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RUSSIA’S REPROCESSING CONUNDRUM

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#642
24/02/2006
Article

(February 24, 2006) Earlier this month, Vladimir Putin announced a new proposal for an international “partnership” between Russia and the U.S. to supply nuclear fuel to countries without uranium enrichment facilities, ostensibly to aid non-proliferation and apparently to help under developed countries meet energy requirements.

(642.5748) WISE Amsterdam - Almost simultaneously, the Environment Committee of Russia’s State Duma (parliament) approved a resolution recommending the gradual reduction of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing at the Mayak facility in the Chelyabinsk region of the southern Urals.

The initial proposal came following meetings to discuss the environmental impacts of the reprocessing facility and called for all reprocessing activities to cease (with the exception of work required by international agreements). It also stipulated that the dumping of liquid radioactive wastes into the Techa reservoir system be stopped and called for the plant’s reprocessing license to be revoked. Mayak, Russia’s most radioactively contaminated spot, already escaped an attempt to revoke its license because it was dumping waste into local water systems in 2003 - the license was renewed and the head of the federal nuclear oversight agency responsible for trying to stop Mayak was removed from his position.

The chairperson of the environmental committee, Vladimir Grachev told Norwegian organization Bellona, “We have already managed to get the decision accepted by Rosatom”. However, according to Bellona, Rosatom is actually making plans to increase reprocessing operations at Mayak with a plan to start reprocessing fuel from VVER-1000 reactors, something the plant does not currently have the technical capacity to do. In addition, there is also GNEP (see “Nuclear relapse goes global” in this issue), which would mean an increase in reprocessing in Russia as well as a vast increase in the amount of radioactive wastes stored in the country. Mayak currently reprocesses 120 tons of SNF a year but is capable of processing 400 tons.

Grachev argues that there is no conflict between the recommendations of the committee he led and the GNEP scheme as proposed by the Bush administration but it would seem to make the government’s acceptance of the committee’s resolution politically difficult, if not impossible.

Environmental groups within and outside Russia have been urging the cessation of reprocessing activities at Mayak for over a decade and have cautiously welcomed the committee’s resolution. However, one of the country’s leading environmentalists, Professor Alexei Yablokov warns that this could be a ploy by Rosatom to win more government funding - in the past, the agency has been known to make public announcements relating to its own failings and confessing to the poor state of facilities in order to obtain higher levels of funding from government. Ecodefense’s Vladimir Slivyak says that he remains hopeful that on this occasion, that is not the case given that the committee was mostly made up of nuclear industry insiders who, in his opinion, would not approve such a resolution lightly.

One rather major factor that could ensure the failure of the GNEP scheme is the lack of existing technology to fulfil the latest nuclear fantasy envisaged in the proposal. The U.S. Department of Energy itself has acknowledged that the systems and technologies required to make such a proposal possible are not proven - in other words, it is offering a service without having the tools or the know-how to actually deliver.

Despite this small matter, DOE officials have been busy promoting GNEP during visits to the UK and other nuclear countries. One much talked about part of this ‘initiative’ is that it will be used to encourage and promote the construction of new nuclear power plants in under developed countries. Undoubtedly for highly altruistic reasons rather than to help the bankrupt nuclear industries of these western states profit by selling their ridiculously obsolete and highly dangerous technologies to poor countries.

Likely customers
Russia has already offered to provide Iran with a similar service (to GNEP) in an attempt to diffuse the current stalemate over the Tehran’s alleged ambition to develop a nuclear weapons programme. Two-day talks were held between the two countries in Moscow this week and although senior Iranian officials called the negotiations “positive and constructive”, Tehran is still insisting that it will not give up its enrichment programme. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that it was too early to declare the talks a failure but some Russian officials have suggested that Iran’s seeming willingness to find a compromise is a ruse to avert the possible imposition of international sanctions. A Russian delegation has since travelled to Tehran for further negotiations.

Moscow has major economic interests in Iran and these would be seriously threatened by any international sanctions taken against the country. State-run AtomStroiExport Co. is building a US$800 million reactor at Bushehr - Iranian business is reportedly vital to keeping Russian’s struggling nuclear industry afloat.

Sources: The Moscow Times, February 22, 2006; BBC News, February 21, 2006; N-Base Briefing 486, February 11 2006; Bellona, February 9 & 13 2006; The Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 2006; WNA News Briefing 06.06, February 1-7 2006

Contact: WISE/NIRS Russia

New deal for Iran?

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is reportedly in the process of drafting a new compromise deal in a last ditch effort to settle the rapidly escalating international dispute over Iran’s resumption of uranium enrichment activities.

An unnamed EU representative to the IAEA has revealed that ElBaradei is to offer an agreement that would allow Iran to continue limited uranium enrichment research in return for guarantees that it would not conduct large scale enrichment work.

Given that Iran continues to refuse any proposals that would result in the cessation of activities at its Natanz enrichment facility, and considering that both Russia and China are likely to veto any moves to impose sanctions because of their own commercial interests in the country, ElBaradei is seeking a solution that could be acceptable to all parties - or at least some because it has already been reported that ‘western powers’ (read Bush administration and friends) are opposed to any deal that would allow Iran to keep technology that could be diverted to military use.

Previous efforts, by the EU-3 of the UK, Germany and France, to broker a deal failed last year and Iran has since threatened to withdraw some 25 billion Euro (US$30 billion) from European banks. Germany would be seriously affected given that it also has to consider the annual exports of German companies to Iran - mostly financed by credit institutions - and worth over 4 billion Euro (US$4.8 billion), which would be halted should sanctions be imposed.

The Islamic Republic is said to view this latest proposal more favourable since it would not involve it giving up its “legitimate rights”. Tehran remains defiant on the matter of sanctions and points out that it managed to achieve its current levels of nuclear knowledge while under past sanctions and without assistance so new sanctions would not have any adverse effects on its nuclear activities. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation also told the ISNA news service that “The Natanz facility is deep underground and no attack can damage it” but emphasised the country’s willingness to allow other countries to participate in the project so that the international community could see that it was not working on nuclear bombs.

The IAEA Board is due to meet in Vienna on March 6 and ElBaradei’s report on Iran will be circulated to member countries on February 26 but at this point, it seems doubtful that any further action (like referral to the UN Security Council) will be recommended although this, as with all other proposals before it, is being referred to as Iran’s last chance.

Sources: BBC News & Reuters, February 21 2006; ITAR-TASS & AFP, February 19 2006; NuclearFuel Volume 31 Number 3, January 30 2006