You are here

3. Alternatives for nuclear energy in the Ukraine

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#449-450
Special: Chernobyl: Ten Years of Disaster. Possibility and Necessity of Phase-out of Chernobyl
10/04/1996
Article

Introduction

(April 10, 1996) In the past few years, many studies have been conducted on the reorganisation of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, mainly by foreign environmental organisations. Ukraine is notorious for its high energy consumption. Its energy efficiency is very low compared with that of Western European countries. In terms of per unit of GNP (Gross National Product), Ukraine's energy use is eight times as much. There are historical reasons for this. Ukraine inherited an outdated heavy industry from the USSR. Energy prices were subsidised by the state, so there never was any reason or incentive to take energy-efficiency measures. The distribution of energy to industrial plants was not based on the actual level of production; it was a rigid system of annual energy allotments. To keep people employed, production plants maintained more shifts than necessary; thus, machines and engines were kept running even without output. Heating of houses was centralised. It was not possible to regulate the temperature within individual houses - except by opening windows or doors. Power plants had a very low efficiency: 25%, compared to 45-55% in West Europe. On the other hand, this of course means there are great opportunities for improving energy efficiency.

Since the independence of Ukraine, things have gone worse instead of better. Ukraine is now experiencing a severe crisis. Production has fallen by almost half; unemployment is high. In the past, nearly all the gas and oil came from Russia at low prices. Now, Ukraine has to pay international prices for them. Ukraine has built up huge debts in importing gas from Russia. There is no money to invest in the modernisation of industry and the energy infrastructure, although this is the best investment. The little money there is, is used for nuclear reactors. Thus, it seems Western help is the only way out.

Four foreign reports will be summarised here. The conclusions are clear: Energy-saving measures and improving energy efficiency at little or no cost have a big potential and can be realised within a short time.

 

General energy situation

Even in the short-term, the potential of energy-saving and energy-efficiency measures is considerable. The amount of energy saved through such measures would greatly exceed the amount of energy produced by Chernobyl. Even the World Bank has concluded in a study that a further 15% decline in electricity consumption from 1995 till the year 2000 is possible.1 This 15% decline is equivalent to three times the Chernobyl production! From 1990 till 1994, the consumption of electricity in the Ukraine decreased 34%. Translated into megawatts, this decrease is more than the total production of all 14 Ukrainian nuclear plants.

Hence, the seeming major problem of creating substitute power for the closed Chernobyl reactors is in fact a non-problem. The current power-generating capacity is not even half utilised. Many coal plants have been idled; they can be brought into production on short notice. In the past, a lot of electricity was not used in Ukraine itself, but exported. In 1990, for instance, 12% of all electricity generated was exported. This decreased to about 1% in 1993.2

The problem is not the closure of the nuclear power plants. This can easily be done without much problem, as far as energy needs are concerned.

Table:
Electricity & Energy Consumption in the Ukraine

 

Electricity* Energy
  Nuclear Fossil Total Total
Year TWh TWh TWh MTOE **
1990 76.7   295 196.2
1992     250  
1993 57.0 135.9 228  
1994 68.4   201 135.9
1995 70.5      
* Electricity production is about 25% of total energy consumption
** Million Ton Oil Equivalent
Sources: NRDC, 15 June 1994, "Non-Nuclear options for replacing Chernobyl" p 6,7; Nucleonics Week, 8 Feb 1996 p 8; Nucleonics Week, 10 Feb 1996 p 10, 23; Nucleonics Week 9 Feb 1995 p 8; Greenpeace Ukraine, Nov 1995 "Ukraine: potential for energy saving ...", p 4

The real problem is: how to overcome the energy and economy crises in the Ukraine. With the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine found that Russia, formerly its largest trading partner, no longer needed most of its output. As a result, energy consumption fell by 31% from 1990 to 1994. In the same period the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined even more: by 56%! In 1994 alone, the GDP fell 24,5%.3 The energy use per unit of GDP within the period 1990-94 grew 73%,4 instead of decreasing as everywhere else. Reversing this trend will save more energy than the energy that Chernobyl can produce.

Several organisations have made `least-cost' plans for coping with the Ukrainian energy problems. Of these, we will mention or cite studies from the US Department of Energy (DOE)5, the NRDC6, Greenpeace Ukraine7 and the German BUND8. In general, low-cost/no-cost measures must be taken: adjustments of the very low energy prices to world levels and improved management will account for 15% to 60% reduction of energy use, in less than five years. Short-time measures such as improved energy efficiency will result in a further 20% decrease of energy use.

US DOE least-cost

The US DOE released a report promoting energy efficiency and wind power as an answer to Ukraine power needs. Opposing Western funding for new nuclear reactors, the DOE proposes cheaper options, such as:

  • Upgrading existing fossil fuel plants, extending their lifetimes, improving their efficiency, eliminating their need for firing with imported gas and oil, adding 2000 MW.
  • Building renewable energy resources, especially wind turbines, with 500 to 1000 MW by as early as 1997, and upgrading hydro plants and building new ones.-Improving energy efficiency in heavy industry at very low or no cost, saving about 1600 MW.
  • Minimal investment in lighting efficiency improvements which would reduce electricity demand by 500 MW.
  • New technology and equipment which could increase the energy efficiency of industrial processes and save another 2100 MW.

The DOE lists a total of 7200 MW possible savings made up of: potential savings gives 4200 MW through energy conservation and efficiency measures, renewable energy 1000 MW and fossil fuel plants 2000 MW. Realisation of the DOE plan would also reduce pollution, alleviate waste problems, improve the economy and make Ukraine a competitor in the world market.9

 

NRDC non-nuclear options

The NRDC proposes four main sources for energy saving, which are all low- or no-cost measures:

  1. Energy price adjustments. In the past, energy prices were very much subsidised. They still are subsidised. Thus, the present energy prices are still very low - the Ukrainians pay less than 50% of the average international electricity prices. If the subsidy is stopped, energy use will decline. The money used for subsidising energy prices can be invested in energy saving.
  2. Housekeeping measures in the industrial sector: improved information and operation, better maintenance, better management. Potential in the short term: 50% less energy.
  3. Technological improvements. In the West, energy consumption of major industrial processes decreased with a factor 2 or 3. Not so in Russia or the Ukraine. Introduction of these improvements will not only be critical for realising big reductions in energy consumption; it is also critical for maintaining Ukrainian competitiveness in the world market. Potential in the short term: 30 - 60%.
  4. Rational Energy Strategy through Integrated Resource Planning (IRP). Two examples (somewhat theoretical possibilities):
    1. Reduction of the losses in transmission and distribution of electricity. In Ukraine, these losses amount to 17% of total electricity production. In five years, it is possible to reduce these losses to 7% or 9%. That will be a gain of 8% to 10% of total electricity. In 1993, electricity production was 228 billion KWh. So 8% of this is 18 billion Kwh - equivalent to 1.5 times the total production of the Chernobyl reactors!
    2. Improvement of gas distribution systems, which leak up to 45% of the gas being distributed in many cities.

Other examples: expansion of industrial and residential co-generation plants; building steam and gas turbines; development of renewable energy resources.

By implementing Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) options, over half of the electricity used can be cost-effectively saved by the year 2010, according to an estimate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. These IRP options include:

  1. energy conservation and efficiency;
  2. improvements in existing generation, transmission and distribution systems;
  3. renewable energy technologies;
  4. industrial co-generation and independent power production; and
  5. improved electricity transfer.

The enhancement of the efficiency of existing coal and gas plants and the construction by local industry of new co-generating plants, which can use imported gas or local coal with high efficiency (80 to 90% efficiency, compared to the 25% of the old gas and coal plants), will provide more power - and at much lower costs - than the completion of all nuclear reactors which were planned. These can be done in five years. The gain of power in the higher efficiency plants will be more than the power of all closed nuclear reactors, both in Russia and Ukraine.

In Ukraine and Russia, the whole system of energy distribution is not based on real demand or production, but on a rigid system of allotted energy quantities to industries, in disregard of their real demand or production. If the energy prices rise and energy subsidies disappear, the economic potential of the incentive to save energy would grow. The introduction of energy meters will promote this.

Energy prices are now frozen by the government, at a level two to three times lower than it costs to produce.10 The very obsolete systems can all be replaced by new co-generation plants, which can be built by Ukrainian industry. The costs of all the measures proposed by the NRDC will be less than those of the measures contained in the present G-7 MoU.

  1. The results would be much better:
  2. closure of Chernobyl and other nuclear plants
  3. no new nuclear reactors needed
  4. lesser risks and no more nuclear waste production
  5. lower costs-structural reduction of energy use by over 50 percent
  6. improved energy efficiency and lower
  7. production costs-improved export competitiveness.

The NRDC also gives some strong conclusions and advices, which are worthwhile to mention

  • The US should not propose or support investments in nuclear power in Ukraine.
  • Replacement power for Chernobyl using energy conservation and renewable energy options can be achieved in the next 18 months.
  • 17 US companies will undertake energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in Ukraine.
  • The US should oppose the completion of additional nuclear reactors in Ukraine for reasons of safety.
  • The NRDC shares the great concern of Ukrainian environmental groups and members of Parliament over the lack of public discussion and debate regarding nuclear matters.
  • The US should advocate for an open and comprehensive energy planning process as well as the full implementation of existing procedures to ensure public participation in the review of safety and environmental impacts.

 

BUND and Greenpeace Ukraine Proposals

The plans of the BUND, dating from 1992, were more or less the same as those from NRDC, except for BUND's proposal to build many little co-generation plants to replace the closed nuclear plants and old fossil fuel plants.11

The most recent study is that of Greenpeace Ukraine, dated November 1995. After studying the potential for energy saving and alternative power supplies, Greenpeace Ukraine has come to the conclusion that energy-saving measures could reach at least 65% of energy demand. Eighty percent of the savings could be achieved in the industry alone. About one third of these savings could be achieved through no-cost and low-cost measures. The report estimates the potential of windpower at 2000 times that of current power production. Small-scale hydro power in minor rivers could produce four times the current hydro power production, which in 1993 was 17 billion KWh or 7% of total electricity production. Geothermal energy could substitute 7-10% of fossil energy demand. Biomass - burning or biogas production - has a big potential too, but the lack of economic incentives inhibits the use of biomass as a fuel.

The end conclusion is that energy savings, energy-efficiency measures and renewable energy together would meet future energy needs, at less costs than nuclear energy.

Sources:

  1. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 15 June 1994; "Non-Nuclear options for replacing Chernobyl" p.4
  2. NRDC, 15 June 1994; "Non-Nuclear options for replacing Chernobyl" p.8,9
  3. Nukem Market Report, Aug. 1995; "Ukraine. The Nucleus Of A New Economy" p.6
  4. Greenpeace, Ukraine, Nov. 1995: "Potential for energy saving, alternative power supplies and the Closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant" p.4
  5. Department of Energy (US), 1 July 1994; "US/Ukraine evaluation of Energy Options to Replace the Chernobyl nuclear plant"
  6. NRDC, 15 June 1994; "Non-Nuclear options for replacing Chernobyl"
  7. Greenpeace Ukraine, Nov. 1995; "Potential for energy saving, alternative power supplies and the Closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant"
  8. Hervormd Nederland (NL), 4 July 1992; "Dom, duur en riskant" (Stupid, Expensive and Risky) p.9.
  9. Nucleonics Week, 16 June 1994; "DOE Deal Claims Disintegrate As Ukraine Stands By Demands For VVERs" p.7
  10. Nucleonics Week, 6 Oct. 1994; "Funding And Equipment Woes Dog Ukrainian Nuclear Plants" p.7
  11. Hervormd Nederland (NL), 4 July 1992; "Dom, duur en riskant" (Stupid, Expensive and Risky) p.9.