(December 24, 2004) Taking risks for monetary gain is called "gambling". In a move controversial even with its staff, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) released its Final Rule affecting how reactor operators purchase safety-related parts to ensure that systems, structures and components (SSC) will perform vital functions during operation or an accident. (1)
(620.5658) NIRS - Effective December 22, 2004, the nuclear industry will use a "voluntary" rule (10 CFR 50.69) to "risk-inform" its quality assurance practices for SSC in a variety of safety functions. The rule, largely written by industry, promises hundreds of millions of dollars in savings on purchasing contracts formerly requiring "nuclear grade" components that can now be replaced with cheaper "commercial grade" parts.
The new rule marks an end to the latest chapter of NRC's tarnished record on the safety oversights on non-compliant safety parts. It provides industry with an exit strategy that allows NRC to accept safety equipment that does not conform to the safety specifications reactors were licensed to maintain. A deteriorating and cost driven nuclear industry only amplifies concerns for public safety.
The safety problem goes back to the 1970s when the push to build and operate power reactors in the US led the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers to develop standards for products to maximize nuclear safety margins. Utilities could purchase parts intended for use in reactor safety systems from suppliers approved by "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants" under 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. These "nuclear grade" products were qualified and differentiated from commercial industry grade parts in order to ensure the quality control necessary to protect public safety. Utilities were allowed to purchase safety-related parts from commercial grade suppliers only if the parts were "dedicated". Dedicating parts involved qualifying the commercial parts to be suitable for use in safety systems so as to minimize the introduction of substandard parts.
With the worldwide collapse of the nuclear power market in the 1980s, nuclear vendors began shutting down production lines. "Nuclear grade" parts became scarce, forcing aging reactors to increase their reliance on "dedicated" parts. Allegations of substandard and "fraudulently marketed" safety components began to surface with greater frequency. Documents show that NRC was originally skeptical of allegations and took no aggressive action to stop the flood of bad parts. As the result of a government-wide task force, NRC had to recognize that counterfeit parts presented a growing safety concern. From 1986 to 1989, NRC initiated a series of inspections of commercial grade dedication programs. Out of 13 different utilities' quality assurance programs for "dedicated parts," NRC found problems with 12.
The General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office or GAO) identified, in its 1990 report to Congress "Nuclear Safety and Health: Counterfeit Parts and Substandard Products Are a Governmentwide Concern", that NRC "is deferring its regulatory responsibility" by failing to take enforcement action against nuclear power utilities that installed "fraudulent" products (such as fasteners, pipe fittings, electrical equipment, valves, even bolts) in 64% of the nation's domestic power reactors. GAO said "Nonconforming products can fail and result in death or injury to the public and workers, increase government program costs significantly, and waste tax dollars." (2) The government watchdog recommended "an aggressive regulatory posture concerning products used in plant safety systems, GAO recommends that the Chairman, NRC, reinstitute inspections of utilities' quality assurance programs and take appropriate enforcement actions when violations occur." (3)
Contrary to recommendations, NRC avoided enforcement action against utilities relying on counterfeit products. NRC abandoned a commitment to Congress for more aggressive inspections and instead discontinued industry-wide routine inspection programs for fraudulent parts.
As a result of safety allegations originally raised in the mid-1980's and brought to the attention of President Ronald Reagan by Steven Comley and his Massachusetts-based whistleblower support organization, We The People, NRC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) began an audit of NRC oversight of the issue. In 1994, OIG found that NRC's decision to abandon routine inspections and inspect only on a reactive basis was neither technically justifiable nor documented. "Our review disclosed what appears to be conflicting conclusions about the safety implications of the assessments and pilot inspections findings, and questions about the overall adequacy of utilities' dedication programs." (4) OIG noted that assessments of pilot inspections from 1991-1992 appeared similar to findings from 1986-1989, which were characterized as "significant safety implications."(5) NRC stonewalled the safety implications and countered that the agency was moving toward a more safety focused and less costly performance based inspection program.
By 1998, a Commission Paper directed staff to "risk inform" its regulations so as to reduce both its licensing burden and cost. The nagging counterfeit parts issue was at the top of the list in a rulemaking plan that would seek to put an end to controversy and questions on safety. Option 2, as it was coined, stated "As the primary part of this option, risk-informed definitions of 'safety-related' and 'important to safety' could be developed. This would lead to changes in the scope of what receives special operational and qualification treatment." (6) The paper went on to say "Under implementation of Option 2, there could be extensive changes to treatment of SSCs, as those with low risk importance have their regulatory requirements reduced and others not currently regulated have requirements added. To prevent excessive industry and staff burden, it is essential that an efficient regulatory process be employed as part of any implementation process." (7) So opened the next tortured chapter of NRC's "special treatment" of industry's cheating in a gamble with public safety.
During the subsequent rulemaking, three NRC engineers raised significant criticisms of changes to the quality control for procurement of reactor parts. A September 26, 2002 "Differing Professional View" (DPV) filed by a senior mechanical engineer raised detailed concerns about the treatment requirements for risk informing safety components as "not sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety." (8) According to the DPV, critical portions of the rule's language were deleted without valid technical justification on the "nebulous assertion that the rule language contained too much detail." (9) Similarly, another detailed DPV filed the same day by another mechanical engineer stated that significant modifications made during a concurrence process resulted in a change that "fails to resolve safety concerns regarding the proposed rule in a sufficient technical manner." (10) The DPV stated that "the rule will be insufficient to maintain the reliability of SSC's to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions." (11) While the three engineers eventually agreed with the final draft rule forwarded to the NRC Commission, in a recent internal memorandum the engineers now say that the final rule "raises more safety concerns than the proposed rule that was released for public comment in May 2003." (12) The three dissenting engineers state that the final rule "is not sufficient to ensure that the risk associated with the elimination of the special treatment requirements is maintained acceptably small." (13)
NIRS has filed for the public release of all NRC documents relating to the DPVs and dissenting staff memos under the Freedom of Information Act.
Sources:
(1) Federal Register, November 22, 2004, Vol. 69. Number 224, "10 CFR 50, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors; Final Rule"
(2) "Nuclear Safety and Health: Counterfeit Parts and Substandard Parts Are a Governmentwide Concern," GAO, October 1990, p. 2.
(3) Ibid, p.5.
(4) "Review of NRC's Process for Regulating Parts Used in Nuclear Power Plants," Audit Report, (OIG/93A-25), NRC Office of the Inspector General, July 28, 1994, Findings, p. 4.
(5) Ibid, p. 4.
(6) "Options for Risk-Informed Revision to 10 CFR Part 50-'Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," SECY-98-300, U.S. NRC, 12/23/1998.
(7) Ibid, SECY-98-300.
(8) "Differing Professional View Concerning the Proposed 10 CFR 50.69 Rulemaking," Memo to Sam Collins, Director NRC/NRR, from John R. Fair, NRC/NRR, 09/26/2002, p. 1.
(9) Ibid, p. 1.
(10) "Differing Professional View Regarding Proposed 10 CFR 50.69, "Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors," Memo to Sam Collins, Director NRC/NRR, from Thoms G. Scarbrough, NRR, 09/26/2004, p.2.
(11) Ibid, p. 2.
(12) "Final 50.69 rule released, but some implementation issues remain," Inside NRC, Platts, November 29, 2004, p. 13.
(13) Ibid, p. 13.
Contact: Paul Gunter at pgunter@nirs.org