Taiwan
Nr. of reactors
|
first grid connection
|
% of total electricity
|
6
|
1977-11-16
|
19.02%
|
Taiwan has adopted the following management strategy for spent nuclear fuel: “storage in spent fuel pools for the near term, onsite dry storage for the mid-term, and final deep geological disposal for the long term".(*01)
Atomic Energy Council (AEC) was founded in 1955 at the ministerial level under the Executive Yuan as the Competent Authority (regulatory body). FCMA is the unique agency for the supervision of spent fuel and radioactive waste safety management. Radwaste Administration (RWA) was established in January 1981, as an affiliated agency under AEC, to meet the growing need for radioactive waste management. After restructuring RWA was renamed as Fuel Cycle and Materials Administration (FCMA) in early 1996.(*02)
Low-level waste
The Lan-Yu Storage Site provides off-site interim storage for solidified low-level radioactive waste from 1982 to 1996, and has not received any radioactive waste since then. Because of the high temperature, moisture, and salty ambient atmosphere in Orchid Island, many drums stored on site for decades has shown paint scaling or rusted, some waste in drums even presents solification deformation.(*03)
Interim dry storage
Taiwan’s current policy calls for dry storage of spent fuel at the reactor site until final disposal, although it is recognized that additional storage facilities will be needed soon to deal with the growing amount of spent fuel being produced. Taiwan is also looking at sending its fuel overseas for reprocessing. However, U.S. government opposition to Taiwanese reprocessing has so far blocked significant movement on this; since Taiwanese reactors and fuel are of U.S. origin, bilateral agreements require Taiwan to obtain U.S. consent for reprocessing.(*04)
Recognizing the problem of spent fuel storage, the authorities began looking toward cooperation on the development of dry storage technology, with mixed success. China offered to take over Taiwan’s spent fuel inventory in the late 1990’s but Taiwan refused due to fears that Beijing would demand political concessions in exchange.(*05) In 2001, Taiwan also explored the possibility of storing its spent fuel on Russian territory; but dropped negotiations after U.S. objections.(*06) However, this could still be a possibility in the long-term.
Since December 1983, research for final disposal has been carried out. The "Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act" was issued in December 2002. It states that the producer of high-level waste is responsible for the implementation of final disposal and is required to submit a final disposal plan for HLRW within two years after the Act came into effect. In Dec. 2004, TPC submitted the "Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Disposal Plan" to AEC. The plan was approved in July, 2006, and will be carried out in five phases: (1) Potential host rock characterization (2) Candidate site investigation; (3) Detailed site investigation and testing; (4) Repository design and license application; and (5) Repository construction. Finally, a deep geological disposal repository is expected to be operational after 2055.(*07)
Ukraine
Nr. of reactors
|
first grid connection
|
% of total electricity
|
15
|
1977-09-26
|
47.20%
|
Established in 1996 the State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company 'Energoatom' is responsible for everything nuclear in Ukraine, including radioactive waste management. There is no intention for final disposal in Ukraine in the coming decades, though the possibility remains under consideration. In 2008 the National Target Environmental Program of Radioactive Waste Management was approved. Storage of used fuel for at least 50 years before disposal remains the policy.(*01)
Waste management: Interim storage
Before 2005, Ukraine transported annually about 220 tons of spent fuel to Russia.(*02) Because of the rising price of Russia’s reprocessing and spent-fuel storage services, however, Energoatom decided in the 1990s to construct dry storage facilities. The first Ukrainian dry-cask interim storage facility came into operation in July 2001 at the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant for storage of fuel from the six reactors.(*03) But since 2005, Ukraine has been shipping spent fuel again to Russia from its other sites: about 150 tons a year from seven VVER-1000s and about 30 tons a year from its two VVER-440s,(*04) at a cost to Ukraine of over US$100 annual.(*05)
In December 2005, Energoatom signed a US$ 150 million agreement with the US-based Holtec International to implement the Central Spent Fuel Storage Project for Ukraine's VVER reactors.(*06) This was projected for completion in 2008, but was held up pending legislation.
Then in October 2011 parliament (and upper house in February 2012) passed a bill on management of spent nuclear fuel. It provides for construction of the dry storage facility within the Chernobyl exclusion area. The storage facility will become a part of the spent nuclear fuel management complex of the state-owned company Chernobyl NPP,(*07) also constructed by Holtec.
The first pond-type spent fuel storage facility (SFSF-1) for RBMK-1000 spent fuel at Chernobyl has been in operation since 1986. Due to the “unavailability of SFSF-2 and taking into account the future prospects of this project it was decided to withdraw SFSF-1 from the list of facilities, subject to decommissioning.”
SFSF-2 (or Interim Storage Facility-2 as it is often called outside Ukraine) construction started in June 2000 by Framatome (later Areva), financed by EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account, and part pf the Shelter Implementation Plan. ISF-2 is designed for long-term storage (100 years) of all Chernobyl spent fuel and is a necessary condition for decommissioning Chernobyl and SFSF-1. At the beginning of April, 2007 the agreement was canceled and in September 2007 a contract for completion was signed also with Holtec.(*08) The design of the new facility was approved by the Ukrainian regulator in late-2010. Work can commence once the contract amendment for the implementation is signed. It is expected that construction work will be finalized by 2014.(*09) Negotiations with Holtec on the construction could be completed in April 2012. Costs, however, have been escalating since the project financing scheme was drawn up before the 2008 financial crisis: some U.S. banks that participated in the financing scheme had ceased to exist.(*10)
High-level wastes from reprocessed spent fuel will be returned from Russia from 2013 onwards and should be stored at the existing repository 'Vektor' 17 km away from Chernobyl where a low-level waste repository has been built.(*11) Preliminary investigations have shortlisted sites for a deep geological repository for high- and intermediate-level wastes including all those arising from Chernobyl decommissioning and clean-up.(*12)
United Kingdom
Nr. of reactors
|
first grid connection
|
% of total electricity
|
17
|
1956-08-27
|
17.82%
|
In 1981, the government in Britain decided to postpone plans for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. In 2010, the NDA came up with a plan that has to lead to final disposal of high-level waste from 2075. The government claims to follow an advisory committee, but the committee thinks the government gives a distorted view of their advice. Nuclear fuel is reprocessed and liquid and glassified waste is stored at Sellafield until a final repository will be opened.
Low- and medium-level radioactive waste
Great Britain dumped solid low and intermediate level radioactive waste in sea from 1949 untill 1982.(*01) A near-surface repository in Drigg (near Sellafield) has operated as a national low-level waste disposal facility since 1959. Wastes are compacted and placed in containers before being transferred to the facility.(*02)
Investigation from 1978 to 1981 into the disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Caithness led to much opposition. In 1981, the British government therefore decided to postpone a decision on the storage of high-level waste by fifty years.(*03)
Although in 1981 the government decided to postpone the plans for a high-level radioactive waste facility, the search for a storage place for low- and medium-level radioactive waste had to be continued. For this purpose the British nuclear industry created Nirex in 1982. After repeated selections of a number of new sites and abandoning them again, Nirex chose Sellafield in 1991 for detailed studies on a deep repository for long-lived low-level and intermediate level radioactive waste.(*04)
In March 1997, however, the government rejected Sellafield due to the unfavorable geological conditions. The government has also decided that a new choice of location can take place only after the government has adopted new procedures for that purpose, and for that participation is required. It took until 2001 before new procedures have been settled.(*05) It will take at least 25-30 years before a deep geological disposal facility for low en intermediate level radioactive waste will be in operation.(*06) Large information campaigns for years and years hasn’t led to a final repository for nuclear waste.
High-level radioactive waste
After the 1981 postponement of a decision on the storage of high-level, the parliament established a new waste policy in 2001, which led to the foundation of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2002. The government set up the commission on radioactive waste management (CoRWM) in 2003 to consider long-term waste strategy. This committee has to advise the government on all sorts of nuclear waste, of which "inspire public confidence" and "protect people and the environment" have been central principles.(*07)
The CoRWM released an advice in July 2006.(*08) The committee calls robust interim storage (100 years) and geological disposal as the end-point for all high and intermediate level waste. in deep underground after intensive research into the long-term safety of disposal. For the realization of the storage "voluntarism and partnership" is important: the local population should be willing to cooperate. The government adopted the recommendations of the CoRWM in October 2006 and initiated a new round of official consultations that would end in 2008. Nirex was wound up and the government-owned Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was given responsibility for the long-term management of all UK radioactive wastes.
Meanwhile, it became clear there was a more positive feeling about the construction of nuclear power plants. CoRWM found it necessary to emphasized that its opinion is about nuclear waste that already exists ('legacy waste'): with nuclear waste from new-build power plants other ethical and political aspects play a role than with the present waste. CoRWM states there was no distinction, technically. Both could be accommodated in the same stores and disposal sites. But creating new-build wastes was a choice, and there were alternatives. The political, social and ethical issues surrounding the deliberate creation of new wastes were therefore quite different from those arising from the inevitable need to manage the legacy.(*09) CoRWM argued that the waste implications of any new build proposals would need their own assessment process.
On 10 January 2008, the government announced plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants, followed by a new nuclear waste policy on 12 June 2008.(*10) The government indicated to make no distinction between waste, which is now simply inevitable, and waste from new power plants. The government said that principles of "voluntarism and partnership" are to be used in the selection process and calls on municipalities to present themselves to host a disposal facility. Most of the land in the UK is thought to be geologically suitable for the store.(*11)
Several members of the first CoRWM don’t agree with the government. On a November 20, 2009, letter to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change(*12), Ed Miliband, they stated that the government has reproduced the CoRWM report in an incorrect and distorted way. "In conclusion we reiterate that we do not consider it credible to argue that effective arrangements exist or will exist either at a generic or a site-specific level for the long—term management of highly active radioactive wastes arising from new nuclear build." The members also protest against the fact that the government makes no distinction between unavoidable nuclear waste, which has been produced already, and new nuclear waste that can be avoid. "However, it is clear that government has conflated the issue of new build with legacy wastes and thereby intends the CoRWM proposals to apply to both. No separate process, as suggested by CoRWM1, for new build wastes is contemplated. There will be no opportunity for communities selected for new nuclear power stations to consider whether they wish to volunteer to host a long term radioactive waste facility; it will simply be imposed upon them."
On 15 January 2010, the Scottish government said that nuclear waste must be just stored above ground at or close to existing nuclear facilities (in Dounreay, Hunterston, Torness and Chapelcross), reducing the need for waste to be transported long distances. A consultation exercise on the issue has been launched. Underground storage is not eligible because "Having an out of sight, out of mind policy is losing support." The strategy is at odds with the UK government's preferred option of storing nuclear waste deep underground.(*13)
In March 2010, the NDA published a report in which it states that "a geological disposal facility will be available to receive ILW and LLW in 2040 and HLW and spent fuel in 2075",(*14) but spending cuts could delay the plans, and community support is vital.(*15)
The government thinks this takes too long, and Energy Minister, Charles Hendry, asked NDA's Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD) to look at reducing the timescales for first emplacement of high level waste (currently 2075) as well as the dates for spent fuel and waste from new build power stations presently indicated to take place in 2130.(*16)
In a preliminary response to the Minister's request RWMD says: "There are fundamental principles that are critical to the success of the implementation of the geological disposal programme. These are: the vital role of voluntarism and partnership with local communities (…); and, the need for technical and scientific work necessary to underpin the safe disposal of radioactive waste to be done rigorously and to the required high standard."(*17) RWDM will evaluate and "be in a position to consider whether or not changes to the programme would be realistic" in December 2012. (*18)
The long and tortuous story of UK radioactive waste policy demonstrates that achieving legitimacy around the management of these wastes is a social process with long time horizons. After 50 years of policies, institutional change and debate, extraordinarily little has been achieved in securing the long-term disposition of wastes.
United States of America
Nr. of reactors
|
first grid connection
|
% of total electricity
|
104
|
1957-10-19
|
19.25%
|
The U.S. nuclear waste management policy in the 1960s was focused on underground storage in salt. From 1987 on it was all about Yucca Mountain. In 2009 newly elected President Obama thwarted the plan and a commission was founded to study possible disposal: the nuclear waste policy is back to square one. Awaiting a final disposal facility, spent fuel is stored on site of nuclear power plants. U.S. nuclear utilities are eager to demonstrate that the spent fuel will not stay on-site indefinitely. Thus far, however, all efforts to establish central interim storage facilities have been unsuccessful.(*01) The U.S. dumped between 1949 –1967 in an unknown number of operations radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean, and between 1946-1970 in the Pacific Ocean.(*02) No commercial reprocessing has taken place.
No high-level radioactive waste in salt
Already in 1957 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) called storage of nuclear waste in salt the best option.(*03) Also the Atomic Energy Commission developed plans in that direction. In 1963 test drilling in salt began at Lyons, Kansas for a national repository. Because this produced unfavorable results, one went to other places to drill in salt. Also without success.(*04)
Then the eye fell on salt at Carlsbad, New Mexico. The construction of the storage mine (called Waste Isolation Pilot Plant -WIPP) was expected to cost US$ 100 million in 1974,(*05) was cancelled by president Carter in 1980, but Congress restored budget to keep it alive.(*06) The storage would initially begin in 1988, but, although the underground facility was finished by then, because water leaked into the mine (*07) the start of disposal is delayed many times.(*08,09,10) The first waste arrived at WIPP on March 26, 1999. (*11) Construction costs were estimated at US$ 2 billion. (*12)
Around 64,000 m3 of waste – out of the maximum allowed quantity of 175,600 m3 - was stored by the end of 2009. Storage is planned to continue until the end of the 2020s when the maximum allowed capacity will be reached; the mine will be closed in 2038.(*13) It is the world's first geological repository. However, not all nuclear waste can be stored at WIPP. The U.S. government makes a distinction between nuclear waste generated from the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste generated by the production of electricity from nuclear power plants. In Carlsbad, the storage of low and high level radioactive waste (including spent fuel) from nuclear power plants for electricity production has been expressly prohibited by the government.(*14) However, one part of the radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production was allowed to go there. Generally, TRU (Transuranic) waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with radioactive elements, mostly plutonium.(*15)
In 1982, the government established the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This Act gave states with possible locations an important role in the supervision on the choice of location, including federal funds for its own investigation into the suitability of the site, for an amount of US$10 million per year. States also had the power to prevent the storage. The NWPA mandated that the DOE select three candidate sites for a geological repository for U.S. spent fuel and high-level waste.(*16)
The government adapted the rules. In 1984, the DOE put salt lower on the list and a year later only one salt layer remained on the list: Deaf Smith, Texas.(*17) In 1986, the DOE nominated sites in Texas (salt), Washington state (basalt) and in Nevada’s Yucca Mountain (volcanic tuff).(*17)
At the time, two of the most politically powerful members of Congress, the Speaker of the House and the House Majority Leader, represented Texas and Washington state respectively. They opposed siting the repository in their states. By comparison, the delegation from Nevada was politically relatively weak and so Yucca Mountain became the focus of attention.(*19) In 1987, therefore, Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to direct that Yucca Mountain would be the only site to be examined for suitability for the first U.S. Geological repository. (*US20) The 1982 NWPA had mandated that the second repository be in crystalline rock, i.e., in the eastern half of the country, where most of the country’s power reactors are located. However, the 1987 amendments also instructed the DOE to “phase out in an orderly manner funding for all research programs … designed to evaluate the suitability of crystalline rock as a potential repository host medium.” (*21)
To reassure Nevada that other states would ultimately share the burden of hosting the nation’s radioactive waste, Congress also set a legal limit on the amount of radioactive waste that could be emplaced in Yucca Mountain “until such time as a second repository is in operation.” The limit was established as “a quantity of spent fuel containing in excess of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal or a quantity of solidified high level radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of such a quantity of spent fuel.”(*22)
No high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain
The implementation of the decision to dispose nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain did not go smoothly. "Yucca Mountain is not selected through a scientific method, but through a political process," said Robert Loux. He worked for the government of the state of Nevada as a leader of the real estate developer for radioactive waste. "The choice of the repository led to much resistance. The governor, congress delegates, local authorities and almost the entire population was against it." Yucca Mountain is located in an earthquake zone. Loux: "There are 32 underground fractures and four young volcanoes. In the summer of 1992, an earthquake occurred with a magnitude of 5.4 on the Richter scale. This led to considerable damage. Therefore Yucca Mountain is unsuitable. The government of Nevada has made laws that prohibit the storage.”(*23) In March 1998, a survey of the California Institute of Technology found that the risk of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions is larger than hitherto assumed.(*24)
The Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository would have to come in operation in 2010, according to plans made in the 1980s. But it took until July 2002, when President Bush signed a resolution clearing the way for disposal at Yucca Mountain, (*25) and until June 2008 before the DOE applied for a permit to build the storage.(*26) President Barack Obama stopped the storage at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in late February 2009,(*27) although DOE had spent US$14 billion (in 2009 dollars) from 1983 through 2008 for the Yucca Mountain repository. The construction of the storage mine and exploitation would have cost between US$41 and US$67 billion (2009 dollars) according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).(*28) Obama finds Yucca Mountain unsuitable and unsafe for the disposal of radioactive waste and therefore "no option". A new strategy for the disposal of nuclear waste must be developed and on 29 January 2010, Obama appointed a commission to work out a new policy: the 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future'.(*29)
On 27 January 2012, after nearly two years of work, the Blue Ribbon Commission has issued its final recommendations for "creating a safe, long-term solution" for dealing with spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Efforts to develop a waste repository and a central storage facility should start immediately, it says. “Put simply, this nation's failure to come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly. It will be even more damaging and more costly the longer it continues.” It continued, "The need for a new strategy is urgent, not just to address these damages and costs but because this generation has a fundamental, ethical obligation to avoid overburdening future generations with the entire task of finding a safe, permanent solution for managing hazardous nuclear materials they had no part in creating."(*30) Experience in the U.S. and in other nations suggests that any attempt to force a top down, federally mandated solution over the objections of a state or community - far from being more efficient - will take longer, cost more, and have lower odds of ultimate success. By contrast, the approach the commission recommends is explicitly adaptive, staged, and consent-based. In practical terms, this means encouraging communities to volunteer to be considered to host a new nuclear waste management facility while also allowing for the waste management organization to approach communities that it believes can meet the siting requirements. Siting processes for waste management facilities should include a flexible and substantial incentive program.(*31) On 31 January 2012, Energy Secretary Steven Chu said that the U.S. will likely need more than one permanent repository for commercial nuclear fuel.(*32) The U.S. nuclear waste policy is therefore back to square one. Except that there is no chance of returning to the option of salt domes or layers. This follows from the 2008 "Nuclear waste trust decision" of the U.S. government,(*33) stating: "Salt formations currently are being considered as hosts only for reprocessed nuclear materials because heat-generating waste, like spent nuclear fuel, exacerbates a process by which salt can rapidly deform. This process could potentially cause problems for keeping drifts stable and open during the operating period of a repository”.
Refrerences:
Taiwan
*01- Atomic Energy Council: High Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal, 1 April 2011
*02- Taiwan: National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, June 2007
*03- Atomic Energy Council: Lan-yu Storage Site status, February 2012
*04- Nuclear Fuel: Long-Term Spent Fuel Dilemma at Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Renegotiation, Nuclear Fuels, June 1, 2009.
*05- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan Rejected Chinese Offer of Fresh Fuel for Waste Disposal, 20 April 1998
*06- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan to Wait on U.S.-Russian Deal Before Taking Spent Fuel Initiative, 9 July 2001
*07- Atomic Energy Council, 1 April 2012
Ukraine
*01- World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Ukraine, February 2012
*02- K.G. Kudinov: Creating an Infrastructure for Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel, in Glenn E. Schweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber, ed., An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility-Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype, National Academies Press, 2005, pp. 145-151
*03- David G. Marcelli and Tommy B. Smith: The Zaporozhye ISFS, Radwaste solutions, Jan/Febr 2002
*04- International Panel of Fissile Materials: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011
*05- World Nuclear Association, February 2012
*06- Business wire: Energoatom and Holtec International Formalize the Contract to Build a Central Storage Facility in Ukraine, 30 December 2005
*07- World Nuclear Association, February 2012
*08- JC- Ukraine: Ukraine National Report on Compliance with the Obligations under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, September 2008, p.48-49
*09- EBRD: Chernobyl: New Safe Confinement and Spent Fuel Storage Facility, March 2011
*10- Ukrinform: Talks on construction of storage facility for spent nuclear fuel to be completed in April, 28 March 2012
*11- Foratom: Ukrainian Nuclear Forum Association, 28 February 2012 www.foratom.org/associate-members/ukraine.html
*12- World Nuclear Association, February 2012
United Kingdom
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999, p53
*02- Low Level Waste Repository Ltd: http://www.llwrsite.com
*03- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout: Learning to listen: institutional change and legitimation in UK radioactive waste policy; in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, December 2009, p. 989 – 1008.
*04- John Knill: Radioactive Waste Management: Key Issues for the Future, in: F. Barker (ed), Management of Radioactive Wastes. Issues for Local Authorities. Proceedings of the UK Nuclear Free Local Authorities Annual Conference 1997 held in Town House, Kirkcaldy, Fife, on 23 October 1997, Publisher Thomas Telford, London, 1998, p 1 - 17.
*05- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout
*06- NDA: Strategy for the management of solid low-level radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, August 2010
*07- Department for Trade and Industry (DTI): Managing the Nuclear Legacy: a Strategy for Action, CM 5552, HMSO, London, July 2002.
*08- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely, CoRWM’s recommendations to Government, Doc 700, HMSO, London, July 2006
*09- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Re-iteration of CoRWM’s Position on Nuclear New Build, Doc 2162.2, HMSO, London, September 2007
*10- Defra/BERR: Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: A Framework for Implementing Geological Disposal, Cm 7386, HMSO, London, June 2008.
*11- World Nuclear News: Waste Plan Revealed, 12 June 2008
*12- Blowers, MacKerron, Allan, Wilkinson, Pitt and Pickard: New Nuclear Build and the Management of Radioactive Wastes, Letter to Secretary of State from Former Members of CoRWM, 20 November, 2009
*13- BBC News: Nuclear waste storage options examined, 15 January 2010
*14- NDA: Geological Disposal, Steps towards implementation, March 2010 p.24
*15- BBC News on line: Budget cuts caution on UK nuclear waste plan, 7 July 2010
*16- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste, 22 December 2011
*17- NDA: Geological Disposal. Review of Options for Accelerating Implementation of the Geological Disposal Programme, December 2011
*18- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste
United States of America
*01- IPFM: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011, p.106
*S02- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*03- Department of Energy: WIPP Chronology, 5 February 2007
*04- For a detailed discussion on the history of the plans for the storage of nuclear waste in the U.S. we refer to: 1- Ronnie Lipschutz: Radioactive Waste: Politics, Technology and Risk, Cambrigde USA, 1980; 2- A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze, Political Construction of Technology. Nuclear Waste disposal in the United States, 1945-1972, WMW-publication 10, Faculteit Wijsbegeerte en Maatschappijwetenschappen Universiteit Twente, Netherlands, 1992; 3- Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The National Experience, in: Roger E. Kasperson (ed), Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983, chapter 2.
*05-World Watch: WIPP-Lash: nuclear burial plan assailed, Vol 4, No 6 , Nov/Dec 1991, p.7
*06- Science: Radwaste dump WIPPs up a controversy,19 March 1982
*07- US Guardian weekly: Pilot waste dump is already in trouble, 12 October 1988
*08- Nucleonics Week: WIPP moves toward 1993 waste tests, senate okays bill in 11th hour, 15 October 1992. p 8
*09- WISE News Communique: US DOE delays (abandons?) giant waste projects, no 389, 19 November 1993, p 6
*10- WISE News Communique, US: WIPP is delayed again and again…, no. 496, 21 August 1998, p 2
*11- WISE News Communique: First waste at WIPP, but problem not solved, no 508, 9 April 1999
*12- Nuclear Fuel: After two decades and $2billion, DOE targets spring for WIPP operations, 9 March 1998, p 6-7
*13- Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Renewal Application Chapter 1, Closure Plan, May 2009
*14- WIPP: Why WIPP, 5 February 2007
*15- Luther. J. Carter, Waste Management; Current Controversies over the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; in: Environment, Vol. 31, no. 7, September 1989, p 5, 40-41
*16- Ralph. L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt: Managing Waste from Power Plants, in: Risk Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1994, pp 107-130.
*17- Department of Energy: Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, June 1985, Volume 1, p 41
*18- Department of Energy: A Multi-attribute utility analysis of sites nominated for characterization for the first radioactive waste repository – A decision aiding methodology, DOE/RW-0074, 1986
*19- IPFM: Managing spent nuclear fuel from power reactors, 2011, p.109
*20- United States of America Congress: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, The Act was extensively amended on 22 December 1987, Sec. 160
*21- NWPA, Sec. 161
*22- NWPA, Sec. 114, d
*23- Interview Robert Loux by Herman Damveld, in: Herman Damveld, Steef van Duin en Dirk Bannink: Kernafval in zee of zout? Nee fout! (Nuclear waste in sea or salt? No wrong!), Greenpeace Netherlands, 1994, p. 29-30
*24- Nuclear Fuel: 6 April 1998, p 13.
*25- Reuters: Bush clears way for Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, 23 July 2002
*26- Barry D. Solomon: High-level radioactive waste management in the USA, in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, p. 1009–1024
*27- World Nuclear News: Obama dumps Yucca Mountain, 27 February 2009
*28- Government Accountability Office: Nuclear Waste Management. Key attributes, challenges, and costs for the Yucca Mountain repository and two potential Alternatives, GAO-10-48, November 2009. p.19
*29- World Nuclear News: Post-Yucca nuclear waste strategy group, 1 February 2010. One issue that will not be on the table is the exact location of any eventual waste facilities. The 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future' is only to consider strategy, not implementation
*30- World Nuclear News: Immediate action needed on US waste policy, 27 January 2012
*31- Blue Ribbon Commission: Report to the Secretary of Energy, 26 January 2012
*32- Platts: More than one permanent US nuclear repository likely needed: Chu, 31 January 2012
*33- Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Waste Confidence Decision Update, 9 October 2008, p. 59555