(February 16, 2001) The battle continues over the Australian government's plan to build a 20-megawatt research reactor at Lucas Heights on the outskirts of Sydney, Australia's most populous city.

(543.5248) Jim Green - The government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) hope to begin construction of the reactor in 2002. Currently, there is only one operating reactor in Australia, the 10 megawatt HIFAR reactor at Lucas Heights.

Many Australians - including a number of nuclear scientists and engineers - question whether the successful tenderer for the reactor project, INVAP from Argentina, has the experience and expertise to successfully and safely manage the project.

To pursue the plan for a new reactor, the federal government and ANSTO have felt it necessary to reduce public opposition by reducing the radioactive waste stockpile at Lucas Heights.

The government will write, "review" and rubber-stamp an Environmental Impact Statement concerning the plan for a low-level radioactive waste dump in rural South Australia over the next 12-18 months. Surveys show that 86-95 per cent of South Australians are opposed to the proposed dump, and this opposition may yet scuttle the planned dump.

As for spent reactor fuel, some has been sent to the USA for indefinite storage and some to the UK and France for reprocessing. The government and ANSTO hope to use the French Cogema plant to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactor if it proceeds.

Reprocessed wastes will be returned to Australia for indefinite storage. No storage facility exists, and opposition to hosting such a facility has been fierce.

Government officials have publicly discussed the possibility of building a reprocessing or conditioning plant in Australia to treat spent fuel, and this remains a contingency in the event that overseas reprocessing options are closed off. Reprocessing is illegal in Australia, which begs the question why it is acceptable to reprocess spent fuel overseas.

Medical rhetoric
There are many concerns with the replacement reactor project, but the primary problem is that Australia has no need for a new reactor. We have been fed repeated lies about the "need" for a new reactor to produce medical isotopes. However, there is overwhelming evidence debunking this rhetoric.

A better strategy would be to close the HIFAR reactor combined with:

1. Greater reliance on imported isotopes;
2. Ongoing use of the existing cyclotrons in Sydney and Melbourne and others that are likely to be built in Australia;
3. Further research into non-reactor isotope sources (e.g. cyclotrons, spallation technology) with the aim of reducing demand for imported, reactor-produced isotopes; and
4. Greater reliance on alternative clinical technologies (such as computerised tomography and magnetic resonance imaging).

Importation is a viable alternative to a domestic reactor for numerous important isotopes, including the most commonly used diagnostic isotope technetium-99m (actually it is the longer-lived parent molybdenum-99 that is imported) and also therapeutic and palliative isotopes. The major global isotope suppliers have the capacity to supply world demand several times over. More than three-quarters of all nuclear medicine procedures carried out around the world use imported isotopes.

Of course, importing isotopes means exporting the problems associated with research reactors - hence the need for greater use of, and research into, non-reactor isotope sources.

The main non-reactor isotope sources are cyclotrons, which produce about 20 per cent of the isotopes used in nuclear medicine. Because they are powered by electricity rather than the uranium fission reaction of a nuclear reactor, cyclotrons have important advantages: - they generate only a tiny fraction of the waste of research reactors (typically far less than 10%) - they pose no risk in relation to nuclear weapons proliferation (for comparison, consider the use of research reactors to produce plutonium for weapons in India and Israel); and - cyclotrons are much safer than reactors (for comparison, there have been at least three fatal research reactor accidents around the world: Yugoslavia, 1958; USA, 1958; Argentina, 1983).

"National interest"
The medical rationale for a new reactor has become so implausible that the government itself has acknowledged that the debate over isotope supply options "has not been resolved satisfactorily". According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Australian Safeguards Office, the plan for a new reactor is "first and foremost" being driven by a "national interest" agenda.

(February 16, 2001) Following the contribution of a fault at Diablo Canyon in January to California's electricity crisis (see WISE News Communique 542.5240: "Deregulatory disaster in California"), a shutdown at another nuclear power plant has contributed to the state's energy woes.

(543.5244) Public Citizen - The emergency shutdown on 3 February 2001 of San Onofre nuclear reactor No. 3 not only exacerbates California's energy crisis but provides a disturbing example of why the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) industry-friendly maintenance rules are inadequate to stave off catastrophic failures.

The reactor, located on U.S. 5 between San Diego and Los Angeles, had been shut down for about a month for refueling and maintenance. It was in the process of being brought back into operation on 3 February when one of the electrical breakers in the plant "failed catastrophically," according to an NRC event report. The breaker exploded, causing a short and a fire that forced the reactor to be shut down. It will likely remain down for several weeks. The reactor generates approximately 1,100 megawatts, or enough to power 1.1 million homes, according to published reports.

The NRC's maintenance rule requires utilities to do preventive maintenance of "important equipment" to ensure there are no catastrophic failures. But the NRC and the nuclear industry have been cutting back on the amount of time a nuclear reactor is taken out of service for refueling and maintenance by narrowing the scope of work conducted and allowing more maintenance to be conducted while the reactor is operating. The idea is to increase the utility's profitability by decreasing the time reactors are down. The breaker that blew on 3 February is not considered "important equipment," so it is not covered by NRC's maintenance rule.

"The NRC and the nuclear industry have been skimping on maintenance during refueling to improve the profitability of nuclear reactors," said Jim Riccio, senior policy analyst for Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. "The nuclear industry's shortsightedness and greed may extend California's electricity woes for several more weeks as the nuclear plant recovers from the fire. Rather than providing relief to California's electricity crisis, the nuclear industry is contributing to it." The utility declared the explosion and fire to be an "unusual event" -- the lowest level of the four emergency event classifications used by the NRC.

Source and contact: Public Citizen, 1600 20th St. NW, Washington, DC 20009, US
Tel: +1-202-588 1000
Email: cmep@citizen.org
Internet: www.citizen.org/cmep

(February 16, 2001) In the first clear indication in more than 20 years of utility interest in building new atomic reactors in the US, the Exelon Corporation has asked the NRC for an expedited schedule for the licensing and construction of new "pebble-bed" reactors.

(543.5243) NIRS - According to its presentation to the NRC on January 31, Exelon wants to start by building seven 110 MW Pebble Bed Modular Reactors (PBMR) at an undisclosed site, beginning by 2004. Exelon is a minority owner in a consortium that is seeking to build the same reactor design in South Africa (see WISE News Communique 512.5036: "South Africa to build new nuclear reactors".) The company is hoping to begin building that reactor in 2003, with testing to begin in 2005-well after U.S. construction would begin, according to the utility's schedule.

Exelon is a holding company formed from the merger of Commonwealth Edison and PECO Energy. It also includes AmerGen, which is half owned by British Energy. The three companies involved in Exelon already control some 10% of the world's nuclear power plants. Other partners in the PBMR project include British Nuclear Fuels, Eskom-a South African firm, and IDC, a South African state-owned financier.

The January 31 meeting was marked by Exelon's insistence that the NRC adopt the utility's schedule for reactor construction, rather than-as might be considered normal for an applicant-a request than the NRC accommodate Exelon's schedule. Apparently, Exelon wants to be sure all procedural and regulatory hurdles are overcome during the Bush administration.

However, Exelon wants a lot. For example, it believes its new reactor design is so safe that it does not need a containment; instead the utility's presentation spoke of a "citadel" structure over the reactor. Exelon believes that the ceramic coating over the tens of thousands of fuel pellets that would be used as fuel for the reactor is sufficient to serve as a normal reactor containment despite the fact that such a design would require 100% perfection in the manufacture of these thousands of fuel pellets-an undoubtedly impossible goal.

But Exelon doesn't stop there. It wants the Emergency Planning Zone for these new reactors to be reduced from 10 miles (16 km) to less than half a mile (0.8km). It wants the NRC to provide a combined construction/operating license before it has even completed tests on its first South African reactor (which itself is under considerable opposition in that country). It apparently wants some relief from Price-Anderson Act considerations (a nuclear liability fund to cover the costs of a catastrophic nuclear accident), as well as from prohibitions against majority foreign ownership of reactors. Exelon also wants the NRC to give it a combined construction/operating license, before it certifies its reactor design (and it wants to certify the design based on its South African experience-which it does not yet have-rather than go through the normal NRC certification process).

Where Exelon would want to build these seven new reactors is unknown, but it is unlikely that there are many localities eager to embrace them. Exelon envisions these reactors as being "merchant" plants-designed to sell electricity on the wholesale level, rather than directly to consumers. That would seem to indicate Pennsylvania as a likely spot for the reactors, since Exelon is essentially a Pennsylvania company, and that state has deregulated its electricity market sufficiently to be attractive to "merchant" generators. But that is by no means a given: Exelon and its various partners are, at this point, the most expansionist nuclear utility in the business.

The NRC provided little indication about its position toward Exelon's demands during the January 31 meeting, but also provided no sense that it would not be willing to bend to the company's requests.

Will Exelon succeed in being the first company to take a new reactor from initial order to licensing in the US since October 1973? Odds are, no. The design of the reactors is too different, and beyond the NRC's experience to handle on the fast-track schedule Exelon is demanding. Siting of the reactors will be tremendously controversial. The reactors may offer improved safety, but they can't ensure complete safety, and they still produce radioactive waste, just like any other reactor.

But stopping Exelon, which seems determined to become the world's dominant nuclear utility, won't be easy. It will take concerted grassroots effort, wherever Exelon ultimately decides to try to site its reactors.

Source and contact: Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington, DC 20036, US
Tel: +1 202 328 0002; Fax: +1 202 462 2183;
Email nirsnet@nirs.org; Internet: www.nirs.org

(February 16, 2001) In WISE News Communique 542 ("In Brief") we reported briefly on BNFL's announcement to abandon its plans to replace the metallic uranium fuel in two of its Magnox NPPs with "Magrox", an oxide fuel. This article describes some further implications of this decision.

(543.5246) Hugh Richards - BNFL's decision to abandon the development of MAGROX fuel, announced January 25 2001, raises serious questions about the future of Wylfa and Oldbury. Back in May 2000 the plan to extend the lives of these stations to 2013 (Oldbury) and 2016/2021 (Wylfa) was said to be dependent on MAGROX fuel, which was destined to be reprocessed through Sellafield's Thorp plant.

The abandonment of MAGROX illustrates the length of time that key elements of the BNFL business plan survive internal let alone external scrutiny, in this case eight months. The commercial risk of possible regulatory delay, the main reason given for abandonment, should have been known about last May. The wary attitude of the regulator "MAGROX is inherently less controllable" was known to NGO's back in 1999, so why not to BNFL?

BNFL is desperate to operate Wylfa and Oldbury for as long as possible, but Magnox fuel has to be reprocessed through the dilapidated B205 Magnox reprocessing plant at Sellafield built in 1965. B205 has to close in 2012, at the latest, to meet Britain's OSPAR commitments to reduce discharges to near zero by 2020. In their Jan 25th announcement BNFL acknowledge 'current Magnox fuel cycle problems' substantiating the rumor that B205 is failing to meet its targets and may not limp-on as long as 2012.

A new head-end plant, to put Magnox fuel through Thorp, is being considered as an alternative to MAGROX. However, BNFL say it will be at least three years before it can confirm whether this would be financially viable and the 'lead time' for such a plant is said to be about six years. If the plant is not going to be ready before 2010 all the older Magnox reactors would have closed by then, leaving Oldbury and Wylfa as the only stations capable of justifying the investment. A further uncertainty is that all Thorp's current reprocessing contracts will have finished by 2007- 2009, and the output of the last two ageing Magnox stations cannot justify keeping it going.

The head-end plant is likely to prove as 'unviable' as MAGROX. One implication of B205's failure to cope with the spent fuel throughput is an accelerated closure of Magnox stations.

BNFL cannot rely on Oldbury and Wylfa operating much longer. Quite apart from the 'superheater weld' defects at Wylfa which have kept the station out of action for the last nine months, both Wylfa and Oldbury have suffered greater radiolytic corrosion of their graphite cores than any other stations on the system. It is predicted that, before it is 35 years old in two years time, Oldbury will have lost nearly half the graphite in its worst affected blocks. Wylfa is considered only marginally better. These predictions are made in confidential nuclear industry documents, which survey the state of the Magnox reactor cores at the 'end of life'.

Crucially, these documents predict the 'failure' of parts of the graphite cores before 2006 in the case of Wylfa, and 2003 at Oldbury. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate has thus far (as of 11 February 2001) been unwilling to confirm that it has copies of all these documents.

The loss of graphite moderator means there is an insufficient supply of slow neutrons to sustain the chain reaction, so the reactors are gradually losing output, as they 'die'. Periodic Safety Reviews will be necessary for Oldbury and Wylfa within the next few years. There is lot for these reviews to consider. A pipe burst in a reactor at either Oldbury or Wylfa would inject steam directly into the core at over twice the pressure of the carbon dioxide coolant. A physical shock to any of these reactor cores could very easily displace the most unstable graphite blocks by more than the 40mm - 50mm necessary to prevent the control rods entering the channel to shut down the reactor. Displaced graphite blocks would also lead to a build up of heat in the blocked channels, and may damage the fuel elements leading to the possibility of fuel ignition and meltdown, if cooling could not be restored in time.

Given the poor state of their reactors, with the structural stability of the cores increasingly in doubt as they age, the campaign to close both stations is building up momentum. The crunch may come as the three million people within 35 miles of Oldbury demand to know what arrangements have been made for their evacuation in the event of a severe accident. A sign that BNFL knows that 'the game is up' at Wylfa is their decision to use external bracing to stop the superheater pipes 'popping out' of the reactors (Nucleonics Week, 8 February 2001). This is a deplorably deficient 'sticking plaster' solution compared with internal bracing or redoing the welds. It will not stop the welds actually bursting, and suggests that BNFL are not taking their responsibilities seriously, perhaps because they have realised the reactors have become 'unviable'.

Source and contact: Hugh Richards, WANA, PO Box 1, Llandrindod Wells, Powys LD1 5AA, UK
Tel/Fax: +44 1982 570362.
Email: hughrichards@gn.apc.org

HMS Tireless update.

(February 16, 2001) Latest reports on the restart of the nuclear reactor confirm that it is to be restarted and tested on site in Gibraltar and not at sea. This follows repeated action against the continued presence of the nuclear submarine in Gibraltar and statements by the British Ambassador in Madrid, Peter Torry, that the submarine can be safely repaired by March. Lack of safety precautions and warnings for the surrounding population are fuelling more action and calls for democratic rights for the people of Gibraltar.
After a 60 000 strong protest action in Algeciras in January, to demand the immediate removal of the submarine, criminal lawsuits have been filed in the Spanish Supreme Court against both the Spanish and British Governments as well as the captain of the submarine.
Continued action by Greenpeace has resulted in 10 activists being fined GBP350 (US$500) each for obstructing police during their approach to the submarine on January 16th. Activists from Spain, Germany, Austria, Italy and Andorra were involved in the fast launch action in the Naval Dockyard. The "Tireless 10" were repelled by the submarine crew and during scuffles one woman was injured. Two other charges were dropped. It has emerged that 7 out of 12 of the fleet of British hunter killer submarines had signs of cracking at the same critical junction in their reactor cooling system. All 7 were withdrawn from service for repairs at the end of last year. John Large, nuclear advisor to the Gibraltar government, says the failure to diagnose the problem earlier poses major questions about inspection and maintenance of these submarines. Sur, January 2001 and February 2001

Hungary: Paks NPP's lifetime extended to 50 years? The board of directors of the Paks NPP has approved a strategy document called "vision for the future", which proposes to extend its lifetime by at least 10 years and potentially 20 years beyond its assumed lifetime of 30 years. The board also approved a power capacity up-rate from the present 470 MW (each unit) to 500-510 MW. Nucleonics Week, 1 February 2001

(February 16, 2001) The decision by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to approve a loan for completion of the Ukrainian reactors Khmelnitsky-2 and Rivne-4 (K2/R4) was a setback for campaigners against nukes in Eastern Europe, but the battle to stop these projects is not over yet by any means.

(543.5249) WISE Amsterdam - Although the EBRD approved the loan for the completion of K2/R4 replacement reactors last year (see WISE News Communique 540.5226: "EBRD approves K2R4 loan - campaign continues") the money itself will only be disbursed after Ukraine fulfils a series of conditions:

• Full enhancement of the safety, not only of K2/R4 but also of all the other 13 nuclear facilities owned by Energoatom,
• Full implementation of reforms of the electricity sector (particularly privatization of the distribution sector),
• Increase in cash collection
• A report by a body of international nuclear regulators that their Ukrainian counterpart meets the necessary criteria on independence and has the resources to assure operations of all nuclear facilities according to "western safety standards"

As the Ukraine falls more and more into a deep political crisis with President Kuchma allegedly being involved in the murder on a journalist its highly unclear whether the country will ever meet the criteria. On the other hand the EBRD really seems to like the Kuchma government; the bank has increased its operations in the Ukraine which could exceed 500 million Euros this year.

Meanwhile the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the K2 reactor has been conducted, while the EIA for R4 is expected to start later. According to Bankwatch the government has a strange way of dealing with the EIA. Up till now the only participation invited from the NGO's was a letter in which the government asks the following question: Does your organization support completion of new nuclear units at Khmelnitsky and Rivne NPP's? Most probably a 'no' will lead to the NGO not being invited to any further public steps to be taken in the EIA...

Bankwatch, in collaboration with local and national NGO's in the Ukraine will try to prove that the Ukraine does not meet the required criteria. But the NGO's are facing bad working conditions; it is hard to make clear that the whole public participation process is a complete farce when working under conditions of repression and a failing government. Besides the demands that the government make the EIA documents public and organize sufficient public consultations, the Bankwatch network is at the same time preparing legal steps against the authorities responsible for the whole process towards a final decision on the future of K2/R4. The network is trying to provide evidence that the documents be needed for an EIA process simply do not exist - if they lose this case they can at least demand that the documents be published.

International or non-Ukrainian NGO's can support the Bankwatch campaign by addressing the Ukrainian government that they should open the EIA process not only to the own citizens but also accept foreign involvement, as required under the Espoo convention.

Source and contact: Olexi Pasyuk, International Energy Coordinator, CEE Bankwatch Network, PO Box #89, 01025, KIEV, Ukraine
Phone: + 380 44 2386260, Fax: + 380 44 2386259
Email opasyuk@bankwatch.org
Web site http://www.bankwatch.org

(February 16, 2001) An incident at Sellafield's High Level Waste tanks on 26 January 2001 was kept secret for two weeks, only being revealed in BNFL's Sellafield Newsletter on 9 February. The incident caused suspension of a number of Sellafield's operations, including reprocessing at THORP.

(543.5242) WISE Amsterdam - Ironically, the incident happened as a result of improvements intended to increase safety and reduce radioactive discharges into the atmosphere. The ventilation system for dealing with the gases given off by the highly radioactive liquid waste in the tanks had just been improved. However, an electrical wiring fault in part of this system cuased the system to malfunction, leading to a build up of explosive gases. Alarms warned that the system was malfunctioning, but staff ignored the alarms for nearly three hours before taking action to solve the problem. The incident has been provisionally classified as Level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).

Government Ministers were informed several days after the event by inspectors from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), Britain's nuclear safety authority, which is part of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). However, an HSE press release dated 31 January 2001, announcing an NII order to BNFL to reduce the quantity of waste stored in the same tanks, made no mention of the incident that had happened five days previously.

The highly radioactive liquid in the tanks, known as Highly Active Liquor (HAL), is essentially a solution of fission products in nitric acid. This radioactive liquid, which remains after plutonium and unused uranium have been extracted during reprocessing, is initially stored in tanks which must be actively cooled and ventilated 24 hours a day. Failure of cooling and ventilation systems can have disastrous consequences: when a similar tank blew up in Kyshtym in the Russian area of Chelyabinsk in 1957, the resulting nuclear accident was second only to Chernobyl in magnitude, devastating an area the size of central London.

Because of this, the NII has been pressing BNFL for years to convert the waste to a more stable form as soon as possible. BNFL set up a Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP) to convert the waste to glass blocks, which are safer because they do not need active cooling. However, the throughput achieved by the first two waste vitrification lines has been lower than expected, with particular problems in the 1995/96 and 1996/97 periods. The plant was also sabotaged last year (the culprits remain undetected). BNFL declared in 1995 that it would have a third vitrification line ready in 1999, but failed to meet this target.

The order made to BNFL on 31 January, as mentioned in the HSE press release, took the form of a "Specification" - a legally binding requirement - reducing the maximum permitted storage of HAL at Sellafield. The current storage limit is 1,575 cubic metres, and the Specification states that this is to be reduced by 35 cubic metres a year until 2012, when it will be rapidly reduced to the minimum needed to feed the vitrification plant (the "buffer stock"). In order to reduce HAL stocks, the HAL must be vitrified at a faster rate than reprocessing produces more of it. 2012 is the planned closure date of Sellafield's B205 Magnox reprocessing plant (see article elsewhere in this issue), and the planned rapid reduction of HAL stocks from this date is clearly related to B205's closure.

However, the NII states that the major contribution to the hazard potential comes from HAL derived from the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP). Laurence Willams, head of the NII, said in the press release: "We will not hesitate to use our regulatory powers to halt THORP reprocessing, should that be necessary, in order to keep BNFL within the Specification". It is now clear that Williams did hesitate to inform the public of the incident of 26 January. A spokesman for the Nuclear Free Local Authorities said: "Days after this potential disaster occurred the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate still pressed ahead with a feeble plan to give BNFL to July 2015 to clear the waste backlog. At the time we said the plan was totally inadequate and information about the build up of explosive gases on 26 January now demonstrates the dangers."

The staff reaction to the incident, ignoring the alarm for nearly three hours, once more demonstrates BNFL's "serious safety culture problem", as the NII described it following last year's investigation into BNFL's management of safety systems at Sellafield. However, the quickest way to reduce Sellafield's stock of high level radioactive liquid waste is to stop reprocessing, so that no more is produced and the existing stocks can be vitrified.

Sources: Contact:

Sources:

• HSE Press Release E015:01, 31 January 2001
• CORE News Briefing, nos. 05/01 (2 February 2001) and 06/01 (12 February 2001)
• "The storage of liquid high level waste at BNFL Sellafield: an updated report of safety", NII, February 2000
• Nuclear Free Local Authorities press release, 12 February 2001
• The Observer, 11 February 2001

Contact: Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE), 98 Church Street, Barrow, Cumbria LA14 2HJ, UK
Tel: +44 1229 833851. Fax: +44 1229 812239.
Email: info@core.furness.co.uk

(February 16, 2001) The decision to cancel Taiwan's Fourth Nuclear Power Plant project (Lungmen) has been reversed as part of an agreement between the Premier Chang Chung-hsiung and Legislative Speaker Wan Jin-pyng. However, the same agreement also states that the ultimate goal is a nuclear-free Taiwan.

(543.5245) WISE Amsterdam - This agreement, signed on 13 February 2001, is the latest attempt to mend the major political crisis in Taiwan. The question as to whether the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant (Lungmen) should be completed has caused a major political crisis between the Democratic People's Party (DPP) government, elected in March 2000, and the nationalist party KuoMinTang (KMT), which had been in power for the previous 50 years.

(February 16, 2001) High-level radioactive waste is once more set to travel across Europe in Castor containers. These large metal flasks also carry political baggage with them, which is no less explosive than the radioactive waste they contain. Furthermore, they carry high symbolic value in the dispute over nuclear power in Germany. The following contribution describes the political "contents" of a Castor.

(543.5247) Jochen Stay - Shortly before the last Castor transport to Ahaus in March 1998, the nuclear industry placed brightly-colored advertisements in all the major German newspapers. The advertisements stated "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for safety", or "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for democracy", or else "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for confidence".

It soon turned out that quite the opposite of these statements was true, as weeks of media attention were devoted to the contamination scandal, which ultimately led to a temporary ban of all Castor transports. Dozens of Castor containers had traveled across Europe with contamination levels way above the limits for around a decade. The industry and the authorities were aware of this all the time but kept quiet about the problem.

Now the transport ban is coming to an end, but it is still questionable whether a Castor is safer now just because the current Environment Minister carries a Green Party membership card. This time, the anti-nuclear movement could (if enough cash were available) place advertisements stating: "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for consensus-nonsense", or "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for continuation of the nuclear industry", or else "Strictly speaking, Castor is just another word for hushing up nuclear waste incidents". And of course, Castor is another word for resistance. After all, no single word motivates anti-nuclear activists more than the name of this nuclear waste container. The resistance to the Castor transports to Gorleben in 1995, 1996 and 1997 and to Ahaus in 1998 was a success story for the movement. That Angela Merkel as Federal Environment Minister was forced to call a halt to all the transports because of the contamination scandal can be attributed to the fact that the State was close to the limits of its abilities in keeping the transports going.

Now for the first time a Red-Green federal government is testing these limits. Between 27 and 29 March, a train carrying six Castors from the French reprocessing plant at La Hague is due to travel through Germany towards Gorleben. For three years transports have been halted; now the Castor alarm is sounding once more. In these three years, the anti-nuclear movement has had its ups and downs. On the one hand, there was the possibility that delays in the resumption of transports could bring a whole row of plants to the point of being suffocated by their own nuclear waste. On the other hand, the long period without transports could have led to the nuclear debate being kept out of the media spotlight. After all, the great strength of the movement, to bring about massive political pressure during the Castor transports, is also its great weakness if no transports take place. Other focal points of similar intensity have so far not been found. Now of course this question will return to the background, because the transports are starting again... The movement now faces a double challenge. On the one hand, there is the challenge to mobilize and prepare good actions; on the other hand, to carry on the political struggle against the indescribable arguments of the federal government and its constituent parties. Each Castor therefore also has political "contents." The same is true of many cancelled transports...