(December 3, 2008) On October 11, the IPFM released the ‘Global Fissile Material Report 2008, Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty’. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is an essential requirement for constraining nuclear arms races and, in the longer term, achieving nuclear disarmament. Fissile materials, in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are the essential materials in nuclear weapons. Their production is the most difficult step in making nuclear weapons. But huge stocks are available due to the ‘civilian’ nuclear programs.
(680.) IPFM - Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty was endorsed without a dissenting vote in 1993 by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1995, the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed to begin negotiations on “a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” But talks did not begin. At the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2000, it was agreed that negotiations should commence immediately, “with a view to their conclusion within five years.” The CD has, for various reasons, again not formally launched negotiations on a treaty.
Proponents of a Treaty that would only ban production of fissile material, name it a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). There are, however, huge stocks of fissile material in weapons as well as outside the weapon complexes. The latter stocks are currently designated for civilian or naval reactor use or are being recovered from Cold War weapons that have been declared excess for military use. Those who would also like the Treaty to prevent possible future use of these materials for weapons prefer to call the Treaty a Fissile Material Treaty. To reflect this disagreement, this report uses the term Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, or FM(C)T. It proposes, however, treaty articles addressing pre-existing civilian stocks, stocks declared excess to military purposes, and stocks of highly enriched uranium declared for use as fuel for naval-propulsion and other military reactors and verification of their non-weapon use.
Why an FM(C)T is Important
Since the NPT nuclear-weapon states have all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, the core concern for many states is how a treaty will deal with the stockpiles of weapons-usable material accumulated worldwide. The global stockpiles of HEU total between 1400 and 2000 metric tons, while the current global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 tons. Most of this material is in the possession of nuclear weapon states, predominantly the United States and Russia.
There is therefore disagreement today over whether a treaty on fissile materials should ban only the future production of such materials for weapons or if it should deal as well with fissile material in civilian use and even stocks of fissile material reserved for fuel for naval and other military reactors.
A fissile material cutoff treaty would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, and help lay a basis for nuclear disarmament by: Meeting international demands made by the United Nations General Assembly and commitments made by the NPT weapon states; Extending to the nine nuclear weapon states the legal ban on production of fissile material for weapons that currently applies only to non-nuclear weapon states; Further reducing the discriminatory aspects of the NPT by extending mandatory safeguards to nuclear facilities and materials in nuclear weapon states; Improving national monitoring and regulation of fissile material; Extending into the nuclear weapon states institutions and practices necessary for the eventual achievement of a nuclear weapons free world; and Helping to make nuclear weapons reductions irreversible.
Meeting International Demands and Commitments
An FM(C)T addresses the long-standing demands of the international community for a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons. This was spelled out first by the U.N. General Assembly in November 1957 in Resolution 1148, which called for a treaty that would include:
“the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes,”
“ the complete devotion of future production of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes under effective international control,” and
“ the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a program of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international supervision, of stocks of fissionable materials from weapons uses to non-weapons uses.”
As already noted, in December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution calling for negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” On 23 March 1995, the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed to begin negotiations on a treaty. At about the same time, the final document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference called for “[t]he immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.” This call for action was reiterated as one of the 13 steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which commits at least the states party to the NPT, including the five nuclear weapon states, to negotiate an FM(C)T.
The continued delay and possible failure to achieve a treaty would heighten already significant concerns about the prospects of realizing other NPT commitments made by the weapon states.
Universalizing the Legal Ban on Production of Fissile Material for Weapons
All non-weapon states party to the NPT have accepted the obligation not to produce fissile material for weapons.
Although the NPT does not require the parties that joined as nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) to do so, four of the five have declared officially that they have ended production of fissile material for weapons, and the fifth, China, has indicated informally that it has suspended such production. An FM(C)T would turn this production moratorium into a legally binding commitment for these states.
The other four nuclear weapon states—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Israel, India, and Pakistan—are not parties to the NPT. North Korea, though, has also recently ended its production of plutonium and is committed to ending its nuclear-weapons program and returning to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. India, Pakistan and perhaps Israel are believed to be still producing fissile materials in their weapon programs and have refused to join the moratorium.
Ending fissile material production for weapons is particularly important in South Asia, where Pakistan and India both appear to be increasing their rates of production of fissile materials for weapons.
An FM(C)T would create a requirement for Israel, India and Pakistan to end their production of fissile material for weapons and bring facilities under safeguards, and so join the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, without having to join the NPT as non-weapon states.
Reducing Discrimination Between Nuclear Weapon and Non-weapon States
The NPT requires mandatory IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states, while requiring none in nuclear weapon states. This inequitable application of safeguards has raised concerns in non-weapon states about additional costs and vulnerability of proprietary commercial information.
The nuclear weapon states have sought to address this issue by making voluntary offers to open some of their facilities and materials for safeguarding. The United States, followed by the United Kingdom, and later France, in the 1970s, and the Soviet Union and China in the 1980s, offered some facilities and materials for IAEA safeguarding. In practice, however, the IAEA has not been given enough resources to apply the safeguards. An FM(C)T would impose for the first time compulsory safeguards in nuclear weapon states that would, at a minimum, cover all production facilities.
Improving National Accounting for Monitoring of Fissile-material Stocks
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been discovered that accounting for fissile materials has often been very loose in weapon states. An FM(C)T would require that, at least in their civilian nuclear sectors, nuclear weapon states meet internationally agreed standards for the control and accounting of fissile materials.
Making Nuclear-weapon Reductions Irreversible
The United States, Russia, United Kingdom and France have all announced reductions in the size of their nuclear arsenals from their cold war peaks. For the United States, the number of warheads peaked at about 30,000 in the mid-1960s, and the Soviet/Russian arsenal reached 40,000 in the 1980s. In the case of the United States and Russia, reductions have amounted to tens of thousands of weapons. The United Kingdom and France have reduced proportionately by hundreds of weapons each. Some of the material from these weapon reductions has been declared as excess to military requirements by the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom. A total of about 700 tons of highly enriched uranium and almost 100 tons of plutonium (not all of which is from weapons) have been declared excess. This combined total is enough for over 30,000 weapons.
An FM(C)T that obliged states not to use for weapons fissile material either in civilian use or declared as excess for weapons would capture these materials and ensure that nuclear weapon reductions were irreversible. If future arms reductions were accompanied by declarations that the material in these weapons would be placed under international safeguards, the global stock of fissile materials would continue to be irreversibly reduced.
Creating Institutions for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World
Any plausible enduring global prohibition on the production, possession and use of nuclear weapons would require that the nuclear weapon states eliminate their weapons and place all fissile material stocks and production facilities under strict international safeguards. The FM(C)T creates many of the norms, mechanisms and practices that would constitute the core of such regime, including the accounting for and safeguarding of stocks of fissile materials and the extension of mandatory international safeguards into the nuclear weapon states.
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Separated Plutonium
The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 tons. It is divided almost equally between civilian stocks and military stocks, including material declared excess but not yet disposed. Separated plutonium exists mostly in nuclear weapon states, but Japan and a few non-nuclear weapon states in Europe also have significant stocks.
Russia and the United States possess by far the largest stocks of military plutonium: 120–170 and 92 tons, respectively. Russia has declared 34 tons, and potentially up to 50 tons, of its weapon-grade plutonium excess for weapon purposes. The United States has declared excess 54 tons of separated government-owned plutonium, which includes 9 additional tons added to that category in September 2007. The Russian and U.S. plutonium disposition projects have suffered many changes of plans and delays since they were launched in the mid-1990s.
Under a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, the most costly new verification challenge will be to apply safeguards to reprocessing plants in the eight states having nuclear weapons (the five NPT nuclear weapon states, Israel, India, and Pakistan). Although there are only two operating reprocessing plants in the non-weapon states, Japan’s Tokai and Rokkasho facilities, these two plants alone account for 20 percent of the total international safeguards inspection effort performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Highly Enriched Uranium Stocks
More than 99 percent of the global HEU stockpile is in the possession of the nuclear weapon states. Only the United Kingdom and the United States have made public the total sizes of their stocks of HEU. Estimates of the remaining national holdings are generally quite uncertain. According to these estimates, despite the elimination of over 400 tons of Russian and U.S. HEU by down-blending to low-enriched uranium, the global inventory still totals 1670 ± 300 tons. The main uncertainty in estimating the global total is due to a lack of information on the Russian stockpile.
The most significant changes compared to the previous year are due to the ongoing blend-down activities in Russia and the United States, which together eliminated about 40 tons of HEU between mid-2007 and mid-2008. As of mid-2008, the United States had down-blended cumulatively about 96 tons of highly enriched uranium. Little if any of this material was weapon-grade. As of June 2008, Russia had eliminated 337 out of 500 tons of weapon-grade HEU as part of its 1993 HEU deal with the United States, which is to be completed in 2013.
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Contact: International Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton University, 221 Nassau Street, 2nd Floor, Princeton, NJ 08542, USA
Tel: +1-609-258-4677
Fax: +1-609-258-3661
Email: contact@fissilematerials.org
http://www.fissilematerials.org
Source: The Global Fissile Material Report 2008, (with all footnotes and sources) can be downloaded at: http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr08.pdf