Iran

Russia and Iran have signed a contract to build two VVER power reactors at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. The two countries also signed a protocol envisaging possible construction of an additional two reactors in Bushehr and another four at an undetermined location. Bushehr is already home to the only power reactor in Iran (and the entire Middle East), a VVER pressurised water reactor which began commercial operation in September 2013.^1,2 Iran has identified 16 potential sites for nuclear power plants − 10 on the coastal rim of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.³ Consideration is also being given to the construction of desalination plants powered by new reactors.^1,2

Iran's nuclear plants are vulnerable to earthquakes, as discussed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative: "In 2013, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the southwest region of Iran, where Bushehr is located. Given that much of Iran is in a seismic zone, many expressed concerns over [Bushehr's] safety following the earthquake. For example, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia voiced concerns at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2013. Iran denied allegations concerning the plant's safety "vulnerability." Simultaneously, Iran reported an electric generator malfunction and "long cracks ... in at least one section of the structure." However, Tehran dismissed the suggestion that the malfunction was connected to the earthquake."⁴

Oil for atoms?

There is no pretence that Iran's nuclear power program is driven by concerns about climate change. Nuclear Energy Insider and the World Nuclear Association state that Iran intends to conserve hydrocarbon reserves for future export.^2,5

In February 2014, Iran's ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanaei said the two countries have been negotiating Iranian supply of a few thousands barrels of oil per day and "Iran could use some of the proceeds [to pay for] the construction by Russia companies of a second unit at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr."⁶

Neutron Bytes blogger Dan Yurman writes:

"A very real question is how is Iran going to pay for the reactors? The country's economy is on the rocks because of economic sanctions and rapidly dropping oil prices. One possibility is that the Russians are betting the Iranians will offer to pay for the reactors with oil which they will be able to sell on world markets if, and only if, they negotiate a deal with the West on their uranium enrichment program.

"Running the numbers for eight 1000 MW reactors at [US]$5000/kw yields a snapshot value of $5 billion per reactor or $40 billion overall. That kind of money might be helpful to Russia which depends heavily on oil exports to keep its economy afloat. Also, it would pull $40 billion worth of oil out of world markets and put it in Putin's hands perhaps to hold for a future date when market prices have moved north of $100/barrel. At the current price of $75 for barrel oil, $40 billion works out to 533 million barrels of oil. ...

"It still seems plausible then that one motivation for Russia's deal is to prevent Iran's return to world oil markets from depressing the price further. But some experts disagree with this idea. According to the Financial Times, Mark Fitzpatrick, a former US State Department diplomat, says that the whole enterprise is a smoke screen for Iran to justify its uranium enrichment infrastructure. He called it a potential "Putin double cross" of the negotiations being led by the European Union and the U.S."⁷

The US has expressed concern that trade and barter arrangements between Russia and Iran could breach or undermine US-led sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.⁸

Ambassador Mehdi Sanaei said: "Our Russian friends, who have stood by us at difficult moments, should have advantages on the Iranian market. But Russian companies must hurry to get into their niche in our market and not hesitate out of fear of Western sanctions."⁹ Meanwhile, Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, held out the prospect of Western investment in Iran's nuclear power program: "We welcome different countries' cooperation in this regard and it seems that given the tendency that the Western companies have towards cooperation with Iran, we will use their experiences in future."¹⁰

Weapons proliferation implications

What are the proliferation implications of Iran's plans for more power reactors? Perhaps not much, for these reasons:

• Russia's Rosatom will provide nuclear fuel "throughout the entire lifecycle" of the proposed eight new reactors, and spent fuel will be returned to Russia for reprocessing and storage.^1,2
• The reactors will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
• Iran already has several potential sources of fissile material for weapons: its enrichment program, the Bushehr power reactor, and a 5 MW research reactor in Tehran (as well as the partially-built IR-40 research reactor).

That said, the plan for new reactors presents several problems and risks.

Russia supplies the operating Bushehr reactor with enriched fuel − but that hasn't stopped Iran citing its nuclear power program as one justification for its enrichment program.¹¹ Daryl Kimball wrote in Arms Control Today in September: "Iran's light-water reactor at Bushehr ... uses fuel supplied by Russia under a 10-year deal that could be extended past its 2021 end date. Russia is obliged to supply fuel unless Iran chooses not to renew the contract. But Iran's leaders are under heavy political pressure to reduce the country's reliance on foreign energy suppliers and to maintain a uranium-enrichment program that could be expanded if and when the country's nuclear energy needs grow."¹²

With several countries willing to engage in nuclear trade with India, and China supporting Pakistan's nuclear program, and Russia supplying new reactors to Iran, previous historical norms and agreements against nuclear trade with countries violating non-proliferation norms and commitments are near-dead.

The politicking around Iran's nuclear program is dripping with contradictions and irony − not least the leading role of the five declared nuclear weapons states, none of which take their NPT disarmament commitments seriously, in pressuring Iran to curtail its nuclear program. There are further contradictions regarding Iran's partially-built Arak research reactor. Iran is being pressured to either modify the reactor to reduce its plutonium production rate (which it seems willing to do), or to abandon the reactor altogether.

With its current design, if completed the Arak reactor could produce 5−10 kgs of weapon grade plutonium annually.¹³ Yet there is no effort to prevent the construction of new power reactors, each of which could produce 150−200 kg of weapon grade plutonium annually.¹⁴

French hypocrisy

France has been leading the charge to have the Arak reactor included in negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.¹⁵ Yet France supplied Israel with a similar 'research' reactor used to produce plutonium for Israel's nuclear weapons.¹⁶

Dr David Lowry, former director of the European Proliferation Information Centre, addresses another aspect of French hypocrisy: "Among the several reasons the Vienna talks on Iran's nuclear program have had to be reconvened this month — and now extended into next year — was that France objected to the deal with Iran being closed off earlier because of Tehran's contested plutonium production plant at Arak. Whatever doubts the French have over Arak, they seem to be sanguine about Iran's involvement in uranium enrichment, so much so that they are in industrial partnership with the Iranians in this technology, and have been for four decades since an agreement with the Shah of Iran in 1975. Oddly, this deal never gets reported in the context of the Iran nuclear negotiations. Is there any good reason why not? It ought to be centre-stage in any public diplomacy, but isn't. ... The hypocrisy of France, as a nuclear technology supplier to Iran, ganging up on its customer with the other self-appointed permanent five members of the UN security council, along with Germany, would be funny if it wasn't so serious."¹⁷

Following France's obstructive role in negotiations about Iran's nuclear program in November 2013, nuclear physicist Yousaf Butt wrote:

"France's torpedoing of the agreement appears less related to genuine nuclear proliferation concerns than with trying to curry favor with anti-Iranian countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates − who commission and buy expensive French military, satellite and nuclear hardware. ... France's reluctance to sign off on the interim agreement is easier to understand through the prism of its lucrative regional trade agreements with Sunni Arab monarchies opposed to Iran. For example, for the first time since 2007, France penned a military contract with the United Arab Emirates in late July. The billion dollar contract for two spy satellites couldn't have been better timed: French military contracts lost a quarter of their value last year.

"Similarly, just a month after the deal with the UAE, France also signed a billion euro contract with Saudi Arabia − a bitter rival of Iran − to overhaul four frigates and two refueling ships. French business interests in Saudi Arabia are not restricted to just the military, however. Last month, the government-controlled French nuclear power conglomerates Areva and Electricite de France (EDF) hosted about 200 Saudi business and industry representatives at a "Suppliers Day" event held in Jeddah.

"The French ambassador to Saudi Arabia explicitly expressed his hope that the Kingdom would seek French help in implementing its "huge program in the nuclear field." Such long-term infrastructure contracts could be worth roughly 40 billion euros to the French. Similar deals have already been signed with the tiny Gulf nation of Qatar, also an adversary of Iran. Given these − and future − lucrative military and infrastructure contracts, it seems likely that France would seek to curry favor with the Sunni Gulf Arab monarchies by holding up a deal with Iran."¹⁸
 

Technology transfer

It seems that there will be little or no technology transfer of proliferation significance associated with the Russia−Iran reactor agreement. Yet there are mixed messages. A World Nuclear News article describes the agreement as a "turn-key" deal but also quotes Rosatom stating that the parties "intend to ensure the maximum possible participation of enterprises and organizations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in all works related to the construction of new power units on the sites, their operation and decommissioning."¹

Rosatom made the mysterious statement that Russia and Iran have "confirmed their intent to cooperate in the field of the nuclear fuel cycle and ecology".¹ However fuel cycle technology transfer may be limited to fuel fabrication rather than more sensitive stages such as enrichment and reprocessing. Nuclear Energy Insider reports that a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on November 19 for Iran and Russia to work together on the feasibility of assembling fuel bundles in Iran, which will be "economic" once all eight new reactors are grid-connected.²

Rosatom will also train Iranian specialists in the operation, servicing and engineering support for the new reactors.^1,2

If nothing else, Iran will be better placed to build and operate indigenous reactors as a result of the collaboration with Russia.

Proliferation and security

Tied to proliferation issues are security issues such as potential military strikes and cyber-attacks on nuclear plants, and the murder of nuclear scientists and others involved in Iran's nuclear program.

Israel has repeatedly threatened to launch military strikes against Iran's nuclear program.²²

In addition to the Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iran's enrichment program, there has been speculation that Bushehr was also targeted and that Stuxnet may have caused problems leading to the removal of fuel from the reactor in early 2011.³⁵

The Bushehr plant (then under construction) sustained damage from numerous Iraqi bombing raids during the 1980−88 war.^19,20

In September 2014, Iran arrested a Ukrainian man suspected of sabotaging the Bushehr plant. The suspect pretended to be an expert from Russia, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri cited authorities as saying. The nature of the alleged sabotage was not disclosed.²¹

An explosion occurred inside the Arak reactor building in late 2013 according to Israeli sources. According to Israeli website Debkafile, Tehran did its utmost to conceal the blast. Debkafile speculated that the blast resulted from physical sabotage, a viral attack on computers, or the result of inferior steel materials that were unable to withstand intense pressure during testing.²³

In March 2014, the deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, Asghar Zarean, accused "foreigners" of trying unsuccessfully to sabotage the Arak plant.²⁴ Zarean said: "Several cases of industrial sabotage have been neutralized in the past few months before achieving the intended damage, including sabotage at a part of the IR-40 facility at Arak."²⁵

Arak is regarded as particularly vulnerable to attacks in its partially-built state, since attacks could damage or destroy the reactor and associated infrastructure without resulting in widespread radioactive contamination. Israel's former chief of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, who piloted one of the planes that bombed Iraq's Osirak heavy-water reactor in 1981 before it was due to become operational, said: "Whoever considers attacking an active reactor is willing to invite another Chernobyl, and no one wants to do that."²⁶

In addition to the strike on Osirak in 1981, Israel destroyed a suspected reactor site in Syria in 2007 and has refused to rule out bombing Arak.²⁷

In August 2012, saboteurs blew up power lines supplying Iran's underground uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom.²⁸

In August 2014, Iran said it had shot down an Israeli drone that was heading for its uranium enrichment site near the town of Natanz.²⁹

At least five people associated with Iran's nuclear program have been murdered since 2007, including the deputy head of Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (killed by a car bomb in 2012), the head of the country's ballistic missile program, and the head of Iranian cyber warfare (who was shot dead).³⁰⁻³³ In 2012, Iran hanged a man it claimed was a Mossad agent over the killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist in 2010.³⁴

References:

1. WNN, 11 Nov 2014, 'Russia to build eight more reactors in Iran', www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-to-build-eight-more-reactors-in-Ira...
2. K. Steiner-Dicks, 20 Nov 2014, 'ROSATOM main partner in Iran nuclear energy scale-up', http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/rosatom-main-partner-...
3. Energy Business Review, 17 March 2014, http://nuclear.energy-business-review.com/news/iran-chooses-potential-si...
4. Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)', www.nti.org/facilities/184/
5. WNA Weekly Digest, 14 March 2014.
6. Steve Gutterman, 17 Feb 2014, 'Iran says Russia could build nuclear reactor in exchange for oil', www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-russia-iran-oil-idUSBREA1G0DM20140217
7. Dan Yurman, 16 Nov 2014, 'Rosatom inks eight reactor deal with Iran', http://neutronbytes.com/2014/11/16/rosatom-inks-eight-reactor-deal-with-...
8. AFP, 9 Sept 2014, 'No barter deal on agenda as Russia, Iran up energy ties', www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140909/no-barter-deal-agenda-russia...
9. NTI, 18 Feb 2014, 'Envoy: Russia May Construct Reactor in Iran in Swap for Oil', www.nti.org/gsn/article/envoy-iran-may-swap-oil-reactor-russia/?mgs1=955...
10. 19 Nov 2014, 'AEOI Spokesman: Iran, West Likely to Cooperate in Building N. Power Plants', http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930828001337
11. 13 April 2014, 'AEOI Chief: Iran Entitled to Enrich Uranium to 90% Grade', http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930124000768
12. Daryl G. Kimball, Sept 2014, 'Bridging the Uranium-Enrichment Gap', www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Focus/Bridging-the-Uranium-Enrichment-Gap
13. Mark Hibbs, 24 Oct 2013, 'The IR-40 and Diplomacy', http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/24/ir-40-reactor/gr68
14. Jim Green, 2014, 'Can 'reactor grade' plutonium be used in nuclear weapons?', Nuclear Monitor #787, www.wiseinternational.org/node/4067
15. Jonathan Tirone, 11 Nov 2013, 'Iran Signs Nuclear Inspection Accord as Agency Says Work Remains', www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Iran-Signs-Nuclear-Inspection-...
16. Friends of the Earth, Australia, 'Case Studies: Civil Nuclear Programs and Weapons Proliferation', http://foe.org.au/sites/default/files/CivMil-CaseStudies2010.doc
17. David Lowry, 'France's double play in Iran nuclear talks', 26 Nov 2014, www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-d3ee-Frances-double-play-in-Iran-nuclear-t...
18. Yousaf Butt, 14 Nov 2013, 'Column: Too many cooks in the Iran nuclear kitchen', www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-too-many-cooks-idUSBRE9AD17920131114
19. Robert Tait, 25 Jan 2009, 'Iran Makes First Test-Run of Bushehr Nuclear Reactor,' www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/25/iran-reactor-bushehr-trial
20. AP, 18 Nov 1987, 'Iran says nuclear plant hit', The Lewiston Journal,http://tinyurl.com/iraq-iran-1987
21. Vasudevan Sridharan, 7 Sept 2014, 'Iran Arrests Ukrainian for 'Sabotaging' Bushehr Nuclear Plant', www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-arrests-ukrainian-sabotaging-bushehr-nuclear-plan...
22. Associated Press, 25 Nov 2013, 'Israeli leader Netanyahu condemns Iran nuclear deal as a 'historic mistake' and threatens to use military action if needed', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2513092/Israeli-PM-Netanyahu-condemns-I...
23. Julian Kossoff, 4 Nov 2013, 'Was Iran's Arak Nuclear Reactor Hit by Saboteurs?', www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/519466/20131104/iran-nuclear-arak-reactor-sab...
24. Umid Niayesh, 17 March 2014, 'Iran gives details of sabotage at IR-40 nuclear site', http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/2253805.html
25. Associated Press, 15 March 2014, 'Iran says sabotage prevented at nuclear facility', www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.579998
26. Julian Kossoff, 4 Nov 2013, 'Was Iran's Arak Nuclear Reactor Hit by Saboteurs?', www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/519466/20131104/iran-nuclear-arak-reactor-sab...
27. Simon Sturdee / AFP, 13 Nov 2013, 'Iran's Arak reactor: a second route to a nuclear bomb?', www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hu6ibS88Ro6pTL6dkTc-Xmb753yQ...
28. www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-06/iran-says-four-arrested-for-trying-to-sab...
29. Fredrik Dahl, 12 Sept 2014, 'Iran wants U.N. atomic agency to condemn Israeli drone 'aggression'', www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/12/us-iran-nuclear-israel-idUSKBN0H71LL2...
30. Patrick Cockburn, 6 Oct 2013, 'Just who has been killing Iran's nuclear scientists?', www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/just-who-has-been-killing-irans-nuc...
31. 2 March 2014, 'Obama pushes Israel to stop assassinations of Iran nuclear scientists – report', http://rt.com/news/iran-obama-assassination-scientists-443/
32. 12 Jan 2012, 'Iran's history of nuclear incidents', www.abc.net.au/news/2012-01-12/iran27s-history-of-nuclear-incidents/3769454
33. William Tobey, 12 January 2012, 'Nuclear scientists as assassination targets', http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-scientists-assassina...
34. 16 May 2012, 'Iran hangs 'Mossad agent' for scientist killing', www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-16/iran-hangs-27mossad-agent27-for-scientist...
35. BBC, 26 Feb 2011, 'Iran nuclear plans: Bushehr fuel to be unloaded', www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12588621

November 29 − Among the reasons the Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme had to be reconvened last week was that France objected to the deal being closed off earlier. The French objections were over Tehran's contested plutonium production plant at Arak, but whatever doubts they might have over Arak, they seem to be sanguine about Iran's involvement in uranium enrichment.

Indeed, they are in industrial partnership with the Iranians in this technology and have been for four decades since the agreement was initiated by the Shah in 1975. Oddly, this deal never gets reported in the context of the Iran nuclear negotiations. Is there any good reason why not?

The origins of the deal illustrate the dangers of international nuclear collaboration. A joint-stock uranium enrichment Eurodif (European gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment) consortium was formed in 1973, with France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden the original shareholders. In 1975 Sweden's 10% share in Eurodif was sold to Iran.

The French government subsidiary company Cogema (now Areva) and the then Iranian government established the spin-out Sofidif (Société Franco-Iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse) with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25% share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif.

The former Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, lent US$1 billion (and another US$180 million in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory to have the right to buy 10% of the site's production.

Although Iran's active involvement in Eurodif was halted following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran has retained its active involvement in Sofidif, headquartered in Rue La Fayette in Paris, to the present day.

Its current annual report is audited by KPMG. Dr Ali Daee of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran was appointed Iran's new permanent representative to Sofidef as recently as September 25 last year.

Iran's stake in Eurodif was exposed in a report written by Paris-based German nuclear expert Mycle Schneider for the Greens and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.

Four years ago, on October 1 2009, an earlier preliminary atomic agreement with Iran was reached involving the UN nuclear watchdog body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under which it was agreed to transfer three quarters of Iran's low-enriched uranium abroad.

In return, the West agreed to supply Iran with fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which came online in 1967 and which produces medical isotopes for tests for around one million patients in Iran.

When Argentina, which had previously supplied the fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, indicated it was unwilling to do so again, it prompted Iran to ask the IAEA for help.

It turned out that France was to play a critical role in resolving the impasse over enriched uranium fuel for the reactor.

Although in principle Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant − officially declared to the IAEA in February 2003 − could have enriched the low-enriched uranium to the level needed for the reactor to operate, the main "uranium yellowcake" feedstock for enrichment, the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan, had been contaminated. France had both the know-how and willingness to help clean up the contaminated fuel.

Fast forward to November 2013. France, as a nuclear technology supplier to Iran, ganging up on its customer client with the other self-appointed five permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany, is guilty of breathtaking hypocrisy. It would be funny if it wasn't so serious.

Reprinted from the Morning Star, www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-8340-The-French-links-with-Irans-nuclear-p...

Killing the competition: US nuclear front groups exposed

A new report released by the Nuclear Information & Resource Service details US industry plans to subvert clean energy programs, rig energy markets and climate regulations to subsidize aging nuclear reactors.

A coalition of five organizations was joined by renowned energy economist Dr Mark Cooper to release the report, titled 'Killing the Competition: The Nuclear Power Agenda to Block Climate Action, Stop Renewable Energy, and Subsidize Old Reactors'.

The report details the industry's attacks on clean energy and climate solutions and the key battlegrounds in this new fight over the US's energy future. With large political war chests and armies of lobbyists, the power companies have opened up aggressive fights across the country this year:

* Blocking tax breaks for renewable energy in Congress.

* Killing renewable energy legislation in Illinois by threatening to close nuclear plants.

* Passing a resolution calling for nuclear subsidies and emissions-trading schemes in Illinois.

* Suspending renewable energy and efficiency standards in Ohio for two years.

* Ending energy efficiency programs in Indiana.

* Demanding above-market contracts for nuclear and coal plants in Ohio and New York.

Last year, the closure of several reactors highlighted the worsening economics of nuclear energy. Five reactor shutdowns were announced, and eight new reactors cancelled. The industry's rising costs − with new plants too expensive to build and old plants more and more costly to maintain − came head to head with a brewing energy revolution: low natural gas prices, rising energy efficiency, and affordable wind and solar power. As a result, Wall Street firms reassessed the industry, discovering an industry at risk and predicting more shuttered reactors in the coming years.

Energy economist Dr. Mark Cooper, of Vermont Law School's Institute for Energy and the Environment, published a paper outlining the factors contributing to nuclear energy's poor prospects and highlighting the vulnerability of dozens of reactors. Dr Cooper said: "Nuclear power simply cannot compete with efficiency and renewable resources and it does not fit in the emerging electricity system that uses intelligent management of supply and demand response to meet the need for electricity. Doubling down on nuclear power as the solution to climate change, as proposed by nuclear advocates, is a bad bet since nuclear power is one of the most expensive ways available to cut carbon emissions in the electricity sector. The nuclear war against clean energy is a last ditch effort to stop the transformation of the electricity sector and prevent nuclear power from becoming obsolete."

NIRS, 2014, "Killing the Competition: The Nuclear Power Agenda to Block Climate Action , Stop Renewable Energy, and Subsidize Old Reactors", www.nirs.org/neconomics/killingthecompetition914.pdf

Oldest Indian reactor will not restart

After 10 years in long-term outage, it was reported on September 6 that there will be no restart for the first unit of Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-1), located at Rawatbata, 64 km southwest of Kota in the north-western Indian state of Rajasthan. The 100 MW Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor, which was supplied to India under a 1963 agreement with Canada, operated from 1972 to 2004, though with multiple extended shutdowns. Cooperation with Canada was suspended following India's 1974 nuclear weapons test; however design details for the reactor had already been transferred to India.

www.worldnuclearreport.org/Oldest-Indian-Reactor-Will-Not.html

www.deccanherald.com/content/429550/end-road-raps-1.html

Czech Republic: March against uranium in Brzkov

A march against planned uranium mining on September 7 was attended by approximately 200 people. The march was organised by the association 'Our Future Without Uranium', which expresses the disapproval of the Brzkov population with the government's intention to resume uranium mining. During the day citizens signed the petition by the civic association called "NO to Uranium Mining in the Highlands".

www.nuclear-heritage.net/index.php/March_against_uranium_in_Brzkov

What went wrong with small modular reactors?

Thomas W. Overton, associate editor of POWER magazine, writes: "At the graveyard wherein resides the "nuclear renaissance" of the 2000s, a new occupant appears to be moving in: the small modular reactor (SMR). ... Over the past year, the SMR industry has been bumping up against an uncomfortable and not-entirely-unpredictable problem: It appears that no one actually wants to buy one."

Overton notes that in 2013, MidAmerican Energy scuttled plans to build an SMR-based plant in Iowa. This year, Babcock & Wilcox scaled back much of its SMR program and sacked 100 workers in its SMR division. Westinghouse has abandoned its SMR program.

Overton explains: "The problem has really been lurking in the idea behind SMRs all along. The reason conventional nuclear plants are built so large is the economies of scale: Big plants can produce power less expensively per kilowatt-hour than smaller ones. The SMR concept disdains those economies of scale in favor of others: large-scale standardized manufacturing that will churn out dozens, if not hundreds, of identical plants, each of which would ultimately produce cheaper kilowatt-hours than large one-off designs. It's an attractive idea. But it's also one that depends on someone building that massive supply chain, since none of it currently exists. ... That money would presumably come from customer orders − if there were any. Unfortunately, the SMR "market" doesn't exist in a vacuum. SMRs must compete with cheap natural gas, renewables that continue to decline in cost, and storage options that are rapidly becoming competitive. Worse, those options are available for delivery now, not at the end of a long, uncertain process that still lacks NRC approval."

www.powermag.com/what-went-wrong-with-smrs/

India's new uranium enrichment plant in Karnataka

David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini write in an Institute for Science and International Security report: "India is in the early stages of building a large uranium enrichment centrifuge complex, the Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), in Karnataka. This new facility will significantly increase India's ability to produce enriched uranium for both civil and military purposes, including nuclear weapons. India should announce that the SMEF will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, committed only to peaceful uses, and built only after ensuring it is in compliance with environmental laws in a process that fully incorporates stakeholders. Other governments and suppliers of nuclear and nuclear-related dual use goods throughout the world must be vigilant to prevent efforts by Indian trading and manufacturing companies to acquire such goods for this new enrichment facility as well as for India's operational gas centrifuge plant, the Rare Materials Plant, near Mysore."

http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/indias-new-uranium-enrichment...

Iran planning two more power reactors

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) plans to build two new nuclear power reactors, Bushehr Governor General Mostafa Salari announced on September 7. The previous week, AEOI chief Ali Akbar Salehi said that Tehran would sign a contract with Russia in the near future to build the two reactors in Bushehr. The AEOI states that the agreement with Russia will also include the construction of two desalination units.¹

One Russian-supplied power reactor is already operating at Bushehr. Fuel is supplied by Russia until 2021 and perhaps beyond. Plans for new reactors may be used by Tehran to justify its enrichment program.

Meanwhile, construction licenses have been issued for the next two nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates by the country's Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation. Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation plans to begin construction of Barakah 3 and 4 in 2014 and 2015 respectively with all four of the site's reactors becoming operational by 2020.²

1. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930616001123

2. World Nuclear News, 15 Sept 2014

Depleted uranium as a carcinogen and genotoxin

The International Campaign to Ban Uranium Weapons has produced a new report outlining the growing weight of evidence relating to how depleted uranium (DU) can damage DNA, interfere with cellular processes and contribute to the development of cancer.¹ The report uses peer-reviewed studies, many of which have been published during the last decade and, wherever possible, has sought to simplify the scientific language to make it accessible to the lay reader.

The report concludes: "The users of DU have shown themselves unwilling to be bound by the consequences of their actions. The failure to disclose targeting data or follow their own targeting guidelines has placed civilians at unacceptable risk. The recommendations of international and expert agencies have been adopted selectively or ignored. At times, users have actively opposed or blocked efforts to evaluate the risks associated with contamination. History suggests it is unlikely that DU use will be stopped voluntarily: an international agreement banning the use of uranium in conventional weapons is therefore required."

A report released by Dutch peace organisation PAX in June found that the lack of obligations on Coalition Forces to help clean-up after using DU weapons in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 has resulted in civilians and workers continuing to be exposed to the radioactive and toxic heavy metal years after the war.² The health risk posed by the inadequate management of Iraq's DU contamination is unclear − neither Coalition Forces nor the Iraqi government have supported health research into civilian DU exposure. High risk groups include people living near, or working on, the dozens of scrap metal sites where the thousands of military vehicles destroyed in 1991 and 2003 are stored or processed. Waste sites often lack official oversight and in places it has taken more than a decade to clean-up heavily contaminated military wreckage from residential neighbourhoods. Hundreds of locations targeted by the weapons, many of which are in populated areas, remain undocumented and concern among Iraqi civilians over the potential health effects from exposure is widespread.

The Iraqi government has recently prepared a five year environment plan together with the World Health Organisation and UN Environment Programme but the PAX report finds that it is unclear how this will be accomplished without international assistance.

1. www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/malignant-effects

2. www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/pax-rapport-iraq-final-lowres-spread.pdf

www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/no-solution-in-sight-for-iraqs-radioactive...

Clean-up of former Saskatchewan uranium mill

More than 50 years after the closure of the Lorado uranium mill in Saskatchewan, workers are cleaning up a massive pile of radioactive, acidic tailings that has poisoned a lake and threatened the health of wildlife and hunters for decades. The mill is near Uranium City, where uranium mining once supported a community of up to 5,000 people. Lorado only operated from 1957 to 1961, but during that time it produced about 227,000 cubic metres of tailings that were dumped beside Nero Lake. Windblown dust from the top of the tailings presents a gamma radiation and radon concern. Workers will cover the tailings with a layer of specially engineered sand to prevent water from running over them and into the lake. In addition, a lime mixture is to be added to the lake to counteract the acidity.

In 1982, the last of the mines near Uranium City closed, but tailings from the Lorado site and the Gunnar mine were left untouched. Uranium City has about 100 residents now.

Clean-up work also includes sealing off and cleaning up 35 mine exploration sites. Later, the Saskatchewan Research Council is to begin a cleanup of the Gunnar mine. That project is in the environmental assessment stage. Four million tonnes of tailings were produced at Gunnar during its operation from 1955 to 1963.

The clean-up project is controversial. The Prince Albert Grand Council, which represents a dozen First Nations in central and northern Saskatchewan, said in a written submission for the Lorado and Gunnar projects that many residents favour removal of the tailings rather than covering them up. The Saskatchewan Environmental Society says more investigation should have been done on the feasibility of removing the tailings. It questions how the covering will stand up as climate change delivers more severe weather, and whether government will continue to monitor the sites.

http://lethbridgeherald.com/news/national-news/2014/08/31/tough-conditio...

France: Greenpeace activists given suspended sentences

A French court has issued two-month suspended prison sentences to 55 Greenpeace activists involved in a break-in at France's Fessenheim nuclear power plant in March. Fessenheim is France's oldest nuclear plant. About 20 Greenpeace activists managed to climb on top of the dome of a reactor in Fessenheim. The activists, mostly from Germany but also from Italy, France, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Australia and Israel, were all convicted of trespassing and causing wilful damage.

Greenpeace has identified Fessenheim's reactors as two of the most dangerous in Europe and argues that they should be shut down immediately. The area around the plant is vulnerable to earthquakes and flooding. Fessenheim lies in the heart of Europe, between France, Germany and Switzerland, with seven million people living with 100 kms of the reactors.

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29060086

www.english.rfi.fr/economy/20140905-greenpeace-activists-given-suspended...

http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/nuclear-reaction/g...

USA: Missouri fire may be moving closer to radioactive waste

A new report suggests an underground fire at the Bridgeton Landfill may be moving closer to radioactive waste buried nearby. The information comes just days after it was announced construction of a barrier between the fire and the waste will be delayed 18 months. The South Quarry of the Bridgeton Landfill has been smouldering underground for three years. A number of gas interceptor wells are designed to keep the fire from moving north and reaching the radioactive waste buried at the West Lake Landfill. However the wells may have failed according to landfill consultant Todd Thalhamer, who is calling for more tests to determine exactly how far the fire is from the radioactive material.

www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/09/05/report-landfill-fire-may-be-mov...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Lake_Landfill

Britain's nuclear clean-up cost explosion

The cost of cleaning up Britain's toxic nuclear sites has shot up by £6bn (US$9.7b, €7.5b), with the government and regulators accused of "incompetence" in their efforts to manage the country's legacy of radioactive waste. The estimated cost for decommissioning over the next century went up from a £63.8bn estimate in 2011−12 to £69.8bn in 2012−13, with more increases expected in the coming years. This increase is nearly all due to the troubled clean-up of the Sellafield nuclear facility in Cumbria.

www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/sellafield-nuclear-cleanup-bill-w...

Iran

The nuclear industry is relatively young in Iran. Most activities, up to now, have been focused on the research and production of radioisotopes for research, medical and industrial uses. Recently, due to the planning and construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant,  Iran is investing heavily in developing its fuel cycle facilities. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) oversees uranium milling and mining at Saghand, yellowcake production at Ardakan, conversion at Esfahan, enrichment at Natanz, fuel fabrication at Esfahan, and an interim waste facility at Anarak. The AEOI also oversees the nuclear research centers.(*01)

There are a few known waste storage facilities, but only very limited knowledge about scope and capacity. The IAEA learned of the Karaj radioactive waste storage facility in 2003. In the same year, Iran shipped dismantled equipment used in laser enrichment experiments and materials resulting from uranium conversion experiments to the site, where IAEA inspectors viewed them in October 2003. Environmental samples taken by the IAEA at the site in 2005 revealed traces of highly enriched uranium on a container. In response, Iran declared that the traces originated from leaking reactor fuel assemblies at the Tehran Research Reactor. After further investigating the issue, the IAEA concluded that "the statements of Iran are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, and now considers this issue as resolved."

Anarak is also a nuclear waste disposal site. Iran told the IAEA in 2003 that waste resulting from the experiments irradiating UO-2 targets and separating the plutonium at JHL nuclear center was solidified and sent to Anarak.(02)

In February 2005, Iran agreed to repatriate Bushehrs spent fuel to Russia and thus significantly reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation (and the need for spent fuel disposal), and Russia has a deal with Iran to provide nuclear fuel for the first 10 years to the Bushehr power plant.(*03)

Italy

The 8 November 1987 Italian referendum on nuclear power was launched after the April 1986 Chernobyl accident by the Green Party. A majority voted against nuclear power. (*01) Subsequently, the government decided in 1988 to phase out existing plants 1990.(*02) The main national operator entitled to perform spent fuel, radioactive waste and decommissioning activities is Sogin (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari).(*03)

A quest to find host communities for national sites to build repositories for the disposal of low and intermediate level and of high level waste met strong local and national opposition and no site was selected.(*04) A new procedure national repository for the LLW disposal was established in 2008. Sogin will make a list of suitable regions, and if no community volunteers, Sogin will submit the list to the Ministry of Economic Development indicating the first three more suitable sites. Within 30 days an inter-institutional Committee will be created, with the participation of representatives from different Ministries and Regions. However, the time schedule (site selection in 2012) has been postponed.(*05)

Reprocessing
Since the beginning of its nuclear program, Italy had pursued the option to reprocess abroad the spent fuel. After the political decision to stop all nuclear power activities, the policy of reprocessing abandoned, even though the last shipment took place in 2005 as closure of the service agreements signed in the past. As far as the spent fuel still present in Italy, in 1999 the option of on-site dry storage was initially selected , this was difficult to implement due to the strong opposition of local communities, who considered the presence of the dry stored spent fuel as an obstacle for the release of the site.

So the option to reprocess was reopened and in November 2006 an agreement with the French government, regulating the transfer to France of spent fuel, was signed and in April 2007, Sogin signed a contract with Areva. The first shipment of spent fuel to France took place in December 2007 and shipping the waste has to  be completed in 2012. All reprocessing waste is scheduled to return in 2025 at the latest.

Waiting for the availability of the national storage site, the waste will continue to be stored on site. In most nuclear installations new temporary storage facilities have been constructed or are under design or construction. In some cases the refurbishing of existing buildings has been considered.(*06)

In 2010, Sogin was selected as the organization responsible for the identification of the national site and the construction of the high-level radioactive waste repository (surface and reversible). Within the same decree is laid out the siting procedure for the repository, which, in an attempt to soften opposition in possible host communities, will be part of a technology park including a center of Excellence for research and training in the field of decommissioning and radioprotection.(*07)

From 2009 on, the Italian Government, with the aim to restart a new nuclear program, established the necessary legislative provisions. But another popular referendum (launched before the March 2012 Fukushima accident) on 12 June 2011  abandoned the new nuclear program in Italy again.(*08)

Japan

In Japan the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NUMO) was set up in October 2000.

The country has interim storage facilities for all waste classifications at or near the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant. A final disposal facility is expected to be in operation at 2035. The waste management strategy is reprocessing of all spent fuel: first in Europe, and then domestic at Rokkasho. Japan dumped low-level waste in the Pacific Ocean in 12 dumping operations between 1955 and 1969.(*01)

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is seeking permission from the Aomori prefecture to build a low-level waste storage facility at Rokkasho, adjacent to the reprocessing plant. In particular this will be for LLW and what is internationally designated as ILW returned from France from 2013. NISA recommended approval early in 2012 to increase capacity to 2000 drums (200-liter).(*02)

Interim storage & reprocessing
In 1995, Japan's first high-level waste interim storage facility opened in Rokkasho-mura - the Vitrified Waste Storage Center. The first shipment of vitrified HLW from Europe (from the reprocessing of Japanese fuel) also arrived in that year. The last of twelve shipments from France was in 2007, making a total of 1310 canisters. The first shipments from UK arrived in March 2010, with 1850 canisters to go in about 11 shipments in the coming decade.(*03)

In 2005 the utilities Tepco and JAPC announced that a Recyclable Fuel Storage Center would be established in Mutsu City.The application was licensed in May 2010. Application for the design and construction approval was submitted to the Minister of METI in June 2010, and it was approved in August 2010, and the construction work started. The center will store spent fuel generated from Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) in metallic dry casks, and is scheduled to start commercial operation in July 2012.(*04) The JPY 100 billion facility will provide interim storage for up to 50 years before used fuel is reprocessed.(*05)

The Rokkasho reprocessing plant is seriously delayed. First expected to start operation in 1992(!)(*06) and in 1998 supposed start in January 2003,(*07) is currently (April 2012) in a test phase and still not in full commercial operation. The pre-service tests of the main part of the reprocessing plant are now implemented by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and the completion is planned in October 2012.(*08)

Final disposal site selection
In the 1980s and 1990's two sites were selected for underground research laboratories: already in April 1984 Horonobe, and in August 1995 Mizunami. Mizuname is adjacent to the Tono uranium mine where various kinds of research were conducted using existing mine shafts.(*09)

In May 2000, the Japanese parliament (the Diet) passed the Law on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste (the "Final Disposal Law") which mandates deep geological disposal of high-level waste (defined as only vitrified waste from reprocessing spent fuel). In line with this, the Nuclear Waste Management Organisation (NUMO) was set up in October 2000 by the private sector to progress plans for disposal, including site selection, demonstration of technology there, licensing, construction, operation, monitored retrievable storage for 50 years and closure of the repository. Some 40,000 canisters of vitrified HLW are envisaged by 2020, needing disposal - all the arisings from the Japanese nuclear plants until then.

In December 2002, NUMO started to solicit applications (without a specified deadline) from local communities to host a geological repository for vitrified high-level waste that would be at least 300 meters underground. The plan is to select a site by the late 2020s. The selection process is to go through three stages: literature survey; preliminary investigation; detailed investigation for selection of a repository site (about 15 years). The facility would open to accept high-level wastes in the late 2030s.(*10)

Due to a lack of response from municipalities, the amount of the money offered to incentivize applications for the literature-survey stage was raised in 2007 to a maximum of ¥2 billion ($25 million). Up to ¥7 billion (US$90 million) would be provided during the preliminary investigation stage.(*11)

In January 2007, the mayor of Toyo-cho in Kochi Prefecture made the first application(*12) - but without consulting his town council. This resulted in his forced resignation and a special election in April 2007 that resulted in the victory of a candidate opposed to the application. The application was withdrawn.(*13) After this fiasco, the siting policy was changed to allow the government to actively solicit targeted municipalities to apply for a literature survey. So far, as of this writing, it has been the only application.(*14)

Repository operation is expected from about 2035, and the JPY 3000 billion (US$ 28 billion) cost of it will be met by funds accumulated at 0.2 yen/kWh from electricity utilities (and hence their customers) and paid to NUMO. This sum excludes any financial compensation paid by the government to local communities.

In mid 2007 a supplementary waste disposal bill was passed which says that final disposal is the most important issue in steadily carrying out nuclear policy. It calls for the government to take the initiative in helping the public nationally to understand the matter by promoting safety and regional development, in order to get the final disposal site chosen with certainty and without delay. It also calls for improvement in disposal technology in cooperation with other countries, revising the safety regulations as necessary, and making efforts to recover public trust by, for example, establishing a more effective inspection system to prevent the recurrence of data falsifications and cover-ups.

In order to make communities volunteer as possible repository host, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan´s Advisory Board on High-level Waste Repository Safety issued the report on 'Safety Communication on Geological Disposal' in January 2011. This report is based on the "Committee’s recognition that it is important, in confidence building of the safety of geological disposal, to establish a safety communication system, which enables stakeholders or their representatives to participate in the process".(*15)

In the vision of Green Action Japan, “Japan's nuclear waste management policy is unsustainable and in deep trouble because it is dependent on reprocessing with no alternative plan formulated. Aomori Prefecture is concerned that without a final repository site selected and without the implementation of the pluthermal program, it will become the final de-facto repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In turn, local sites being targeted for interim storage are concerned that if reprocessing at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori does not go forward as planned, they in turn may become a de-facto waste dump because the spent fuel stored at their sites would not be able to be shipped to Rokkasho. In the meantime, the prefectures with nuclear power plants are stating they do not want to extend nuclear waste storage space any further.”(*16)

Kazakhstan

In 2003, Kazatomprom, the state owned nuclear company, developed a scheme where revenue generated from importing foreign radioactive waste would be used to fund the disposal of Kazakh waste. The country's environmental groups and the public severely opposed the proposal, and it never went ahead. (After joining the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, Kazakhstan committed itself to not importing foreign radioactive waste.) Still, Kazatomprom regularly pays fines for failing to follow laws regarding the storage of existing waste due to a lack of disposal sites.(*01)

Radioactive waste from nuclear power is stored in five different nuclear facilities. At present time Kazakhstan has no integrated and completed system for dealing with radioactive waste, raising serious environmental concerns. The Provisions for radioactive waste disposal were enforced by the Government Decree of 18 October 1996. The Provisions define the order for radioactive waste disposal in a deep geological repository, the procedure for obtaining permission from the regulatory bodies for its deep geological disposal and also establishes the list of necessary documents for this procedure.(*02)

In May 2011, the Minister of Environmental Protection Nurgali Ashimov said, Kazakhstan will not store nuclear waste from other countries. "In accordance with the legislation, it is prohibited to import nuclear waste to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan will never store nuclear waste. Neither the Ministry nor the Government will allow importing it."(*03)

The Aktau BN-350 nuclear power plant was connected to the grid in 1972 and was shut down in 1999. It's spent fuel was stored on site in cooling pools, but in November 2010, all the fuel was removed to a new long-term storage facility. Over the course of 12 shipments during the last year, the spent fuel was transported over 3,000 kilometers from Aktau, near the Caspian Sea, to the Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility in Eastern Kazakhstan (MAEC).(*04

References:

Iran
*01- Nuclear Threat Initiative – Country Profile: Iran
*02- ISIS: Nuclear Iran, website, visited April 2012
*03- Ali Vaez, Charles D. Ferguson:  Towards Enhanced Safeguards for Iran’s Nuclear Program, FAS Special Report No. 2, October 2011, p.25, 28

Italy
*01- Energie e Innovazione: I risultati dei referendum sull' energia, November/December 1987
*02- WISE News Communique: Nuclear power in Italy finished,15 July 1988
*03- Italy: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Second Italian National Report, October 2008, p.5
*04- AFP: Italy backtracks on nuclear waste decision after mass protests, 27 November 2003
*05- OECD: Radioactive waste management and decommissioning in Italy, 2011, p.13-14
*06- Italy, October 2005
*07- OECD, 2011
*08- Nuclear Monitor: No to nuclear power – Historic victory Italian referendum, 17 June 2011 p.1

Japan
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*02- World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Japan, March 2012
*03- IPFM: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011, p.54
*04- Japan: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management National Report of Japan for the fourth Review Meeting, October 2011
*05- Akahata Sunday Edition: N-related money behind restart of N-waste storage facilities construction, 2 October 2011
*06- Nuclear Monitor 716: Two year delay for Rokkasho plant, 24 September 2010, p.6
*07- Nuke Info Tokyo: Japan's HLW disposal plan, CNIC, March/April 1998
*08- Japan, October 2011, p.2
*09- Nuke Info Tokyo, March/April 1998
*10- Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan: Siting Factors for the Selection of Preliminary Investigation Areas, December 2002
*11- NUMO 2008: Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Japan, July 2008, p.8
*12- NUMO: Toyo town applies as a volunteer area for exploring the feasibility of constructing a repository for high-level radioactive waste, Press release, 25 January 2007
*13- Aileen Mioko Smith: The Failures of Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program 1956 – 2007, Green Action Japan, May 2007
*14- no further applications are announced at the NUMO website, April 2012
*15- OECD: National framework for Management and regulation of radioactive waste and decommissioning, October 2011, p.9
*16- Green Action Japan: Japanese nuclear power plant waste, website, visited April 2012

Kazakhstan
*01- Togzhan Kassenova: Kazakhstan's nuclear ambitions, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 28 April 2008
*02- T. Zhunussova, O. Romanenko, M. Sneve, A. Kim, I. Tazhibaeva, A.Liland: Norway-Central Asia cooperation on nuclear safety and radiation protection. Regulations for radioactive waste handling for long-term storage and final disposal in Kazakhstan, 2009
*03- Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accredited to Singapore, Australia and New Zealand: Kazakhstan not to store other countries' nuclear waste - Minister of Ecology N. Ashimov, 3 May 2011
*04- National Nuclear Security Administration: Joint Statement By Co-Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent Fuel Program, 17 November 2010

On November 9, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran. The assessment, which included a 13-page annex with key technical descriptions of suspect technology development and procurement by Tehran, says that the IAEA "has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program." However, the report stopped short of claiming that Tehran is determined to acquire atomic weapons, nor does it argue that the Middle East state is on the cusp of becoming a nuclear power.

On November 10, one day after the IAEA rapport was published, Russia dismissed the document as “a compilation of well-known facts that have intentionally been given a politicized intonation.” IAEA officials rely in the document on “assumptions and suspicions, and juggle information with the purpose of creating the impression that the Iranian nuclear program has a military component,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in released comments.

According to most commentators and blogers there is something a little phony about all the sound and fury about the latest IAEA Iran report. There is nothing in the report that was not previously known by the major powers. The West and Israel supplied most of the original tip-offs for the annex on weapons development, while Russia was briefed and no doubt knew one of its own scientists had been lecturing the Iranians on how to make explosive implosion devices (ostensibly for making tiny diamonds).

The bulk of the report is historical, referring to the years leading up to 2003. Its interpretation depends largely on whether you are a glass half-full or half-empty sort of person. On the one hand, the IAEA is confirming beyond reasonable doubt that there was a centralized, heavily funded, program: codenamed Amad and run by a man called Mohsen Fahkrizadeh.

On the other hand, the report is also adamant that Amad was halted in 2003.

After that, the report offers evidence of lower-key computer modeling of nuclear detonations in a more diffuse, scattered manner, albeit by some of the same people. But the evidence for this is sketchier, and it is clear the UN inspectors are less confident about making assertions about the more recent period: some of the activities associated with the effort "may still be ongoing"

So again, its significance is somewhat in the eye of the beholder.

The bottom line is it is not this report or the debate over weaponization that is driving the current sense of urgency on the global stage. It is Iran's accumulation of enriched uranium, which is the potential fuel for a nuclear arsenal. The IAEA report estimated Iran now has nearly five metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) easily enough for four bombs, if it was further enriched to weapons grade. It also has 73 kg of 20% enriched uranium - a fraction of what would needed for one warhead but it could be turned into weapons grade much faster.

Furthermore, the Iranians are moving more and more of its enrichment work into a chamber dug under a mountain at a military base at Fordow, where it would be far harder to get at. There are now about two and half 'cascades' of 174 centrifuges there and a large cylinder of (3.5% enriched) LEU has been moved there with the intention of turning it into 20% uranium.

So Iran has the raw materials and the skills necessary to make a small arsenal, perhaps in a few months, if it decided to "break out", which means leave the NPT and throw out the IAEA which is monitoring its uranium stocks and its enrichment activities. But that would be a huge step to take, and a step the current regime has shown it has no appetite for. Rightly so, as it would be seen by many of its neighbors as a declaration of war and simultaneously a short window of vulnerability before Iran put its bomb together and tests it.

So the "break out" scenario is not the biggest threat. Far more worrisome is the possibility that Iran has a parallel, covert program underground somewhere, silently spinning away while the world and its inspectors keep eagle eyes on Natanz and Qom etc. This is very hard to pull off as the whole fuel cycle has to be kept under wraps from the moment the uranium ore comes out of the ground. There is evidence that Iran has tried to do this, but also evidence that the international community has had success thwarting those efforts.

What it should tell us is that it shows very clearly how the existence of a civilian nuclear power industry makes it easy for nations to develop nuclear weapons expertise under a peaceful camouflage. Experts in nuclear weapons construction can maintain that they are merely giving technical advice for commercial nuclear power developments.  Factories built to enrich uranium can be portrayed as part of the civilian nuclear fuel chain. Even separating and stockpiling plutonium can be excused as an exercise in planning for eventual use of "advanced fuel cycles".

Thoughtful persons everywhere should reflect on the fact that, in the absence of a civilian nuclear power industry, none of these activities could be portrayed as anything but an overt attempt to develop nuclear weapons.  If the world turns away from nuclear power and closes the door on this dangerous technology, the early detection and prevention of attempts to construct a nuclear weapons arsenal would be much easier, and the world would become correspondingly much safer. The IAEA-report: "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran" is available at http://iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/bog112011-65.pdf

Sources: Gordon Edwards, email, 6 November 2011 / Guardian (UK), 9 November 2011 / Global Security Newswire, 9 November 2011

French Nuclear Authority points to "weaknesses" of the EPR.
The construction of the EPR nuclear reactor being built in Flamanville, has many "weaknesses" that put the "final quality" into doubt. This is the conclusion drawn after a  thorough inspection conducted on site in May by the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). The report of this "inspection review", highlighted by Le Canard Enchaine on August 24, is posted on the site of the ASN (www.asn.fr). It is a 20 page letter sent by the ASN on June 24 to EDF, the prime contractor for the 1600 megawatt reactor designed by Areva. The inspection has was  carried out by fifteen experts, including an observer from the British regulator. The team found deviations from the construction requirements on essential parts of the reactor: the feed of the steam generators, water injection filters, the RIS batteries of the cooling system. "EDF has to make great efforts to show the final quality of the construction of Flamanville 3", judges the ASN, which points out: "inconsistencies between the requirements specified in sub-contracting and the demands mentioned in the preliminary safety report" - that is to say a non-compliance with initial prescriptions. Concerning an essential feature of the steam generators, experts estimate that "the quality of materials taking into account their importance for safety has not been demonstrated and their use in FLA3 is not possible". In two cases, they demand from EDF to "not engage in actions that are difficult to reverse before demonstrating" compliance.
Le Monde (Fr.) 24 August 2011 (translation Jan Haverkamp)

Town produces 321% more energy than it uses.
A small Bavarian town in Germany called Wildpoldsried produces 321% more energy than it uses, from renewable and natural sources. By selling the excess energy, Wildpoldsried has eliminated all the towns debt and generates 4.0 million Euro (US$5.7 million) in annual income. The point they are at now in terms of energy production and independence was reached by starting a plan about fourteen years ago to develop more clean energy sources and green building projects. The town with a population of about 2,500 started work on a huge community initiative involving the construction of nine new buildings and energy sources. The new buildings included a school, community hall and gym, and they employ solar panels, as do 190 private households. Five biogas digesters, nine windmills, three hydroelectric projects,  ecological flood control and a natural waste water treatment system were part of the plan for energy independence. It all has worked well, and the town is debt-free. They actually formed several local companies to construct, install and manage their wind turbines, with local residents as investors.
www.care2.com, 24 August 2011

Bushehr online after 36 years of construction.
Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant has been connected to the national grid. It began supplying around 60 MW of its 1000 MW capacity on Saturday 3 September at 11:29pm, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said. Construction on Bushehr by German company Siemens KWU started in 1975, but the work was stopped in 1979. Iran signed a deal with Russia in 1995, under which the plant was originally due to be finished in 1999, but the completion of the project was repeatedly delayed. The most recent delay, in February 2011, was caused by the discovery of damaged internals of a coolant pump supplied in the 1970s. To avoid potential consequences of metal debris getting on the fuel assemblies, they were unloaded and washed, while the reactor pressure vessel was cleaned. The fuel was reloaded in April and the plant achieved criticality in May 2011. In August 2011, the Government of Iran invited an International Atomic Energy Agency delegation to visit the country’s nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plant that has been built by Russia’s Atomstroyexport. According to Iran's nuclear officials, Bushehr power plant will reach 40% capacity during a ceremony that will be held on 12 September 2011. It is expected to reach full capacity in November or December 2011.
Nuclear Engineering International, 5 September 2011

North Anna shut down after earthquake.
The largest earthquake to hit the eastern US in 67 years has raised concerns about the safety of the country's nuclear power plants. The 5.8 magnitude quake's epicenter in Virginia on August 23, was close to the North Anna plant, 130 kilometers southwest of Washington. The plant lost power and automatically halted operations after the quake. While the operator reported no 'major' damage to the facility, three diesel generators were required to kick in and keep the reactors' radioactive cores cool. A fourth diesel unit failed. While nuclear power plants can operate safely on back-up power, failure of generators was a key reason for the disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi plant

A spokesman for the operator said the plant was designed to withstand an earthquake of up to 6.2 in magnitude. But some groups have expressed concern about the narrow margin between the design metrics and the quake's size. 'It was uncomfortably close to design basis,' said Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has pushed for stronger nuclear regulations. 'If Fukushima wasn't a wake-up call, this really needs to be to get the NRC and industry moving to do seismic reviews of all the nuclear power plants in the country.' An article in the Washington Post reports that the earthquake moved dry casks (huge concrete containers holding spent nuclear fuel), weighing between 100 to 115 tons, by as much as four inches (10 centimeters).

Twelve other nuclear plants along the Eastern Seaboard declared an "unusual event" following the quake, the lowest of the NRC's emergency classification ratings. North Anna's "alert" status is one step further up on a four-step U.S. emergency scale.

North Anna's reactors are among 27 east of the Rockies that the NRC highlighted during a seismic review last year as presenting a potential hazard, due to the amount of ground-shaking they were designed to withstand. Many nuclear experts say plants in the United States were designed with big margins of error  built in, but last year's NRC survey found that the risks posed by earthquakes were higher than  previously thought.
RTE (Ireland), 24 August 2011 / Reuters, 24 August 2011 / Washington Post, 1 September 2011

Germany: no need for nuclear reserve capacity.
Germany's grid regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) said August 31 that it has decided against keeping one idled nuclear reactor on standby as reserve capacity for the coming two winter seasons to ensure power grid stability after the government permanently closed eight older reactors in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in March. "Our investigations have shown that even in exceptional contingencies the transmission system will remain operational without the dispatch of a reserve nuclear power plant," BNetzA President Matthias Kurth said in a statement.

The government has asked the grid regulator to investigate the need for a nuclear reserve capacity during the winter after transmission system operators in May warned of possible blackouts during extreme winter weather should the eight older reactors remain shut permanently, removing at least 5,000 MW of nuclear capacity from the market.
Platts, 31 August 2011

International blockade Olkiluoto, Finland.
On August 20, 2011 a blockade of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant under construction took place for the second time gathering people from several regions of Finland and from other European countries on the streets. One year ago, on August 28, 2010, it was the very first public street blockade of an atomic facility in Finland ever. It had been started with the support of a number of European and Finnish environmental and anti-nuclear groups. The gathering of the Nuclear Heritage Network, an international network of anti-nuclear activists, taking part in March 2010 in Helsinki had initiated the idea of the blockade and developed it together with the variety of Finnish NGOs and groups. The goal was to question the international reputation of Finland as the country of the so-called "renaissance of nuclear power", and to show that even in this country being under strong pressure of the nuclear lobby atomic power has noch support of the citizens.

For Finnish anti-nuclear activists the Olkiluoto Blockade was also an important occassion for meeting each other and exchanging as so far there doesn't exist any other nationwide organizing structures for a common anti-nuclear strategy. In the south as well as in the north strong networks of local initiatives and organizations exist and in some cases they successfully opposed to projects of uranium mining and new nuclear reactors constructions. However, cross connections between those groups and networks are created so far only in mutual big actions like the Olkiluoto Blockade or the anti-nuclear infotour around the Baltic Sea that also took place in 2010.

This year a blockade of about 100 activists from Finland, Sweden, Germany, Russia, France, United Kingdom and Belarus several times stopped the traffic on the access roads to the disputed Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in Finland. Police had announced to prevent the blockade of roads that were supposed to take place for the second time. They forced protesters from the streets again and again towards a bus stop nearby. Nevertheless, the activists succeeded several times to blockade the main access road to the nuclear power plant for some minutes, while an additional access street had been closed for some two hours by a wooden tripod construction with an activist on the top.
www.greenkids.de

Donors agree to fund new Chernobyl shelter.
There appears to be enough money (at last after almost 15 years) for a new sarcophagus at the Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine. The Nuclear Safety Account and the Chernobyl Shelter Fund donors agreed to provide the necessary financial resources for the implementation of the Chernobyl projects. The decision was made at the Assembly of Contributors to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund meeting on July 7, 2011, in London. The new construction will help "neutralize any possible future threats to the environment from the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine".

The needed amount of financial resources for the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) funding is EUR 740 mln. On the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy on April 26, 2011, a fundraiser was held resulting in donors' obligations of EUR 550 mln. The new decision of the world donors allows for the immediate start of the SIP execution and its completion by 2015. The SIP involves stabilization of the existing sarcophagus and the construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC) for the damaged nuclear reactor.

In 1988 local scientists announced that the life time of the sarcophagus was 20 to 30 years. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) was established nearly a decade later in December of 1997 to collect funds for the NSC project. Currently, the European Union, the United States, and Ukraine cooperate to help meet the CSF's objective while the EBRD is entrusted to manage the CSF and provide oversight of the funds disbursement.

The construction of the original Chernobyl sarcophagus began on May 20, 1986 - three weeks after the accident, and lasted for 206 days.
PRNewswire, 14 July 2011

PSC shifts risks costs overruns to public.
US: Georgia utility regulators agreed on August 2, to scrap a proposal that would have eaten into Georgia Power’s profits should the costs for its nuclear expansion project exceed US$300 million. The Georgia Public Service Commission unanimously approved the plan after making sure the commissioners could review previously approved project costs if there is a budget increase. Customers would pay for cost overruns in their monthly bills unless the PSC determines the overruns are Georgia Power's fault.
Georgia Power is part of a group of utilities building two nuclear reactors at Plant Vogtle. The utility is responsible for US$6.1 billion of the estimated US$14 billion project. The company has been at odds with the PSC’s advocacy staff over how to handle potential cost overruns for the project. The advocacy staff wanted to cut into the utility’s profits if the costs exceeded US$300 million over budget. The advocacy staff agreed to drop its plan if Georgia Power allowed regulators to re-examine previously approved parts of the project if there is a budget increase. If regulators determine that Georgia Power's mistake led to the cost overruns, consumers would not have to pay the additional costs.
Consumer advocates have criticized the PSC's move as shifting all of the burden of the project's cost onto Georgia Power customers, who already are paying for the plant's financing costs.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2 August 2011

Walk away from uranium mining.
Footprints for Peace, an international grassroots group that organizes walks, bike rides and runs around the world, invites families and people of all ages, background and cultures to come and support traditional owners in their opposition to uranium mining in Western Australia by taking part in the “Walk away from uranium mining” that began in Wiluna on August 19 and will finish in Perth on October 28. "We will demonstrate that we have the choice to walk away from this costly, toxic industry — which produces radioactive waste and weapons usable material — in favour of renewable energy options." Footprints for Peace are working together with the Western Australian Nuclear Free Alliance (WANFA) to organise this grassroots awareness-raising and action-based campaign. Everyone is welcome to join the walk for a few hours, a day, a few weeks or the whole way. Even if you cannot walk we still require financial assistance, drivers, kitchen crew members, media liaison volunteers, video operators and photographers, musicians, artists, singers and general support for daily events, such as camp set up and pack up, food shopping and water collection. The walkers will cover a distance of 20 to 25 kilometres a day, with a rest day every five days……… The walk’s conclusion in Perth will coincide with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. There we will deliver our well-supported and strong message that it is time to shut down the nuclear industry’s plans to expand in Western Australia and the rest of Australia.

For more information please visit: http://nuclearfreefuture.com/
GreenLeft (Aus.) 23 July 2011

Sellafield: No prosecutions for organ harvesting.
Recent correspondence has revealed that no one will be prosecuted over the body hacking scandal carried out by the nuclear industry for over 40 years in collusion with government, hospitals, coroners and doctors.

From 1960 to 1991, body parts were taken without consent from 64 former Sellafield workers and 12 workers from nuclear sites in Springfields, Capenhurst, Dounreay and Aldermaston. The liver was removed in all cases and one or both lungs in all but one incident. Vertebrae, sternum, ribs, lymph nodes, spleen, kidneys and fermur were also stripped in the majority of cases. Brains, tongues, hearts and testes were also taken on the advice of the medical officer at Sellafield.

Correspondence from Cumbria Constabulary has been seen which says that despite the findings of the Redfern Inquiry (into the scandal; see Nuclear Monitor 721, 17 December 2010)  that the relationship between the nuclear industry and fellow bodysnatching conspirators was "too close" no one will be prosecuted as it is not "in the public interest".

Extract from a letter sent by ‘Special Operations’ - Cumbria Constabulary: "the issues you raise which I have listed below;
1. That specific people and institutions have breached the Human Tissue Act and that this should be investigated.
2. That an investigation into whether there was any unlawful corruption of the coronial processes had taken place
3. The stipends made to mortuary attendants are also of particular concern.
This was a Government led review which involved both the Department for Energy and Climate Change and the Ministry of Justice. As such any requirement on the police to investigate identified breaches as outlined above would be made by the Government. No such request has been made". (end quotation Cumbria Constabulary correspondence)
Well, surprise, surprise: No such request is likely to be made.
http://101-uses-for-a-nuclear-power-station.blogspot.com/2011/07/dodgy-hacking.html

Floating Nuke Plant Seized in Bankruptcy
A St. Petersburg court seized the 70MW floating nuclear power station under construction at the Baltiisky Zavod shipyards after Rosenergoatom, the division of the Rosatom nuclear monopoly that commissioned it, demanded recognition of its right of ownership to the unfinished vessel. The July 26 court order gave the go-ahead for the seizure on the basis of "significant risk" that Rosenergoatom could lose its investment in the 9.8 billion ruble ($334 million) vessel if another claimant seized Baltiisky Zavod's assets during bankruptcy proceedings.

The ship yard, which is 88.3 percent owned by former Tuva governor Segei Pugachev's United Industrial Corporation is facing litigation from numerous disgruntled creditors. International Industrial Bank, also known as Mezhprombank, had its operating license revoked when it declared itself bankrupt in November. In January prosecutors launched a criminal case against the bank for intentional bankruptcy.

The dispute is not the first to hit Rosatom's ambitious plans to build a generation of floating nuclear power stations to serve remote coastal communities in Russia's north and Far East. Interfax on Thursday quoted an unidentified source at Rosatom saying the contract could be reassigned to another shipbuilder. If true, it would be the second time a contractor has lost the order from Rosatom, which originally commissioned the Sevmash shipyard to build the controversial floating nuclear plants in 2006. Rosenergoatom tore up that agreement in 2008 and signed a new deal with Baltiisky Zavod in 2009. Baltiisky Zavod is scheduled to finish the first station in 2012, according to the contract. The 70-megawatt plant is destined for Kamchatka.
Moscow Times, 15 August 2011

In early April 2011, a nondescript industrial plant 50km west of Tehran, named TABA, came under public scrutiny when it was revealed as being a significant centrifuge manufactur­ing site—apparently unbeknownst to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As the technology involved has become ever more accessible, centrifuge-driven uranium enrichment has emerged as a significant proliferation risk. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the IAEA’s ability to monitor the construction of these specialized machines.

The ability to monitor the construction of centrifuge-driven uranium enrichment is especially illustrative of the added value of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol to the process of confirming the exclu­sively peaceful nature of countries’ nuclear energy program­s. The Additional Protocol is a powerful legal instru­ment developed in the 1990s to complement member states’ Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs). This article considers the proliferation risks involved in centrifuge pro­duction and the merits of the Additional Protocol with respect to two countries, Iran and Brazil, neither of whom implement the updated safeguards techniques, but who both possess the ability and will to manufacture centrifuges.

It is often considered that the most difficult stage in the production of nuclear weapons is acquiring the necessary fissile material: either plutonium or highly enriched ura­nium (HEU). In the past, acquiring these materials usually involved building and running a nuclear reactor (to make plutonium), or a gaseous diffusion plant (for HEU). Both required very substantial industrial capabilities. However, with the spread of gas centrifuge technology in the past three decades, the potential route to HEU has become both significantly less challenging—and less conspicuous.

Like the diffusion method, the gas centrifuge technique separates the two isotopes that make up uranium, concen­trating the crucial U-235 from the very slightly heavier U-238. In nature, uranium consists almost entirely of U-238 (at around 99.3 per cent) and therefore requires processing in order for the weapons-usable U-235 to be separated out. To be useful in ‘light water’ reactors, the raw material must be converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and subse­quently ‘enriched’ in the separation process to consist of 3-5 per cent U-235 particles (known as low enriched uranium, or LEU). Natural uranium can be used in other reactor types after some processing. Nuclear weapons require HEU at about 90 per cent enrichment. Enriching with the centrifuge process involves injecting uranium hexafluoride gas into cylinders rotating tens of thousands of times per minute. The effect of centrifugal force pushes the U-238 closer to the outer wall of the machine, with U-235 particles tending towards the center, which is then siphoned off. Each ma­chine can only perform a very small amount of enrichment. An effective enrichment plant therefore requires large num­bers of centrifuges linked together in so-called ‘cascades’.

The older gaseous diffusion system requires thousands more painstaking steps, which take place in immense facilities using significant amounts of energy, and emitting large amounts of heat. In contrast, centrifuges on average perform the same amount of enrichment in significantly fewer steps, consuming smaller amounts of electricity. Centrifuge fa­cilities therefore tend to be less conspicuous. They are typically much more compact, without the easily identifi­able electrical and cooling systems associated with gaseous diffusion plants, or heat emissions detectable to infrared imaging systems. It may be possible to trace uranium hex­afluoride gas accidentally released from a centrifuge enrich­ment plant, but these emissions are normally very small.

The number of centrifuges required to produce enough fis­sile material for a weapon depends on the design and effi­ciency of the centrifuges themselves—measured in kilograms of ‘separative work units’ per year (kg SWU/yr). This can range from lower than two kg SWU/yr for less advanced models to machines (currently confined to Europe or the United States) operating at 100 kg SWU/yr and above.

Centrifuge production and the Additional Protocol
As a rule of thumb, it requires about 100,000-120,000 kg SWU to produce enough LEU per year for an average sized nuclear reactor. In contrast, it requires only 6,000 kg SWU to produce enough HEU for one weapon a year (known as one ‘significant quantity’, defined by the IAEA as 27.8 kg of 90 per cent enriched uranium).

The potency of gas centrifuge technology in terms of pro­liferation risks is therefore clear: these are machines capable of producing ‘significant quantities’ of fissile material in relatively low numbers and with a small footprint, thus making them a good bet for states wanting to develop nu­clear weapons-usable material without being detected. However, centrifuges are complicated machines, requiring very specialized technical capabilities. One of the major difficulties is that even the slowest centrifuges spin at rates requiring unusually durable materials—ranging from alu­minium alloys for older machines and maraging steel (a particularly strong type of steel) to modern ultra-strong carbon composites. These materials require precision ma­chine tools to shape and strengthen them. The high-speed motors and their variable-frequency power supplies (which adapt the electrical current available from the power grid into an output of much higher frequency) also need to be specifically adapted for use in centrifuges.

Centrifugal safeguards standards
Under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear-weapon states’ obligations on centrifuge manufacturing fall under two IAEA safeguards regimes: those with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs), and those who further implement the strengthened measures of the Additional Protocol to their CSAs.

Though each non-nuclear-weapon state’s CSA is individual, all follow the form and content of a standard text, ‘IN­FCIRC/153’, which obliges a country to provide information on all nuclear material and facilities, and to allow agency inspectors to verify these declarations. The resulting verifi­cation regime focuses largely on nuclear material account­ancy to check the accuracy of declared materials in declared facilities. According to Article 8 of INFCIRC/153, this guarantees the IAEA information on only those facilities ‘relevant to safeguarding such material’. The definition of ‘facility’ is articulated in Article 106 to include reactors, conversion plants, fabrication plants, reprocessing plants, isotope separation plants, separate storage installations, or any location where significant amounts of nuclear material is customarily used. As such there are no requirements re­garding centrifuge production facilities. CSAs were designed in an age when centrifuge enrichment technology was still in its infancy. The underlying assumption was that the production of HEU through conspicuous gaseous diffusion plants would be readily detectable, and that the proliferation risk came instead from the diversion of material from de­clared facilities.

With the discovery of Saddam Hussein’s secret nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, it became clear that it was necessary to address pos­sible clandestine uranium enrichment—with centrifuge production being an important component. Partly as a result of this discovery, the Additional Protocol was developed and opened for voluntary signature in 1997. It is a legal instru­ment that provides the IAEA with more information and wider access rights, thereby strengthening its ability to verify that a country is not producing material for nuclear weapon purposes.

The document ‘INFCIRC/540’ describes the standard ob­ligations required under an AP. In contrast with IN­FCIRC/153, this document specifies in Article 2.a.(iv) that the participating state must provide the IAEA with a descrip­tion of the scale of operations involved in centrifuge produc­tion. According to Annex I of INFCIRC/540, centrifuge production is described as the manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges. These ac­tivities are further detailed in Annex II, which describes the purpose, general design, and component set of gas centri­fuges. Such constituent parts include: rotor assemblies, rotor tubes, bellows, baffles, top and bottom caps, mag­netic suspension bearings, molecular pumps, motor stators, centrifuge housings, and scoops, among others.

As well as indigenous manufacturing capabilities, the pro­tocol also brings into focus the other way of acquiring centrifuges (or their constituent parts)—import from for­eign trade partners. Article 2.a.(ix) of INFCIRC/540 outlines the state’s responsibility, when requested, to provide infor­mation to the IAEA on the identity, quantity, and location of the intended use of all the materials and equipment listed in Annex II that have been acquired from abroad. The information generated by these requirements enables the IAEA to develop a fuller understanding of a member state’s uranium enrichment program. It thus becomes pos­sible to draw comparisons between centrifuge production rates and centrifuge deployment in declared facilities: for instance, if more centrifuges are manufactured than de­ployed, the IAEA will be able to flag the discrepancy for further investigation.

The CSA and the AP differ not only in terms of the infor­mation flow that they can generate but also in the level of access for inspectors. According to Article 76.a of the model CSA text (INFCIRC/153), the IAEA is guaranteed access only to ‘any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present.’ There is a provision in Article 73 of INFCIRC/153 for ‘special inspections’, which give the agency the right to visit ‘locations in addition to the access specified’—a vague definition which John Carlson, a mem­ber of VERTIC’s International Verification Consultants Network, interprets as ‘anywhere in the state’ if there are ‘circumstances giving rise to suspicion.’ This could conceiv­ably include certain centrifuge manufacturing plants. His­torically, though, the special inspection tool (which, accord­ing to Article 77, must be obtained in agreement with the inspected state party) has been of little value. It has only been invoked by the IAEA on one previous occasion. This was against North Korea in 1992, and access was then denied. INFCIRC/540 (the model Additional Protocol) makes an important contribution in this area by outlining a system of ‘Complementary Access’ to inspectors. This expands the rights of the Agency to make visits to centrifuge manufac­turing plants according to Article 4.a.(ii), for the purpose of resolving ‘a question relating to the correctness and com­pleteness of the information provided [...] or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information.’ There is no need to obtain agreement from the party and notification of a visit can be as short as 24 hours.

Though INFCIRC/540 specifies that the IAEA ‘shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify’ information provided by the state, its ability to make informed judgments about a proliferation risk is substantially increased, and a state’s corresponding ability to shield important in­formation from it is substantially diminished. With respect to the monitoring of centrifuge production, the salient points of the Additional Protocol are Article 2.a.(iv)’s en­shrined principle of information provision as a matter of routine, and Article 4.a.(ii)’s enshrined principle of Com­plementary Access as of right.

This has important conse­quences, explored below, for states that produce centri­fuges, as is made clear by the examples of Iran and Brazil, both of whom possess the indigenous capacities to manu­facture these machines, but neither of which currently implement the Additional Protocol.

Iran: AP, the option-limiter
The controversy and uncertainties surrounding Iran’s ura­nium enrichment program are well-known and well-documented. The Islamic Republic has signed an AP, but has not yet ratified it. Nevertheless, Iran implemented the protocol on a voluntary basis between 2003 and 2006, but cut off cooperation in retaliation to the IAEA Board of Governors vote to report Iran to the UN Security Council. During this time the Agency learnt a great deal about the Iranian nuclear infrastructure; since then, however, relevant knowledge about centrifuge production capabilities has deteriorated markedly.

It is therefore not difficult to appreciate the interest gener­ated, when, at a press conference in Washington, DC, an Iranian opposition group announced the discovery of the previously-undocumented role of a facility named TABA in producing centrifuge parts for Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment program. TABA apparently manufactures ‘casing, magnets, molecular pumps, composite tubes, bel­lows, and centrifuge bases’ primarily for the current gen­eration of machines—but also for emerging next-generation centrifuges. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Tehran’s envoy to the IAEA, refuted any allegations of concealment, pointing out that Iran’s safeguards obligations did not necessitate any provision of information about the plant to the IAEA. Rather, they required only the ‘inspection of centrifuge machines.’ This is indeed broadly in line with the require­ments of the CSA as described above, which strictly speak­ing concerns itself only with the nuclear materials flowing within the machines.

The disclosure, however, highlights the proliferation risk resulting from the limited reach of the CSA. TABA is lo­cated in a nondescript industrial park and offers few distin­guishing features. The facility’s generic name—a Farsi ab­breviation of ‘Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran’, meaning ‘Iran Cutting Tools Company’—also gives little away. This lack of transparency and openness over their centrifuge manu­facturing capabilities offers the Iranian authorities the pos­sibility—should they so choose—of secretly sending cen­trifuges to a undeclared enrichment installation to produce weapons-grade fissile material, whilst appearing to fulfill their safeguards obligations.

Enrichment facilities can be relatively small and largely indistinguishable from other industrial plants, or outright hidden as in the case of Iran’s underground Qom enrichment facility. The Qom plant was uncovered in September 2009 as a result of Western intelligence-gathering operations; its existence was previously a secret. In an atmosphere so fun­damentally degraded by a lack of trust between the princi­pal actors, the possibility that any small and inconspicuous enrichment facility could be discretely producing weapons-usable material is a serious consideration.

It is a possibility that Iran’s 2007 decision to suspend an essential commitment to the IAEA regarding the declaration of new facilities has made concerns over undeclared facilities significantly more acute. The commitment in question is set out in the modified Code 3.1 of Iran’s Subsidiary Ar­rangements, to which it acceded in 2003 and which the CSA specifies cannot be unilaterally modified without the IAEA’s consent. The result of the suspension, which the IAEA re­portedly did not agree to, is that Iran has reverted to an outdated requirement that any new facility need only be declared six months prior to the introduction of nuclear material, rather than as soon as the decision to construct it is taken. The option therefore exists for Iranian authorities to begin construction on sites that can house centrifuge cascades, and even to outfit them with this equipment, without violating any of its safeguards obligations. Of course, if undeclared enrichment begins, this is no longer true. But many of the crucial steps taken to get to this point in op­erating a clandestine HEU-producing program (the undeclared industrial development of centrifuges and their deployment in undeclared enrichment plants) will have been taken with little risk.

The power of the AP is to close off such windows of op­portunity and thereby build confidence among countries. INFCIRC/540 states clearly the IAEA’s right to be supplied with information regarding centrifuge production facilities, and its right to access these facilities. The result is an im­portant reversal of responsibility, away from the IAEA hav­ing to press for data and onto the state itself to provide the information in a routine manner.

Brazil: AP, an option limited
The Brazilian centrifuge program began as a covert project in 1979 at the behest of the military government that dominated Brazilian political life until 1985. A research team, under the direction of the Brazilian navy, developed over the next decade a centrifuge technology in which rotors spin not on the usual metal pin bearings, but on electromag­netic bearings, allowing the rotating and fixed parts in the machine to operate without any point of contact. This is designed to eliminate sources of friction which reduce ef­ficiency and durability, and recent enrichment capacities have been placed at 10 kg SWU/yr. Construction of these machines takes place at the navy’s Aramar Experimental Center, outside São Paulo. Brazil has ambitious plans to attain an enrichment capacity at its main deployment site at Resende, near Rio de Janeiro, of 300,000 kg SWU/yr by 2014, and up to one million kg SWU/yr by 2030.

The military origins of the program, its secrecy before the advent of democratic government, a late accession to the NPT in 1998, and the 2005 admission by a former president that Brazil had previously sought to develop nu­clear weapons to counter competition from Argentina all point to the need for a robust verification regime that instills confidence in the peaceful ambitions of the program as it exists today. Currently, this work is done through the 1991 Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, which joins together Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA and ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) to mandate the application of nuclear safeguards. Analogous to the CSA, this ad hoc arrangement does not offer the extended measures provided by the AP, as described above, with the exception of some provisions for unan­nounced inspections. Monitoring, performed by both ABACC and the IAEA, focuses on flows of nuclear mate­rial and provides access only to those facilities through which significant amounts of such material passes. It seems likely that another possible route to fissile material may be opened up with the Brazilian navy’s development of nuclear-pow­ered submarines, in which uranium enriched as high as 10 per cent by centrifuges at Aramar will power a reactor out­side the reach of safeguards. Although the US has made efforts to persuade Brazil to give up on these plans, it was not successful, and negotiations with the IAEA to establish appropriate verification measures are ongoing. This is an eventuality that neither the CSA nor AP address directly, and for which entirely new arrangements will need to be developed.

Despite these substantial capabilities and ambitious plans, implementation of the Additional Protocol has been reso­lutely dismissed by Brazil, with the country’s 2008 Na­tional Defense Strategy rejecting it until further progress in disarmament is made by the NPT nuclear weapons coun­tries. Brazilian officials have offered a variety of other rea­sons—revolving primarily around an unwillingness to allow inspectors access to the commercially sensitive electromag­netic bearing technology, and the fact that it is an unneces­sary measure in a country with a solid non-proliferation record which constitutionally prohibits nuclear weapons development (Brazil has also joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which Iran has only signed). Analysts suspect the main reasons for opposition are military in nature, with the navy unwilling to grant extended access rights to the centrifuge manufactur­ing facilities in Aramar that are co-located with non-nucle­ar submarine R&D activities. This is despite the fact that Article 7 of the AP outlines clearly a state’s right to request ‘managed access’ to protect proprietary information, and that the IAEA Department of Safeguards (in charge of the practical application of safeguards) has had regular access to sensitive technologies throughout its history without leaking them.

Many of the same clandestine enrichment options are there­fore as open to Brazil as they are to Iran - without, how­ever, the associated IAEA reports, UN resolutions or Secu­rity Council sanctions. Most observers, such as Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, or Con­doleeza Rice during her term as US Secretary of State, seem not to question Brazil’s commitment against nuclear pro­liferation. Ad hoc measures, such as the Quadripartite Agreement and a future system to monitor enriched ura­nium production for nuclear powered submarines, are deemed to be imperfect but adequate safeguards measures - despite the lack of scrutiny on centrifuge production at Aramar. Crucially though, this type of safeguards develop­ment can only occur in an atmosphere with a certain level of trust; such as that which generally characterizes the IAEA’s relationship with Brazil.

One of the most important benefits of AP implementation is to lessen the impact of the wider political atmosphere. Should relations take a turn for the worse, the principles of information provision as a matter of routine and Comple­mentary Access as of right allow for confident conclusions to be drawn over the use of centrifuge technology regardless of political context. With the IAEA thus somewhat shield­ed by the AP from the vagaries of international tensions over policy and intent, it is able to focus with greater free­dom on states’ technical centrifuge capabilities, allowing for more reliable judgments on proliferation risk to be made. The effectiveness of the IAEA’s verification regime is dimin­ished, however, by the selective and voluntary implementa­tion of AP requirements in ‘suspect states’—much as the theoretically powerful CSA Special Inspection tool is often rendered impotent in practice. Universalization of the Ad­ditional Protocol should therefore be a central goal in strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Source and contact: Mikael Shirazi and Andreas Persbo, Trust & Verify 133, April-June 2011.
VERTIC (the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) is an independent, non-profit making charitable organization. Established in 1986, VERTIC supports the development, implementation and verification of international agreements as well as initiatives in related areas. It can be reached: Development House, 56-64 Leonard Street
London EC2A 4LT, United Kingdom.
Tel: +44 20 7065 0880
Web: www.vertic.org

Iran: Busher reaches first criticality. 
According to Russian builder AtomStroyExport (ASE),  Iran's first nuclear power reactor Bushehr achieved criticality on 8 May 2011 and is now functioning at the minimum controlled power level. Final commissioning tests will now be carried out prior to start of commercial operation. According to Iranian news agency Fars, the plant is expected to be connected to the national grid within the next two months.
Construction work began on two German-designed pressurised water reactors (PWRs) at the Persian Gulf site in the mid-1970s but was abandoned in 1979 following the Islamic revolution when unit 1 was substantially complete. In 1994, Russia's Minatom agreed to complete unit 1 as a VVER-1000 making use of the infrastructure already in place. However, this necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the main reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with AtomStroyExport. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said in 2008 that it was no longer planning to complete Bushehr unit 2. Further delays ensued for negotiations over fuel supply for the plant, but two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering the supply of fresh fuel for the reactor and its return to Russia after use, securing the plant's fuel supply needs for the foreseeable future.
In February 2011, only weeks before operation was expected to start, the discovery of debris from damaged coolant pumps meant that all the fresh reactor fuel had to be unloaded, checked and cleaned, and the reactor internals and main circulation pipeline flushed through. Bushehr will produce about 1000 MWe for the Iranian grid; about 3% of the country's power supply.
The following table shows which countries produced nuclear energy for the first time after the 1970’s. Currently, only 10 countries did so (of which 3 weren't independent countries at that time), and if we look at countries who started construction of their first nuclear power station, we find that only China and Romania did so after the 1970’s (as said, Iran started in the 1970's)

Country         start of construction             first power of           

of first n-power plant          first n-reactor           

Slovenia                      3-1975                                    10-1981

Brazil                          5-1971                                    4-1982

Hungary                     8-1974                                    12-1982

Lithuania                    5-1977                                    12-1983

South Africa               7-1976                                    4-1984

Czech Republic          1-1979                                    2-1985

Mexico                       10-1976                                  4-1989

China                          3-1985                                    12-1991

Romania                     7-1982                                    7-1996

Iran                             -1975                                       -2011

So which country will be next? According to the World Nuclear Association nuclear power is under serious consideration in over 45 countries which do not currently have it. However, that is in most cases more whish than reality. It is difficult to predict which country will start with the construction of its first nuclear reactor next: will it be Poland, Belarus, Lithuania, Turkey, Jordan or after all the United Arab Emirates?

World Nuclear news, 10 May 2011 / Nuclear Monitor, 21 June 2007 / World Nuclear Association, Emerging nuclear energy countries (visited 25 May 2011)

Big antinuclear demonstration Switzerland. An estimated 20.000 people have held a massive demonstration in northern Switzerland against a possible decision by the government to rely on nuclear energy. The demonstration, staged near the Beznau nuclear power plant, was also attended by people from Germany, Austria and France. According to Maude Poirier, spokeswoman for Sortons du nucleaire, the rally was the biggest protest at nuclear power in Switzerland in 25 years.

Over a thousand high school students went on strike and marched to the centre of Bern on May 24Tuesday, to protest against Switzerland's nuclear energy policy, even though local police had not granted permission for the demonstration.

A day later, on May 25, the Swiss cabinet has called for the phasing out of the country’s five nuclear power reactors and for new energy sources to replace them. The recommendation will be debated in parliament, which is expected to make a final decision in June. If approved, the reactors would be decommissioned between 2019 and 2034 after they have reached their average lifespan of 50 years.

But the delay will anger the antinuclear movement, Greens and the Social Democrats (SP) who had called for nuclear reactors to be closed earlier. And indeed, it looks less like a phase-out scenario and more like an attempt to 'save' nuclear power.

The decision is likely to please business groups who had warned that "a premature shut down of Switzerland's nuclear reactors could lead to higher electricity costs and negatively impact the country's energy-hungry manufacturing sector."

Swiss utility companies Axpo, Alpiq and BKW had expressed an interest in building new nuclear plants and decisions on sites had been expected in mid-2012. (more on Switzerland: Nuclear Monitor 726; 13 May 2011)

Financial Times, 26 May 2011 / Reuters, 25 May 2011 / The Local (Sw.), 24 may 2011

Six potential locations for Danish LLW & ILW repository.
A major step towards a repository for Denmark's low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste has been made with the submission of three pre-feasibility studies to the Danish interior and health ministry. The first study, prepared by national decommissioning body Dansk Dekommissionering (DD), looks at different disposal concepts in terms of types of repository, waste conditioning, safety analyses, costs and long-term impact assessments. Overall, the studies conclude that a moderately deep repository would be the most appropriate from a security point of view, although this would be more expensive than a near-surface repository. From 22 areas suggested in preliminary studies, the reports recommend that six potential sites are taken forward for further study. The six identified locations will now be narrowed down to a shortlist of two or three by an inter-ministerial working group in a process that will include the affected municipalities and regions.

Denmark never implemented a commercial nuclear power program but operated a total of three scientific research reactors over the period from the late-1950s up to 2000, as well as associated fuel fabrication facilities. All three reactors – DR-1, DR-2 and DR-3 – were located at the Risø National Laboratory north of Roskilde on the island of Zeeland. Most of the used fuel from the reactors has been returned to the USA, but the country still has a sizeable amount of low and intermediate level radioactive waste which is being stored at Risø pending the selection and construction of a final repository.

World Nuclear News, 5 May 2011

SKB Turns in application for permit to build a final repository.
On March 16, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB, applied for a permit to build a final repository for spent nuclear fuel and a facility where the fuel will be encapsulated before being transported to the final repository. SKB's application will now be reviewed by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the Environmental Court. The application will subsequently be presented for political decision in the relevant municipalities and by the government. SKB wants to use the so-called KBS-3 method for the repository, in which spent fuel would be placed in copper and steel canisters before being placed in granite bedrock 500 meters below the surface. Bentonite clay would be put around the canisters as a barrier to radioactive leakage. Critics of the plan have repeatedly questioned the choice of copper and its potential for corrosion, among others issues.

The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review, or MKG, an organization that opposes the KBS-3 method, said that SKB has “shown arrogance in the face of criticism” about the method. The group called on Swedish politicians to “take responsibility” and require alternative methods to be further reviewed. MKG  favors a so-called deep-borehole repository, which would be deeper underground than the repository planned by SKB.

SKB is applying for permission to build an encapsulation facility in Oskarshamn Municipality and a final repository for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark in Östhammar Municipality. (see more on the SKB plans in: Nuclear Monitor 706, 26 March 2010: “Nuclear fuel waste storage: end of the road for the Swedish solution”).

In December 2009 SKB, the industry's jointly owned company for nuclear waste solutions, published a "preliminary" environmental impact statement (EIS) on the KBS-3 scheme. The report failed to meet even rudimentary requirements of an EIS. In January 2010 the SKB unilaterally declared the termination of public consultations on the project (consultations mandated by the Swedish Environmental Code, 1998). SKB makes no apologies, but simply notes that long-awaited updates will be filed together with the formal application.

SKB, 16 March 2011 / Nuclear Fuel, 21 February 2011 / Nuclear Fuel, 21 March 2011 / Nuclear Monitor 706, 26 March, 2010

The 'greying' of the nuclear industry.
Almost a third of Britain's nuclear inspectors are eligible to retire within three years, leaving a potential 'knowledge gap' within the regulator. The Office for Nuclear Regulation has hired 93 new inspectors since 2008. But of the 217 inspectors, 30 per cent are over the age of 57, 11 per cent are over 60 and 70 could retire by 2015. The regulator said that new recruits were needed soon so that the older generation could pass on their expertise and bridge the knowledge gap. Is that what they mean by saying that the nuclear industry has matured?

The Times (UK), 19 May 2011

No Nukes Asia Forum in Taiwan
Activist from Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and India wil hold their (almost) annual meeting in Taipei, from September 18- 22.

NNAF began in 1993 and unites Asian based antinuclear organizations. The forum always combines education and exchange with direct action and media outreach. This year the international delegation will travel to Taiwan’s nuclear power station no. 1 and 2 at the northeast coast and nuclear power plant no. 3 at the southeast coast. At the University of the capital Taipei a two-day program will discuss the danger of  nuclear power plants in earthquake prone areas, the debate on climate change and the role of nuclear power and the situation in the different countries.
Contact and more information: hsiujung.lee@gmail.com

Doctors against uranium.
The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) on September 1 adopted a resolution at its International Council meeting in Basel, Switzerland, calling for a ban on uranium mining and the production of yellowcake (uranium oxide). The resolution described both processes as “irresponsible” and “a grave threat to health and to the environment”.
The resolution also describes uranium mining and yellowcake production as a “violation of human rights”. The right to life, liberty and security, to physical integrity, self-determination, the protection of human dignity, the right to clean water are just some of the rights that are afflicted by uranium mining and its processes, say the doctors. IPPNW calls for appropriate measures to ban uranium mining worldwide
Although many national branches of the IPPNW network have been campaigning against uranium mining and nuclear energy for many years already it is seen as a major breakthrough that now the international federation has taken a firm position and has committed itself to support campaigns against uranium mining.
Source and contact: IPPNW, Anne Tritschler, Tel.: +49 (0) 30-698074-14, tritschler@ippnw.de

Iran: Busher reactor finished after 36 years!
On August 21, Russia started loading fuel into the reactor at Iran's first nuclear power station Bushehr. The Bushehr plant is on the Gulf coast of southwest Iran. It is Iran's first nuclear power plant. Construction of two pressurized water nuclear reactors began in 1974 with the help of German contractor Siemens and French scientists. The Bushehr I reactor was 85 percent complete and the Bushehr II reactor was partially complete prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Shah. The project was halted and the site was then damaged during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and equipment was looted.

The project was later revived with Russian help but construction ran into repeated delays blamed by Russia on problems with receiving payment from Iran. Current plans are for one reactor to be launched. Bushehr will have an operating capacity of 1,000 MW.
Reuters, 21 August 2010

Sudan: 4 reactors in 2030.
Well, if you think you read it all…. Sudan plans to build a four-reactor nuclear power plant to "fill a gap in the energy needs" of Africa's largest country by 2030, Mohamed Ahmed Hassan el-Tayeb, head of Sudan's atomic energy agency, said on August 24. He also said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would help to build a research reactor and power plant for Sudan by providing expert training for staff, fellowships and feasibility studies.

He said Sudan was hoping for "a medium size four-unit power plant with each reactor producing between 300-600 MW per year". El-Tayeb said bidding for equipment and technology could begin in five years time and a further 10 years for construction of the plant, so it could be completed by 2030, costing between US$3-6 billion.

Currently 20% of the population has access to electricity.
Reuters, 24 August 2010

Nuclear power: Goal or means?
Vice President Boediono of Indonesia said on August 20, that a proposal to build a nuclear power plant in Indonesia was still on the table although he could not say when or where it may be built. “We will continue trying. Someday, somewhere we will build the nuclear power plant.”

More often than not it seems that nuclear power is rather a goal than a means to boil water (because that’s all there is to it, or not…?).
Jakarta Post, 20 August 2010

Radioactive boars on the rise in Germany.
Almost a quarter century after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown in Ukraine, its fallout is still a hot topic in some German regions, where thousands of boars shot by hunters still turn up with excessive levels of radioactivity and considered potentially dangerous for consumption. In fact, the numbers are higher than ever before. The total compensation the German government paid last year for the discarded contaminated meat shot up to a record sum of  425,000 euro (US$558,000), from only about 25,000 euro ten years ago, according to the Federal Environment Ministry in Berlin. "The reason is that there are more and more boars in Germany, and more are being shot and hunted, that is why more contaminated meat turns up," spokesman Thomas Hagbeck told The Associated Press. Boars are among the species most susceptible to long-term consequences of the nuclear catastrophe 24 years ago. Unlike other wild game, boars often feed on mushrooms and truffles which tend to store radioactivity and they plow through the contaminated soil with their snouts, experts say.

However, boars are actually the beneficiaries of another ecological crisis — climate change. Central Europe is turning into a land of plenty for the animals, as warmer weather causes beech and oak trees to overproduce seeds and farmers to grow more crops the boars like to feast on such as corn or rape, said Torsten Reinwald of the German Hunting Federation.

"The impact of the Chernobyl fallout in Germany, in general, has decreased," said Florian Emrich, spokesman of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. For example, radiation has ceased to be a problem on fields cultivated with commercial crops, he said. But forest soil in specific regions that were hit hardest after Chernobyl — parts of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg in southern Germany — still harbors high amounts of radioactive Cesium-137 which has a half life of roughly 30 years, Emrich said. In fact, the Cesium from the Chernobyl fallout is moving further into the ground and has now reached exactly the layer where the boars' favorite truffles grow. Therefore, the season for such truffles — a variety not eaten by humans — usually means a rising number of radioactive boars.
AP, 18 August 2010

Russian reactor too expensive for Belarus?
Alyaksandr Lukashenko said that Belarus might abandon plans to have its nuclear power plant project built by Russia and financed with a Russian loan, according to BelaPAN. The Belarusian leader said that the signing of an interstate agreement on the project had been postponed once again, and that the government did not reject the possibility of the plant being built by a contractor other than Russia s Atomstroiexport. Belarus chose Russia on the basis of "what they promised to us," Mr. Lukashenko noted. "They urgently demanded from us that they build this plant and then they started putting pressure on us for, I believe, purely subjective reasons. You know what the reasons are," he said.

Russia wanted Belarus to pay "in fact a double price," but Minsk refused, saying that there had been an agreement that the price would be "the same as in Russia," he said, adding that Belarus had agreed to pay the price at which the last nuclear power plant was built in Russia.
www.naviny.by, 16 August 2010

RWE looses again: Borssele has to remain in public hands.

RWE failed to gain 50% of the Netherlands' only nuclear power plant at Borssele through its takeover of Dutch utility Essent. The ruling by the Arnhem appeal court upholds an earlier ruling prohibiting Germany's RWE from acquiring Essent's 50% stake in the Borssele nuclear plant as part of its takeover of the Dutch utility. According to Delta, the appeal court decision has emphasized that the country's sole nuclear power plant must remain in public ownership. Any transfer of Essent's share of the plant to RWE would therefore contravene this. In September 2009, the transaction price for RWE's takeover of Essent was dropped by 950 million Euro (then worth US$1.35 billion) to take into account the exclusion of Borssele from the deal while Delta's court case against the proposed transfer was ongoing. Essent's share in the plant has remained in the hands of the provincial and municipal governments who were the company's original public shareholders.
The Dutch coalition government collapsed on February 20, when the two largest parties failed to agree on whether to withdraw troops from Afghanistan this year as planned. Elections are planned on June 9, with an expected right-wing victory. The extreme-right party PVV ('party for freedom') is expected to become one of the largest –or even the largest- party in parliament. The PVV is (besides anti-islam and with racist tendencies) extremely pro-nuclear, anti-wind & solar energy and does not believe in climate change ands speaks consistently about the environmental movement as the 'environmental maffia'.

The just fallen coalition government had agreed not to approve any new nuclear plants in the Netherlands during its mandate. Dutch utility Delta has announced plans to build a second nuclear plant at the site, embarking on the first stage of the pre-application process in June 2009.

German utility RWE has indicated it is also interested in building a nuclear power plant in the Netherlands, RWE CEO Juergen Grossmann said at the company's annual earnings press conference on February 25 in Essen, Germany

World Nuclear News, 3 March 2010 / Platts, 25 february 2010

USDOE: US$40 million for Next Generation Nuclear Plant.

On March 8, U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu announced selections for the award of approximately US$40 million in total to two teams led by Westinghouse Electric Co. and General Atomics for conceptual design and planning work for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP).  The results of this work will help the Administration determine whether to proceed with detailed efforts toward construction and demonstration of the NGNP.  If successful, the NGNP Demonstration Project will demonstrate high-temperature gas-cooled reactor technology that will be capable of producing electricity as well as process heat for industrial applications and will be configured for low technical and safety risk with highly reliable operations.  Final cost-shared awards are subject to the negotiation of acceptable terms and conditions.

The NGNP project is being conducted in two phases.  Phase 1 comprises research and development, conceptual design and development of licensing requirements. The selections announced now will support the development of conceptual designs, cost and schedule estimates for demonstration project completion and a business plan for integrating Phase 2 activities. Phase 2 would entail detailed design, license review and construction of a demonstration plant.

U.S. Department Of Energy, Press Release 8 March 2010

Switzerland: Geneva will fight extension Muhleberg licence.

Geneva City Council has decided to appeal to the Federal Administrative Tribunal against the decision of the federal authorities to allow the 355 MW Mühleberg nuclear plant to continue operating beyond 2012, when it will have been 40 years in service. Geneva will contribute CHF 25,000 (US$23,000 or 17,000 Euro) to help meet the costs of a committee formed to oppose the licence extension. In November 2009 the electorate of the neighbouring canton of Vaud also voted against the extension. The centre-left Social Democrats and the Green Party are also opposing the licence extension.

Power In Europe, 22 February 2010 / Nuclear Monitor 702, 15 January 2010

Uranium mining - victory in Slovakia!

After more than three years of campaigning Slovak parliament finally agreed on legal changes in geological and mining laws in order to stop uranium mining in Slovakia. All the changes were proposed by anti-uranium mining coalition of NGOs led by Greenpeace and supported by over 113 000 people that signed the petition.  For Slovak environmental movement this is a really important milestone. For the first time in Slovak history NGO’s were able to:

1) collect over 100 000 signatures (a number given by law for the Parliament to discuss an issue) - note that Slovakia has 5 million citizens; 2) to open an environmental topic in Slovak parliament by a petition; 3) and finally to achieve a legal change by petition  initiative.

Legal changes agreed by parliament on March 3 are giving more information access and competencies for local communities, municipal and regional authorities to stop or limit geological research of uranium deposits and to stop proposed uranium mining. It’s not a complete ban of uranium mining, but a significant empower of local and regional authorities in the mining permitting process. All 41 municipal authorities influenced by proposed uranium mining already declared that they do not agree with proposed uranium mining in their territories.

The chance that Slovak uranium will stay deep in the ground is much higher today!

Greenpeace Slovensko, Bratislava, 4 March 2010

Uranium from stable and democratic countries?

One of Kazakhstan's most prominent business figures and a former uranium tycoon, Mukhtar Dzhakishev was arrested last year on accusations of corruption, theft and illegal sales of uranium assets to foreign companies. Dzhakishev's case, along with a string of other high-profile arrests in the former Soviet state and world No. 1 uranium producer, has fuelled speculation of an intensifying power struggle within the political elite.

Kazakhstan, hit hard by global economic slowdown, wants to attract fresh foreign investment as well as bolster the role of the state in strategic industries such as uranium and oil. It has also alarmed human rights groups who have questioned Kazakhstan's methods of fighting corruption in a country where President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in power for two decades, tolerates little political dissent.

Dzhakishev, who was head of state uranium major Kazatomprom from 1998 until his arrest and played a key role in turning Kazatomprom into a major global uranium player, has denied all accusations. "It is obvious that I cannot count on justice in my own country and my fate has already been decided," he wrote from his detention centre in a letter published by his lawyers this week. His arrest left Kazatomprom's foreign partners such as Canada's Uranium One worried about the future of their projects. Other investors include France's Areva and Japanese companies such as Toshiba Corporation. Closed-door court hearings into earlier allegations of theft and corruption have already started and lawyers expect a verdict in March.

Reuters, 4 March 2010

Israel to build reactor –but will not allow inspections?

Israel will shortly unveil plans to produce nuclear-generated electricity, officials said on March 8. Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau said Israel, which has a population of 7.5 million and generates electricity mostly using imported coal and local and imported natural gas, is capable of building a nuclear reactor, but it would prefer to work with other countries. Israel already has two reactors -- the secretive Dimona facility in the Negev desert, where it is widely assumed to have produced nuclear weapons, and a research reactor, open to international inspection, at Nahal Soreq near Tel Aviv.

Unlike other countries in the region, Israel has not signed the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is suppose to curb the spread of nuclear technologies with bomb-making potential. Yet Israel does have a delegation at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Landau said it would not be a problem for Israel to build a civilian reactor without signing the NPT: "There are many countries who are not signatories to the NPT and they are doing fine. There are others which are signatories and the world community did not really take proper care against proliferation," he said. Many countries? India, Pakistan and North-Korea (withdrawn), three (excuse me, four with Israel) and 189 signatories, you call that many? Asked whether IAEA inspectors would supervise the building of an Israeli plant, Landau said: "We take care very well of our own needs and don't need inspectors."

Reuters, 8 March 2010

…. And Syria? (March 11, 2010) Meanwhile, Israels' arch-foe Syria responded in Paris saying that Damascus needs "to consider alternative sources of energy, including nuclear energy." Syria's candidacy for the nuclear club will raise some eyebrows too, given the regime's close ties with Iran and the still unanswered questions over an earlier alleged attempt to build a reactor in secret. The International Atomic Energy Agency complained last year that Damascus had refused to cooperate with its investigation of a remote desert site called Dair Alzour, which was bombed by Israel in September 2007. Inspectors have found unexplained traces of uranium at the site, as well as at a nuclear research reactor in Damascus, amid reports that Syria has been working with Tehran and North Korea on covert nuclear programs.

AFP, 9 March 2010

Winter meeting of the Nuclear Heritage Network.

This relatively new network has been very active against uranium mining in Finland and is currently organising a Baltic Sea Info Tour (see http://www.greenkids.de/europas-atomerbe/index.php/Action:Infotour_Aroun...) and preparing new actions against nuclear new-build in the north-east region of Europe .

Their winter meeting will take place from March 24 to 29 in and close by Helsinki, Finland. This includes one day of action, aimed at the to be taken Finnish political decisions on more new nuclear power stations. An important project to be discussed for the summer will be the „Baltic Sea Info Tour“ that will take place to inform people around the Baltic Sea.

More information? Write an email to contact@nuclear-heritage.net

Chernobyl-Day: concerted action to stop Mochovce 3+4. The Wiener Plattform "Atomkraftfreie Zukunft" (Viennese Platform "Nuclearfree Future") has taken the lead in organising an international action-day on April 26, the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, against the construction of Mochovce 3+4 in Slovakia. (more on Mochovce in next issue).

They ask groups to demonstrate in front of Slovak and Italian embassies in as many countries as possible. A small delegation should submit a paper to the respective ambassadors. The paper explains the importance of stopping this dangerous Slovak nuclear power plant and says what the responsible people should do.

If these actions are carried out in numerous cities or capitals it should be effective enough to put pressure on Slovakia and the respective governments.  Please join the campaign and contact atomkraftfreiezukunft@gmx.at

Announcement: Anti Nuclear European Forum (ANEF) on June 24, in Linz, Austria.

ANEF was established 2009 as counter-event to ENEF (European Energy Forum) since ENEF failed to fulfill ENEF´s official objectives and was/is used one-sided as a propaganda instrument for the promotion of nuclear power instead. Within ANEF negative aspects of nuclear energy will be discussed on an international level. ANEF is organized by the Antinuclear Representative of Upper Austria in cooperation with “Antiatom Szene” and “Anti Atom Komitee”. The participation of international NGOs is very important because it needs a strong signal against the nuclear renaissance.

The organizers would like to warmly invite you to participate in ANEF. Please let us know as soon as possible if you, or someone else from your organization, is considering to participate in ANEF by sending an informal email to office@antiatomszene.info. The detailed program will be available soon and will be send to you upon request. Accommodation will be arranged for you.
Further information on ANEF is published on www.anef.info. Learn about ANEF-Resolution here: http://www.anef.info/?q=en. 

ElBaradei: Threat Iran ‘hyped’.
On September 14, the 53rd IAEA General Conference confirmed the appointment of Mr. Yukiya Amano of Japan, a Japanese career diplomat, as the next IAEA Director General. Mr. Amano assumes office on 1 December 2009, succeeding Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei to the Agency´s top post. His appointment is for a term of 4 years - until November 2013.

Meanwhile, in an interview with The Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists, Elbaradei stated that there is no concrete evidence that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons program. "But somehow, many people are talking about how Iran's nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world. In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped." ElBaradei said there was concern about Iran's future nuclear intentions and that Iran needs to be more transparent. “But the idea that we'll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn't supported by the facts as we have seen them so far," said ElBaradei.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 24 August 2009 / IAEA, 14 September 2009

France: charges dropped for publishing document.
The public prosecutor in Paris has decided not to press charges against Stephane Lhomme, the spokesperson for the anti-nuclear Sortir du Nucleaire organization. Lhomme had been under investigation since 2006 for breach of national security in connection with the publication of a classified document acknowledging weaknesses in the EPR reactor design's ability to withstand the crash of a commercial jetliner. After he was arrested many organizations published the documents on their website. 30,000 People, several of them wellknown political figures, intellectuals, writers and artists, signed a petition demanding the case to be closed.

Lhomme revealed in 2006 that he was in possession of an internal Electricite de France document, stamped "defense confidential," that acknowledged weaknesses in the EPR's resistance to an aircraft crash, a major issue after the terrorist attacks with airplanes in the US on September 11, 2001. The revelation came during public inquiry and licensing proceedings for EDF's first EPR unit, Flamanville-3. Lhomme was charged with endangering national security by revealing the contents of a classified document.

Nucleonics Week, 27 August 2009

SE tries to stifle opposition.
Plans by Slovak utility Slovenske Elektrarne (SE) to stifle opposition to its contested Mochvoce 3, 4 nuclear power reactors have mistakenly been leaked to Greenpeace. The leaked documents show that SE, which is jointly owned by Italian energy giant ENEL and the Slovak State, intends to manipulate public hearings on the environmental impact assessment for the project which involves the construction of two new Soviet-era reactors. The documents also mention strategies to "prevent [a] public hearing in Vienna", "reach the lowest possible media & public attention" and "avoid antinuc [sic] unrests [sic]". "These tactics are more akin to communist era manipulation and show that the Mochovce nuclear project is in dire straits," said Jan Haverkamp, Greenpeace EU dirty energy policy officer.

Construction of the Mochvoce 3,4 nuclear reactors started in the 1980s but was halted after the velvet revolution. After privatization of state utility SE to the Italian electricity giant ENEL, the Slovak government demanded from ENEL to finish the project. Because the reactors are from a 1970 Russian design and much of the civil construction already has happened in the 1980s, it is not possible to replace it with a modern design. As a result, the safety level of these nuclear reactors is lower than what is currently considered appropriate, especially after the 9/11 attacks.

Greenpeace 11 September 2009

US enrichment plant denied loan guarantee, or not?
US enrichment company USEC is preparing to 'demobilize' - or cancel - its partially built uranium enrichment plant after the US Department of Energy (DoE) denied its application for a loan guarantee in July.  As mentioned in the July 16 Nuclear Monitor In Briefs, loan guarantee from the Department of Energy was essential for continued construction. The American Centrifuge Plant is mid-construction at Piketon, Ohio. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted a construction and operation license for the plant in April 2007. The plant had been scheduled for commercial operation in 2010, but financing for the plant has long been a concern and earlier this year USEC announced that it was slowing the plant's schedule pending a decision on the DoE loan guarantee.  The company applied for loan guarantees amounting to US$2 billion (Euro 1.37 billion) in July 2008. After the DoE decision in late July, however, the company said it is initiating steps to demobilize the project in which it has already invested US$1.5 billion.

Two weeks later, in a surprising announcement, the Department of Energy said it has agreed to postpone by six months a final review of USEC's loan guarantee application for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio. The additional time will allow USEC to address financial and technical concerns about its application that caused the DoE to deny the loan guarantee.

Sources: World Nuclear News, 28 July & 5 Augusts 2009

DOE loan guarantees.
Established under the US Energy Policy Act of 2005, the DoE loan guarantee program was set up as a way of helping to drive forward the "commercial use of new or improved technologies to sustain economic growth while delivering environmental benefits such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing a stable and secure energy supply".

Up to US$18.5 billion of loan guarantees are available for the construction of advanced nuclear reactors and up to US$2 billion for front-end fuel cycle projects such as enrichment plants. The only front-end projects to submit loan guarantee applications by the September 2008 deadline were USEC's American Centrifuge Plant and Areva's Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility. Together, the USEC and Areva loan guarantee applications far exceeded the US$2 billion set aside for front-end fuel cycle loan guarantees.

Saving the climate equals 8 million jobs in the power industry.
A strong shift toward renewable energies could create 2.7 million more jobs in power generation worldwide by 2030 than staying with dependence on fossil fuels would. The study, by environmental group Greenpeace and the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), urged governments to agree a strong new United Nations pact to combat climate change in December in Copenhagen, partly to safeguard employment. “A switch from coal to renewable electricity generation will not just avoid 10 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions, but will create 2.7 million more jobs by 2030 than if we continue business as usual,” the report said. Under a scenario of business as usual, the number of jobs in power generation would fall by about half a million to 8.6 million by 2030, hit by mainly by a decline in the coal sector due to wider mechanization.

The report said that, for the first time in 2008, both the United States and the European Union added more capacity from renewable energies than from conventional sources including gas, coal oil and nuclear power. The report suggested the wind sector alone, for instance, could employ 2.03 million people in generating power in 2030 against about 0.5 million in 2010.

The report can be found at: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/working-for-the-cl...

U.K.: Keeping the nuclear fire burning.
A stinging attack on the nuclear policy of the United Kingdom's Government and the role played by civil servants has been made by Jonathan Porritt. Retiring as chairman of the Government's Sustainable Development Commission he spoke of wasted years and opportunities in pursuing the revival of the nuclear industry. In 2003 the commission had worked with the Department of Trade and Industry minister Patricia Hewitt on a new White Paper which concluded that "nuclear power is not necessary for a secure low-carbon efficient UK economy". However, instead of implementing the plans, civil servants "kept the nuclear flame burning" until a new minister was appointed. "The civil servants won that battle at a great cost to energy policy in the UK. We have had years of delay on critical things that could have been done on renewable energy and energy efficiency. We had six to eight years of prevarication when we could have been getting on with it."

N-Base Briefing 622, 19 August 2009

MOX-transport delayed.
A planned transport of MOX-fuel (Plutonium-uranium mixed oxide) from Sellafield to Grohnde nuclear reactor in northern Germany, which had been planned for this autumn is to be postponed. A spokeswoman of power plant operator E.on said September 10, that the transport will not be done within the next two months (probably meaning September and October). According to E.on the reasons are purely organizational and recent discussions about routes for the planned transport did not matter in the decision.

However, at the moment there is no agreement on which harbour should be used on the route to Grohnde. Bremen (harbor management) rejected the shipment. Earlier plans for a route via Cuxhaven had been withdrawn by the applicant (either a haulage company or E.on) after (encountering) strong criticism.

But the reason may actually be political. With German parliament elections late September, which may lead to either a nuclear-friendly or an anti-nuclear government for the next 4 years, polluters may be trying not to provoke more anti-nuclear publicity.

Die Welt online, 11 September 2009 / Junge Welt, 14 September 2009

Clean energy in Germany cheaper than nuclear power.
In July a study of the German ecological NGO "Deutsche Umwelthilfe" has been published that analyzed the electricity market in Germany. The results are very interesting and maybe a good argument for anti-nuclear campaigning in other countries, too: In practice all offers of nuclear companies are more expensive than clean energy of independent ecological electricity companies!

This result was surprising as the nuclear power has been much subsidized and the reactors have been paid for itself since a long time - so they have only the costs of running the reactors, but don't have to repay the costs of the construction any longer. In addition the nuclear fuel is tax-exempted, the nuclear companies don't have to have an insurance covering all the costs of the accidents they could cause, they don't have to pay a realistic price for the final disposal of their radioactive waste and other consequences...

But it is a fact: nuclear energy is more expensive than ecological energy - at least in Germany as the study proofs!

You find the tables (German) of this study in the internet: http://www.duh.de/uploads/media/Vergleich_Preis_Stromkennzeichnung_07-20...