than that produced by both gas and coal-fired power stations, and more costly than many renewable energy options," Froggatt said.[37]

Even nuclear convert George Monbiot weighed in with sharp criticisms: "Seven years ago, I collected all the available cost estimates for nuclear power. ... 8.3 pence was so far beyond what anyone else forecast that I treated it as scarcely credible. It falls a penny short of the price now agreed by the British government. I still support nuclear power. But none of this means that we should accept nuclear power at any cost. And at Hinkley Point the cost is too high."[38]

Monbiot adds: "That's not the only respect in which the price is too high. A fundamental principle of all development is that we should know how the story ends. In this case no one has the faintest idea. Cumbria – the only local authority which seemed prepared to accept a dump for the nuclear waste from past and future schemes – rejected the proposal in January. No one should commission a mess without a plan for clearing it up."

Monbiot's solution is nothing if not quixotic − non-existent liquid thorium reactors and non-existent integral fast reactors.

References:
[1] Edward Davey and David Cameron, 21 October 2013, 'Initial agreement reached on new nuclear power station at Hinkley', https://www.gov.uk/government/news/initial-agreement-reached-on-new-nucl...
[2] Stop Hinkley, 22 Oct 2013, www.stophinkley.org/PressReleases/pr131022.htm
[3] Alan Whitehead, 24 Oct 2013, http://alansenergyblog.wordpress.com/2013/10/24/the-knowns-the-unknowns-...
[4] Allan Jeffery, 31 July 2013, 'The Hinkley nuclear power station will never be built', www.thisiscornwall.co.uk/Hinkley-nuclear-power-station-built/story-19591...
[5] Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment, 21 Oct 2013, 'Nothing welcome about Government's new build deal', www.corecumbria.co.uk/newsapp/pressreleases/pressmain.asp?StrNewsID=326
[6] Francois de Beaupuy and Tara Patel, 25 Nov 2010, 'China Builds Nuclear Reactor for 40% Less Than Cost in France, Areva Says', www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-24/china-builds-french-designed-nuclear-r...
[7] WNN, www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Olkiluoto_3_delayed_beyond_2014-1707124.html
[8] WNN, 24 Oct 2013, 'Symbolic milestone for Finnish EPR', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Symbolic_milestone_for_Finnish_EPR-2410134...
[9] http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20121213-703038.html
[10] WNN, 11 Feb 2013, 'TVO prepares for further Olkiluoto 3 delay', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-TVO_prepares_for_further_Olkiluoto_3_delay...
[11] www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5f849de4-dbf8-11e1-86f8-00144feab49a.html
[12] http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/enel-edf-idUKL5E8N4DIJ20121204
[13] Steve Bird, 26 Oct 2013, 'Deaths, chilling safety lapses, lawsuits, huge cost over-runs and delays: Why we can't trust the French with Britain's nuclear future', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2477202/Deaths-chilling-safety-lapses-l...
[14] Reuters, 26 Feb 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/areva-nuclear-idUSL6N0BPK4820130225
[15] Aaron Larson, 23 Oct 2013, 'Agreement Sets Stage for Construction of New Nuclear Plant in UK', www.powermag.com/agreement-sets-stage-for-construction-of-new-nuclear-pl...
[16] K. Steiner-Dicks, 23 Oct 2013, 'Hinkley Point C strikes a price', http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/hinkley-point-c-strik...
[17] Reuters, 23 Oct 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/uk-edf-gulf-britain-idUKBRE99M0...
[18]Wales Online, 26 Oct 2013, www.walesonline.co.uk/news/news-opinion/rhodri-morgan-beware-price-promi...
[19] Tom Fitzpatrick, 8 Feb 2013, 'Treasury willing to back Hinkley nuclear plant with UK Guarantee', Construction News, www.cnplus.co.uk/sectors/energy/treasury-willing-to-back-hinkley-nuclear...
[20] Alex Brummer, 21 Oct 2013, 'Nuclear deal is a devastating indictment of the muddled approach of successive governments', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2471115/Nuclear-deal-means-giving-overs...
[21] Construction News, 28 Oct 2013, http://www.cnplus.co.uk/8654752.article
[22] Terry Macalister and Jennifer Rankin, 18 Oct 2013, 'Nuclear expert raises concerns about Chinese role in UK's new nuclear plants', www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/17/nuclear-expert-warning-chine...
[24] He Zuoxiu, 19 March 2013, 'Chinese nuclear disaster "highly probable" by 2030', www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5808-Chinese-nuclear-di
[25] South China Morning Post, 7 Oct 2013, 'China nuclear plant delay raises safety concern', www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1325973/china-nuclear-plant...
[26] Keith Bradsher, 15 Dec 2009, 'Nuclear Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns', www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/business/global/16chinanuke.html?_r=2&
[27] David Biello, 16 Aug 2011, 'China's nuclear ambition powers on', www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2011/08/16/3293802.htm
[28] 'China needs improved administrative system for nuclear power safety', 22 June 2011, www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2011-06/acs-cni062211.php
[29] Jonathan Watts, 25 Aug 2011, 'WikiLeaks cables reveal fears over China's nuclear safety', www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/25/wikileaks-fears-china-nuclear...
[30]WNN, 28 June 2013, 'Loan guarantee for Hinkley Point C', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Loan_guarantee_for_Hinkley_Point_C-280613S...
[31] 'An Overview of the New Nuclear Deal in the UK', 21 Oct 2013, www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/10/an-overview-of-the-new-nuclear-deal/
[32] Tamara Cohen, 21 Oct 2013, 'Nuclear plant may NOT cut bills, minister admits', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2471071/Nuclear-plant-NOT-cut-bills-adm...
[33] Michael Klimes, 23 Oct 2013, 'Subsidy-Free Nuclear Deal Questioned by Environmental Audit Committee', www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/515440/20131021/caroline-flint-generation-dav...
[34] Tom Burke, 25 Oct 2013, http://tomburke.co.uk/2013/10/25/third-or-fourth-time-lucky/
[35] Business Green, 21 Oct 2013, www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2301810/government-hails-historic-nuclear-...
[36] Greenpeace, Hinkley Strike Price Briefing, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLhBTXYpiiUMtB1e7gWQjtjVVhinLaE-ulBi...
[37] Guardian, 21 Oct 2013, www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/21/uk-nuclear-power-plant-contr...
[38] George Monbiot, 22 Oct 2013, 'The farce of the Hinkley C nuclear reactor will haunt Britain for decades', www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/21/farce-hinckley-nuclear-rea...

More information:

(Written by Nuclear Monitor editor Jim Green.)

About: 
Sizewell-BFlamanville-3

EPR: outstanding desing issues

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#751
4250
15/06/2012
Pete Roche
Article

In both the Unites States and United Kingdom, the EPR-design is awaiting approval from the nuclear regulatory bodies. A whole list of outstanding issues have to be addressed by EDF and Areva in the UK and in the US, a new revised schedule shows the EPR is unlikely to receive design certification by the nuclear regulator before the end of 2014.

On 14th December 2011 the United Kingdom’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and Environment Agency granted interim Design Acceptance Confirmations (iDACs) and interim Statements of Design Acceptability (iSoDAs) for the UK EPR and the AP1000 reactor designs. The ONR‘s interim approval for the UK EPR came with a long list of caveats – 31 so-called “GDA Issues”.

UK: Generic Design Assessment
Since then EDF and Areva have closed out only one of the 31 “GDA Issues” According to the ONR’s latest Generic Design Assessment (GDA) quarterly report — issued on 24th May for the period ending March 31 — EDF and Areva have fallen substantially behind in the number of responses to the GDA Issue resolution to date. ONR said the shortfalls in deliverables “are having an effect on our progress and on our ability to use the (outside) technical support contractors we had programmed to support our work, as their availability is not always guaranteed when the original assessment dates have been missed.”

The GDA Issue resolution plan Areva and EDF agreed to with ONR called for all GDA Issues to be resolved by November 2012. This will now extend into 2013. Areva and EDF have committed to deploy additional resources and submit a revised GDA Issue resolution plan, but ONR is still waiting to receive it. Building magazine reported in its May 25 issue, that the process is three months behind schedule.

Among the 30 remaining GDA Issues that have yet to be closed is one on the EPR’s control and instrumentation (C&I) system, which was the subject of an unprecedented joint regulatory letter from the UK, France and Finland in 2009. The French safety regulator, the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, on April 16 removed its reservations about the digital C&I system for the EPR, but the ONR is still waiting for some deliverables due from EDF and Areva on the C&I GDA Issues.

The process of working to close out the 31 “GDA Issues” is leading to some design changes, according to ONR. “We have received a number of modification proposals to amend the EPR design to take account of the solutions proposed to some of the GDA Issues,” ONR said in its latest quarterly report, citing two examples. There are two related design changes to the main coolant loop pipework and both improve the quality of inspection achievable during construction and operation.

US: delay EPR certification
Design certification in the US is also likely to be delayed: the EPR is unlikely to receive design certification by the US nuclear regulator, NRC, before the end of 2014, and even that will “present a challenge”. Design certification for the EPR had earlier been targeted for June 2013. Areva submitted its application for certification of the EPR design in December 2007 aiming to clear the way for reactors of that generic type to be built anywhere in America subject to site-specific licensing procedures and the issue of a combined construction and operating licence (COL). Four COL applications referencing the EPR have already been submitted to the NRC.

The NRC has issued a new review schedule to allow Areva to respond to outstanding technical issues previously raised by the NRC and to provide additional information related to new post-Fukushima requirements issued by the commission in February.

Under the revised schedule, Areva is expected to submit to the NRC, by 30 August 2013, details about how the EPR design meets the post-Fukushima requirements and all outstanding technical issues should be resolved by 1 November 2013.

Matthews told Areva that there is "no margin" in the schedule to allow for the timing of "critical milestones" to be changed and still achieve certification by the end of 2014. He added, "While the staff has increased its attention to meeting the schedule, we will ensure that the design meets all applicable NRC regulatory requirements before we proceed to certification rulemaking."

In July 2010, the NRC highlighted two areas of concern related to the EPR design. These centered on design complexity and independence issues: each safety division within the system must be able to perform its function without relying on data from outside and must also be protected from adverse external influences. Areva needs to demonstrate to the regulator's satisfaction that these issues have been addressed, and show that data exchange between systems will not adversely affect safety.

Areva has already described proposed design changes intended to reduce the level of complexity as well as to address some of the intercommunication issues. However, Areva has notified the NRC of some areas where its feels that design changes are not advisable, and these appear to be the areas which the regulator feels may not meet its standards.

Source: NuClear News No.41, June 2012 / World Nuclear News, 31 May 2012
Contact: Pete Roche
Email: pete[at]no2nuclearpower.org.uk

About: 
WISE

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#742
17/02/2012
Shorts

Germany exporting electricity to France.
Germany has shut down many nuclear power plants after Fukushima. France, in contrast, has still a very large nuclear capacity. So one might expect (and that was highlighted by nuclear proponents in Germany and elsewhere many times) that Germany needs "to pull some power from the reliable French nuclear plants" to make up for the fact that German solar power is not contributing anything in this season. But that's not exactly what happened during the cold winter days in western-Europe early February. Though the day is short, PV power production is still peaking at an impressive level during the current cold spell in Germany.

Because France has so much nuclear power, the country has an inordinate number of electric heating systems (but what is cause and effect?). And because France has not added on enough additional capacity over the past decade, the country's current nuclear plants are starting to have trouble meeting demand, especially when it gets very cold in the winter. With each drop of 1 degree in the temperature, the demand for electricity rises with 2,300 MW. In the French Brittany, citizens were asked by EDF to reduce their consumption.

As a result, power exports from Germany to France reached 4 to 5 gigawatts – the equivalent of around four nuclear power plants – early February according to German journalist Bernward Janzing in a Taz article. And it was not exactly a time of low consumption in Germany either at 70 gigawatts around noon on February 3, but Janzing nonetheless reports that the grid operators said everything was under control, and the country's emergency reserves were not being tapped. On the contrary, he reports that a spokesperson for transit grid operator Amprion told him that "photovoltaics in southern Germany is currently helping us a lot."
die tageszeitung, 3 February 2012


UK: the powers that be.
Newly appointed Energy Secretary Ed Davey performed a spectacular U-turn on nuclear power, February 5, as he declared he would not block plans for a new generation of nuclear reactors. Liberal Democrat Davey was appointed to the Cabinet post on February 3,  after Chris Huhne resigned to fight criminal charges. In the past, Davey has condemned nuclear power as dangerous and expensive. As Lib Dem trade and industry spokesman in 2006 Mr Davey was the architect of the party's anti-nuclear policy. He launched the policy with a press release entitled "Say no to nuclear", which warned a new generation of nuclear power stations would cost taxpayers tens of billions of pounds. What's that with being in power and changing positions?

Ed Davey used his first day as Energy Secretary to send a warning to more than 100 Conservative MPs that he is not prepared to back down over the issue of onshore wind farms. He insisted he was a 'lifelong supporter' of wind power.
Daily Mail, 6 February 2012 / The Times, 7 February 2012


Australia: Ferguson's Dumping Ground Fights Back.
The Gillard Government is pushing ahead with plans to host a nuclear waste dump at Muckaty in the Northern Territory (NT), despite local opposition. Traditional Owners have vowed to fight on, according to Natalie Wasley. In February 2010, Resources Minister Martin Ferguson introduced the National Radioactive Waste Management Bill into the House of Representatives, saying it represented "a responsible and long overdue approach for an issue that impacts on all Australian communities". The legislation names Muckaty, 120 kilometers north of Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory, as the only site to remain under active consideration for a national nuclear waste dump. The proposal is highly contested by the NT Government and is also being challenged in the Federal Court by Traditional Owners. Despite this, the Bill is currently being debated in the Senate — and will likely pass.

Ferguson’s law is a crude cut and paste of the Howard government’s Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act that it purports to replace. It limits the application of federal environmental protection legislation and it curtails appeal rights. The draft legislation overrides the Aboriginal Heritage Protection Act and it sidesteps the Aboriginal Land Rights Act. It allows for the imposition of a dump on Aboriginal land with no consultation with or consent from Traditional Owners. In fact, the Minister can now override any state or territory law that gets in the way of the dump plan.

Before it won government, Labor promised to address radioactive waste management issues in a manner that would "ensure full community consultation in radioactive waste decision-making processes", and to adopt a "consensual process of site selection". Yet despite many invitations, Martin Ferguson refuses to meet with Traditional Owners opposed the dump.

Medical professionals have called for federal politicians to stop using nuclear medicine as justification for the Muckaty proposal. Nuclear radiologist Dr Peter Karamoskos wrote in the NT News:

"…the contention that is most in error is that the radioactive waste to be disposed of there is largely nuclear medicine waste. Nearly all such waste is actually short-lived and decays in local storage and is subsequently disposed of safely in the normal waste systems without need for a repository. The vast bulk of the waste… is Lucas Heights nuclear reactor operational waste, and contaminated soil (10 thousand drums) from CSIRO research on ore processing in the 1950s and 1960s."
Natalie Wasley in NewMatilda.com,  13 February 2012


US: Watts Bar 2 schedule pushed back.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has said that it is ‘experiencing challenges’ with the cost and schedule for completion of its Watts Bar 2 nuclear power plant. The revised completion date for the plant may extend beyond 2013 and the costs are expected to ‘significantly exceed’ TVA’s previous estimate of US$2.5 billion. TVA, which operates three nuclear power plants: Browns Ferry, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, decided to restart construction at Watts Bar 2 in 2007. It originally planned to finish the plant, which was 55% complete, within a five year window. Now, the completion date has been put back to 2013 and TVA says it is performing a root cause analysis to better understand the factors contributing to the project's extended schedule and cost. According to TVA the delays to the completion of Watts Bar unit 2 may also affect the timing of the Bellefonte 1 completion. Construction is set to resume at Bellefonte 1 after initial fuel loading at Watts Bar 2. (More in Nuclear Monitor 732, 9 September 2011).
Nuclear Engineering International, 7 February 2012


Russia: Fire at nuclear sub at Murmansk
Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry Dmitry Rogozin has indirectly admitted that the Yekaterinburg – one of the Northern Fleet’s strategic nuclear submarines – which caught fire on December 29 while in dry dock for repairs near Murmansk had “armaments” on board when the 20-hour-long blaze broke out, injuring 9. The deputy prime minister had previously vociferously denied this in both Russian and international media – even though evidence discovered by Bellona at the time suggested otherwise. Evidence that has emerged since the fire, however, suggests that the burning vessel was loaded not only with nuclear missiles but torpedoes as well.

The Yekaterinburg Delta IV class submarine – capable of carrying 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles with up to ten nuclear warheads apiece and 12 torpedoes – caught fire in Roslyakovo when welding works reportedly went awry, though the real cause of the fire remains unknown. The fire was concentrated in the bow area of the vessel.

Had Russia’s Emergency Services Ministry –which was primarily responsible for handling the crisis– not extinguished the flames in time, the torpedoes in the front chamber of the submarine would have detonated first. Many Russian fire and resuce workers would have been killed and the blaze’s intesity would have increased. The fire would have spread to the missile compartment, which also would have detonated as a result of the high temperatures. An explosion would have then damaged the Yekaterinburg’s two nuclear reactors, resulting in a release of radiation into the atmosphere.

Murmansk (300,000-strong population, just 6 kilometers away) should have been evacuated along with other towns in the surrounding area. The fire occurred just prior to Russia’s New Year’s holidays, and an evacuation would have causes panic and chaos. Yet had things gone as they very possibly could have, even more explosions releasing more radioactivity could have resulted, making – as shown in Fukushima – efforts to extinguish the fire even more arduous, as radioactivity continued to spread.
Bellona, Charles Digges, 14 February 2012


No More 'hot' waste in WIPP.
On January 31, the New Mexico Environment Department denied a federal Department of Energy's  request for permission to use new lead-lined drums for some of the more highly radioactive waste being shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) (see Nuclear Monitor 739, 23 December 2011). DOE applied to the New Mexico Environment Department for a modification of the hazardous waste permit in order to dispose of "shielded containers" of remote-handled (RH) waste. The shielded containers, which have never been used before, are lead-lined in order to contain the high gamma emissions from the RH waste. DOE was proposing to bring more "remote-handled" plutonium-contaminated waste to WIPP than will fit in the remaining designated space. It is another attempt by DOE to expand the mission of WIPP beyond its original purpose.

But the NMED denied the request. The denial does not close the door on the possibility, but the Environment Department said a more detailed review, likely including the possibility of public hearings, would be required before any change is permitted.
ABQ Journal, 31 January 2012, / Nuclear Monitor 739, 23 December 2011


UK report: "A corruption of Governance?".
Parliament was kept in the dark and fed false information that boosted the case for nuclear power, campaigners claimed in a newly released report "A Corruption of Governance?" on February 3, 2012. MPs were handed a dossier which suggests that evidence given to ministers and Parliament promoting the use of nuclear power was "a false summary" of the analysis carried out by governmental departments. Specifically the report claims that on the basis of the government's own evidence there is no need for the controversial new generation of nuclear power stations if Britain is to achieve 80 per cent reductions in carbon dioxide by 2050. The report also alleges that government statements claiming that electricity supply will need to double or even triple in order to achieve a low-carbon economy are disproved by its own evidence. Katy Attwater, Stop Hinkley Point's spokesperson, said: "This scrupulously researched report shows that two of the National Policy Statements, EN-1 and EN-62, approved by Parliament, are based on false information and the public has no alternative but to deem them invalid. MPs have, likewise, no alternative but to consider them fraudulent, re-open the debate and bring those responsible for this corruption to account."
Press release Stop Hinkley Point, 6 February 2012


The EPR nuclear reactor: A dangerous waste of time and money.
The French EPR (European Pressurised Reactor, sometimes marketed as an ‘Evolutionary Power Reactor’) is a nuclear reactor design that is aggressively marketed by the French companies Areva and EDF. Despite the companies’ marketing spin, not only is the reactor hazardous, it is also more costly and takes longer to build than renewable-energy alternatives. While no EPR is currently operating anywhere in the world, four reactors are under construction in Finland (Olkiluoto 3, construction started in 2005), France (Flamanville 3, 2007) and China  (Taishan 1 and 2, 2009-10). The projects have failed to meet nuclear safety standards in design and  construction, with recurring construction defects and subsequent cover-ups, as well as ballooning costs and timelines that have already slipped significantly.

'The EPR nuclear reactor: A dangerous waste of time and money' is an update of the 2008 Greenpeace International briefing on this reactor. Added are some of the many new design and construction errors and the economic setbacks the EPR has run into. Greenpeace included more information on the tremendous gains in the cost performance of renewable energy and the increase level of investment.

The report is available at: www.laka.org/temp/2012gp-epr-report.pdf


Austrian NGOs: Ban on import nuclear electricty!
At a February 3, meeting with German, Czech and Austrian anti-nuclear activists in Passau, Germany, including members of The Left Party (Die Linke) faction in the German Bundestag and from the Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP), support for an Austrian import ban on nuclear electricity was clearly signalled. Spokeswoman for the Left Party Eva Bulling-Schröter: "It is absurd that Austria, which for very good reasons abandoned nuclear energy, is exporting clean hydropower to Germany for instance and then imports nuclear power for its own use. The planned and very controversial new Czech Temelin reactors would loose important custumors if Austria and Germany woud ban the import and not buy its electricity. The campaign of the Austrian antinuclear groups is welcome and could be a model for a similar campaign in Germany."

"It is a ridiculous idea of the federal government when it says that Austria could not do without nuclear power before 2015", says Roland Egger of  Atomstopp upper-Austria.
Press release atomstopp_oberoesterreich, (stop nuclear, upper-austria), 9 December 2011 & 3 February 2012

EPR construction in China: same problems

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#735
6179
21/10/2011
WISE Amsterdam
Article

Finland’s English-language news desk, YLE , has obtained evidence of problems in the construction of a nuclear power plant being built in China by Areva. The French company is building a reactor of the same model as Finland's Olkiluoto, which has experienced similar shortcomings. Meanwhile, costs of Olkiluoto are now estimated at 6.6 billion euro. The price mentioned (and decided on) in Finnish Parliament was 2,5 billion euro, the initial contract for Olkiluoto 3 was 3 billion euro.

The first two European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) construction projects at Olkiluoto and in Flamanville, France, have been plagued by problems. Now it turns out that there have been similar setbacks with another EPR project, a double reactor in Taishan, southern China, near Hong Kong. YLE has obtained inspection reports from China's National Nuclear Safety Administration based on visits in 2009, as construction was beginning there. The results are familiar to observers of the Finnish and French ventures.

When building work began on the new, third reactor at Olkiluoto, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) detected quality-control shortcomings in areas such as concrete pouring. In 2005 and 2006, it also found that some subcontractors were inexperienced, documentation was incomplete and that there were linguistic difficulties among the workforce, 80 percent of whom are foreigners. Four years later, the list of problems at Taishan is very similar: concrete quality problems, unqualified or inexperienced subcontractors, shortcomings in documentation and language problems.

Areva has not learned from its mistakes, according to Greenpeace. "There seem to be serious ongoing problems in the company's safety culture," says Greenpeace energy specialist Jehki Härkönen. "This is their third such project, and exactly the same mistakes are being made as in the past."

STUK, the Finnish nuclear safety watchdog, declines to draw conclusions about Areva based on the Chinese report, as Areva is just a subcontractor in Taishan. However when STUK was shown the report by YLE, it immediately requested further details from the Chinese. STUK Director Petteri Tiippana says that the allegations are serious. "If there are insufficient language skills, there can be problems," he told YLE. "If builders are not qualified, it can lead to shortcomings in quality. The Chinese authorities are drawing attention to exactly the right issues."The success of Areva's projects is a crucial question in Finland, as it is one of the main contenders to build the planned Fennovoima reactor in Pyhäjoki.

Further delays Olkiluoto
Finnish nuclear company Teollisuuden voima (TVO) announced officially that the Olkiluoto 3 EPR cannot achieve grid connection before 2014. At that point, OL3 would be five years late from the original four year planned construction time and it would have taken twelve years years from gaining license to operation. However, further delays are still possible.

TVO cites problems with the I&C system as the main reason and delays with wiring and piping as secondary reasons.

Areva has yet to comment on the issue. On October 10 CEO Luc Oursel was still boasting his plan to build new nukes in Finland. TVO has asked Areva to come up with new timeline for finishing the project. The delay announcements are usually followed by increased cost estimates, which currently is at 5.9 billion euros. And indeed, on October 12, the French daily Les Echos was citing a report stating the costs for Areva are expected to 6.6 billion euro (US$ 9.1 billion).

But this number can still be an underestimation of the real price considering the evidence that cheap labour is being employed at the construction site. At worst, some Polish workers are paid less than two euros an hour. The roughly 250 euro monthly salary is printed on pay slips obtained by YLE. The Finnish Electrical Workers' Union says this is not an isolated case, but TVO says it has no evidence of pay irregularities. But it plans to look into its subcontractors. The Finnish Construction Trade Union previously voiced concerns regarding subcontracting chains at Olkiluoto that are difficult to trace.

Areva appealed to the Finnish utility firm TVO for "intense cooperation and mutual commitment" during the testing phase for Okliuoto 3. In a statement it said that commissioning the reactor would require "significant efforts from all parties" after TVO earlier on the same day (Oct. 12) blamed Areva for further delays to the construction of the nuclear plant.

Source: YLE (www.yle.fi), 23 September & 11 October 2011 / Jehki Härkönen, climate & energy campaigner Greenpeace Nordic, Helsinki, Finland, 12 October 2011 / Reuters, 12 October 2011
Contact: Jehki Harkonen, Greenpeace Finland.
Email: jehki.harkonen[at]greenpeace.org

About: 
WISEOlkiluoto-3

The troubled recent history of nuclear power in South Africa

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#733
6168
23/09/2011
Greenpeace South Africa
Article

Six days after the nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima in Japan in March 2011, South Africa’s Minister of Energy Dipuo Peters declared her country’s intention to add 9,600 MW of nuclear electricity - or six new nuclear reactors. On September 15 she said she had signed off on a proposal for new nuclear power plants and said it would be presented to cabinet soon. Peters said she expects the cabinet to decide on the plan by the end of this year and the bid process to start early in 2012. The last attempt to build a nuclear plant, led by state-owned power utility Eskom, was scratched on funding woes.

Speaking at the second regional conference on energy and nuclear power in Africa in Cape Town on May 30 this year, Ms Peters went even further, trumpeting the development of a nuclear-export market to the rest of Africa, supported by both the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the African Union.

South Africa spent 13 years pursuing the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, wasting billions of rands in the process (R9-billion was spent on research and development and another R22-billion would have been needed to complete a demonstration model) as investors across the world shied away from having anything to do with it. Eventually the state cancelled the project and wrote off the monies it had spent. The government and its wholly owned power utility Eskom remain hell bent on securing what it believes will be a cheap and sustainable nuclear solution for its energy supply crisis.

By 2006, South Africa was beginning to run short of power generation capacity. It was clear that the PBMR would not be available to order for a long time. Eskom began to talk about ordering ‘conventional’ nuclear power plants. First in line were the EPR supplied by the French company, Areva and the AP1000 supplied by the Japanese owned company, Westinghouse. Eskom’s implication was that such designs were well proven. In fact, at that point, only one order had been placed for an EPR and none for the AP1000. By 2011, there were four orders for EPRs, two for China, one for France and one for Finland and four for AP1000s, all for China. None of these orders were in service by 2011 and the two EPR orders for France and Finland were seriously over budget and late.

In 2006, the South African government forecast that a new unit could be on-line between 2010 and 2012. By mid-2007, Eskom was targeting construction of 20,000 MW of new nuclear capacity by 2025, although completion of the first unit had slipped to 2014. It expected an overnight construction cost of US$2,500/kW. (Overnight cost is the cost of a construction project if no interest was incurred during construction, as if the project was completed "overnight.")

In January 2008, Eskom received two bids in reply to its call for tenders from November of the previous year for 3,200-3,400 MW of new nuclear capacity in the near term and up to 20,000 MW by 2025. One bid was from Areva for two EPRs (plus 10 more for the long-term) and the other from Westinghouse for the three AP1000s (plus 17 more in the long term).

It was later reported that the bids were for around US$6,000/kW (overnight) – more than double the expected price. It was therefore no surprise when Eskom abandoned the tender in December 2008 on the grounds that the magnitude of the investment was too much for it to handle. This was despite the willingness of Coface, the French government’s loan guarantee body, to offer export credit guarantees and despite Areva’s claims that it could have arranged 85% of the financing.

Eskom in crisis
Three weeks into January 2008, Eskom had hit a brick wall. It could no longer meet all the country’s electricity demands without melting the national grid. Eskom turned to the bulk users, and appealed to them to ration their demand. Even so, for some months the country faced a series of electricity outages (euphemistically called “load shedding”). Not only was this a blow to businesses, agriculture, schools, hospitals and households, but it coincided with global recession.

Eskom had also run out of money and its credit ratings were reduced. Eskom could no longer afford to invest in new infrastructure, without massive extra income. It would take three years before it could make new orders, and until then the board was saying no to new investments. The biggest blow to the nuclear industry was the decision to scrap the tender process for Nuclear-1, the first of a number of new large-scale reactors. The government had to inform vendors Areva and (Toshiba-owned) Westinghouse that their bids would not be considered for the meantime. The policy was not being suspended, but the orders were temporarily shelved.

Newly appointed CEO Brian Dames tried to rebuild Eskom’s reputation and finances. A big hurdle was the steady loss in Eskom’s credit ratings. Eskom hoped to raise electricity tariffs substantially, despite this being opposed by the trade union movement and other sections of civil society. The National Energy Regulator reduced Eskom’s application for 35% increases for three years to 25%, amounting to a doubling of tariffs over the same period, hitting poor and middle-class households, who objected strongly to the sweetheart commercial deals which Eskom had made in the past with smelters and other large users to be charged minimal tariffs.

The government then guaranteed Eskom’s massive investment in two giant coal-fired power stations. Medupi, the first of the two to be built, will be funded by the World Bank despite the enormous carbon emissions the 4,800 MW plant will produce. The loan of US$3,75 billion, was strongly opposed by local NGOs, and even caused countries like the Netherlands, Britain, the US, Norway and Italy to abstain from voting at the bank’s decision making committee.

To help Eskom get funding for its future nuclear power stations, companies like Areva have said they will help to intercede with the French government to release development finance. The potential Chinese bidders for Nuclear-1 (China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group) have linked up with the Standard Bank of South Africa, 20% owned by a Chinese bank (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), in order to assist Eskom to purchase future reactors.

As a result, Eskom’s financial woes are less of an obstacle to re-launching the bids for Nuclear-1.

2010 onwards
The South African government seemed to assume that cheap reactors can be found, if only they could be identified. This led it to look at a design offered by Korea, which had won four orders for the Unityed Arab Emirates (UAE) with a bid worth about US$4,000/kW (overnight costs), well below the levels offered by Areva and Westinghouse, but 60% above the level assumed by the South African government in 2006.

Despite the precariousness of the Korean option, the South African government has had discussions with the Korean government about the supply of such reactors.

The other design being considered by South Africa is the one that makes up the majority of Chinese orders. China dominates the world market for nuclear power plants accounting for 25 out of 38 of the reactors on which construction has started since January 2008. Of the 25, 19 are supplied by Chinese companies and this CPR-1000 design is based on the design China imported from France in the 1980s. This is the same design as is already installed at Koeberg. Some updating will have taken place, for example taking advantage of better IT equipment, but it is clear that it is fundamentally a 40 year old design. The South African government has also been talking to the Chinese government about importing such reactors.

However, a number of assumptions seem to underlie this attempt:
• That the reactors would be much cheaper than more modern designs, partly because they are older and partly because they would be manufactured in China;
• That China has the spare component manufacturing capacity to export plants; and,
• That the NNR would be comfortable licensing a design that fell well short of the requirements of Western regulators, for example on protection against impact by aircraft.

Eskom seems remote from this process and it is not clear whether it supports the idea of importing older technology. As with its reservations with the PBMR, Eskom could be uncomfortable raising any concerns about South African government policy.

The lessons from the Fukushima disaster in March 2011 have yet to be fully identified, but there does seem to be a strong probability that older designs will be seen, worldwide, not just in the West, as inadequate for new orders. In particular, designs with a greater level of ‘passive’ safety – ones that in an emergency situation do not require the operation of engineered safety systems to bring them to a safe condition – will be required. Even the French EPR does not incorporate strong passive safety features and the Chinese and Korean designs certainly do not have passive safety.

The new call for nuclear tenders
The call for tenders expected for 2012 is based on the Integrated Resource Plan 2010. The rationale for the integrated resource planning process is that it should identify the lowest cost way to meet electricity demand by considering all resources including energy efficiency measures. The plan includes 9,600 MW of new nuclear capacity to be completed between 2023 and 2030. Whether this nuclear capacity really represents the least cost way of meeting demand depends on the accuracy of the assumptions made on the cost.

The IRP 2010 bases its assumptions on a report commissioned from the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2010), a US research organisation funded primarily by US electric utilities. Nuclear power costs are dominated by the costs associated with the construction of the plants, the overnight cost of construction and the cost of borrowing, which is related to the discount rate. For the construction cost, the EPRI report gives an overnight cost of R28,375/kW for an Areva EPR and R33,235/kW for a Westinghouse AP1000. If we assume an exchange rate of US$1=R6.75, this equates to about US$4,200/kW and US$4,900/kW. It is hard to understand why the South African government should assume costs that are only 70-80% of the prices bid two years earlier. There is certainly no evidence that estimated nuclear costs have gone down since then.

The discount rate of 8% adopted by the South African government also appears too low. For example, the UK government assumed a discount rate of 10% in 2008 when it assessed the economics of nuclear power. The discount rate is effectively a tool to allocate the limited quantity of capital available as profitably as possible. It should ensure that only projects that achieve the given rate of return on capital – the discount rate – are pursued. If nuclear power is assessed using too low a discount rate, it is likely that relatively unprofitable projects will be pursued at the expense of more profitable projects. The use of too low a discount rate is particularly serious because one of the key reasons the previous tender failed appears to have been because affordable finance was not available. Cape Times reported that Rob Adam, CEO of Necsa, has said:

‘The country’s nuclear programme had been canned in 2008 because “we couldn’t get a bank to lend the money for long enough. Commercial banks’ time frames are too short. So now the vendor must come with a bank or financial institution”, and South Africa would repay this over time.’

It appears the South African government did not learn from the previous tender when it assumed far too low a construction cost and proceeded with a call for tenders that had to be abandoned because the prices bid could not be financed. The government also seems heavily involved with the process, with ministers and sometimes the president conducting negotiations and signing agreements with governments of potential suppliers. These efforts have been particularly intense with France with whom an undertaking to explore an intergovernmental agreement on spent-fuel management, co-operation between the countries’ nuclear safety authorities, and implementation of the agreement on nuclear R&D between the Necsa and its French counterpart have been agreed.

Sources: This article (except the lead) is reprinted from a new Greenpeace South Africa report, called 'The true costs of nuclear power in South Africa'. It is available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/News/news/The-True-Cost-of-Nuclear-E...
Contact: Greenpeace South Africa, 10A and 10B Clamart House, Clamart Road, Richmond, Johannesburg, South Africa
Email: iafrica@greenpeace.org
Web: www.greenpeaceafrica.org

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#732
09/09/2011
Shorts

French Nuclear Authority points to "weaknesses" of the EPR.
The construction of the EPR nuclear reactor being built in Flamanville, has many "weaknesses" that put the "final quality" into doubt. This is the conclusion drawn after a  thorough inspection conducted on site in May by the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). The report of this "inspection review", highlighted by Le Canard Enchaine on August 24, is posted on the site of the ASN (www.asn.fr). It is a 20 page letter sent by the ASN on June 24 to EDF, the prime contractor for the 1600 megawatt reactor designed by Areva. The inspection has was  carried out by fifteen experts, including an observer from the British regulator. The team found deviations from the construction requirements on essential parts of the reactor: the feed of the steam generators, water injection filters, the RIS batteries of the cooling system. "EDF has to make great efforts to show the final quality of the construction of Flamanville 3", judges the ASN, which points out: "inconsistencies between the requirements specified in sub-contracting and the demands mentioned in the preliminary safety report" - that is to say a non-compliance with initial prescriptions. Concerning an essential feature of the steam generators, experts estimate that "the quality of materials taking into account their importance for safety has not been demonstrated and their use in FLA3 is not possible". In two cases, they demand from EDF to "not engage in actions that are difficult to reverse before demonstrating" compliance.
Le Monde (Fr.) 24 August 2011 (translation Jan Haverkamp)


Town produces 321% more energy than it uses.
A small Bavarian town in Germany called Wildpoldsried produces 321% more energy than it uses, from renewable and natural sources. By selling the excess energy, Wildpoldsried has eliminated all the towns debt and generates 4.0 million Euro (US$5.7 million) in annual income. The point they are at now in terms of energy production and independence was reached by starting a plan about fourteen years ago to develop more clean energy sources and green building projects. The town with a population of about 2,500 started work on a huge community initiative involving the construction of nine new buildings and energy sources. The new buildings included a school, community hall and gym, and they employ solar panels, as do 190 private households. Five biogas digesters, nine windmills, three hydroelectric projects,  ecological flood control and a natural waste water treatment system were part of the plan for energy independence. It all has worked well, and the town is debt-free. They actually formed several local companies to construct, install and manage their wind turbines, with local residents as investors.
www.care2.com, 24 August 2011


Bushehr online after 36 years of construction.
Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant has been connected to the national grid. It began supplying around 60 MW of its 1000 MW capacity on Saturday 3 September at 11:29pm, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said. Construction on Bushehr by German company Siemens KWU started in 1975, but the work was stopped in 1979. Iran signed a deal with Russia in 1995, under which the plant was originally due to be finished in 1999, but the completion of the project was repeatedly delayed. The most recent delay, in February 2011, was caused by the discovery of damaged internals of a coolant pump supplied in the 1970s. To avoid potential consequences of metal debris getting on the fuel assemblies, they were unloaded and washed, while the reactor pressure vessel was cleaned. The fuel was reloaded in April and the plant achieved criticality in May 2011. In August 2011, the Government of Iran invited an International Atomic Energy Agency delegation to visit the country’s nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plant that has been built by Russia’s Atomstroyexport. According to Iran's nuclear officials, Bushehr power plant will reach 40% capacity during a ceremony that will be held on 12 September 2011. It is expected to reach full capacity in November or December 2011.
Nuclear Engineering International, 5 September 2011


North Anna shut down after earthquake.
The largest earthquake to hit the eastern US in 67 years has raised concerns about the safety of the country's nuclear power plants. The 5.8 magnitude quake's epicenter in Virginia on August 23, was close to the North Anna plant, 130 kilometers southwest of Washington. The plant lost power and automatically halted operations after the quake. While the operator reported no 'major' damage to the facility, three diesel generators were required to kick in and keep the reactors' radioactive cores cool. A fourth diesel unit failed. While nuclear power plants can operate safely on back-up power, failure of generators was a key reason for the disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi plant

A spokesman for the operator said the plant was designed to withstand an earthquake of up to 6.2 in magnitude. But some groups have expressed concern about the narrow margin between the design metrics and the quake's size. 'It was uncomfortably close to design basis,' said Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has pushed for stronger nuclear regulations. 'If Fukushima wasn't a wake-up call, this really needs to be to get the NRC and industry moving to do seismic reviews of all the nuclear power plants in the country.' An article in the Washington Post reports that the earthquake moved dry casks (huge concrete containers holding spent nuclear fuel), weighing between 100 to 115 tons, by as much as four inches (10 centimeters).

Twelve other nuclear plants along the Eastern Seaboard declared an "unusual event" following the quake, the lowest of the NRC's emergency classification ratings. North Anna's "alert" status is one step further up on a four-step U.S. emergency scale.

North Anna's reactors are among 27 east of the Rockies that the NRC highlighted during a seismic review last year as presenting a potential hazard, due to the amount of ground-shaking they were designed to withstand. Many nuclear experts say plants in the United States were designed with big margins of error  built in, but last year's NRC survey found that the risks posed by earthquakes were higher than  previously thought.
RTE (Ireland), 24 August 2011 / Reuters, 24 August 2011 / Washington Post, 1 September 2011


Germany: no need for nuclear reserve capacity.
Germany's grid regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) said August 31 that it has decided against keeping one idled nuclear reactor on standby as reserve capacity for the coming two winter seasons to ensure power grid stability after the government permanently closed eight older reactors in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in March. "Our investigations have shown that even in exceptional contingencies the transmission system will remain operational without the dispatch of a reserve nuclear power plant," BNetzA President Matthias Kurth said in a statement.

The government has asked the grid regulator to investigate the need for a nuclear reserve capacity during the winter after transmission system operators in May warned of possible blackouts during extreme winter weather should the eight older reactors remain shut permanently, removing at least 5,000 MW of nuclear capacity from the market.
Platts, 31 August 2011


International blockade Olkiluoto, Finland.
On August 20, 2011 a blockade of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant under construction took place for the second time gathering people from several regions of Finland and from other European countries on the streets. One year ago, on August 28, 2010, it was the very first public street blockade of an atomic facility in Finland ever. It had been started with the support of a number of European and Finnish environmental and anti-nuclear groups. The gathering of the Nuclear Heritage Network, an international network of anti-nuclear activists, taking part in March 2010 in Helsinki had initiated the idea of the blockade and developed it together with the variety of Finnish NGOs and groups. The goal was to question the international reputation of Finland as the country of the so-called "renaissance of nuclear power", and to show that even in this country being under strong pressure of the nuclear lobby atomic power has noch support of the citizens.

For Finnish anti-nuclear activists the Olkiluoto Blockade was also an important occassion for meeting each other and exchanging as so far there doesn't exist any other nationwide organizing structures for a common anti-nuclear strategy. In the south as well as in the north strong networks of local initiatives and organizations exist and in some cases they successfully opposed to projects of uranium mining and new nuclear reactors constructions. However, cross connections between those groups and networks are created so far only in mutual big actions like the Olkiluoto Blockade or the anti-nuclear infotour around the Baltic Sea that also took place in 2010.

This year a blockade of about 100 activists from Finland, Sweden, Germany, Russia, France, United Kingdom and Belarus several times stopped the traffic on the access roads to the disputed Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in Finland. Police had announced to prevent the blockade of roads that were supposed to take place for the second time. They forced protesters from the streets again and again towards a bus stop nearby. Nevertheless, the activists succeeded several times to blockade the main access road to the nuclear power plant for some minutes, while an additional access street had been closed for some two hours by a wooden tripod construction with an activist on the top.
www.greenkids.de


Donors agree to fund new Chernobyl shelter.
There appears to be enough money (at last after almost 15 years) for a new sarcophagus at the Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine. The Nuclear Safety Account and the Chernobyl Shelter Fund donors agreed to provide the necessary financial resources for the implementation of the Chernobyl projects. The decision was made at the Assembly of Contributors to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund meeting on July 7, 2011, in London. The new construction will help "neutralize any possible future threats to the environment from the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine".

The needed amount of financial resources for the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) funding is EUR 740 mln. On the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy on April 26, 2011, a fundraiser was held resulting in donors' obligations of EUR 550 mln. The new decision of the world donors allows for the immediate start of the SIP execution and its completion by 2015. The SIP involves stabilization of the existing sarcophagus and the construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC) for the damaged nuclear reactor.

In 1988 local scientists announced that the life time of the sarcophagus was 20 to 30 years. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) was established nearly a decade later in December of 1997 to collect funds for the NSC project. Currently, the European Union, the United States, and Ukraine cooperate to help meet the CSF's objective while the EBRD is entrusted to manage the CSF and provide oversight of the funds disbursement.

The construction of the original Chernobyl sarcophagus began on May 20, 1986 - three weeks after the accident, and lasted for 206 days.
PRNewswire, 14 July 2011


PSC shifts risks costs overruns to public.
US: Georgia utility regulators agreed on August 2, to scrap a proposal that would have eaten into Georgia Power’s profits should the costs for its nuclear expansion project exceed US$300 million. The Georgia Public Service Commission unanimously approved the plan after making sure the commissioners could review previously approved project costs if there is a budget increase. Customers would pay for cost overruns in their monthly bills unless the PSC determines the overruns are Georgia Power's fault.
Georgia Power is part of a group of utilities building two nuclear reactors at Plant Vogtle. The utility is responsible for US$6.1 billion of the estimated US$14 billion project. The company has been at odds with the PSC’s advocacy staff over how to handle potential cost overruns for the project. The advocacy staff wanted to cut into the utility’s profits if the costs exceeded US$300 million over budget. The advocacy staff agreed to drop its plan if Georgia Power allowed regulators to re-examine previously approved parts of the project if there is a budget increase. If regulators determine that Georgia Power's mistake led to the cost overruns, consumers would not have to pay the additional costs.
Consumer advocates have criticized the PSC's move as shifting all of the burden of the project's cost onto Georgia Power customers, who already are paying for the plant's financing costs.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2 August 2011


Walk away from uranium mining.
Footprints for Peace, an international grassroots group that organizes walks, bike rides and runs around the world, invites families and people of all ages, background and cultures to come and support traditional owners in their opposition to uranium mining in Western Australia by taking part in the “Walk away from uranium mining” that began in Wiluna on August 19 and will finish in Perth on October 28. "We will demonstrate that we have the choice to walk away from this costly, toxic industry — which produces radioactive waste and weapons usable material — in favour of renewable energy options." Footprints for Peace are working together with the Western Australian Nuclear Free Alliance (WANFA) to organise this grassroots awareness-raising and action-based campaign. Everyone is welcome to join the walk for a few hours, a day, a few weeks or the whole way. Even if you cannot walk we still require financial assistance, drivers, kitchen crew members, media liaison volunteers, video operators and photographers, musicians, artists, singers and general support for daily events, such as camp set up and pack up, food shopping and water collection. The walkers will cover a distance of 20 to 25 kilometres a day, with a rest day every five days……… The walk’s conclusion in Perth will coincide with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. There we will deliver our well-supported and strong message that it is time to shut down the nuclear industry’s plans to expand in Western Australia and the rest of Australia.

For more information please visit: http://nuclearfreefuture.com/
GreenLeft (Aus.) 23 July 2011


Sellafield: No prosecutions for organ harvesting.
Recent correspondence has revealed that no one will be prosecuted over the body hacking scandal carried out by the nuclear industry for over 40 years in collusion with government, hospitals, coroners and doctors.

From 1960 to 1991, body parts were taken without consent from 64 former Sellafield workers and 12 workers from nuclear sites in Springfields, Capenhurst, Dounreay and Aldermaston. The liver was removed in all cases and one or both lungs in all but one incident. Vertebrae, sternum, ribs, lymph nodes, spleen, kidneys and fermur were also stripped in the majority of cases. Brains, tongues, hearts and testes were also taken on the advice of the medical officer at Sellafield.

Correspondence from Cumbria Constabulary has been seen which says that despite the findings of the Redfern Inquiry (into the scandal; see Nuclear Monitor 721, 17 December 2010)  that the relationship between the nuclear industry and fellow bodysnatching conspirators was "too close" no one will be prosecuted as it is not "in the public interest".

Extract from a letter sent by ‘Special Operations’ - Cumbria Constabulary: "the issues you raise which I have listed below;
1. That specific people and institutions have breached the Human Tissue Act and that this should be investigated.
2. That an investigation into whether there was any unlawful corruption of the coronial processes had taken place
3. The stipends made to mortuary attendants are also of particular concern.
This was a Government led review which involved both the Department for Energy and Climate Change and the Ministry of Justice. As such any requirement on the police to investigate identified breaches as outlined above would be made by the Government. No such request has been made". (end quotation Cumbria Constabulary correspondence)
Well, surprise, surprise: No such request is likely to be made.
http://101-uses-for-a-nuclear-power-station.blogspot.com/2011/07/dodgy-hacking.html


Floating Nuke Plant Seized in Bankruptcy
A St. Petersburg court seized the 70MW floating nuclear power station under construction at the Baltiisky Zavod shipyards after Rosenergoatom, the division of the Rosatom nuclear monopoly that commissioned it, demanded recognition of its right of ownership to the unfinished vessel. The July 26 court order gave the go-ahead for the seizure on the basis of "significant risk" that Rosenergoatom could lose its investment in the 9.8 billion ruble ($334 million) vessel if another claimant seized Baltiisky Zavod's assets during bankruptcy proceedings.

The ship yard, which is 88.3 percent owned by former Tuva governor Segei Pugachev's United Industrial Corporation is facing litigation from numerous disgruntled creditors. International Industrial Bank, also known as Mezhprombank, had its operating license revoked when it declared itself bankrupt in November. In January prosecutors launched a criminal case against the bank for intentional bankruptcy.

The dispute is not the first to hit Rosatom's ambitious plans to build a generation of floating nuclear power stations to serve remote coastal communities in Russia's north and Far East. Interfax on Thursday quoted an unidentified source at Rosatom saying the contract could be reassigned to another shipbuilder. If true, it would be the second time a contractor has lost the order from Rosatom, which originally commissioned the Sevmash shipyard to build the controversial floating nuclear plants in 2006. Rosenergoatom tore up that agreement in 2008 and signed a new deal with Baltiisky Zavod in 2009. Baltiisky Zavod is scheduled to finish the first station in 2012, according to the contract. The 70-megawatt plant is destined for Kamchatka.
Moscow Times, 15 August 2011

Flamanville, Olkiluoto; more problems EPR

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#731
6159
29/07/2011
WISE Amsterdam
Article

This so-called “third generation” of nuclear reactors, instigated by the development of the EPR, is proving to be a complete failure. Complex, unfinished designs combined with suppliers who don’t hesitate to cut corners, are a recipe for risky and dangerous reactors. Endless delays and billions of euros in extra cost, in turn, are bound to shipwreck the energy policy of a country that bets on nuclear power.

Governments and investors need to focus on solutions that are delivering safe, renewable energy instead of betting on a risky and dangerous new nuclear reactor. While renewable energy provides most of new electricity generation capacity in Europe as a whole, Finland and France are still making little progress on wind power and other modern renewable energies.

Olkiluoto
The first ever EPR nuclear reactor - currently under construction by French nuclear company Areva at Olkiluoto, Finland - has been hit once again by delays and the discovery of a host of design and construction defects. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, Areva as well as its Finnish client TVO have kept a low profile to avoid attention concerning the problems of the EPR project. On July 20, it was revealed that the Flamanville EPR at Flamanville, France, is ridden by similar problems: new delays and  cost overruns.

Greenpeace published a new briefing on the EPR project in Finland based on documents from the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Areva recently doubled its claim for economic damages from the Finnish project from 1 billion to 1.9 billion euros. TVO "has considered and found the claim by the Supplier to be without merit. TVO will update its counterclaim during the arbitration proceedings." The arbitration proceeding may continue for several years and the claimed and counter-claimed amounts may change. Areva’s total cost for the project is approaching double the contracted price of 3 billion euros. The companies have last  acknowledged a new construction delay to the project in June 2010, when TVO said construction would not be completed before the end of 2012, delaying electricity production until the second half of 2013. The plant was originally meant to go online first half of 2009. At the same time, Areva announced a writedown of 367 million euros, bringing the total cost overrun to 2.6 billion euros, on top of a contracted price of 3 billion. The new problems will most likely imply that the cost and lead time of the project have more than doubled.

The latest annual and quarterly reports by Finnish nuclear regulator (STUK) reveal a long list of alarming issues with the EPR:
* There are new design issues, and the finalization of designs and analyses are lagging behind construction. If the design does not pass the pending analyses, expensive and time-consuming modifications may be required.
* Major lapses in quality assurance and safety control, including backup diesels, emergency cooling systems, electric cabling, radioactivity-containing pools, polar crane, reactor building support structures.
* Continuing lack of safety culture: quality requirements not being communicated in the supply chain; carrying out work without required plans and tests; absence of effective supervision.
* Significant new delays have accumulated; timelines for construction, installation and design approvals have not been met.

Flamanville 3
On July 20, it was revealed that the Flamanville EPR in France is ridden by similar problems.

When the French government published the decree giving the go-ahead for EDF to construct the 1650 MW EPR at its Flamanville site in Normandy on April 11, 2007 the unit was scheduled to begin operating in 2012. Costs were estimated then at 3.3 billion euro; when the decision was taken to built an EPR in 2004 costs were estimated at 3 billion euro.

Now, 4 years later, on July 20, 2011 Electricite de France (EDF) announced that the Flamanville 3 reactor will produce its first kWh only in 2016. EDF announced also on July 20, that the cost of construction amounted to 6 billion euros, (almost) double the price originally announced. To justify this additional cost, EDF argues that this reactor is the first of its kind. They forget too quickly that Flamanville 3 was preceded by the EPR Olkiluoto.

EDF is architect engineer of the project. While Areva is contributing the nuclear steam supply system, Bouyges Construction is leading the civil engineering consortium which included its subsidiaries Bouyges Travaux Publics and Quille, as well as Baudin-Châteauneuf. According to EDF, civil construction is 80% complete, said a statement, and "a start has been made on assembling piping and electrical equipment."

UK: Revised schedule later this year
EDF Energy, the UK subsidiary, has been planning to announce a revised schedule for its first UK EPR towards the end of this year when it can take account of the final report from chief regulator concerning the Fukushima accident. Company CEO Vincent de Rivaz had previously aimed for the end of 2017 at the time to begin commercial operation, with this already having been revised in statements to 2018.

Sources: AFP, 21 October 2004 / World Nuclear News, 11 April 2007 / EDF Press release, 20 july 2011/ Greenpeace, Press release, 21 July 2011 / Greenpeace Briefing: New problems at Olkiluoto, 21 July 2011 / World Nuclear News, 21 July 2011
Contact: Jehki Härkönen, Greenpeace energy campaigner (Finland): +358 40 197 2620 or Lauri Myllyvirta, energy campaigner (Greenpeace International): +31 6535 04711

The EPR in crisis

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#719-720
6100
12/11/2010
Professor Steve Thomas, Business School, University of Greenwich
Article

Much has been written in the Nuclear Monitor in the past few years about the European Pressurised water Reactor. Now a new study by Professor Steve Thomas (Business School, University of Greenwich, London) describes the history, failure, and outlook of this reactortype: 'The EPR in Crisis', published November 10. An important report, since the EPR is one of the most mentioned reactor types in the hype of the nuclear renaissance and is planned to be built in a number of countries. With kind permission of the Steve Thomas, we publish the entire report. Please note that this report is copyright material.

Content:
Introduction
The roots of the EPR design
Marketing of the EPR
USA
Future prospects
UK
Italy
India
Other markets
Construction experience
Olkiluoto
Flamanville
Taishan
Safety assessment
Instrumentation and Control
Core catchers
Economic issues
The Roussely Report
Conclusions
Annex 1: Letter STUK to Areva
Endnotes

The European Pressurised water Reactor or EPR (*1) was to have been the demonstration of a new generation of nuclear reactors, so-called Generation III+, first talked about in the late 1990s. The difference between ‘III+’ and the earlier ‘III’ designs is that III+ designs are said to rely more on ‘passive’ rather than ‘engineered’ systems.(*2)

Introduction
The rationale for the Generation III+ plants was that they would be an evolution of existing designs but would be designed from the start with the lessons from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents fully incorporated. They would rely more on natural processes rather than engineered systems for their safety – so-called passive safety. As well as being safer, they would also be more ‘buildable’, cheaper to build and operate, and easier to decommission. In short, they would address the issues that had led to ordering of earlier designs to a near halt from about 1990 onwards.

The Olkiluoto order, placed in 2003, should have been on-line in 2009 and should have been a demonstration of the qualities of Generation III+ designs in general and the EPR in particular. However, by 2010, the EPR appeared to be in crisis. The two orders on which significant construction work had been completed had gone seriously wrong, obtaining safety approval from regulators in Europe and the USA was proving far more difficult than had been expected, estimated construction costs had increased by a factor of at least four in the past decade and the EPR had failed to win orders in bids for tender for nuclear capacity. Relations between the two state-controlled French companies at the heart of the development of the EPR, Areva, the vendor and Electricité de France (EDF), the utility appeared at breaking point. EDF was reportedly contemplating designing two new reactors in competition with those offered by Areva.(*3)

In this report, we examine the roots of the design, existing and potential orders for the reactor, experience with construction of the EPR, issues arising from the safety assessment of the design, and economic issues. We examine the report by the Roussely Commission, a report commissioned by the French government and headed by a former Chief Executive of the French utility, Electricité de France (EDF), and its implications for the EPR.

The roots of the EPR design
In 1989, Siemens, the main German nuclear vendor and Framatome, the French nuclear vendor formed a joint venture company, Nuclear Power International (NPI) to design a new Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). Siemens and Framatome had both been licensees of Westinghouse for their PWR technology. Design work was partly funded by German utilities and Electricité de France. This design would be based on Siemens’ and Framatome's most recent PWR designs, the ‘Konvoi’ design and the N4 respectively. By 1992, NPI was claiming that the conceptual design of the EPR was nearly complete, (*4) although the conceptual design was not actually completed until 1994. The EPR would have a thermal output of 4250MW giving an electrical output of about 1450MW. The containment was drawn mainly from the N4 design, while instrumentation was expected to be drawn from the Konvoi. A particular feature of the design was the inclusion of a ‘core catcher’ so that in the event of a core melt, the core would be retained within the containment. There was some uncertainty about what type of external hazards would be guarded against, with the French requiring protection only against a light aircraft, such as a Cessna, while the Germans required a military jet, like a Phantom.

In March 1995, the basic design phase was started with the expectation that EDF would order the first unit before 2000 and have it in service by 2006. However, there was then already so much nuclear capacity in France that EDF had more than enough nuclear power capacity to meet base-load. This meant that ‘series’ ordering, that is ordering at a predictable rate of several units per year, would not be needed before 2005.(*5) The French programme had always been premised on an assumption that a nuclear power programme only made sense if series ordering was expected. The issue of aircraft protection was not fully resolved but the French containment was approved by both the German and French regulators. By November 1995, there were concerns, especially amongst EDF officials, about the cost of the design, then expected to be more than US$2000/kW. (*6) The basic design work was not completed on time and in August 1997, after further concern about costs, the output of the plant was increased to 1800MW. (*7)

In September 1999, the head of DSIN (the French safety regulatory body later renamed DGSNR), Andre-Claude Lacoste, stated he expected to issue an interim safety verdict on the EPR within ‘a few weeks to a few months’ with a final design certification, reported to be equivalent to NRC’s design certification for advanced reactors. (*8) The output of the reactor had been reduced back down to about 1500MW. However, by 2003, the final certification had not been issued and Andre-Claude Lacoste, the head of the French regulatory body,, stated the process carried out up till then did not correspond to US design certification and that to achieve this would take 2-3 years more. (*9)

In August 2000, Framatome and Siemens agreed to a new joint venture formally merging their nuclear activities into a new company called Framatome ANP, subsequently renamed Areva NP. Framatome would hold 66 per cent of the stock and Siemens the rest.(*10)

Marketing of the EPR
Continued delays to EDF’s order led Areva NP to switch to Finland as the focus for its marketing. In May 2002, the Finnish Parliament approved the construction of a fifth nuclear unit in Finland. Three designs were short-listed from a list of seven for an order to be placed by the Finnish utility, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). The Finnish safety regulator, STUK, had already stated that it saw no difficulties in principle in licensing any of the seven initial candidates. (*11) The three short-listed reactors were the EPR, a Russian design and a Boiling Water Reactor design also offered by Areva NP. TVO was widely reported to be looking for a ‘turnkey’ (fixed price) contract. Westinghouse chose not to bid overtly on the grounds that a turnkey offer would not be profitable. (*12) However, there were also claims by Areva that Westinghouse’s AP1000 would not have met the requirements on aircraft protection because its containment was not strong enough. (*13) The AP1000 does not have a core-catcher and the head of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen has stated that on these grounds, the AP1000 would not have been acceptable in Finland. (*14)

In December 2003, TVO signed a turnkey deal with Areva NP for a 1600MW EPR at a cost, including interest during construction and two fuel charges of €3bn. The Finnish regulator was by then in close contact with the French regulator, DGSNR, which was expecting that an order for France would be placed in 2004. STUK expected to complete its review of the design within a year of the placing of the order.

By December, STUK and DGSNR had agreed to opt for different approaches so that construction in Finland did not have to wait until demonstrations of safety features that were expected to reduce costs had been carried out.(*15) In January 2005, STUK approved construction of Olkiluoto 3. (*16). In September 2004, DGSNR completed its review of the EPR and in October, the French government issued design approval for it, claimed to be equivalent to NRC design certification.(*17) In December 2004, Areva NP wrote to the US NRC asking it to begin a review of the EPR design for the US market. (*18) It expected completion of the review in 2008.

Approval by the French regulator came just after the opening of a call for tender from China in October 2004 and with further delays in ordering in France, Areva NP’s marketing efforts switched to China. China’s decision on the tender was delayed several times and it was not until December 2006 that it was announced that it had been won by Toshiba/Westinghouse’s offer of four AP1000s. One of the factors behind Areva NP’s failure to win the initial tender was reported to be its reluctance to transfer the technology as quickly and as fully as the Chinese wanted. (*19) China wanted quickly to be in a position to be able to build reactors of the design it chose without any input from the original vendor and in 2010, it was planning to start placing orders for plants of the AP1000 design without major involvement from Westinghouse. (*20) There were reports that Areva NP had failed to match Westinghouse’s offer to ‘sell the Chinese the blueprints.' (*21) However, reportedly in the interests of relations with France, China subsequently ordered two EPRs in November 2007 for the Taishan site in a deal reportedly worth €8bn. It is not clear what the terms of the contract were or what it covered so it is difficult to compare this deal with others. EDF took a 30 per cent stake in the company, Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (GNPC), building the reactors.

In the meantime, EDF finally ordered its first EPR to be built at its Flamanville site in 2005. At that time, EDF expected the reactor to cost €3.3bn, although the reactor would produce 1700MW, 100MW more than the Olkiluoto order. Construction of the reactor (first structural concrete) did not start until December 2007 and it was expected to take five years to build, a year more than Olkiluoto. Unlike Olkiluoto where Areva NP carried out the architect engineering, EDF itself carried out the architect engineering, as it has done with the 58 previous reactors it had bought from Framatome.

The next tender was for South Africa launched in January 2008 calling for 3200-3600MW of new capacity from Areva NP and Toshiba Westinghouse. The tender was in two parts: the first with specific proposals for the 3200-3600MW of capacity and the second the development of a 20,000MW nuclear fleet to be in place by 2025.. The first part of the bid would require either two EPRs of 1600MW or three AP1000s each about 1200MW. (*22) It was reported that the bids were in the order US$6000/kW (*23) and in November 2008, it was reported that Areva had won the contest, although the scale of 20,000MW programme was to be scaled back.(*24)However, in December 2008, Eskom cancelled the tender citing ‘the magnitude of the investment.'(*25)

In February 2009, Areva NP bid for two reactors to be constructed in Ontario.(*26) Other bidders were Toshiba-Westinghouse (AP1000) and the Canadian vendor, AECL offering a new Candu design.(*27) The commissioning body was Infrastructure Ontario a state-owned agency. In June 2009, the Ontario government suspended the tender citing concerns about pricing. It was reported that Areva NP’s bid for one EPR was US$21bn. This was denied by Areva NP but they did not reveal the actual figure.(*28)

In February 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began the assessment of bids for 5000MW of new nuclear capacity. In addition to a bid from Areva NP for three EPRs, it was reported that there were bids from General Electric-Hitachi and Toshiba/Westinghouse. (*29) The EPR bid initially involved Areva NP, GDF Suez, Bechtel and Total. Subsequently, at the request of the French government, EDF was persuaded to join the EPR bid. In July, three bids were selected for assessment including a bid from GE-Hitachi for a boiling water reactor (BWR) and one from a Korean group offering its Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), the APR-1400. (*30) In December 2009, it was announced that the tender had been awarded to the Korean consortium for four APR-1400 units at a price of US$20bn. According to Korean media reports, the Korean bid was almost 30 per cent lower per kW than the EPR bid, while the GE Hitachi offer was said to be higher than the French bid. The failure to win this bid led to much criticism of the French nuclear industry, in particular the lack of unity in the French bid. EDF, which has acted as architect engineer for all the PWRs built in France, had been unwilling to act as architect engineer for foreign bids and had only been persuaded by the French government in December to lead the bid as the UAE utility, ENEC, had requested. (*31)

USA
The USA is potentially the largest nuclear market (along with China) in the world and Areva and EDF have made a major financial commitment to open up this market. EPR is one of five designs being assessed by the US safety authorities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and is a candidate for Federal subsidies including Federal loan guarantees. Subsidies for new nuclear reactors were first mooted in 2002, when President Bush launched an initiative aimed at re-starting commercial ordering for nuclear reactors using the Generation III+ design in the USA, the Nuclear Power 2010 programme: no reactor order, not subsequently cancelled, had been placed since 1974 in the USA. The Bush government believed that nuclear technology was competitive and that a handful of subsidised demonstration plants were needed to show that the new designs had overcome the problems of earlier designs.(*32) The publicity for the programme claimed: ‘New Generation III+ designs ... have the advantage of combining technology familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs.'(*33)

This programme has evolved considerably since it was first announced and although nominally Nuclear Power 2010 is due to end at the end of fiscal year 2010, the effort by the Federal government to re-start nuclear reactor ordering will almost certainly continue. Nuclear Power 2010 originally had the goal of having new reactors online by 2010. Time-scales have slipped substantially – the first unit is unlikely to be on-line before about 2018 if there are no more delays.

The programme was to take advantage of new licensing procedures, already passed into law in the 1992 Energy Policy Act, so that a combined Construction and Operating License (COL) license would replace the existing procedure of separate construction and operating licenses. The proposed Energy Policy Act of 2003 (EPACT 2003) offered the prospect of Federal loan guarantees for new reactors covering up to 50 per cent of the cost of the projects. When the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)(*34)looked at the cost implications of this bill, it assumed that loan guarantees would be offered for six reactors. The CBO assumed that the reactors would be of 1100MW, each costing US$2.5bn (US$2300/kW) and that they would be financed by 50 per cent debt and 50 per cent equity. This meant that the guarantees required would be worth about US$7.5bn. It asserted the risk of default would be ‘well above 50 percent’ but that over the plant’s expected operating lifetime, its creditors (which could be the federal government) could expect to recover a significant portion of the plant’s construction loan so the net cost to taxpayers would be about 25 per cent of the sum guaranteed.

EPACT 2003 was not passed, but a successor bill, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) was passed and contained much more generous levels of support for new nuclear reactors. EPACT 2005 included provisions to cover cost overruns due to regulatory delays,(*35) and a production tax credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour for the first 6,000 megawatt-hours from new nuclear reactors for the first eight years of their operation, subject to a $125 million annual limit.(*36)

However, the biggest incentive was the provision of loan guarantees under Title XVII of that bill. While the loan guarantees would only be available for technologies that were not ‘commercial’, the number of units that would be eligible was not precisely specified. The US Department of Energy stated: ‘DOE has defined “commercial technologies,” which are not eligible for loan guarantees under this program, as “in general use if it has been installed in and is being used in three or more commercial projects in the United States in the same general application as in the proposed project, and has been in operation in each such commercial project for a period of at least five years.” Given that new reactors will take at least five to ten years to build, a large amount of loan guarantees for the same design could be offered before the design is considered “commercial”.(*37)

The potential scale of the loan guarantees programme has escalated dramatically since 2003. Let us assume that these were now available for only three units of each of the five designs being assessed by the US NRC and for up to 80 per cent of the total cost. Since the CBO made its estimate in 2003, the estimated cost of new reactors has increased to at least US$6000/kW and their average size has increased to 1200-1600MW making the cost (without finance costs) of an EPR nearly US$10bn.

Under these assumptions the programme would be able to provide loan guarantees worth more than US$100bn. In July 2008, the US DOE announced it was ready to accept applications for loan guarantees, but Congress authorized only up to US$18.5bn.(*38) Congress believed this might be sufficient to cover four projects (seven to eight reactors), but using more realistic cost assumptions, this seemed likely to be able to only allow three or four reactors at most. The Obama Administration asked for an additional US$36bn in loan guarantees in February 2010 , but the appropriations process was held up by election-year politics, so by November 2010, it was not clear how much the additional funds would be. There is also the issue of the fee that should be charged to borrowers for the loan guarantees. This should be an economic fee, in other words, one that reflects the risk involved. . The fees are assessed by the federal Office of Management and Budget and are supposed to reflect the risk of default for that project. As has become clear with the Calvert Cliffs project, discussed below, if the risk of a loan is assessed to be high, the fee could be more than the developers are prepared to pay.

The subsidies on offer under EPACT 2005 did stimulate utilities to announce plans for more than 30 new reactors, seven of which were for EPRs. However, a significant proportion of these never got beyond the early planning stage and by June 2010, only 27 had made applications to the NRC for COLs. Four of these were for EPRs (see Table 1) including two to be built by UniStar, a 50-50 joint venture created in 2005 between EDF and the US utility, Constellation. UniStar is a partner in the other two projects with PPL for the Bell Bend project and with Ameren UE for the Callaway reactor. By June 2010, of these 27 reactors, one application had been withdrawn and the owners of four others, two of which were for EPRs, had asked for the process to be suspended. Of the remaining 22, two were EPRs and the developer of one of these, PPL, stated that it was still ‘several years from a final decision on whether to build Bell Bend.'(*39) The future of the EPR therefore seemed highly dependent on the one EPR project still being actively pursued, the UniStar Calvert Cliffs project.

Table 1 EPR’s proposed in USA

Plant

Owner

COL application

Loan Guarantee

Calvert Cliffs 3

UniStar

COL 3/08

Shortlist

Callaway 2

AmerenUE

Suspended 4/09

Applied

Nine Mile Pt 3

UniStar

Suspended 1/09

Applied

Bell Bend

PPL

COL 10/08

Applied

Source: Author’s research

The presence of EDF in the UniStar joint venture, with its vast experience of building and operating PWRs supplied by Areva – 58 units in service in France – was seen as a major advantage. Constellation owns about 3.9GW of existing nuclear power plants at three sites (Calvert Cliffs, Nine Mile Point and Ginna).(*40) In September 2008, EDF tried to take over Constellation but were outbid by MidAmerican Energy Holdings, a private company controlled by Warren Buffet. It was reported that the rival bid for Constellation could derail EDF’s nuclear ambitions in the USA if MidAmerican did not support new nuclear build. In December 2008, EDF announced an agreement with Constellation to take a 49.99% holding in Constellation’s nuclear subsidiary, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group. The deal was done through the EDF subsidiary, EDF Development Inc, and cost US$4.5bn.(*41) Mid American Holdings amicably withdrew its offer. The UniStar joint venture remains separate from this deal.

Whether the purchase of the stake in Constellation’s nuclear assets made any sense without the new build reactors is far from clear. However, it is apparent that EDF regards it as part of its bid to build new reactors and expand the scope of its operations into plant design and construction. Nucleonics Week reported: “EDF Chairman/CEO Pierre Gadonneix defended the decision to buy what some in France are calling ‘old’ US nuclear plants as a ticket to what will be ‘the world's largest nuclear market tomorrow’."(*42) In summer 2009, Gadonneix was replaced by Henri Proglio, who has been reportedly much less enthusiastic about EDF’s nuclear expansion outside France.

The Calvert Cliffs reactor was forecast to cost US$7.2bn in 2008. (*43) UniStar ordered forgings and other long lead-time reactor components for Calvert Cliffs in 2006 and 2007. A partial construction and operating license application (COLA), mainly the environmental report, was submitted in July 2007 and was docketed by the NRC in January 2008. The remainder of the COLA was submitted in March 2008 and was docketed on June 4, 2008. As of November 2010, there was no schedule for issue of the COL because of the problems with certifying the design. (*44) Part 1 of the application for federal loan guarantees was submitted in September 2008 and Part 2 in December 2008. In 2009, the US Department of Energy short-listed four projects for loan guarantees, including Calvert Cliffs. The first loan guarantee was offered to another project in February 2010 and an offer to Calvert Cliffs was widely expected to follow soon after. However, by August 2010, no commitment had been made and Constellation began to cut back drastically on expenditure on the Calvert Cliffs project. How far this was due to the delays in granting loan guarantees and how far it was due to deterioration in the economics of the new reactor is not clear.

The CEO of Constellation stated: ‘market signals to build a baseload plant of any kind, let alone nuclear, have suffered significantly since we started the project four years ago.’ He said Constellation will abandon the project if it does not receive a conditional loan guarantee for the project. The poor market signals included low natural gas prices and the short- and long-term power price outlooks.(*45) EDF, in its report for the first half of 2010 published in July 2010, made a provision of €1.06bn (about US$1.45bn) related to financing delays on nuclear projects in the United States.(*46)

By September, signs of strain between EDF and Constellation were clear. A particular issue was that under the terms of the purchase of the stake in Constellation’s nuclear assets, Constellation could require EDF to US$2bn worth of Constellation’s natural gas, coal and hydropower plants by end 2010.(*47) There was speculation in September 2010 that these problems could lead to EDF selling its stake in the nuclear assets and dissolving the UniStar joint venture.(*48) In October 2010, Constellation unilaterally withdrew from negotiations with the US Department of Energy for loan guarantees for the Calvert Cliffs project. It was reported that the fee to provide loan guarantees for 80 per cent of the forecast cost of the plant (US$9.6bn) was initially proposed at US$880m, or 11.6 per cent of the amount borrowed.(*49) When Constellation rejected that offer, DOE proposed a 5 per cent fee, but with conditions including that Constellation fully guarantee construction and commit to sell 75 per cent of the power through a Purchase Power Agreement (PPA), presumably through its subsidiary Baltimore Gas & Electric. The Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) would have had to approve a PPA.

Subsequently Constellation sold its 50 per cent stake in UniStar to EDF for US$140m. In addition, Constellation transferred to UniStar potential new nuclear sites at Nine Mile Point and R.E. Ginna in New York as well as Calvert Cliffs. The agreement requires EDF to transfer 3.5 million of the shares it owns in Constellation and to give up its seat on Constellation's board and in exchange, Constellation gave up the option to require EDF to buy Constellation’s fossil fuel capacity.(*50)

EDF was reported to be keen to proceed with the Calvert Cliffs project but US law does not allow US nuclear reactors to be owned, controlled or dominated by foreign companies or governments, so EDF would need to find a new partner to proceed. It is not clear whether loan guarantees could be offered to UniStar in advance of a new US partner being agreed and whether the fee would be the same.

While the political wrangling about how much Congress will be prepared to allow the US DOE to offer in loan guarantees, the deteriorating prospective economics for new nuclear reactors and the economic risk they pose to their owners may mean that relatively few loan guarantees are granted. The projects most likely to go ahead are those with the ‘belt and braces’ of Federal loan guarantees and a state regulatory body that commits to allowing the utility to recover its costs from consumers. Calvert Cliffs and Bell Bend would be exposed to the PJM electricity market and therefore could expect no support from the state regulator. If the Calvert Cliffs project does collapse and an existing project, such as Bell Bend cannot be brought in to replace it, it is hard to see how the EPR could survive in the USA. This would be a severe blow to EDF and Areva, both of which have invested a large amount of cash and their credibility in opening up the US market to the EPR.

Future prospects
The EPR is competing in a number of other markets where Areva NP hopes it will be the basis for series ordering, in particular the UK and Italy.

UK
The UK government’s program is based on very different underlying assumptions than that of the United States. The UK government did not claim that nuclear power would be directly competitive with fossil fuels, but if a carbon price of €36/tonne was assumed, it would be competitive. Both the Labour government up to May 2010 and the successor Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition seem heavily committed to reviving nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom. However, all three parties have stated that orders should only be placed if they do not involve public subsidies. Ordering would therefore take place without subsidy, provided a few non-financial enabling decisions were taken, particularly on planning processes and certification of designs. In 2008, when the government revisited nuclear economics, it assumed the construction cost was £1,250/kW ($2,000/kW).

The government’s nuclear regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), started to examine four separate designs in 2007 including the Areva NP EPR and the Toshiba/Westinghouse AP1000. The rationale was that up to three designs would be finally certificated, thus giving utilities a choice of designs. In fact, the other two designs were quickly withdrawn leaving just the EPR and AP1000.

Three utilities have made significant commitments to UK ordering: EDF, RWE, and E.ON – the latter two in a consortium called Horizon. EDF took over the UK nuclear generation company, British Energy, for about €15 billion in 2008, while RWE/E.ON have purchased sites in 2009 adjacent to existing nuclear power plants for several hundred million Euros. Both EDF and the RWE/E.ON consortium expect to order 4 units, for a total of 10 to 12 GW of capacity. EDF is expected to order the EPR, while the RWE/E.ON consortium has yet to choose its supplier.

EDF heavily committed itself to nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom with its purchase in 2009 of British Energy. The price seemed far above the value of the assets being acquired and only has any logic if new nuclear orders are placed. British Energy went bankrupt in 2002 because its operating costs, then about £16/MWh, were marginally higher than the price it received for electricity. Since then, operating costs have grown every year and by 2008/09, the operating costs had risen to £41.3/MWh. British Energy only remained solvent because of the extremely high wholesale electricity prices that prevailed in that period – British Energy received £47/MWh in that period. If operating costs continue to rise and/or wholesale electricity prices fall (by the end of 2009, they were well below the 2008 peak), British Energy will be at risk of collapse again.

The RWE/E.ON consortium had invested a few hundred million pounds in options to buy sites, but if it did not take up these options, it could walk away from a British nuclear program at little cost. By the start of 2010, the UK was still 3-4 years from completing safety assessment of the design and getting planning permission for specific sites – the point when a firm order could be placed.

Italy
In 1987, a referendum led to the closure of the four operating nuclear power plants in Italy and the abandonment of work on construction of another nuclear station. The Berlusconi government has introduced legislation that would pave the way for the reintroduction of nuclear power in Italy. Four 1650 MW EPRs could be built, with construction starting as early as 2013, under an agreement signed in February 2009 by the French utility, EDF, and the largest Italian utility, ENEL. ENEL has not selected the sites for these units yet. It has said the cost would be about €4-4.5 billion each or $3,600-4,000/kW.(*51) There has been speculation about other competing bids to build nuclear power plants – for example, a consortium led by A2A, the Milan-based utility offering AP1000s – but these projects are much less advanced than those of ENEL. (*52)

India
It has been reported that a memorandum of understanding (MOU), including the intention to build two EPRs, would be signed in February 2009 between Areva and the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited.(*53) Even if this MOU is signed, it is far from being a firm order and many MOUs come to nothing, for example, if financing cannot be arranged.

Other markets
President Sarkozy has announced that a second EPR in France will be ordered in 2011 for the Penly site. It is unlikely there will be scope for many further orders for France given that France already has more baseload electricity capacity than it can readily use and with plans to operate existing reactors for up to 60 years instead of the earlier expectations of 40 years, it will not be till after 2035 when the existing reactors begin to be retired. The Penly plant was to be built by EDF, which would have a 50 per cent stake in it, with the other stakes being held by the other major French utility, GDF Suez (25 per cent) and ENEL (the main Italian utility), E.ON (a large German utility and the oil company, Total, each with 8.33 per cent. However, in September 2010, GDF Suez, which was disappointed not to have been given the job of building the plant, announced their withdrawal from the project.(*54) There were reports that GDF Suez was hoping to lead construction of a reactor at another site, using the Areva ‘Atmea’ design (see below).(*55)

The Finnish Parliament has voted to allow construction of two additional nuclear reactors by two different consortia. Both consortia have named the EPR as one of three or four options they might choose. It is far from certain whether these orders will be placed, and if they are, whether the EPR will be chosen, especially given the poor performance of the EPR at the Olkiluoto site. In July 2010 in the Canadian province of New Brunswick, Areva, the New Brunswick government and New Brunswick Power announced that they would examine the feasibility of building a light-water nuclear reactor in the province by 2020. However, in September 2010, the incoming Premier for the province announced the agreement would go on the back-burner.(*56)

Construction experience
While utilities and governments will be interested in the theoretical attractions of new designs, it will be actual experience of building and operating these new designs that will be crucial in determining their success. By October 2010, no EPR was yet in service but four were under construction, one in Finland (Olkiluoto), one in France (Flamanville) and two in China (Taishan).

Olkiluoto
The Olkiluoto-3 reactor order of December 2003 was the first nuclear order in Western Europe and North America since the 1993 Civaux-2 order in France and the first order outside the Pacific Rim for a Generation III/III+ design. The Finnish electricity industry had been trying to get Parliamentary approval for a new nuclear unit since 1992. This was finally granted in 2002. The Olkiluoto-3 order was a huge boost for the nuclear industry in general and Areva NP in particular. Industry anticipated that, once complete, the plant would provide a demonstration and reference for other prospective buyers of the EPR.

The contract price for Olkiluoto-3 was reported in 2004 to be €3bn for a 1600 MW reactor.(*57) Subsequently, the price was reported to be €3.2bn(*58) or €3.3bn.(*59) Safety approval was given by the Finnish regulator, STUK, in March 2005 and substantive work on-site started in August 2005. At the time the contract was signed, the value was equivalent to about US$3.6-4.0bn (depending on the contract price) or about $2250-2475/kW (€1=US$1.2). This cost included financing and two reactor cores, so the cost per kW in overnight terms would have been somewhat lower, although given the very low rate of interest charged (2.6%), finance costs would be low.

Although the total cost was well above the nuclear industry‘s target of US$1000/kW of only a few years previously, it was still regarded by many critics as a ‘loss-leader’. Areva NP had been trying to persuade either EDF or one of the German utilities to place an order for an EPR since the late 1990s(*60) and there were fears that if an order for the EPR was not placed soon, AREVA NP would start to lose key staff(*61) and the design would become obsolete.(*62) Areva NP also needed a ‘shop window’ for EPR technology and Olkiluoto-3 would serve as a reference plant for other orders. As an additional incentive and at the request of the customer, Areva NP offered the plant on ‘turnkey’ or fixed price terms. It also took responsibility for the management of the site and for the architect engineering, not just the supply of the ‘nuclear island’. This was not a role it was accustomed to. For the 58 PWRs Areva NP’s predecessor, Framatome, had supplied for France, as well as for the foreign projects including those in China and South-Africa, it was EDF that had provided these services.

The Olkiluoto project has gone seriously wrong since construction started. By August 2010, Areva NP acknowledged that the estimated cost had reached €5.7bn (an additional €367m was acknowledged in the 2009 accounts), which at the prevailing exchange rate of €1=US$1.35 represented a cost of US$4800/kW.(*63) The contract is also the subject of an acrimonious dispute between Areva NP and the customer, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). Areva NP claims compensation of about €1bn for alleged failures of TVO. TVO, in a January 2009 counterclaim, is demanding €2.4bn in compensation from Areva NP for delays in the project.(*64)

Table 2 Timetable of problems at Olkiluoto 3

Date

Event

4/04

STUK: ‘We are getting the documents late. They (Areva) aren’t reserving enough time for our review and they don’t have all the information required by our guides.'(*65)

10/05

Pouring of base slab delayed by concerns about strength of concrete. Manufacturing of reactor pressure vessel and steam generators "a few weeks" behind the original schedule(*66)

2/06

Problems with qualifying pressure vessel welds and delays in detailed engineering design put construction more than six months behind schedule(*67)

3/06

STUK opened an investigation into manufacturing and construction problems(*68)

5/06

Despite measures including two shifts on site and three shifts at Areva's component manufacturing plant, work is eight to nine months behind schedule(*69)

7/06

TVO acknowledges delay now 1 year. STUK investigation: An extremely tight budget and timetable, supplier inexperience, poor subcontractor control and regulators’ difficulty in assessing information have caused confusion and quality control problems that have delayed the Olkiluoto-3 project(*70)

10/06

Areva takes provision of ca €300m for Olkiluoto project71 3 out of 4 ‘hot legs’ not made to specification. 72 Project manager replaced(*73)

12/06

Delay estimated at 18 months(*74)

1/07

Areva NP: Areva-Siemens cannot accept 100 % compensation responsibility, because the project is one of vast co-operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 % compensation principle’ TVO: ‘I don’t believe that Areva says this. The site is in the contractor’s hands at the moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible of what happens at the site. But the realisation of the project is Areva’s responsibility'(*75)

5/07

TVO and Areva agree design not complete enough when contract signed. STUK: ‘a complete design would be the ideal. But I don't think there's a vendor in the world who would do that before knowing they would get a contract. That's real life(*76)

8/07

Problems meeting requirements to withstand an airplane crash mean delay 2 years(*77)

9/07

Steel containment liner repaired in 12 places to fix deformations and weld problems(*78) Areva acknowledges further financial provisions for losses but does not quantify them. Independent estimate €500-700m(*79)

6/08

TVO site manager replaced(*80)

10/08

Delay now estimated at 3 years.(*81) Manufacturer of containment liner failed to obey an order to stop welding after a STUK-TVO inspection discovered that an incorrect welding procedure was being used.(*82) Areva initiates arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce over ‘a technical issue'(*83)

12/08

Areva announces further loss provisions. Independent estimates €1.3bn(*84)

12/08

Letter from STUK Director General top CEO Areva: ‘I cannot see real progress being made in the design of the control and protection systems.’ ‘This would mean that the construction will come to a halt and it is not possible to start commissioning tests.’ ‘the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons who speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make progress in resolving the concerns'(*85)

1/09

Delay acknowledged to be 3.5 years.(*86) Siemens announces withdrawal from Areva NP.(*87) Areva-Siemens file a second arbitration proceeding against TVO.(*88) Areva asking for €1bn in compensation. TVO counterclaiming for €2.4bn for ‘gross negligence’.(*89) TVO expects arbitration to take several years(*90)

3/09

Areva admits cost over-run now €1.7bn(*91)

06/10

TVO reports further delay till 2013 to completion of the plant.(*92) Delay confirmed by Areva NP(*93)

07/10

Areva booked €367m in new charges on expected losses with Olkiluoto.(*94)

Sources: As per endnotes

It seems unlikely that all the problems that have contributed to the delays and cost-overruns have been solved (see Table 2); the final cost could be significantly higher. The result of the claim and counter-claim arbitration between Areva NP and TVO will determine how the cost over-run will be apportioned. It is far from clear that TVO could survive financially if it had to shoulder a significant proportion of these costs. Even Areva, despite it being controlled by the French government had its credit rating reduced to BBB+, partly because of these problems(*95) and it would hardly be good for business if its customer was put out of business by the purchase of an EPR.

Flamanville
EDF finally ordered an EPR reactor in January 2007, to be located at their Flamanville site. This reactor was rated at 1630 MW(*96) and construction commenced in December 2007.(*97) In May 2006, EDF estimated the cost would be €3.3bn.(*98) At that time (€1=US$1.28), this was equivalent to US$2590/kW. This cost however did not include the first fuel or finance costs, so the overnight cost, which conventionally includes fuel but not finance costs would have been somewhat higher.

EDF did not seek a turnkey contract and chose to manage the contracting, for example, letting contracts for the turbine generator and the architect engineering. How far these decisions were influenced by the poor experience at Olkiluoto and how far they were influenced by the need EDF saw to maintain in-house skills is not clear.

In May 2008, the French safety regulatory authorities temporarily halted construction at Flamanville because of quality issues in pouring the concrete base mat.(*99)Delays had led the vendor, Areva NP to forecast the reactor would not be completed until 2013, a year late, but in November 2008, EDF claimed the delays could be made up and the reactor finished by the original schedule of 2012.(*100) EDF did admit that the expected construction costs for Flamanville had increased from €3.3 billion to €4 billion.(*101) This was then equivalent to US$3,265/kW (€1=US$1.33), substantially more than the Olkiluoto contract price, but far below the levels being quoted in the USA and the current cost of Olkiluoto. An Areva official suggested that the cost of an EPR will now be at least €4.5bn, although it was not specified whether this was an overnight cost.(*102) In January 2010, French unions reported that the project was then running at least two years behind schedule.(*103) These reports, originally denied by EDF, were confirmed by them in July 2010, when it also acknowledged that costs were by then running at €1.7bn over the original €3.3bn budget.(*104) In October 2010, Le Figaro reported a further delay of a year at Flamanville citing ‘several’ sources. EDF have denied this report. (*105)

Table 3 Timetable of problems at Flamanville 3

Date

Event

5/06

EDF decides to proceed with Flamanville 3(*106)

7/06

Site work commenced. Target construction time 54 months, construction cost €3.3bn excluding finance and fuel(*107) (*108)

1/07

NSSS ordered from Areva NP(*109)

4/07

French government issues construction license(*110)

12/07

First concrete poured(*111)

3/08

ASN asks EDF to improve work in several areas involving in particular quality control and organization.(*112) Inspection had revealed several problems in the civil construction work, including errors in installation of steel reinforcing bar in the concrete and "inconsistency" between rebar blueprints and the concrete pouring plan. organization for preparing concrete pouring was "insufficient"(*113)

5/08

ASN requires EDF to stop concrete pouring on May 26 (ban lifted June 17). Problems ‘show insufficient discipline on the part of the licensee and insufficient project organization’. Welding anomalies found in one of the four bottom pieces of the steel liner of the containment building (*114)

10/08

ASN told Areva to improve its oversight of forgings after procedures used by Italian subcontractor Societe della Fucine were found not to conform to standards(*115)

12/08

EDF acknowledges cost had increased to €4bn due mainly to inflation, and technical & regulatory changes.(*116) Construction schedule claimed still to be achievable

01/10

Unions claim construction is at least 2 years behind schedule(*117)

07/10

EDF confirms delay and announces expected costs are €1.7bn over budget(*118)

08/10

ASN asks EDF to modify the architecture of the non-safety instrumentation and control system(*119)

10/10

Le Figaro reports a further year delay(*120)

Sources: As per endnotes. Note: ASN = Autorité de sûreté nucléaire

Taishan
Under the terms of the contract Areva NP won to supply two EPRs to China, the company is only supplying the nuclear island and the contract is not turnkey. EDF is involved in the management of this project and has an equity stake in the reactors.(*121) Little reliable, independent information comes out of China on nuclear construction. The IAEA reported that work started on the first Taishan unit in November 2009 and on the second unit in April 2010. In July 2010, the South China Morning Post reported that work on the ‘second phase’ the Taishan units would not start in the third quarter of 2011 as expected.(*122) No reason for the delay was given by the plant owners, but there has been speculation that China was not comfortable with the fact that delays at Olkiluoto and Flamanville meant that the Taishan units would probably be the first EPRs to enter service.

Safety assessment
As mentioned previously, there was some confusion about the level of assessment of the EPR that had been carried out by the Finnish and the French regulators when construction started at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville plants respectively. It is now clear that neither had carried out a comprehensive generic safety review.

In August 2007, the UK safety regulator, the HSE launched its Generic Design Assessment (GDA) for the EPR (and three other designs). The timetable called for completion of the generic review in June 2011. There are three possible conclusions to this process: (*123) (1) if the regulators are fully content, they will issue an HSE Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC); (2) if they are largely content, they will issue an HSE Interim Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Environment Agency Interim Statement of Design Acceptability and identify the unresolved GDA Issues; and (3) if the regulators are not content no Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Statement of Design Acceptability will be issued. By August 2010, the HSE had acknowledged the first and third outcomes were implausible.(*124) In the case of the second outcome, the proposer would have to submit a Resolution Plan. However, once an interim DAC has been given, issues not covered by the Resolution Plan would not be considered. The HSE has recognised that it will probably be the first regulator to complete a generic assessment of the EPR and this would leave it in an invidious position if its requirements are seen as less stringent than those of other regulators. The HSE stated in July 2010:(*125)

We had originally hoped that the safety assessment of AP1000 and EPR by their ‘home’ regulators would be complete well before we completed GDA Step 4 in June 2011 so that we could fully consider their conclusions during our own assessment. However, we now understand that there is significant ongoing safety assessment by the home regulators for both AP1000 and EPR. This is a significant regulatory process concern for us, the implications of which are being considered at present, together with ways of ensuring the best possible international cooperation on and harmonisation of assessment outcomes.’

The HSE claims it will complete the GDA in June 2011, but ‘interim’ approvals, which would not suffice for construction of the reactors to begin in the UK, appear at the moment to be ‘more likely’ than final approvals for both designs for the June 2011 timeline.(*126)

Areva submitted a Standard Design Certification Application to the NRC in December 2007 more than 3 years after Areva NP began discussions with the NRC. At that time, Areva expected that the NRC would complete its technical review in two years, and finish the rulemaking that certifies the design the following year, 2010.(*127) This proved over-optimistic and in March 2010, after a number of delays, the NRC stated the final certification would not be before June 2012.(*128)

Instrumentation and Control
Table 2 shows that there were conflicts between Areva and STUK, the Finnish regulator even before construction started. The extent of these was illustrated by a leaked letter from the head of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen, to the CEO of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon in December 2008 (see Annex 1). In April 2009, the HSE classified Instrumentation & Control (I&C) as a ‘Regulatory Issue’, a particular feature of the design that might not meet UK regulatory standards.(*129) In July 2010, the I&C issue remained a Regulatory Issue and while HSE stated in July 2010 that it anticipated that an acceptable solution could be found, it had not received details of the modification proposed. The specific issue raised here, the level of redundancy in the I&C systems was subsequently taken up in a joint statement by the UK, French and Finnish regulators in November 2009.(*130) In August 2010, the HSE reported that while they believe that an ‘acceptable position can be reached for GDA’, this would depend ‘on timely and quality responses from EDF and AREVA and we have already noted difficulties with delivery on other C&I issues.’(*131)

The US and Chinese regulators were not party to this process, but in July 2010, it was reported that the US NRC had found that the I&C was too complex and interconnected to meet US regulations. The issue was described by an NRC spokesman as being ‘a critical path issue that is going to have to be resolved’.(*132) Whether this resolution would delay completion of the review beyond June 2012 is not clear. However, the I&C systems for UK, France, Finland and the USA will now all differ from each other because it is too late to make some changes to the French and Finnish designs.(*133)

Core catchers
A particular bone of contention has been the need of a ‘core-catcher’. In the event of a failure of the emergency core cooling system, this would ‘catch’ the core if it breached the reactor pressure vessel. There is no international agreement on the need for this feature: it is widely seen as essential for mainland Europe, but not the USA and other countries like Korea. However, this is an expensive system and Anne Lauvergeon blamed the extra cost of this as one of the factors behind the loss of the contract for UAE to a Korean design that does not have a core-catcher.(*134) Lauvergeon claimed that safety enhancements designed to prevent any offsite radiological impact — like the core catcher and the reinforced containment made the EPR 15 per cent more expensive than a Generation II PWR.(*135)

Economic issues
When a ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ was first mooted, a key element was the use of so-called Generation III+ designs, which would be safer, simpler, cheaper and easier to build than earlier designs. This, it was claimed, would overcome the problems that had led to the dramatic reduction in ordering from the mid-80s onwards. Particularly strong claims were made on costs with vendors claiming their new designs could be built for US$1000/kW. As noted above, cost was a particular issue from the start with the EPR and cost claims for it were not as aggressive as for some of the other designs. Nevertheless, in 1998, NPI claimed reactors could be built for US$1415/kW.(*136) In 2001, A US executive of Framatome claimed the EPR could be built in the USA for US$1320/kW.(*137)

In 2003, TVO’s studies for Olkiluoto envisaged that it would be able to buy a nuclear reactor for US$1800/kW or less. EDF’s studies from the same year assumed a cost of €1275/kW, then about US$1450,(*138) while the French government was even more optimistic in September of that year, assuming €1043/kW.(*139) These forecasts were revealed to be hopelessly unrealistic when it emerged that the winning bid for Olkiluoto was actually €3bn equivalent to €1875/kW or US$2300/kW.

In May 2006, when EDF ordered Flamanville, the cost estimated by EDF was reported to be €3.3bn, essentially the same as for Olkiluoto given inflation and the higher expected output (1630MW).(*140)

Costs at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville plants escalated rapidly, but it was not clear how far this was due to an underlying underestimate of costs and how far it was due to specific errors. Initial cost estimates for US EPRs were no less unrealistic with Areva and Unistar claiming overnight costs of US$1600-2000/kW in 2005.(*141) By 2008, Unistar was still estimating only US$2400/kW (2005 dollars).(*142) However by August of that year, the Unistar CEO, Mayo Shattuck suggested that the cost would be at the mid- to upper-end of the range US$4500-6000/kW (US$7.2-9.6bn).(*143)

Reports of bids for international contests produced even higher projected costs. In South Africa, Eskom expected a construction cost of US$2,500/kW. In January 2008, Eskom received two bids in reply to its call for tenders from November of the previous year for 3200 to 3400 MW of new nuclear capacity in the near term and up to 20,000 MW by 2025. One bid was from Areva for two EPRs (plus 10 more for the long-term) and the other from Westinghouse for the three AP1000s (plus 17 more in the long term).(*144) Both claimed their bids were “turnkey,” but whether they were really turnkey in the fixed price sense or whether they were simply for the whole plant is not clear. It was later reported that the bids were for around $6,000/kW – more than double the expected price.(*145)

In 2007, Ontario Power Authority (OPA), the public body responsible for planning the Ontario power system, had assumed nuclear power plants could be built for about C$2,900/kW.(*146) In June 2008, the Canadian government announced Darlington in Ontario as the site for a two-unit new build project and on May 20, 2009, information leaked that the Ontario government had chosen AECL as the leading bidder over Areva and Westinghouse to start building the first new nuclear plants in Canada in 25 years. Two new reactors were projected to start operating by 2018. However, the provincial government reportedly conditioned any go-ahead on financial guarantees by the federal government to cover the financial risks involved. Three bids were received, one from Areva and one from AECL, although only the AECL bid complied with the requirement that the vendor assume the construction risk. There was a press report on the size of the bids. This suggested that Areva’s non-compliant bid was C$23.6 billion (US$21 billion) for two EPRs (1600 MW each) or C$7,375/kW (US$6,600/kW). AECL and Westinghouse’s bids were higher. Ontario decided to suspend the tender. Subsequently, Areva disputed the published bid price, but they were not willing to supply the actual price they bid.

In December 2009, the UAE ordered four nuclear reactors from Korea using AP1400 technology, beating opposition from consortia led by EDF (including GDF Suez, Areva, and Total with the EPR) and GE-Hitachi.(*147) The contract is with Korean Electric to build and operate the reactors, the first coming on-line at an unspecified site in 2017 and the last by 2020. The terms of the deal and what is included are not clear, although the contract is reported to be worth $20.4 billion. The Korean bid was reported to be $16 billion lower than the French bid.(*148)

The response from Areva to this failure was particularly vitriolic. The CEO , Anne Lauvergeon, blamed the extra safety features required by the European market, particularly the core-catcher and a steel-lined double concrete containment that the EPR includes, whereas the winning bid, the Korean APR-1400 has no core-catcher and a single steel containment structure. She seemed to propose that Areva could offer previous generation models (for example, the 1000MW design sold to China in 1980) for export to third world countries.(*149)

The Roussely Report
The French government belatedly realised that commercialisation of the EPR was going badly and in October 2009 commissioned a former CEO of EDF, Francois Roussely, to examine the French nuclear industry. His report was given added point by the failure to win the tender for the UAE in December 2009. This failure was widely seen in France as due to the lack of an integrated offer including engineering, construction, fuel and waste, as well as equipment supply. The report, ‘The Future of the French Civilian Nuclear Sector’ was published in July 2010.(*150)

Roussely identified two major problems:

• The credibility of the EPR had been seriously damaged by problems at Olkiluoto and Flamanville;

• The capacity factors [reliability] of reactors in France have deteriorated sharply whereas elsewhere in the world, these have improved significantly.

He makes 15 recommendations, 12 described as ‘structural’ and 3 as ‘emergency’. Most of the structural measures seem to be aimed at creating a ‘Team France’, which would ensure France could offer a unified and comprehensive package for export markets in emerging countries. He recommends that the extension of reactor operating life to 60 years is supported and that further optimisation of the EPR from the feedback of the four reactors under construction and of past achievements be carried out. This optimisation should be carried out jointly by EDF and Areva.

On the problems at Olkiluoto and Flamanville, he recommends only that these reactors be completed with a few delays and as little cost over-run as possible. Lessons from this should be fed back into the construction of the Penly unit and any units ordered for the UK. The issue of poor reliability does not appear to be addressed directly by any of the recommendations. He does recommend that a charter setting out the conditions of employment applicable to all employees of nuclear power in France be introduced and that the mission of the Agence Securité Nucleaire (ASN) be reviewed, but it is not clear how this would address the issue of poor availability.

Of most interest is his diagnosis of the problems with the EPR. He attributes the problems squarely to ‘complexity’:

The complexity of the EPR comes from design choices, notably of the power level, containment, core catcher and redundancy of systems. It is certainly a handicap for its construction, and its cost. These elements can partly explain the difficulties encountered in Finland or Flamanville.’

He recommends:

The EPR should therefore be further optimised based on feedback from reactors under construction and past achievements. This optimisation would be lead jointly by EDF and Areva, in conjunction with ASN, with a view to make the detailed design as safe [as the current design].’

This recommendation does not seem realistic. The EPR was designed over a long period with the specific objective of rationalising the features of earlier designs. To assume that it would be a simple and quick process to just go through the design again to simplify it seems totally unrealistic. This is well illustrated by the issue of the I&C system noted above, which, ironically, was seen as not having enough redundancy. This problem was first identified in 2008; yet more than two years later, a detailed solution to the problem still has not been presented to the regulators. Any redesign that was comprehensive enough to significantly reduce complexity and costs would almost certainly be so extensive as to require the regulators to make a very full re-evaluation of the design.

This was the case with the problems with the AP1000 in the USA. This design received generic approval from the US regulator in 2006; yet in 2008, the supplier, Toshiba/Westinghouse, put in extensive design revisions that the US regulator is not expected to be able to approve before 2012. If we assume that this process of rationalization could be done in two years starting in 2011 and the regulators took a further four years to assess the design, this would mean that the design would not be ready to order before about 2017/18, after the Penly unit in France is expected to be on-line and at about the same time as EDF is claiming it will have the first UK EPR on-line.

Roussely recommends that the international French nuclear offering be ‘diversified’ with a smaller design, the Atmea, that could be brought to market quickly as a design more suitable for markets that would struggle to accommodate a reactor as large as the EPR. The Areva-Mitsubishi joint venture to develop Atmea was first announced in 2007.(*151) Atmea was described as being Generation III (rather than III+). A company spokesman said Atmea would be based on ‘proven technologies’ with ‘no technical breakthroughs or revolutionary innovations’. The design was reportedly to be submitted to the French regulator, ASN, in June 2010.(*152) The target for ASN to complete its review by fall 2011 seems unrealistic. Designs of this size from Areva or Mitsubishi are now more than 30 years old and given new features such as a core catcher and aircraft crash protection, the design must be substantially new. This either suggests that a highly optimistic timetable has been adopted or that the ASN review will not be a full generic assessment. Realistically, the Atmea design is highly unlikely to be available to order for 4-5 years and it is far from clear who the customers might be. GDF-Suez has expressed interest in building one in France but given that France already has serious over-capacity in nuclear, this would make no sense. Other customers, such as Jordan, are still some way from placing an order and for a country with no nuclear experience to order a first-of-a-kind unproven design would be seen as a massive risk.

It is particularly interesting to note the things that Roussely is entirely silent on. He fails to mention the prohibitively high prices bid by Areva on Ontario and South Africa, about double what the relevant governments expected. He also says a great deal about the Atmea design but nothing about the Kerena design, a BWR design that Areva has been working on for about as long as it has been working on the Atmea. The Kerena design is one of the options if another nuclear reactor is built in Finland.

The question that Roussely should have but utterly fails to address is whether the EPR is salvageable. Given the difficulties at construction sites, dramatically soaring construction cost estimates and difficulties of getting generic safety approval, this is surely the question that begs to be asked. It may be that the consequences to France’s nuclear strategy if the answer is that it is not are so severe that the question is politically impossible for an inquiry commissioned by the French government.

The fallout from the Roussely report seems set to continue with efforts by the French government to create a ‘Team France’ and the two key companies, EDF and Areva jockeying for position. It was reported in September that EDF was being pressed to increase its direct stake in Areva from 2.4 per cent to 15 per cent.(*153) EDF was making clear its dissatisfaction with Areva. It was reported in September 2010 that EDF was contemplating a partnership with a Chinese nuclear vendor or a Russian nuclear vendor to offer their designs to South Africa(*154) and that EDF was planning to develop nuclear reactors of its own design in competition with Areva.(*155) Neither proposal seems realistic: the Chinese design is essentially a 1970s design imported from France, which in turn imported it from the USA; the history of the EPR suggests that the time taken from start of conceptual design to the point when the reactor could be ordered is likely to be in the order 10-15 years. A more likely explanation is that EDF is trying to ensure that in any new configuration for the French nuclear industry, it is very much in the lead.

Conclusions
The EPR design is in crisis.

• Construction has gone dramatically wrong at the two sites in Europe where it is being built;

• The prices it is being offered at are so high that all contests where the EPR has been bid have either been abandoned (South Africa and Canada) or the contract has gone to a much lower bid from a competitor (UAE);

• Potential markets such as USA, UK and Italy all look problematic and reactor orders, if placed at all, will be much later than expected

• The process of obtaining safety approval in France, UK and USA is incomplete and, even if successful, the features needed to achieve regulatory approval may add significantly to costs.

The two sites in Europe where EPR is under construction, Olkiluoto and Flamanville, have gone dramatically wrong from the start of construction. It might have been argued that the problems at Olkiluoto were due to the lack of experience of the utility and the inexperience of Areva NP in carrying out the architect engineering. However, the fact that EDF, the most experienced nuclear utility in the world seems to be doing no better at Flamanville suggests the main problems are more related to the buildability of the design itself than to specific issues at Olkiluoto.

The promise for Generation III+ plants that they would: ‘have the advantage of combining technology familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs’(*156) has clearly not been fulfilled. The Chief Executive of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, acknowledges: ‘the cost of nuclear reactors has "always" gone up with each generation, because the safety requirements are ever higher. "Safety has a cost,"’(*157). Francois Roussely, former CEO of EDF stated: ‘The resulting complexity of the EPR, arising from the choice of design, specifically the level of power, the containment, the core catcher and the redundancy of the security systems is certainly a handicap for its construction and therefore its cost.’(*158)

The intuitively plausible notion that a new generation of nuclear reactors, starting without a blank sheet of paper could easily come up with a more rational and cheaper, yet safer design of reactor has been shown to be an illusion by the lengthy and still incomplete process of gaining safety approval. The Finnish and French authorities’ decision to allow construction to start before full generic approval had been given looks particularly ill-judged

As early as 1995 and again in 1997, there were concerns about the cost of the EPR then expected to be US$2000/kW but when other vendors began to claim they could build plants for US$1000/kW, Framatome seems to have felt obliged to follow suit. While it did not claim US$1000/kW was possible, it did claim reactors could be built for less than US$1500/kW in 1998 and 2001, less than a quarter of the prices it is now offering a decade later. At US$6000/kW or more, it seems unlikely that EPR will be affordable except where huge public subsidies are offered and/or there is a strong likelihood of full cost recovery from consumers, no matter what the cost is.

As the reality of these high costs hits home, it is likely that even markets in which government support for new nuclear orders has been strongest, such as the USA and UK, will find it difficult to support the costs.

From a business point of view, the right course for EDF and Areva seems clear. They must cut their losses and abandon the EPR now. In the short-term this will require some painful write-offs, for example, of investments in the UK and the USA, but in the long-term, the losses will be much greater if they continue to try to make the EPR work. Areva’s main business is its reactor servicing and fuel activities and these would be little affected by the abandonment of the EPR. EDF already has too much nuclear generating capacity in France, so not ordering more reactors will save it from unnecessary capital expenditure at a time when it acknowledges its debts are too high.(*159)

However, from a political point of view, France has invested so much political and financial capital in being the world leader in nuclear technology, such a decision to abandon the design will be politically too painful until it becomes unavoidable. However, for the governments of countries like the USA and the UK, which have invested little political capital in the French nuclear dream, the sensible course is clear: stop all investment of public money in the doomed EPR technology.


Annex 1 Letter from Jukka Laaksonen to Anne Lauvergeon

December 9, 2008

Dear Mrs. Lauvergeon,

With this letter I want to express my great concern on the lack of progress in the design of Olkiluoto 3 NPP automation.

The construction of Olkiluoto 3 plant seems to proceed generally well but I cannot see real progress being made in the design of the control and protection systems. Without a proper design that meets the basic principles of nuclear safety, and is consistently and transparently derived from the concept presented as an annex to the construction license application, I see no possibility to approve these important systems for installation. This would mean that the construction will come to a halt and it is not possible to start commissioning tests.

I expressed my concern on this already in spring 2008, in a meeting with Mr. Xavier Jacob and TVO's management. After that Areva organised a workshop at professional level in Erlangen on April 23-25, 2008. The goal of the workshop was to clarify the open technical issues. I was told afterwards that it was a successful event where our concerns were conveyed to your experts and were well understood by them. It was especially encouraging to hear that after the workshop a group led by an expert of high repute, Dr. Graf, was given a task to make sure that the issues be addressed promptly.

Since then there have been several meetings among our experts but we have not seen expected progress in the work on Areva side. The systems with highest safety importance are to be designed by Areva NP SAS but unfortunately the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons who speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make progress in resolving the concerns. Therefore, evident design errors are not corrected and we are not receiving design documentation with adequate information and verifiable design requirements. This is unfortunate because I am convinced that within your organisation there is enough competence to resolve all open issues. I wonder how this competence is actually being used in this project and whether an input by Dr. Graf and his group has been actually utilised.

I sincerely hope you could initiate some action in this area, in order to ensure bringing the construction of Olkiluoto 3 to a successful end.

With my best regards, Jukka Laaksonen, Director General, STUK


Endnotes

 (*1) European Pressurised water Reactor or Evolutionary Pressurised water Reactor for the US market.

(*2) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, Mitsubishi introduce mid-size 'Atmea 1' PWR design’ Sept 6, 2007, p 1.

(*3) Agence France Presse ‘France's EDF designs reactor to challenge Areva: report’ September 28, 2010.

(*4) Nuclear News ‘Joint Franco-German design partly unveiled’, Aug 1992, p 52.

(*5) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR basic design goes forward: EDF to build first unit by 2000’ Mar 2, 1995, p 5.

(*6) Nucleonics Week ‘France-German advanced reactor may be too expensive to buy’ Nov 16, 1995.

(*7) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR becoming 1,800-MW plant to meet competitive targets’ Aug 21, 1997, p 5.

(*8) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR design certification expected in mid-2000: interim opinion sooner’ Sept 13, 1999, p 11.

(*9) Inside NRC ‘Lacoste says licensing advanced PWR in France would take 2 to 3 years’ Dec 30, 2002.

(*10) Nuclear News ‘Siemens/Framatome nuclear merger completed’ Aug 2000, p 109.

(*11) Nuclear News, ‘Proposal for fifth reactor should fulfill licensing reqs’ Apr 2001, p 46.

(*12) Nucleonics Week ‘Westinghouse will sit out bid for single unit in Finland’ Nov 14, 2002, p 1.

(*13) Nucleonics Week ‘Framatome claim AP1000 couldn’t win Finnish bid on economics is denied’ Apr 10, 2003.

(*14) Nucleonics Week ‘ENEC says it considered designs with core catchers for new reactors’ January 28, 2010, p 1.

(*15) Inside NRC ‘French and Finnish EPRs will march to different regulatory drums’ Dec 13, 2004, p 10.

(*16) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK okays Olkiluoto-3, sets limit on initial fuel burnup’ Jan 27, 2005, p 1.

(*17) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR wins design approval from French government’ Oct 14, 2004, p 6.

(*18) Inside NRC ‘Areva ready for NRC to start design review process for EPR’ Feb 7, 2005, p 1.

(*19) Xinhua Economic News Service ‘China Focus: China, France sign 8-bln-Euro nuclear energy deal’ Nov 27, 2007.

(*20)TendersInfo ‘China : Shaw Signs Contract to Support Additional AP1000 Nuclear Power Plants in China’ August 22, 2010.

(*21) Nucleonics Week ‘Westinghouse may win China bid as Areva balks at tech transfer’ March 16, 2006, p 15.

(*22) Nucleonics Week ‘French consortium to submit bids to build two EPRs in South Africa’ Jan 24, 2008, p 5.

(*23) Nucleonics Week ‘Big cost hikes make vendors wary of releasing reactor cost estimates’ Sept 14, 2008.

(*24) Nucleonics Week ‘Eskom to build initial reactors, but long-term plan to be curtailed’ Nov 20, 2008.

(*25) Nucleonics Week ‘Eskom cancels tender for initial reactors’ Dec 11, 2008, p 1.

(*26) Nucleonics Week ‘AECL, Areva, Westinghouse submit bids for new reactors at Darlington’ Mar 5, 2009, p 3.

(*27) The Candu reactor uses heavy water as moderator rather than light water as in the PWR.

(*28) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva disputes EPR cost figure as Canadians grapple with risk issue’ Jul 23, 2009, p 1.

(*29) Nucleonics Week ‘UAE starts selection process for multi-unit nuclear program’ Feb 12, 2009, p 3.

(*30) Nucleonics Week ‘Three consortia submit bids to UAE to build new reactors’ Jul 9, 2009.

(*31) Nucleonics Week ‘Bidders said to be making last-ditch efforts to supply reactors to UAE’ December 10, 2009, p 1.

(*32) The US Department of Energy commissioned a cost study from the University of Chicago, which was published in 2004 and concluded that nuclear power was competitive with power from coal and natural gas. Office of nuclear energy, science and technology (2004) ‘University of Chicago: "Nuclear Power Competitive With Coal & Natural Gas"’ Press Release, September 20, 2004. http://nuclear.gov/home/09-20-04.html

(*33) http://nuclear.gov/home/11-21-03.html

(*34) Congressional Budget Office (2003) ‘Congressional Budget Office cost estimate: S14 Energy Policy Act of 2003’ Congressional Budget Office, Washington. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/42xx/doc4206/s14.pdf

(*35) Up to $500 million each for the first two new nuclear reactors, and half of the overruns due to such delays (up to $250 million each) for the next four reactors. See http://www.ne.doe.gov/energypolicyact2005/neepact2a.html

(*36) http://www.irs.gov/irb/2006-18_IRB/ar07.html

(*37) http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2008/janqtr/pdf/10cfr609.2.pdf

(*38) http://lpo.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/NuclPowerSol7-11-08Amen...

(*39) Inside NRC ‘NRC extends US EPR design review by six months; COL delays not expected’ Mar 1, 2010, p 5.

(*40) Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, undated ‘Fact Sheet’. Accessed on Jan 27, 2009 at

http://www.constellation.com/vcmfiles/Constellation/Files/Press-Kit_Corp...

(*41) Nucleonics Week, 2008 ‘EDF to acquire nearly half of Constellation's nuclear business’ Dec 18, 2008, p 1.

(*42) Nucleonics Week, 2008 ‘In France, EDF/CEG deal draws fire, but seen as key to EPR series cost’ Dec 25, 2008.

(*43) Electric Utility Week, 2008 ‘Regulators back expansion of Calvert Cliffs, but environmentalists ask for preconditions’ Dec 1, 2008, p 28.

(*44) http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/calvert-cliffs/review-sched...

(*45) SNL Coal Report ‘Optimism fades to frustration on Constellation's nuclear expansion’ Aug 9, 2010.

(*46) http://shareholders-and-investors.edf.com/fichiers/fckeditor/Commun/Fina...

(*47) Washington Post ‘Constellation, EDF in purchase dispute’ September 25, 2010.

(*48) Baltimore Sun ‘Daily Briefing’ September 28, 2010.

(*49) International Herald Tribune ‘EDF partner sees impasse in plan for U.S. reactor: Cost of loan guarantee dooms joint project, Maryland utility says’ October 11, 2010, p 15

(*50) EDF (2010) ‘Constellation Energy Group, Inc’ Form SC 13D/A. Filed 10/28/10 with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

(*51) Nucleonics Week, ‘Enel Targets 2020 for Operation of First Italian EPR Unit,’ Oct 8, 2009.

(*52) Nucleonics Week, ‘Milan Utility A2A Could Become Hub of AP1000 Consortium for Italy,’ Oct 22, 2009.

(*53) The Hindu, 2009. ‘Areva to sign MoU with NPCIL; to set up two reactors’ January 22, 2009. Accessed on

Jan 27, 2009 at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/006200901221224.htm

(*54) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘Penly project less certain after GDF SUEZ pullout’ September 24, 2010.

(*55) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘GDF SUEZ may seek partner for new French nuclear unit’ September 27, 2010.

(*56) The Telegraph-Journal ‘Alward to shelve Areva deal; Generation Premier-elect says he plans to put future nuclear plans with Areva on ice and concentrate on the ongoing completion of Point Lepreau power plant refurbishment’ September 29, 2010.

(*57) Project Director Martin Landtman stated: ‘The value of the whole Olkiluoto 3 investment including the Turn-key Contract is about EUR 3 billion in year 2003 money. No other figures are published’, personal communication, e-mail to Mycle Schneider, dated 8 Oct 2004.

(*58) Nucleonics Week, ‘EC probing claims Olkiluoto loan guarantees were state aid’, 26 Oct 2006.

(*59) Nucleonics Week, ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’, 5 Mar 2009, p 1.

(*60) Nucleonics Week, ‘Giant EPR said to be competitive: EDF to decide on order next year’, 6 Nov 1998, p 1.

(*61) Petroleum Economist, ‘France mulls nuclear future’, Mar 2001.

(*62) Nucleonics Week, ‘EPR safety approval won‘t last beyond 2002, regulator warns’, 6 Mar 1997.

(*63) Agence France Presse ‘Areva reports profit surge from sale of asset’, July 30, 2010.

(*64) Agence France Presse, ‘Setbacks plague Finland's French-built reactor’, 30 Jan 2009.

(*65) Nucleonics Week ‘Problems in getting information could delay review of Olkiluoto-3’ Apr 1, 2004, p 4.

(*66) Nucleonics Week, ‘Olkiluoto-3 base slab pour delay not expected to impact end date’ Oct 20, 2005, p 4.

(*67) Nucleonics Week ‘Construction of Olkiluoto-3 behind schedule’ Feb 2, 2006, p 1.

(*68) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK begins investigating construction delay at Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 2, 2006, p 8.

(*69) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 containment liner set in place, but project still lags’ Mar 2, 2006, p 8.

(*70) Nucleonics Week ‘Host of problems caused delays at Olkiluoto-3, regulators say’ Jul 13, 2006, p 1.

(*71) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 delays lower Areva nuclear profits by Eur 300 million’ Oct 5, 2006, p 4.

(*72) Nucleonics Week ‘Problems found with Olkiluoto-3 hot legs’ Oct 19, 2006, p 1.

(*73) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva puts star engineer in charge of Olkiluoto-3 project’ Nov 2, 2006.

(*74) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 commercial date slips to late 2010 at earliest’ Dec 7, 2006, p 1.

(*75) Finnish Broadcasting Company TV news, 30 Jan 2007.

(*76) Nucleonics Week ‘Lack of complete design blamed for problems with Olkiluoto-3’ May 17, 2007, p 4.

(*77) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva: Plane crash requirements to delay Olkiluoto-3 construction’ Aug 16, 2007, p 1.

(*78) Nucleonics Week ‘Regulator requires repairs to welds on Olkiluoto-3 containment liner’ Sept 20, 2007, p 1.

(*79) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, TVO at odds over resolution of Olkiluoto-3 cost overruns’ Sept 6, 2007 p 9.

(*80) Nucleonics Week ‘Second top TVO executive leaving Olkiluoto-3’ June 26, 2008, p 1.

(*81) Nucleonics Week ‘Target date for operating Olkiluoto-3 again delayed, this time until 2012’ Oct 23, 2008.

(*82) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK finds more problems with Olkiluoto-3 liner, forgings’ Nov 13, 2008, p 3.

(*83) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO CEO sees improved workflow, potential for problems at Olkiluoto-3’ Nov 20, 2008, p 11.

(*84) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto costs weigh on Areva 2008 profits; TVO rejects blame’ Dec 25, 2008, p 9.

(*85) Letter from Jukka Laaksonen to Anne Lauvergeon, Dec 9, 2008.

(*86) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO: Olkiluoto-3 operation delayed to June 2012’ Jan 15, 2009, p 1.

(*87) Nucleonics Week ‘Siemens' departure seen putting Areva under financial stress’ Jan 29, 2009, p 14.

(*88) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO: Olkiluoto-3 operation delayed to June 2012’ Jan 15, 2009, p 1.

(*89) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 5, 2009, p 1.

(*90) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 arbitration could last 'several years,' TVO says’ Mar 19, 2009, p 9.

(*91) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 5, 2009, p 1.

(*92) TVO ‘Finland: Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant to start operation in 2013’ Press Release, June 7, 2010.

(*93) Business Wire ‘AREVA: Olkiluoto 3 project: nuclear operation to start end of 2012’ June 7, 2010.

(*94) Associated Press ‘Areva net profit soars despite new EPR charge’ July 30, 2010.

(*95) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘Embattled AREVA suffers ratings downgrade’ June 29, 2010.

(*96) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF orders Flamanville-3 EPR NSSS, with startup targeted in 2012’, 5 Jan 2007, p 1.

(*97) Nucleonics Week, ‘Flamanville-3 concrete pour marks start of nuclear construction’ 6 Dec 2007, p 3.

(*98) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’, 11 May 2006, p 1.

(*99) Nucleonics Week, ‘Concrete pouring at Flamanville-3 stopped after new problems found’, 29 May 2008, p 18.

(*100) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF confirms target of starting up Flamanville-3 in 2012’, 20 Nov 2008, p 1.

(*101) Associated Press Worldstream, ‘EDF to lead up to euro50B in nuclear plant investment’, 4 Dec 2008.

(*102) Nucleonics Week, ‘Areva official says costs for new EPR rising, exceeding $6.5 billion’, 4 Sept 2008, p.1.

(*103) French Business Digest ‘Unions confirm 2-yr delay at EDF's nuclear project in N France – report’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*104) Agence France Presse ‘EDF announces 2-year delay, cost hike at new reactor’ July 30, 2010.

(*105) Le Figaro, October 27, 2010, p 17.

(*106) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’ May 11, 2006, p 1.

(*107) Nucleonics Week ‘Site preparation work for EPR at Flamanville gets under way’ July 13, 2006, p 9.

(*108) Nucleonics Week ‘Cost estimate for Flamanville-3 unchanged, EDF official says’ Sept 7, 2006, p 9.

(*109) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF orders Flamanville-3 EPR NSSS, with startup targeted in 2012’, Jan 25, 2007, p 1.

(*110) Nucleonics Week ‘On brink of election cycle, French government licenses EPR’ Apr 19, 2007, p 6.

(*111) Nucleonics Week ‘Flamanville-3 concrete pour marks start of nuclear construction’ Dec 6, 2007, p 3.

(*112) Nucleonics Week ‘ASN asks EDF to improve quality, organization at Flamanville-3’ Mar 27, 2008, p 1.

(*113) Nucleonics Week ‘Regulator seeks EDF's response to QA findings at Flamanville-3’ Apr 3, 2008, p 5.

(*114) Nucleonics Week ‘Concrete pouring at Flamanville-3 stopped after new problems found’ May 29, 2008, p 14.

(*115) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva tasked to prove quality of EPR forgings’ Oct 30, 2008 p 1.

(*116) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF: Flamanville-3 cost rise due to inflation, technical/regulatory changes’ Dec 11, 2008.

(*117) French Business Digest ‘Unions confirm 2-yr delay at EDF's nuclear project in N France – report’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*118) Agence France Presse ‘EDF announces 2-year delay, cost hike at new reactor’ July 30, 2010.

(*119) Nucleonics Week ‘ASN asks EDF to make changes to Flamanville-3 I&C system’ August 5, 2010, p 10.

(*120) Le Figaro, October 27, 2010, p 17.

(*121) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘EDF's past efforts pay off with two EPR deals sealed in China’, 15 Aug 2008.

(*122) South China Morning Post ‘Hold-ups in construction of Taishan nuclear power plant; Atomic plant first in China to use latest European technology’ July 31, 2010, p 3.

(*123) Health and Safety Executive (2010) ‘ New nuclear power stations Generic Design Assessment: Guidance on the management of GDA outcomes’ HSE, London.

http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/management-gda-outcomes.pdf

(*124) Inside NRC ‘Areva and Westinghouse unlikely to get 'clean' UK design reviews’ Sept 14, 2009.

(*125) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q1-10.pdf

(*126) Nucleonics Week ‘UK reviews of AP1000 and EPR might not be fully closed by 2011’ June 24, 2010, p 1.

(*127) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva files application with NRC for certification of US-EPR design’ Dec 13, 2007, p 5.

(*128) Inside NRC ‘NRC extends US EPR design review by six months; COL delays not expected’ Mar 1, 2010, p 5.

(*129) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q2-09.pdf

(*130) Health and Safety Executive (2009) ‘Joint Regulatory Position Statement on the EPR Pressurised Water Reactor’ HSE, London. http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2009/hse221009.htm

(*131) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q2-10.pdf p 12.

(*132) Inside NRC ‘Areva must modify I&C for US-EPR design, says NRC’ July 5, 2010, p 3.

(*133) Inside NRC ‘I&C designs will differ for Finnish, French, UK and US EPRs’ July 5, 2010.

(*134) Nucleonics Week ‘Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features’ Jan 14, 2010, p 1.

(*135) Nucleonics Week ‘Atmea 1 design to be submitted to French regulators for safety review’ Apr 1, 2010, p 3. 25

(*136) Nucleonics Week ‘Giant EPR said to be competitive: EDF to decide on order next year’ Nov 6, 1998, p 1.

(*137) Nucleonics Week ‘Framatome offers turnkey plant as US nuclear competition entry’ Dec 20, 2001, p 1.

(*138) Nucleonics Week ‘Bids give TVO a range of choices for fifth Finnish reactor project’ Apr 3, 2003, p 1.

(*139) Nucleonics Week ‘French government study sees EPR at overnight cost of 1,043 euros/KW’ Sept 11,2003, p 7.

(*140) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’ May 11, 2006, p 1.

(*141) Nucleonics Week ‘Constellation sites 'reserved' for part of U.S. EPR fleet’ Sept 22, 2005, p 1.

(*142) Public Utilities Fortnightly ‘Financing New Nukes; Federal loan guarantees raise hopes for new reactors planned by affiliates of Constellation and NRG.’ February 2008, p 19.

(*143) Nucleonics Week ‘Loan guarantee sought for Calvert Cliffs-3’ Aug 7 2008, p 1.

(*144) Nucleonics Week “Eskom Gets Bids for Two EPRS, Three AP1000s, Bigger ‘Fleet,’” Feb 7, 2008.

(*145) Nucleonics Week ‘Big Cost Hikes Make Vendors Wary of Releasing Reactor Cost Estimates’ Sept 11, 2008.

(*146) Toronto Star ‘Nuclear Bid Rejected for 26 Billion: Ontario Ditched Plan for New Reactors over High Price Tag That Would Wipe Out 20-Year Budget’ July 14, 2009.

(*147) Korea Herald ‘Korea Wins Landmark Nuclear Deal’ Dec 28, 2009.

(*148) Right Vision News ‘UAE: Middle East Leads Rally in Nuclear Plant Orders’ Jan 12, 2010.

(*149) Nucleonics Week ‘French regulatory chief rejects idea of tailoring reactor safety to market’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*150) For an English translation, see http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/roussely-report-france-nucl... Quotes used are from this translation.

(*151) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, Mitsubishi introduce mid-size 'Atmea 1' PWR design’ Sept 6, 2007, p 1.

(*152) Nuclear News ‘The safety of the Atmea1 reactor will be reviewed’ July 2010.

(*153) Agence France Presse ‘France pushes EDF to raise stake in Areva: report’ September 27, 2010.

(*154) http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE68E03220100915

(*155) Agence France Presse ‘France's EDF designs reactor to challenge Areva: report’ September 28, 2010.

(*156) http://nuclear.gov/home/11-21-03.html

(*157) Nucleonics Week, ‘Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features’ January 14, 2010, p 1.

(*158) http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/roussely-report-france-nucl...

(*159) For a detailed analysis of the business prospects for EDF and Areva, see S Thomas (2009) ‘Areva and EDF: Business prospects and risks in nuclear energy’ Greenpeace, Amsterdam. http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/files/pdfs/nuclear/Areva_EDF_Final.pdf  

Contact: Professor Steve Thomas, Business School, University of Greenwich, London, U.K. PSIRU (www.psiru.org),
Email: stephen.thomas@gre.ac.uk

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#719-720
12/11/2010
Shorts

UK & US regulators: unresolved safety issues EPR and AP1000.
On November 10, the UK nuclear regulator said it expects both the Areva EPR and the Westinghouse AP1000 reactors to have unresolved safety issues when the generic design assessment, or GDA, program completes next year. In a quarterly progress report, the NII said it has potential open issues in 10 out of 18 topical areas on the Areva EPR design review and in 16 out of the 18 topical areas on the Westinghouse AP1000 design. The GDA program was set up to issue design acceptance confirmations, or DACs, to the reactor vendors, which would see the regulator sign off on all but site specific licensing issues. The DAC could then be referenced in site license applications by utilities building the reactors. But the program has been plagued by delays resulting from NII Staff shortages and "a failure on the part of the reactor vendors to satisfy the regulator's queries", as Platts puts it.

A day earlier, World Nuclear News reported that Westinghouse has been told by the U.S. NRC that it's AP1000 aircraft impact study is not adequate. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said that documents put to it in order to demonstrate a 2009 requirement did not include 'realistic' analyses and that this amounted to a violation of requirements that Westinghouse must explain and rectify. A rule introduced by NRC in 2009 states that  new nuclear power plant buildings and safety systems must maintain containment, cooling of the reactor core and the integrity or cooling of used fuel facilities in the event of the impact of a large passenger jet. All reactor vendors must fulfill this requirement for their designs. For Westinghouse this regulatory work comes in addition to a 2007 design amendment to the original AP1000 design, which was certified by the NRC in 2006.

In February, UK regulators already criticized the "long delays" and "poor quality" of replies they received from Westinghouse and Areva following safety reviews of their reactor designs.
Source: World Nuclear News, 9 November 2010 / Platts, 10 November 2010 / Nuclear Monitor 704, 26 February 2010


Update Belene, Bulgaria
The situation around the planned nuclear power station in Belene in Bulgaria has become unclear again. Under heavy Russian pressure (among others directly from Prime Minister Putin) and political pressure from a faction within his own party GERB around the Parliament Chair Tsetska Tsacheva, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov declared he is dedicated to the construction of the power plant on the shores of the Danube. Russian Atomstroyexport, a part of Rosatom, prolonged the construction contract with half a year under the condition of a price increase of maximally 2,5 billion Euro on top of the initial 4 Billion price tag. According former director of the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency and current professor in risk analysis at the university of Vienna, Georghi Kashchiev, during a round table discussion on 18 October in Sofia, this does, however, not include the first load and large parts of the non-nuclear equipment. With that, the demand from Borisov that the total cost of the project remain under 7 billion Euro come under severe pressure. It is also unclear whether the 500 Million Euro already sunk into Belene are part of this budget. On 1 November, Bulgaria's finance minister Simeon Djankov once more confirmed that no state finances would flow into the project.

In a surprise move, Prime Minister Borisov declared on 25 October after a visit to Muenich a week earlier, that he had found a strategic investor from Bavaria for Belene. Bulgarian media speculate interest from Siemens, the engineering firm that recently broke its alliance with Areva and partnered instead with Rosatom. Siemens, however, refuses to comment on these speculations. An announcement from the Bulgarian Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism that the new strategic investor would be announced in the first week of November was not realised, however, and German media have remained suspiciously silent about a possible deal. On 5 November, Borisov announced an offer of up to 2% participation to each Serbia and Croatia in what he said was a pragmatic attempt to secure markets for the output of Belene.

… and Mochovce, Slovakia

Slovakia has asked and received an extension of the period of comment on the draft verdict of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, that the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Mochovce 3,4 project has violated the rules of the Convention. The NGOs that originally filed the complaint, Za Matku Zem, Greenpeace Slovakia, Global2000 and the Oeko-buero Wien, did not object to an extension to 30 November. The ACCC is expected to come with a final verdict in December. A spokesperson of the Slovak nuclear regulator UJD, which was responsible for issuing construction licenses in spite of the fact that the EIA procedure had not been finalised, is currently looking for possibilities to implement a likely final verdict of the ACCC, but stated to Greenpeace that it has problems finding a proper legal pathway to do so.

An ACCC verdict is, however, binding and a breach of the Aarhus Convention is also a breach of EU legislation on Environmental Impact Assessments, which means that the European Commission would be obliged to start corrective procedures against Slovakia in case the ACCC verdict concludes a violation of the rules.

… and Temelin, Czech Republic

The submission date for the tender for five new nuclear power stations issued by the Czech utility CEZ has been extended with a year to 2013. CEZ argued that some of the contenders had asked for such an extension, though analysts are of the opinion that the lack of growth in electricity demand in the Czech Republic has bitten into the economic viability of the project. The tender for five blocks, two for Temelin and one for Dukovany in the Czech Republic, one for Jaslovske Bohunice in Slovakia and one for a still to be decided project is expected to cost around 500 billion Czech Crowns or 25 billion Euro. Each block is supposed to deliver between 1000 and 1600 MW capacity.
Source of these 3: Jan Haverkamp, Greenpeace EU Unit, email, 6 November 2010


Another fiasco at Monju, Japan.
A12-meter-long, 46-centimeter-wide, 3.3-metric-ton heavy fuel exchange component that lodged in the reactor vessel of the Monju fast-breeder reactor after being dropped on August 26, cannot be extracted using "usual methods," the Japan  Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has stated. The JAEA made the announcement November 9, after examining the component -a cylinder now stuck in an opening in the reactor vessel cap- with a camera. The agency believes that to get the part out, equipment on the reactor vessel cap will have to be removed, and an entirely new structure built to prevent sodium now covering the cylinder from mixing with the outside air and igniting during the process. The agency is now considering ways to do this, but gave no hint when testing of the reactor may recommence.

Since Monju resumed test operations on May 6 after shut down since a 1995 sodium leak, it has undergone the first stage of testing. These core confirmation tests were completed on July 22. Preparations were being made for the next stage, which involves increasing power output to 40%, planned for July 2011. However,  the jammed relay cylinder has made further long delays probable.
Source: Nuke Info Tokyo 138, Sept/Oct 2010 / The Mainichi Daily News, 10 November 2010


UK: What 'no subsidies' means: more help will be given.
Following lobbying by the nuclear industry the Government has accepted that it needs to give more financial incentives in order to ensure a new generation of reactors are built in the UK. Energy minister Charles Hendry said he now agreed with the industry that fixing a high minimum price for carbon emissions was not enough. Instead he thought other financial incentive measures would be need to encourage nuclear and other low-carbon energy sources.
Source: N-Base Briefing 674, 10 November 2910


IEA: US$312 billion subsidy annually for fossil.
On November 10, the International Energy Agency published its World Energy Outlook 2010. The IEA report clearly states that fossil fuels are heavily subsidized by more than US$312 billion per year globally! This leads obviously to unfair competition with clean and climate friendly renewable energies. IEA is increasingly recognizing the important role renewable energy can play to fight climate change and improve security of supply. However, it is failing to shift technology recommendations from unproven, dangerous and expensive technologies such as CCS and nuclear power plants.
Source: Press release Greenpeace, 9 November 2010

India: thousands arrested during Jaitapur protests

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#719-720
6104
12/11/2010
Karuna Raina, Greenpeace India
Article

World's largest nuclear park is planned in Jaitapur, in Ratnagiri district on the coast of southern Maharashtra, India. The park would comprise up to six large EPR nuclear reactors bought from the French nuclear giant- Areva. In addition to the inherent hazards of nuclear power, the project threatens the livelihoods of about 10 000 farmers and fishermen and their families.

On October 29, despite preventive arrests, prohibitory orders and road blocks more than 3000 villagers' courted arrests, as part of their 'Jail Bharo' agitation. By 6 pm, the police requested the leaders of the agitation to stop the flow of people. The agitation was primarily in response to the government claim that the villagers were quiet and only a handful of outsiders were leading the agitation against the proposed 10,000 MW Jaitapur nuclear power project in the village.

The agitation started peacefully at noon at Bhagwati temple in the village. Hundreds of women including the elderly queued up to be arrested, followed by the men folks. The police had arranged for four buses, but they failed awfully short, as villagers of Madban and the neighboring villages continued to pour in.

The 250-strong contingent of policemen came prepared with riot gear and rifles, but there was not even slogan shouting. "This is a show of strength and the government must now realise that we cannot be taken for granted," Pravin Davankar of the Janhit Seva Samiti, which has been opposing the project for the past five years.

The villagers were angry because the government was refusing to tell them the truth and releasing information in bits and pieces. "After all, we are the ones to be directly affected," said Sanjay Gavankar, a villager, who runs a cashew nut factory. The local people are against forced acquisition of their land by the government. They consider their land to be of much more value than a job at NPCIL and some money in lieu of the land. The local people have unanimously rejected the compensation package offered by the government and even lit bon fires with it.

Satyajit Chavan, an activist protesting in Jaitapur, said: “It seemed more like a police state, where emergency measures are evoked to apparently maintain law and order. The state seems to act against wishes of its own citizens.”

Retired High Court judge B G Kolse-Patil, who had being served orders preventing him from entering Ratnagiri District, flouted the ban and attended the rally. While the police were looking for him on the road, he took a different route and appeared dramatically in the temple at 3 pm. "I will oppose this sort of high-handedness by the state tooth and nail," he said. The police had to physically carry him off to arrest him. Retired Admiral L Ramdas and retired Supreme Court Judge P B Samant, who were coming to the rally, were stopped by the police on the Highway. The Jaitapur project is characterized by shocking neglect – from the choice of an earthquake-prone and ecologically valuable site, to a timetable that leaves insufficient time to review the risks of the nuclear reactor design, not yet in operation anywhere in the world. Because of these and many other flaws the reactors would entail unacceptable hazards.

A joint report by Greenpeace and European solar panel manufacturers showed earlier this week that solar power can deliver electricity at a competitive cost by 2015. This is 3 years before the first planned reactor could be in operation in Jaitapur. Wind power and biomass can do that already now. There is no need to import dangerous and destructive nuclear reactors.

Sources: Blogpost by Karuna Raina, Greenpeace India, 29 October / Times of India, 29 October 2010

About: 
Greenpeace India - New Delhi

Confidential EDF documents show possible accident risks EPR

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#718
6099
29/10/2010
Article

On 27 September, 2010, the French anti-nuclear network Sortir du nucléaire received internal EDF documents, showing that the design and manufacture of the vessel closure head for the EPR in Flamanville could, in theory lead to a Chernobyl-type accident. Several EDF documents show that the number of welds and the type of steel used in some parts of the reactor vessel may cause leaks. EDF considers that the leaks may, in turn, develop into a Chernobyl-type of accident. The type of steel and welds used are part of the emergency shutdown system of the EPR and cover 89 points of entry into the reactor vessel.

The documents demonstrate that EDF engineers have designed parts of the vessel closure head for the EPR that not only endanger safety but also knowingly violate French law (namely violations of the decree of 12 December 2005 on nuclear pressure equipment) relating to nuclear facilities under pressure.

For Sortir du nucléaire, the conclusion is obvious: in spite of all these issues, EDF persists in a policy that sacrifices security for profits. In view of the catastrophic consequences of an accident, this attitude is unimaginable and unforgivable.

Sortir du Nucleaire is working hard to get all the technical documents translated into English, but summaries are already available. Although much has to be investigated before final conclusions can be drawn, we support Sortir du Nucleaire in exactly this call; let the French safety authorities give full disclosure of all documents and let independent specialists research the issue and come to conclusions. If there is no reason for fear it is in the interest of the French authorities and EDF to follow this route, otherwise there is a clear public interest for full disclosure. EDF has confirmed that the documents are genuine but have also already said that they see no problem; they have taken the theoretic problem into account while building the EPR. 

Summary of documents highlighting EPR weaknesses
The EDF documents reveal the weaknesses in the design and the manufacture of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) casing. This complex mechanism enables the emergency shutdown system of the reactor to be activated. The casing for each mechanism is connected to the closure head of the reactor's pressure vessel and contributes to the leak-tightness of the vessel up to a pressure of 155 bars. If one of the casing is weakened, the whole of the reactor's  pressure vessel becomes vulnerable. Sortir du nucleaire comes to three main conclusions

1. Weakness in the welding of the CRDM casing: 4 welds rather than 1
EDF has opted to use 4 welds for the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) casing of the EPR, whereas only one weld was used for the casing of the CRDM of the 58 French nuclear reactors, in order to minimize the risk of leakage.[i] These four welds constitute a breach of the 12 December 2005 decree on nuclear pressure equipment; the decree states in Appendix 1 (3.3) that "socket welded connections are forbidden."[ii]

However, they are being used for the casings of the CRDM. Yet the EDF is fully aware of the regulations, as it refers to the French regulations having set "a limit on the number of welds."[iii]

A greater number of welds increases the risk of failure of the leak-tightness of the CRDM casing, and this in turn greatly increases the risk of control rod cluster ejection. The consequences of such a failure would be a loss of primary coolant and a real risk of reactor core fusion. According to the EDF's head of nuclear fuels, a control rod cluster ejection can cause a Chernobyl-type accident.[iv]

The risk of rupture of any of the mechanisms' casing in the head of the EPR pressure vessel is multiplied by the number of mechanisms penetrating the vessel head (89), in other words there are 89 weakness sites.

2. Weakness in the stainless steel used in the CRDM casing: a steel which doesn't stand the test of time
The central part of the CRDM casing used for the EPR will be made of martensitic stainless steel which becomes brittle when exposed to heat. This type of stainless steel can fracture without warning, a well-known fact.[v]

In view of its fragility, martensitic stainless steel is not suitable for pressurized equipment in the main primary circuit of a nuclear reactor. And yet this is what EDF plans to do, in full knowledge of the risks: the EDF document points out that "small errors of temperature or functioning time have a big impact on the behavior of these hardened steels".[vi]

This is the second time that there is a breach of regulations for equipment that is crucial to the safety of the EPR. This is a breach of the 12 December 2005 decree on nuclear pressure equipment which stipulates that "the ratio between elastic limit at ambient temperature and resistance to traction at ambient temperature must not exceed 0.85 for martensitic steels".[vii]

The decree states that these are "essential safety requirements for nuclear pressure equipment". EDF engineers are fully aware of this: "Using this type of steel for pressurized equipment in the main primary circuit has always been prohibited in any nuclear reactor. Its use for EPR mechanisms has therefore come under scrutiny, particularly since this steel does not meet the NPE (Nuclear Pressure Equipment) criteria stipulating that the ratio between elastic limit at ambient temperature and resistance to traction at ambient temperature must not exceed 0.85.[viii]

The use of this type of stainless steel increases the risk of sudden rupture of the CRDM casing and control rod cluster ejection. Such a rupture would cause a loss of primary coolant and a real risk of fusion of the nuclear core. According to the EDF's head of nuclear fuels, a control rod cluster ejection can cause a Chernobyl-type accident.[ix]

As said, the risk of fracture of the stainless steel casing of one of the mechanisms in the head of the EPR pressure vessel is multiplied by the number of mechanisms penetrating the vessel head (89), in other words there are 89 weakness sites.

3. Weakness due to the lack of mechanism preventing control rod cluster ejection
The welding weaknesses of the CRDM and the type of steel used in their casing increase the risk of ejection of the control rod cluster. According to a memo written by EDF's head of  nuclear fuels in 2001,[x] ejection of the control rod cluster could cause a Chernobyl-type accident: "The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was due to uncontrolled reactivity, leading to core melt and explosion. Until then, only a few calculations had taken into account this type of accident. The Three Miles Island accident (sic) had already raised this problem. At the time, I took part in an intercompany working group looking at this issue, to carry out a risk analysis of such an accident for our PWRs (Pressurized Water Reactor). Reactivity accidents could occur when the reactor is running at full power. A rupture in the winch or the vessel head could cause one or several of the control rod clusters to be ejected."[xi]

What follows reveals that a Chernobyl-type reactivity accident could happen in any French nuclear reactor: "During such an accident, the fuel close to the ejected control rod will suddenly become very reactive. It is likely to reach very high reactivity values. This power excursion may cause the rupture of  the casing, and a fuel pellet explosion, with uranium dispersing into the main circuit water. This could be followed by a steam explosion. If not controlled, a steam explosion produces a huge amount of energy likely to rupture the pressure vessel."[xii]

Finally, according to the same document, a locking device for the rod cluster control ejection would limit the risk of reactivity accident[xiii]. Yet not locking device for rod cluster control ejection has been planned for the EPR[xiv].

EDF's head of nuclear fuels suggests at the end of his memo: "Ideally, we should try not to take into account this type of accident when planning future reactors"[xv].

Notes:
[i] Doc n°2 Synthèse des choix de conception des mécanismes de commande, 5.1. Modification et contrôle des soudures p.11-12, F.Odier, EDF-SEPTEN, (08.12.2008).
[ii] Arrêté du 12 décembre 2005 relatif aux équipements sous pression nucléaires
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000004539...
[iii] Doc n°2 Synthèse des choix de conception des mécanismes de commande, 5.1 Modification et contrôle des soudures p.11-12, F.Odier, EDF-SEPTEN, (08.12.2008).
[iv] Doc n°3 Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, p.112 EDF-SEPTEN, A. Berthet (20.12.2001).
[v] "Suite à des constats sur site de fragilisations et de ruptures brutales de tiges de vanne en aciers inoxydables martensitiques", Doc n°4 Note de synthèse sur le vieillissement des aciers martensitiques, III.1, p.9, EDF-Direction Production Ingénierie (08.08.06).
[vi] Doc n°4 Note de synthèse sur le vieillissement des aciers martensitiques, III.3, p.11, EDF-Direction Production Ingénierie (08.08.06).
[vii]Arrêté du 12 décembre 2005 relatif aux équipements sous pression nucléaires, annexe 1, point 4. http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000004539...
[viii] Doc n°2 Synthèse des choix de conception des mécanismes de commande, 5.4, p.12-13, EDF-SEPTEN (08.12.2008).
[ix] Doc n°3 Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, p.112 EDF-SEPTEN, André Berthet (20.12.2001). [x] Doc n°3 Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, p.112 EDF-SEPTEN, André Berthet (20.12.2001).
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Doc n°3 Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, p.115 EDF-SEPTEN, A. Berthet (20.12.2001).
[xiv] L'EPR sous pression, p.4, document anonyme reçu en septembre 2010.
[xv] Doc n°3 Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, p.115 EDF-SEPTEN, A. Berthet (20.12.2001).

List of EDF documents:

  • Document 1: L'EPR sous pression (EPR under pressure), p.4, anonymous document received in September 2010.
  • Document 2 : Synthèse des choix de conception des mécanismes de commande, F.Odier, EDF-SEPTEN, (08.12.2008).
  • Document 3 : Management des activités Physique des Coeurs et Combustibles, EDF-SEPTEN, A. Berthet (20.12.2001).
  • Document 4 : Note de synthèse sur le vieillissement des aciers martensitiques, III.1, p.9, EDF-Direction Production Ingénierie (08.08.06).

Link to EDF documentation and detailed analysis (in French): http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/dossiers/EPR-revelations2.html
More information about all problems of EPR: http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/dossiers/EPR.html

Source and contact: Sortir du Nucleaire, 9 rue Dumenge, 69317 LYON cedex 04, France.
Mail: contact@sortirdunucleaire.fr
web: www.sortirdunucleaire.fr

About: 
Sortir du Nucleaire

Pages