Background material on Mochovce nuclear plant and Siemens in the East

(462.4585) WISE Amsterdam
History

(November 29, 1996) The Mochovce nuclear power plant has had three different forms. From 1984 until 1991 the project was jointly managed by the Russian designer and the Czechoslovak principal contractor Skoda. At this point the project was abandoned (mostly without the proper mothballing) while Slovakia's economy was restructuring. In 1994, the Meciar government decided to restart the project with western partners, most significantly EdF (Electricité de France) as the project manager and the EBRD (European Bank for Restructuring and Development) as the lead financier (with other partners both east and west). During the international campaign against Mochovce opposition to the project was voiced from many places. There were national decisions to vote against the project by Austria, Norway, Luxembourg, Greece, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey (1). The European Parliament voted 196 to 40 to halt the project until safety issues could be resolved and over 1.2 million Europeans signed petitions against Mochovce while over 200 non-profit organizations from around the world called for a complete halt.

Due to this response several of the largest players (including the EBRD, Preussen Elektra and Bayernwerk AG) quit the project or were forced out. In 1996, the Slovak government restarted the Mochovce project with the Czech contractor Skoda taking the largest role (with EdF working on only a small portion) and with Siemens building the Instrumentation and Control system (the master controls). But without western funding and with key safety recommendations cut in an attempt to save money, the problems at Mochovce are really just beginning.

Can Mochovce be made safe?

1. Problems with East/West Hybrid technology
   Mochovce is a hybrid of Eastern and Western technology which has not yet been tested. Mochovce would be the first ever in the world. "The greatest obstacle is the lack of knowledge of the way Soviet reactors are constructed. The Czech firm Skoda was licenced to build nuclear power plants, but the philosophy behind the safety measures - such as why which pipes are thicker or thinner - is known only to the Russians. Siemens has not presented a safety report by which the consequence of an accident are being estimated," explains the Austrian nuclear energy expert, Manfred Heindler. (2) "Thus Siemens optimism can only reflect an interest in their own purpose."
   "Experts from the IAEA say the plan for Mochovce favored by the EBRD executive would produce a plant that did not meet Western licensing standards. To complete Mochovce to western standards would cost about three times the EBRD figure [1.45 bil DM]" according to David Kid spokesperson for the IAEA.(3)
2. Russian paradox - they are needed, yet they may no longer exist.
   Contrary to the popular press and many western politicians, Russian involvement in the effort to upgrade Mochovce is not a mistake. In fact, there is virtually a consensus amongst western technical experts that Russian involvement is required to understand the origi- nal design and to attempt to upgrade it. However, the post 1989 economic restructuring of Russia has seriously crippled its nuclear engineering capacity. Once the well treated elite of a nuclear superpower, Russia's nuclear experts are now often unpaid for months and even committing suicide(4). In this kind of environment, it is unclear if Russia can deliver the technical information needed to understand how to upgrade Mochovce, even if it wanted to. Some technical experts believe the only way to safely upgrade Mochovce is to provide significant financial assistance to the Russian nuclear infrastructure (5), but the west has been unwilling to even consider such a plan.
3. Siemens : no responsibility / no project management. The German Company, Siemens, does convey the impression that it will concern itself implementing Western safety standards in Mochovce. However, by closer inspection it is the East European Companies which carry the responsibilities. The upgrading measures are determined and overseen by the Slovak nuclear authorities; the Russian Ministry Minatom is responsible for the VVER technology, and the Czech Company Skoda is responsible for the state ("mothballing") of the plant as completed to date. Siemens considers itself responsible for the bubble-condenser, which should substitute the lacking containment. Siemens itself admits that this bubble-condenser has not been tested, but does not answer the question what would happen if the bubble-condenser should not stand the test.
4. How good is Siemens in Germany. All the nuclear power plants at present in operation in Germany are from Siemens. Yet, these too are not to be considered safe. Alone in 1995 there were 152 unplanned nuclear "incidents" This year a lawsuit was brought against the nuclear department of Siemens/KWU (Kraftwerke Union) "on account of the suspicion that when nuclear power plant Kruemmel was under construction there was violation of the nuclear law and radiation protection." An interim expert examination and report carried out by the Federal Institute for the Examination of Materials ascertained that the walls of the reactor pressure container were too thin. (6)

After it was clear that no additional reactors would be built in Germany, Siemens tried other projects in Germany. These range from the unsuccessful attempt to build a reprocessing plant in Wackers- dorf, to the failed nuclear park at Hanau, which is said to have cost Siemens up to a billion DM before the project failed for political reasons (7). Currently a research reactor is planned near Munich, which has similarly aroused strong public resistance. It will be operated using highly enriched uranium, which can be used for military purposes. The planning for this controversial nuclear research reactor will be judicially examined (8), the costs for the construction is estimated to be DM 720 million.

Despite all setbacks, Siemens/KWU has no plans to withdraw from the nuclear business. On the contrary: there are preparations for a new "advanced" Franco-German reactor - the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor). However, none of the German power suppliers is prepared to order a new nuclear power plant before 2010 or to invest in the development so that the whole project is seriously jeopardized.(9)

Serious cuts have been made even in German nuclear safety operation: the new program "top" by Siemens has reduced the length of inspection for nuclear power plants. This allows "operation until shortly before wearing out." (10) Thanks to the "reference method" only a few construction parts will still be thoroughly examined. It has already often happened that serious defects are identified during the review process which are spotted by chance rather than systematic inspection, this proposed shorter cycle will reduce the chances of this kind of discovery.(11)

Siemens turns to the East
Since the reactor disaster at Three Mile Island 1979, the West German power suppliers have commissioned in all only three nuclear power plants. The last reactor in Germany was ordered in 1982 (12). Siemens has not yet succeeded in its efforts to retrofit at least one Eastern NPP with western technolology. The first attempt led to East Germany, but Greifswald - the same type as Mochovce - was not completed, as the costs for raising the safety measures to an acceptable Western level were too high.

Long before the Eastern Bloc opened up, Siemens had tried to push its way into the nuclear Eastern market. After Chernobyl, the public demanded the closure of dangerous nuclear power plants in the East. Then the new argument of the atom lobby, which proclaimed upgrading of the plants, was that the states could not manage without nuclear energy, and that Western safety technology would make the NPP safe. For example, in November 96 a spokesman from Siemens asked in astonishment and with reference to Mochovce, "Do the Austrians want the blocks to go into operation without our safety technology?"(13). However, without Siemens' involvement, Mochovce would not go into operation.

German Politicians
When the dispute over Mochovce reached a climax in 1995, the Bavarian Minister for the Environment, Goppel (CSU) intervened and claimed the "demand to shut down reactors in the East European countries only because of inferior safety standards, while in Germany first-class developments in nuclear energy technology were being given up, as hypocritical and as an illusionary disregard for the realities." (14) The Bavarian Minister-President, Edmund Stoiber (CSU) was just as actively for the completion of Mochovce.(15) He gave the head of the Slovak government, Vladimir Meciar, his pledge to support Bayernwerk AG participation in the completion of the controversial Slovak NPP Mochovce. Also, he claimed that Mochovce should be made the "pilot project for East European nuclear power plants". Naturally, with Western safety technology.

German Banks
The exports of the German atomic industry are made possible only by the state-owned banks and the large private banks. To finance Mochovce Siemens was given not a credit for delivery by the German state-owned Bank for Reconstruction, but also the state Hermes-guarantee as an export guarantee to insure itself against losses. But also, later on the money still flows: for example, for Angra-2 in Brazil; further construction was not possible because funds ran out, but the operator of the plant, FURNAS, received a credit of US$700 million from a German Bank-Syndicate, with which the continuation of the work by Siemens/KWU could be paid for (16).

Why Siemens is important
PreussenElektra, the European Parliament, numerous national governments and the IAEA all had serious concerns about the safety of the original EdF proposal. EdF, the EBRD and Bayernwerk AG were all concerned about difficulty of insuring safety at investment levels lower than the originally proposed plan, and with Skoda as the main contractor. Siemens, however, never expressed concerns about the safety of the project under any conditions.
Siemens argues that the plant will be less safe without their involvement and if they do not do the upgrade work another company will. However, history has shown that when western governments cut funds for nuclear plants deemed unsafe, the project can die (17). Alternatively, when these projects are propped up by the western nuclear states, the result is often an overly expensive, delayed and substandard plant (see discussion of Angra II below and Cernavoda (18)).

At the same time Siemens involvement in the project is regularly used by SE and the Mochovce plant itself as proof that western safety standards are being maintained. The public relations staff at the Mochovce plant claim that there has been no real change in the project since the EBRD did their analysis. They continue to use the least cost analysis and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and public participation process (PPP) from the earlier project design as working documents and claim no new studies are necessary for the Skoda managed project. (19)

The Upgrade versus Closedown Paradox
The 1992 G-7 meeting in Munich set the World Bank on the task of trying to more precisely estimate the cost of not just phase out but also of upgrading these reactors. After over a year of study, the World Bank came to the conclusion that in every case of the 6 nations with RBMK and VVER 440/230 it was cheaper to close these reactors than to upgrade them. It was estimated the cost of replacing these reactors with gas fired plants would cost US$ 18 billion and providing the necessary safety upgrades would cost US$ 24 billion (20). But to date, no reactors have been closed (except for the special case of Greifswald) with western aid money. In fact, western aid has made it possible for many of these reactors to stay open and some unfinished reactors to restart construction.

Especially disturbing are the efforts of the EBRD to trade safety upgrades for closure at Kozloduy in Bulgaria and Ignalina in Lithuania. In both of these cases the Bank entered into these projects with the intention of providing short term safety aid in exchange for the promise of early closure of the plants. In both cases the western money has been used to upgrade the plants. Then once the upgrades have been started they have been used as an excuse for continued operation of these reactors. In neither case have firm close down dates been negotiated and there is no near term plan for closure of any of these accident prone reactors. (21)

In the specific case of Siemens and Slovakia, the paradox is especially acute. Siemens is involved in a US$200 million upgrade of Bohunice. These upgrades did not even warrant a mention by the US Department of Energy which ranked Bohunice as one of the 6 most dangerous nuclear reactors in Europe. All of the western lenders required the closure of Bohunice as one of the conditions of completing Mochovce. Siemens has never put forward such a condition and is in fact making it extremely unlikely to happen. These Bohunice upgrades scheduled to be completed in 1999, do not make any economic sense if the plant is to be closed by the year 2000 as often (but not consistently) claimed by the Slovak government.

Myths
There are a number of commonly believed myths which Siemens and the rest of the nuclear industry relies on to convince people that nuclear facilities in the east should be finished. Besides the safety arguments already discussed, they are:

1. The myth of the cheap unfinished reactor
2. The myth of quick safety upgrades
3. The myth that Siemens work overseas means reliability and timeliness.
4. The myth that new reactors are needed in the east.

The following section looks briefly at these myths and reveals the reality behind the claims.

1. The myth of the cheap unfinished reactor (the Temelin example) One of the central arguments for Mochovce is that so much work has already been done on the plant, that completing it is the cheapest solution. Similarly, the 1992 Tractebel report (the official least-cost-report) forecasted completion of Temelin by the end of 1995 and at a cost of 68.1 billion Czech Crowns total (US$ 2.7 billion). After subtracting sunken costs, the price for this 2000 MW facility would be about US$700 per installed KWh, a highly competitive price for electricity.
   But the consultants knew that things could go wrong, so they built in some scenarios to show that Temelin made sense even if the prices shift. The worst case scenario predicted by Tractebel was 4 years of delay and 79.7 billion Czech Crowns (US$ 3.2 billion) (22).
   Currently, CEZ (the Czech electricity monopoly) is forecasting that Temelin will not be completed until late 1999 or early 2000 (23) and has stopped talking about cost overruns completely, but the last official statement put them at over 80 billion Crowns (24) and reliable sources have leaked to the press that the cost will exceed 100 billion Crowns and completion will be well into the next century (25). Thus with at least three years of construction left we are already beyond the worst case. As is often true with nuclear contractors, they underestimated the difficulty of their work (just at the time when such underestimations insure that they will win the "least cost" contract).
2. The myth of quick safety upgrades (Loviisa example)
   The Finns built two reactors of the same model as Mochovce the VVER 440/213 at Loviisa. The nuclear industry often points to the high performance of these blocks and good operating record as proof that this design is both safe and cost effective. But here are significant differences between Loviisa and Mochovce. Most significant is the fact that for 10 years before construction started at Loviisa, the Finns and Russians worked together to improve the design of the 440/213. The safety modifications implemented at Loviisa are almost all absent at Mochovce. Many changes (like the rotation of steam generators to avoid turbine missiles, etc.) are not being implemented at Mochovce for they are simply too expensive. The Finns had the advantage of working on plans, the Slovaks must in many cases change things which are already in place. The Finns did a plant wide PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) to help guide them. This is the only plant wide PSA done on VVER 440/213. Mochovce is missing this key safety study required in the US and many other countries (26).
3. Siemens reliability and timeliness outside Germany (Angra II example)
   Siemens work on reactors outside of German has had serious problems. The Angra II reactor started construction in Brazil in 1976 and was originally planned to go on line in 1983, it is still not finished, though construction continues on it. The construction was halted in 1988 due to financial problems, but restarted in 1994 when German Banks stepped in to help the cash short Brazilians. Siemens is now claiming it will go on line in 1999, making it the longest nuclear construction project in history, at 23 years. The cost of this facility was originally to be US$ 1.3 million, but the 1994 final projected cost had rocketed to US$ 6 billion total (27).
4. The myth new reactors are needed in the east (VVER 640 example)
   Not content with fixing old reactors, Siemens has signed a letter of intent with the Russian nuclear ministry, Minatom, concerning the supply of a control- and monitoring system. The system is developed for the new VVER-640 type, which according to the Minatom plan, has to replace the RBMK (Chernobyl) type reactor. For Siemens this would mean an important step toward the central- and east-European nuclear market in new reactors. An official agreement will be signed at the end of the year, according to Bavarian Environmental minister Thomas Goppel. (28) It is estimated that 40% of all Russian internal energy could be conserved, clearly using existing resources efficiently would be more cost effective than building new capacity. (29)

19 November 1996

Footnotes
 

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