HLW

Taiwan

Taiwan has adopted the following management strategy for spent nuclear fuel: “storage in spent fuel pools for the near term, onsite dry storage for the mid-term, and final deep geological disposal for the long term".(*01)

Atomic Energy Council (AEC) was founded in 1955 at the ministerial level under the Executive Yuan as the Competent Authority (regulatory body). FCMA is the unique agency for the supervision of spent fuel and radioactive waste safety management. Radwaste Administration (RWA) was established in January 1981, as an affiliated agency under AEC, to meet the growing need for radioactive waste management. After restructuring RWA was renamed as Fuel Cycle and Materials Administration (FCMA) in early 1996.(*02)

Low-level waste
The Lan-Yu Storage Site provides off-site interim storage for solidified low-level radioactive waste from 1982 to 1996, and has not received any radioactive waste since then. Because of the high temperature, moisture, and salty ambient atmosphere in Orchid Island, many drums stored on site for decades has shown paint scaling or rusted, some waste in drums even presents solification deformation.(*03)

Interim dry storage
Taiwan’s current policy calls for dry storage of spent fuel at the reactor site until final disposal, although it is recognized that additional storage facilities will be needed soon to deal with the growing amount of spent fuel being produced. Taiwan is also looking at sending its fuel overseas for reprocessing. However, U.S. government opposition to Taiwanese reprocessing has so far blocked significant movement on this; since Taiwanese reactors and fuel are of U.S. origin, bilateral agreements require Taiwan to obtain U.S. consent for reprocessing.(*04)

Recognizing the problem of spent fuel storage, the authorities began looking toward cooperation on the development of dry storage technology, with mixed success. China offered to take over Taiwan’s spent fuel inventory in the late 1990’s but Taiwan refused due to fears that Beijing would demand political concessions in exchange.(*05) In 2001, Taiwan also explored the possibility of storing its spent fuel on Russian territory; but dropped negotiations after U.S. objections.(*06) However, this could still be a possibility in the long-term.

Since December 1983, research for final disposal has been carried out. The "Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act" was issued in December 2002. It states that the producer of high-level waste is responsible for the implementation of final disposal and is required to submit a final disposal plan for HLRW within two years after the Act came into effect. In Dec. 2004, TPC submitted the "Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Disposal Plan" to AEC. The plan was approved in July, 2006, and will be carried out in five phases: (1) Potential host rock characterization (2) Candidate site investigation; (3) Detailed site investigation and testing; (4) Repository design and license application; and (5) Repository construction. Finally, a deep geological disposal repository is expected to be operational after 2055.(*07)

Ukraine

Established in 1996 the State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company 'Energoatom' is responsible for everything nuclear in Ukraine, including radioactive waste management. There is no intention for final disposal in Ukraine in the coming decades, though the possibility remains under consideration. In 2008 the National Target Environmental Program of Radioactive Waste Management was approved. Storage of used fuel for at least 50 years before disposal remains the policy.(*01)

Waste management: Interim storage
Before 2005, Ukraine transported annually about 220 tons of spent fuel to Russia.(*02) Because of the rising price of Russia’s reprocessing and spent-fuel storage services, however, Energoatom  decided in the 1990s to construct dry storage facilities. The first Ukrainian dry-cask interim storage facility came into operation in July 2001 at the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant for storage of fuel from the six reactors.(*03) But since 2005, Ukraine has been shipping spent fuel again to Russia from its other sites: about 150 tons a year from seven VVER-1000s and about 30 tons a year from its two VVER-440s,(*04) at a cost to Ukraine of over US$100 annual.(*05)

In December 2005, Energoatom signed a US$ 150 million agreement with the US-based Holtec International to implement the Central Spent Fuel Storage Project for Ukraine's VVER reactors.(*06) This was projected for completion in 2008, but was held up pending legislation.

Then in October 2011 parliament (and upper house in February 2012) passed a bill on management of spent nuclear fuel. It provides for construction of the dry storage facility within the Chernobyl exclusion area. The storage facility will become a part of the spent nuclear fuel management complex of the state-owned company Chernobyl NPP,(*07) also constructed by Holtec.

The first pond-type spent fuel storage facility (SFSF-1) for RBMK-1000 spent fuel at Chernobyl has been in operation since 1986. Due to the “unavailability of SFSF-2 and taking into account the future prospects of this project it was decided to withdraw SFSF-1 from the list of facilities, subject to decommissioning.”

SFSF-2 (or Interim Storage Facility-2 as it is often called outside Ukraine) construction started in June 2000 by Framatome (later Areva), financed by EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account, and part pf the Shelter Implementation Plan. ISF-2 is designed for long-term storage (100 years) of all Chernobyl spent fuel and is a necessary condition for decommissioning Chernobyl and SFSF-1. At the beginning of April, 2007 the agreement was canceled and in September 2007 a contract for completion was signed also with Holtec.(*08) The design of the new facility was approved by the Ukrainian regulator in late-2010. Work can commence once the contract amendment for the implementation is signed. It is expected that construction work will be finalized by 2014.(*09) Negotiations with Holtec on the construction could be completed in April 2012. Costs, however, have been escalating since the project financing scheme was drawn up before the 2008 financial crisis: some U.S. banks that participated in the financing scheme had ceased to exist.(*10)

High-level wastes from reprocessed spent fuel will be returned from Russia from 2013 onwards and should be stored at the existing repository 'Vektor' 17 km away from Chernobyl where a low-level waste repository has been built.(*11) Preliminary investigations have shortlisted sites for a deep geological repository for high- and intermediate-level wastes including all those arising from Chernobyl decommissioning and clean-up.(*12)

United Kingdom

In 1981, the government in Britain decided to postpone plans for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. In 2010, the NDA came up with a plan that has to lead to final disposal of high-level waste from 2075. The government claims to follow an advisory committee, but the committee thinks the government gives a distorted view of their advice. Nuclear fuel is reprocessed and liquid and glassified waste is stored at Sellafield until a final repository will be opened.

Low- and medium-level radioactive waste
Great Britain dumped solid low and intermediate level radioactive waste in sea from 1949 untill 1982.(*01) A near-surface repository in Drigg (near Sellafield) has operated as a national low-level waste disposal facility since 1959. Wastes are compacted and placed in containers before being transferred to the facility.(*02)

Investigation from 1978 to 1981 into the disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Caithness led to much opposition. In 1981, the British government therefore decided to postpone a decision on the storage of high-level waste by fifty years.(*03)

Although in 1981 the government decided to postpone the plans for a high-level radioactive waste facility, the search for a storage place for low- and medium-level  radioactive waste had to be continued. For this purpose the British nuclear industry created Nirex in 1982. After repeated selections of a number of new sites and abandoning them again, Nirex chose Sellafield in 1991 for detailed studies on a deep repository for long-lived low-level and intermediate level radioactive waste.(*04)

In March 1997, however, the government rejected Sellafield due to the unfavorable geological conditions. The government has also decided that a new choice of location can take place only  after the government has adopted new procedures for that purpose, and for that participation is required. It took until 2001 before new procedures have been settled.(*05) It will take at least 25-30 years before a deep geological disposal facility for low en intermediate level radioactive waste will be in operation.(*06) Large information campaigns for years and years hasn’t led to a final repository for nuclear waste.

High-level radioactive waste
After the 1981 postponement of a decision on the storage of high-level, the parliament established a new waste policy in 2001, which led to the foundation of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2002. The government set up the commission on radioactive waste management (CoRWM) in 2003 to consider long-term waste strategy. This committee has to advise the government on all sorts of nuclear waste, of which "inspire public confidence" and "protect people and the environment" have been central principles.(*07)

The CoRWM released an advice in July 2006.(*08) The committee calls robust interim storage (100 years) and geological disposal as the end-point for all high and intermediate level waste. in deep underground after intensive research into the long-term safety of disposal. For the realization of the storage "voluntarism and partnership" is important: the local population should be willing to cooperate. The government adopted the recommendations of the CoRWM in October 2006 and initiated a new round of official consultations that would end in 2008. Nirex was wound up and the government-owned Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was given responsibility for the long-term management of all UK radioactive wastes.

Meanwhile, it became clear there was a more positive feeling about the construction of nuclear power plants. CoRWM found it necessary to emphasized that its opinion is about nuclear waste that already exists ('legacy waste'): with nuclear waste from new-build power plants other ethical and political aspects play a role than with the present waste. CoRWM states there was no distinction, technically. Both could be accommodated in the same stores and disposal sites. But creating new-build wastes was a choice, and there were alternatives. The political, social and ethical issues surrounding the deliberate creation of new wastes were therefore quite different from those arising from the inevitable need to manage the legacy.(*09) CoRWM argued that the waste implications of any new build proposals would need their own assessment process.

On 10 January 2008, the government announced plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants, followed by a new nuclear waste policy on 12 June 2008.(*10) The government indicated to make no distinction between waste, which is now simply inevitable, and waste from new power plants. The government said that principles of "voluntarism and partnership" are to be used in the selection process and calls on municipalities to present themselves to host a disposal facility. Most of the land in the UK is thought to be geologically suitable for the store.(*11)

Several members of the first CoRWM don’t agree with the government. On a November 20, 2009, letter to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change(*12), Ed Miliband, they stated that the government has reproduced the CoRWM report in an incorrect and distorted way. "In conclusion we reiterate that we do not consider it credible to argue that effective arrangements exist or will exist either at a generic or a site-specific level for the long—term management of highly active radioactive wastes arising from new nuclear build." The members also protest against the fact that the government makes no distinction between unavoidable nuclear waste, which has been produced already, and new nuclear waste that can be avoid. "However, it is clear that government has conflated the issue of new build with legacy wastes and thereby intends the CoRWM proposals to apply to both. No separate process, as suggested by CoRWM1, for new build wastes is contemplated. There will be no opportunity for communities selected for new nuclear power stations to consider whether they wish to volunteer to host a long term radioactive waste facility; it will simply be imposed upon them."

On 15 January 2010, the Scottish government said that nuclear waste must be just stored above ground at or close to existing nuclear facilities (in Dounreay, Hunterston, Torness and Chapelcross), reducing the need for waste to be transported long distances. A consultation exercise on the issue has been launched. Underground storage is not eligible because "Having an out of sight, out of mind policy is losing support." The strategy is at odds with the UK government's preferred option of storing nuclear waste deep underground.(*13)

In March 2010, the NDA published a report in which it states that "a geological disposal facility will be available to receive ILW and LLW in 2040 and HLW and spent fuel in 2075",(*14) but spending cuts could delay the plans, and community support is vital.(*15)
The government thinks this takes too long, and Energy Minister, Charles Hendry, asked NDA's Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD) to look at reducing the timescales for first emplacement of high level waste (currently 2075) as well as the dates for spent fuel and waste from new build power stations presently indicated to take place in 2130.(*16)

In a preliminary response to the Minister's request RWMD says: "There are fundamental principles that are critical to the success of the implementation of the geological disposal programme. These are: the vital role of voluntarism and partnership with local communities (…); and, the need for technical and scientific work necessary to underpin the safe disposal of radioactive waste to be done rigorously and to the required high standard."(*17) RWDM will evaluate and "be in a position to consider whether or not changes to the programme would be realistic" in December 2012. (*18)

The long and tortuous story of UK radioactive waste policy demonstrates that achieving legitimacy around the management of these wastes is a social process with long time horizons. After 50 years of policies, institutional change and debate, extraordinarily little has been achieved in securing the long-term disposition of wastes.

United States of America

The U.S. nuclear waste management policy in the 1960s was focused on underground storage in salt. From 1987 on it was all about Yucca Mountain. In 2009 newly elected President Obama thwarted the plan and a commission was founded to study possible disposal: the nuclear waste policy is back to square one. Awaiting a final disposal facility, spent fuel is stored on site of nuclear power plants. U.S. nuclear utilities are eager to demonstrate that the spent fuel will not stay on-site indefinitely. Thus far, however, all efforts to establish central interim storage facilities have been unsuccessful.(*01) The U.S. dumped between 1949 –1967 in an unknown number of operations radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean, and between 1946-1970 in the Pacific Ocean.(*02) No commercial reprocessing has taken place.

No high-level radioactive waste in salt
Already in 1957 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) called storage of nuclear waste in salt the best option.(*03) Also the Atomic Energy Commission developed plans in that direction. In 1963 test drilling in salt began at Lyons, Kansas for a national repository. Because this produced unfavorable results, one went to other places to drill in salt. Also without success.(*04)

Then the eye fell on salt at Carlsbad, New Mexico. The construction of the storage mine (called Waste Isolation Pilot Plant -WIPP) was expected to cost US$ 100 million in 1974,(*05) was cancelled by president Carter in 1980, but Congress restored budget to keep it alive.(*06) The storage would initially begin in 1988, but, although the underground facility was finished by then, because water leaked into the mine (*07) the start of disposal is delayed many times.(*08,09,10) The first waste arrived at WIPP on March 26, 1999. (*11) Construction costs were estimated at US$ 2 billion. (*12)

Around 64,000 m³ of waste – out of the maximum allowed quantity of 175,600 m³ - was stored by the end of 2009. Storage is planned to continue until the end of the 2020s when the maximum allowed capacity will be reached; the mine will be closed in 2038.(*13) It is the world's first geological repository. However, not all nuclear waste can be stored at WIPP. The U.S. government makes a distinction between nuclear waste generated from the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste generated by the production of electricity from nuclear power plants. In Carlsbad, the storage of low and high level radioactive waste (including spent fuel) from nuclear power plants for electricity production has been expressly prohibited by the government.(*14) However, one part of the radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production was allowed to go there. Generally, TRU (Transuranic) waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with radioactive elements, mostly plutonium.(*15)

In 1982, the government established the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This Act gave states with possible locations an important role in the supervision on the choice of location, including federal funds for its own investigation into the suitability of the site, for an amount of US$10 million per year. States also had the power to prevent the storage. The NWPA mandated that the DOE select three candidate sites for a geological repository for U.S. spent fuel and high-level waste.(*16)

The government adapted the rules. In 1984, the DOE put salt lower on the list and a year later only one salt layer remained on the list: Deaf Smith, Texas.(*17) In 1986, the DOE nominated sites in Texas (salt), Washington state (basalt) and in Nevada’s Yucca Mountain (volcanic tuff).(*17)

At the time, two of the most politically powerful members of Congress, the Speaker of the House and the House Majority Leader, represented Texas and Washington state respectively. They opposed siting the repository in their states. By comparison, the delegation from Nevada was politically relatively weak and so Yucca Mountain became the focus of attention.(*19) In 1987, therefore, Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to direct that Yucca Mountain would be the only site to be examined for suitability for the first U.S. Geological repository. (*US20) The 1982 NWPA had mandated that the second repository be in crystalline rock, i.e., in the eastern half of the country, where most of the country’s power reactors are located. However, the 1987 amendments also instructed the DOE to “phase out in an orderly manner funding for all research programs … designed to evaluate the suitability of crystalline rock as a potential repository host medium.” (*21)

To reassure Nevada that other states would ultimately share the burden of hosting the nation’s radioactive waste, Congress also set a legal limit on the amount of radioactive waste that could be emplaced in Yucca Mountain “until such time as a second repository is in operation.” The limit was established as “a quantity of spent fuel containing in excess of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal or a quantity of solidified high level radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of such a quantity of spent fuel.”(*22)

No high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain
The implementation of the decision to dispose nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain did not go smoothly. "Yucca Mountain is not selected through a scientific method, but through a political process," said Robert Loux. He worked for the government of the state of Nevada as a leader of the real estate developer for radioactive waste. "The choice of the repository led to much resistance. The governor, congress delegates, local authorities and almost the entire population was against it." Yucca Mountain is located in an earthquake zone. Loux: "There are 32 underground fractures and four young volcanoes. In the summer of 1992, an earthquake occurred with a magnitude of 5.4 on the Richter scale. This led to considerable damage. Therefore Yucca Mountain is unsuitable. The government of Nevada has made laws that prohibit the storage.”(*23) In March 1998, a survey of the California Institute of Technology found that the risk of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions is larger than hitherto assumed.(*24)

The Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository would have to come in operation in 2010, according to plans made in the 1980s. But it took until July 2002, when President Bush signed a resolution clearing the way for disposal at Yucca Mountain, (*25) and until June 2008 before the DOE applied for a permit to build the storage.(*26) President Barack Obama stopped the storage at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in late February 2009,(*27) although DOE had spent US$14 billion (in 2009 dollars) from 1983 through 2008 for the Yucca Mountain repository. The construction of the storage mine and exploitation would have cost between US$41 and US$67 billion (2009 dollars) according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).(*28) Obama finds Yucca Mountain unsuitable and unsafe for the disposal of radioactive waste and therefore "no option". A new strategy for the disposal of nuclear waste must be developed and on 29 January 2010, Obama appointed a commission to work out a new policy: the 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future'.(*29)

On 27 January 2012, after nearly two years of work, the Blue Ribbon Commission has issued its final recommendations for "creating a safe, long-term solution" for dealing with spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Efforts to develop a waste repository and a central storage facility should start immediately, it says. “Put simply, this nation's failure to come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly. It will be even more damaging and more costly the longer it continues.” It continued, "The need for a new strategy is urgent, not just to address these damages and costs but because this generation has a fundamental, ethical obligation to avoid overburdening future generations with the entire task of finding a safe, permanent solution for managing hazardous nuclear materials they had no part in creating."(*30) Experience in the U.S. and in other nations suggests that any attempt to force a top down, federally mandated solution over the objections of a state or community - far from being more efficient - will take longer, cost more, and have lower odds of ultimate success. By contrast, the approach the commission recommends is explicitly adaptive, staged, and consent-based. In practical terms, this means encouraging communities to volunteer to be considered to host a new nuclear waste management facility while also allowing for the waste management organization to approach communities that it believes can meet the siting requirements. Siting processes for waste management facilities should include a flexible and substantial incentive program.(*31) On 31 January 2012, Energy Secretary Steven Chu said that the U.S. will likely need more than one permanent repository for commercial nuclear fuel.(*32) The U.S. nuclear waste policy is therefore back to square one. Except that there is no chance of returning to the option of salt domes or layers. This follows from the 2008 "Nuclear waste trust decision" of the U.S. government,(*33) stating: "Salt formations currently are being considered as hosts only for reprocessed nuclear materials because heat-generating waste, like spent nuclear fuel, exacerbates a process by which salt can rapidly deform. This process could potentially cause problems for keeping drifts stable and open during the operating period of a repository”.

Refrerences:

Taiwan
*01- Atomic Energy Council: High Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal, 1 April 2011
*02- Taiwan: National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, June 2007
*03- Atomic Energy Council: Lan-yu Storage Site status, February 2012
*04- Nuclear Fuel:  Long-Term Spent Fuel Dilemma at Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Renegotiation, Nuclear Fuels, June 1, 2009.
*05- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan Rejected Chinese Offer of Fresh Fuel for Waste Disposal, 20 April 1998
*06- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan to Wait on U.S.-Russian Deal Before Taking Spent Fuel Initiative, 9 July 2001
*07- Atomic Energy Council, 1 April 2012

Ukraine
*01- World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Ukraine, February 2012
*02- K.G. Kudinov: Creating an Infrastructure for Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel, in Glenn E. Schweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber, ed., An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility-Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype, National Academies Press, 2005, pp. 145-151
*03- David G. Marcelli and Tommy B. Smith: The Zaporozhye ISFS, Radwaste solutions, Jan/Febr 2002
*04- International Panel of Fissile Materials: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011
*05- World Nuclear Association,  February 2012
*06- Business wire: Energoatom and Holtec International Formalize the Contract to Build a Central Storage Facility in Ukraine, 30 December 2005
*07- World Nuclear Association,  February 2012
*08- JC-  Ukraine: Ukraine National Report on Compliance with the Obligations under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, September 2008, p.48-49
*09- EBRD: Chernobyl: New Safe Confinement and Spent Fuel Storage Facility, March 2011
*10- Ukrinform: Talks on construction of storage facility for spent nuclear fuel to be completed in April, 28 March 2012
*11- Foratom: Ukrainian Nuclear Forum Association, 28 February 2012 www.foratom.org/associate-members/ukraine.html
*12- World Nuclear Association, February 2012

United Kingdom
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999, p53
*02- Low Level Waste Repository Ltd: http://www.llwrsite.com
*03- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout: Learning to listen: institutional change and legitimation in UK radioactive waste policy; in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, December 2009, p. 989 – 1008. 
*04- John Knill: Radioactive Waste Management: Key Issues for the Future, in: F. Barker (ed), Management of Radioactive Wastes. Issues for Local Authorities. Proceedings of the UK Nuclear Free Local Authorities Annual Conference 1997 held in Town House, Kirkcaldy, Fife, on 23 October 1997, Publisher Thomas Telford, London, 1998, p 1 - 17.
*05- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout
*06- NDA: Strategy for the management of solid low-level radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, August 2010
*07- Department for Trade and Industry (DTI): Managing the Nuclear Legacy: a Strategy for Action, CM 5552, HMSO, London, July 2002.
*08- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely, CoRWM’s recommendations to Government, Doc 700, HMSO, London, July 2006
*09- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Re-iteration of CoRWM’s Position on Nuclear New Build, Doc 2162.2, HMSO, London, September 2007
*10- Defra/BERR: Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: A Framework for Implementing Geological Disposal, Cm 7386, HMSO, London, June 2008.
*11- World Nuclear News: Waste Plan Revealed, 12 June 2008
*12- Blowers, MacKerron, Allan, Wilkinson, Pitt and Pickard:  New Nuclear Build and the Management of Radioactive Wastes, Letter to Secretary of State from Former Members of CoRWM, 20 November, 2009
*13- BBC News: Nuclear waste storage options examined, 15 January 2010
*14- NDA: Geological Disposal, Steps towards implementation, March 2010 p.24
*15- BBC News on line: Budget cuts caution on UK nuclear waste plan, 7 July 2010
*16- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste, 22 December 2011
*17- NDA: Geological Disposal. Review of Options for Accelerating Implementation of the Geological Disposal Programme, December 2011
*18- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste

United States of America
*01- IPFM: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011, p.106
*S02- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*03- Department of Energy: WIPP Chronology, 5 February 2007
*04- For a detailed discussion on the history of the plans for the storage of nuclear waste in the U.S. we refer to: 1- Ronnie Lipschutz: Radioactive Waste: Politics, Technology and Risk, Cambrigde USA, 1980; 2- A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze, Political Construction of Technology. Nuclear Waste disposal in the United States, 1945-1972, WMW-publication 10, Faculteit Wijsbegeerte en Maatschappijwetenschappen Universiteit Twente, Netherlands, 1992; 3- Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The National Experience, in: Roger E. Kasperson (ed), Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983, chapter 2.
*05-World Watch: WIPP-Lash: nuclear burial plan assailed, Vol 4, No 6 , Nov/Dec 1991, p.7
*06- Science: Radwaste dump WIPPs up a controversy,19 March 1982
*07- US Guardian weekly: Pilot waste dump is already in trouble, 12 October 1988
*08- Nucleonics Week: WIPP moves toward 1993 waste tests, senate okays bill in 11^th hour, 15 October 1992. p 8
*09- WISE News Communique: US DOE delays (abandons?) giant waste projects, no 389, 19 November 1993, p 6
*10- WISE News Communique, US: WIPP is delayed again and again…, no. 496, 21 August 1998, p 2
*11- WISE News Communique: First waste at WIPP, but problem not solved, no 508, 9 April 1999
*12- Nuclear Fuel: After two decades and $2billion, DOE targets spring for WIPP operations, 9 March 1998, p 6-7
*13- Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Renewal Application Chapter 1, Closure Plan, May 2009
*14- WIPP: Why WIPP, 5 February 2007
*15- Luther. J. Carter, Waste Management; Current Controversies  over the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; in: Environment, Vol. 31, no. 7, September 1989, p 5, 40-41
*16- Ralph. L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt: Managing Waste from Power Plants, in: Risk Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1994, pp 107-130.
*17- Department of Energy: Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, June 1985, Volume 1, p 41
*18- Department of Energy: A Multi-attribute utility analysis of sites nominated for characterization for the first radioactive waste repository – A decision aiding methodology, DOE/RW-0074, 1986
*19- IPFM: Managing spent nuclear fuel from power reactors, 2011, p.109
*20- United States of America Congress: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, The Act was extensively amended on 22 December 1987, Sec. 160
*21- NWPA, Sec. 161
*22- NWPA, Sec. 114, d
*23-  Interview Robert Loux by Herman Damveld, in: Herman Damveld, Steef van Duin en Dirk Bannink: Kernafval in zee of zout? Nee fout! (Nuclear waste in sea or salt? No wrong!),  Greenpeace Netherlands, 1994, p. 29-30
*24- Nuclear Fuel: 6 April 1998, p 13.
*25- Reuters: Bush clears way for Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, 23 July 2002
*26- Barry D. Solomon: High-level radioactive waste management in the USA, in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009,  p. 1009–1024
*27- World Nuclear News: Obama dumps Yucca Mountain, 27 February 2009
*28- Government Accountability Office: Nuclear Waste Management. Key attributes, challenges, and costs for the Yucca Mountain repository and two potential Alternatives, GAO-10-48, November 2009. p.19
*29- World Nuclear News: Post-Yucca nuclear waste strategy group, 1 February 2010. One issue that will not be on the table is the exact location of any eventual waste facilities. The 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future' is only to consider strategy, not implementation
*30- World Nuclear News: Immediate action needed on US waste policy, 27 January 2012
*31- Blue Ribbon Commission: Report to the Secretary of Energy, 26 January 2012
*32- Platts: More than one permanent US nuclear repository likely needed: Chu, 31 January 2012
*33- Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Waste Confidence Decision Update, 9 October 2008, p. 59555

China

In China, there are two storage facilities for intermediate-level waste and a centralized facility for high-level waste. A geological disposal repository for high-level waste will start operation in 2050 at the earliest.

Reprocessing
When China started to develop nuclear power, a 'closed fuel cycle' strategy was formulated and declared at an International Atomic Energy Agency conference in 1987: at-reactor storage; away-from-reactor storage; and reprocessing. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)  has drafted a state regulation on civil spent fuel treatment as the basis for a long-term government program. There is a levy of CNY 2.6 cents/kWh on used fuel, to pay for its management, reprocessing, and the eventual disposal of HLW.(*01)

China began construction of a multi-purpose reprocessing pilot plant at Lanzhou nuclear complex in July 1997. This project was approved in July 1986 and began receiving spent fuels from Daya Bay reactors in September 2004. The plant is fully operational.

Moreover, a commercial reprocessing plant (800 tHM/a) is planned to be in commission around 2020 at the Lanzhou Nuclear Complex, and site selection has already begun.(*02) However, as of December 2009, no final agreement had been reached between China and France on the transfer of the relevant technologies; the plant construction appears to remain on hold.(*03)

Interim storage and final disposal
In the 1980’s, radioactive waste disposal work was initiated in China. The former Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI) subsidiary Science and Technology Committee set up a panel of radioactive waste treatment and disposal. The siting of solid LILW disposal site began in the 1980’s and was implemented under the auspice of the former Ministry of Nuclear Industry. Industrial-scale disposal of low- and intermediate-level wastes is at two sites, near Yumen in northwest Gansu province, and at the Beilong repository in Guangdong province, near the Daya Bay nuclear plant. These are the first two of five planned regional low- and intermediate-level waste disposal facilities.(*04)

A centralized used fuel storage facility has been built at Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex, 25 km northeast of Lanzhou in central Gansu province. The initial stage of that project has a storage capacity of 550 tons and could be doubled.(*05) However, most used fuel is stored at reactor sites. New Chinese plant designs include on-site spent fuel storage with a capacity of 20 years worth of spent fuel.(*06)

Although most of China’s nuclear power plants are located in the more populated eastern regions, storage facilities are located in the far west. This policy is likely aimed at avoiding local opposition to locating these facilities near populated areas, signaling at least a marginal impact that public opinion might have on Chinese policies.

However, as one Chinese nuclear expert observed, unlike democratic systems where public opinion holds significant sway, the decision of the Chinese government is really “the only decisive factor for spent fuel management in China.”(*07) Since 2003, the spent fuel from two nuclear power plants in the southeastern province of Guangdong has been shipped to the Gansu facility – a distance of about 4000 kilometers. This is consistent with CNNC policy to ship spent fuel by rail to centralized storage facilities for interim storage and reprocessing.(*08)

In 1985, CNNC worked out an R&D program for the deep geological disposal of high/level waste. The preliminary repository concept is a shaft-tunnel model, located in saturated zones in granite.(*09)

Site selection and evaluation has been under way since then and is focused on three candidate locations in the Beishan area of Gansu province and will be completed by 2020. All are in granite. An underground research laboratory will then be built 2015-20 and operate for 20 years. The third step is to construct the final repository from 2040 and to carry out demonstration disposal. Acceptance of high-level wastes into a national repository is anticipated from 2050.(*10)

The regulatory authorities of high-level radioactive waste disposal projects are Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA). The China Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) is in charge of the project control and financial management. CNNC deals with implementation, and four CNNC subsidiaries are key players: Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) handles site investigation and evaluation, engineered barrier study and performance analyses, with the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) undertaking radionuclide migration studies. The China Institute for Radiation Protection (CIRP) is responsible for safety assessment, and the China Nuclear Power Engineering Company (CNPE) works on engineering design.(*11)

Czech Republic

State-owned utility CEZ is fully responsible for storage and management of its spent fuel until it is handed over to the state organization SURAO (RAWRA in English: Radioactive Waste Repository Authority), founded on 1 June 1997.(*01) Eventual provision of a high-level waste repository is the responsibility of RAWRA. Most of low and intermediate level waste is stored on site or moved to the near-surface repository in operation at Dukovany.(*02)

Long-term interim storage
The concept preferred at the moment is the long-term interim storage of spent fuel in container interim storage facilities at the sites of the nuclear power plants at Temelin and Dukovany. Problem concerning this is that the spent fuel must be stored in an interim storage facility for a very long period of time, because the final disposal in a repository is only planned after 2065. The condition of the nuclear waste or the level of the hazard potential of the waste at that stage is unforeseeable.(*03)

In agreement with the Policy for radioactive waste and spent fuel management of 2002 the Czech Republic anticipates to develop a national deep geological repository in magmatic crystallytic rocks (granites or homogenous gneiss massifs) after 2050 and it should start operation in 2065.

The program of the repository development started back in 1992 (in the first year jointly with the Slovak Republic). Thirty potential locations were gradually identified, of which 12 potential locations were selected with varied geological conditions and diverse host rocks. The first geological survey was performed on six locations with granitic massifs in 2003 – 2005, without utilization of surface survey methods, and areas were selected for future prospecting stage of the geological survey. The works were suspended in 2005 due to public resistance.(*04) On 17 December 2009 “as a gesture of goodwill”, RAWRA announced that it will make it possible for communities to claim a financial compensation for geological research work of potentially CZK 100 million in total.(*05)

On November 25, 2010 a working group for dialogue was established to “strengthen the transparency of the process of selection a suitable site for a deep geological repository of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste, with respect to the public interests and to facilitate the active participation of the public and the communities in particular in the related decision-making process.”(*06)

Based on results of the completed stage of negotiations with the general public the Administration anticipates the start of surveying works start gradually after “negotiations with the general public are completed" and “only if the affected municipalities get involved on a voluntary basis in the selection process of the future deep geological repository location.”(*07) One possible site is at Skalka in southern Moravia. In the late 1990s, this site was considered for a centralized used fuel interim storage facility as an alternative to the Temelin storage facility and to the storage capacity expansion at Dukovany (beyond the 600 t facility).(*08)

Finland

In 1994, the Nuclear Energy Act came into force, according to which all nuclear waste must be treated, stored and disposed of in Finland. Before that some of the spent fuel was sent to Russia.(*01) Posiva Oy is responsible for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It is established in 1995 by TVO and Fortum, two owners of nuclear power plants.(*02) Storage of spent fuel takes place on site until the final repository is finished. Finland hopes to begin with final disposal in granite around 2020-2025.

Onkalo
Preparations for the disposal of high level radioactive waste began in the late 1970s.(*03) In 1985, 102 potential sites were listed and in 1987 reduced to five for further research. This resulted in detailed site investigation at four sites from 1992 on, two of them at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. For all sites an environmental impact assessment was carried out and in May 1999, Posiva Oy proposed for a permit for the disposal at Olkiluoto in the municipality of Eurajoki. Local consent was highest in Olkiluoto and Loviisa, but at Olkiluoto a larger area was reserved for the repository and a larger part of the spent fuel was already stored there.

In January 2000 the town council of Eurajoki accepted the repository, followed by approval by the government and parliament in May 2001. In Finland the same disposal concept is applied as in Sweden.(*04) The construction application will be submitted in 2012, and operating license application in 2018. Posiva Oy expects that the first cannisters will go down in 2020 and final disposal will end in 2112. Around 2120, the repository is finally closed and sealed.(*05)

Construction of an underground rock characterization facility (called Onkalo) started in 2004. This will later become (part of) the final repository.(*06)

In May 2010 it was found that the time schedule might not be met. The Finnish TV showed that there is still much research to be done before the application for the permit (scheduled end of 2012) can take place. The Director of the Research Department of Posiva Oy, Juhani Vira, stated his willingness to request the permit at a later date.(*07)

However, in the planned facility will not have enough space for the spent fuel from the already approved nuclear reactor at Pyhäjoki. In October 2011, TVO and Fortum stated that the repository could not safely be expanded to accommodate used fuel from Fennovoima's planned plant.(*08) In March 2012, Despite pressure from the government to make a deal, Posiva Oy maintains that it could not be extended any further without compromising its long-term safety.(*09)

Because Finland has the same disposal concept as Sweden, there is the same criticism on the stability of the granite and on the use of copper. Dr. Johan Swahn, Director of the Swedish NGO office for nuclear waste review, wrote in December 2009: “There is no way that anyone can honestly claim that Posiva has a completed robust safety case. The Posiva safety case has not been developed independently, but relies entirely on the Swedish safety case work. The final test of the Swedish safety case will not be done until the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority gives an approval of the safety analysis…This will not be the case before 2013-2014.” “Already now there is concern from the authority about the barrier systems of copper and clay. It is not clear if all relevant copper corrosion processes are known and the risk for clay erosion is still not understood. So an approval is not at all certain. And nothing can today be claimed to be robust."(*10)

In 2010, the Swedish geologist Nils-Axel Mörner noted that there are many horizontal and vertical fractures around the planned repository. According to Mörner the safety is therefore not proven.(*11)

Geology Professor Matti Saarnisto, former Secretary-General of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, told in June 2010 Parliament that “an exaggeratedly positive image has been presented of the integrity of the structure of Olkiluoto’s bedrock”. He warns that a honeycomb of storage sites extending over an area of several square kilometres will weaken the bedrock, making it vulnerable to earthquakes, and that during an ice age permafrost could spread deep into the rock, potentially rupturing the canisters and releasing radioactivity into the groundwater.(*12)

“The matter of fact is that to some extent all of the research institutes involved are suffering from a hostage syndrome. They see it as essential that spent fuel be disposed of at Olkiluoto, because it has been planned that way for decades. There is no scientific basis for it,” Saarnisto said in 2009.(*13)

France

As in almost all countries, in France, the storage of radioactive waste is controversial. Pressure groups believe the storage of high-level radioactive waste in clay, planned at Bure from 2025 at the earliest, is in violation of the legislation of the government, because there is only one underground laboratory and a 1991 law requires at least two. All spent fuel is reprocessed in La Hague. France dumped low- and intermediate level waste in sea twice, from 1967-1969.(*01)

LLW
Low-level radioactive waste was stored at the above-ground site CSM (Centre de Stockage de la Manche) from 1969 till 1994. In 1996, the government-appointed commission 'Turpin' concluded that the site also contains long-living and higher radioactive waste and that the inventory was not exactly known. The commission also found that radioactivity from the site is leaking into the environment. It however concluded that dismantling and reconditioning the waste would cost too much and might generate a significant risk to the workers involved.(*02)

ANDRA is currently operating two disposal facilities: one for short-lived low-level and intermediate-level waste (CSFMA) and the other for very-low-level waste (CSTFA), both situated in the Aube district.(*03)

The 2006 Planning Act calls for the commissioning by 2013 of a storage facility for low-level long-lived wastes. The opening of this new sub-surface (15 m to 100 m depth) facility has been seriously delayed, to at least 2019, by massive protests in the areas considered as possible sites. ANDRA launched a public call to 3,115 communities in 2008 for volunteers to host the facility. Forty-one applied for consideration and, in June 2009, the government selected two small villages both in the Aube department that already houses the two operating disposal facilities for short-lived wastes. But both communities withdrew “under the pressure of the opponents.”(*04) Currently, the project is suspended and ANDRA and the government are looking for a new approach. Pending the creation of a suitable disposal facility, existing LLW-LL waste is stored at the production sites or in facilities which have traditionally used radioactive applications.

ILW-LL and HLW
Pending the commissioning of a deep repository, intermediate-level, long-lived waste (ILW-LL) and high-level waste is stored at their production sites, mainly La Hague, Marcoule and Cadarache.

In 1979, the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency ANDRA was established to manage and provide storage of nuclear waste. From 1987 to 1990 field study was conducted but protest against four test drilling forced the government to stop research and develop new policy.(*05) In 1991 parliament passed the Nuclear Waste Act, which regulated the new policy. The law is meant as a legal instrument for the creation of underground research laboratories, where studies will be conducted in potential host formations, at least at two locations and a best site will be chosen in 2006. It clearly prohibits the actual storage of nuclear waste in these laboratories. For this a new law had to be adopted after 2006.(*06)

Shortly thereafter ANDRA began with research in three new locations, which met fierce resistance. The French government stopped the investigation and wanted to consult the population. The government contracted for this reference Christian Bataille, then a member of parliament and undisguised supporter of nuclear power.(*07) In his search for a department that wanted to host an underground laboratory he spoke with people from different locations, elected officials and associations, but that did not lead to a broad support. Sometimes the disposal plans caused big splits in small local communities. In 1994, this disagreement was the reason why the mayor Michel Faudry from the potential host community Chatain in the department of Vienne committed suicide.(*08)

On January 6 1994, after the consultations Bataille chose three candidate departments for the underground high-level waste laboratories: Meuse, Gard, Haute-Marne and Vienne. Whether that laboratory is converted into a HLW-repository is a choice that will be made later. If a permit for the construction of an underground lab is given, the host community receives a compensation of €10 million per year during construction and operation of the laboratory.(*09)

Local groups were very dissatisfied with the state of affairs. In December 1997, the Conseil d'Etat rejected a complaint laid down in 1994 by residents of Meuse and Vienne on the Bataille mission. They stated that there had never been a real involvement of the affected population, as required by law. With this decision the Conseil d'Etat did not follow the advice of the so-called government commissioner, who agreed with the plaintiffs.(*10) Elected officials near Bure organized a nation-wide committee of elected officials opposed to underground labs.(*11) Associations of winegrowers in several area's (Cotes-du-Rhone and Roussillon) fear that their sales market will collapse if a nuclear waste repository is constructed in their neighborhood.(*12)

In 1997, in response to the protests, the French government decided to commission the National Assessment Commission (CNE) to study retrievability.(*13) CNE, a group that reviews progress on HLW management for government and parliament, published its report 'Thoughts on retrievability' in June 1998. CNE proposes retrievable storage (for TRU waste: non-heat-generating transuranic wastes) be licensed for relatively short periods – 50 years - to ensure that a decision must be taken on a regular base on whether or not the facility should be kept open. It also recommends long-term interim storage for spent fuel on the grounds that the fuel contains valuable energy products.(*14) In August 1999, the government authorized ANDRA to start work on an underground waste lab in a clay formation in Bure and to begin the process of finding a second site in granite. The Bure license would expire at 31 December 2006 by which time the parliament has to decide whether to transform the Bure site into a repository.(*15)

In December 1998 the departments Gard en Vienne were considered unsuitable because of geological reasons. The French government okay'd the waste lab at Bure in clay, but called for a new granite site.(*16)

Before the end of 2006 the government had to find a way out of a tough situation. The Nuclear Waste Act from 1991 required that at least two research laboratories should have been established, from which - following similar research - a choice had to be made. But there is only one underground laboratory: Bure.

Many environmental groups think that the government and ANDRA therefor do not comply with the law. In a December 2009 email Markus Pflüger of the anti-nuclear group Stop Bure in Trier (Germany) emphasized that again.(*17) But he also points at the fact that geological fault lines in the subsurface of Bure are denied by ANDRA: and, according to Pflüger, these fault lines are definitely a safety risk.

In June 2006 Planning Act was published.(*18) Besides 'optimizing repository concepts' and complete experimental program with technological demonstrations, it states that all operators of nuclear installations must estimate the future costs for the management of their spent fuel, decommissioning operations and the management of radioactive waste, and must allocate “the required assets to the coverage of those provisions.”

Commercial reprocessing, although originally introduced to obtain plutonium fuel for starting up fast-neutron reactors, is now clearly established as the national policy for spent-fuel management. A disposal facility for long-lived intermediate and high-level wastes is required to be in operation by 2025. No license shall be granted, however, “if the reversibility of such a facility is not guaranteed.” While the conditions of reversibility will be defined in a subsequent law, its minimum duration is one hundred years.

The license for the underground research laboratory in Bure (officially called LSMHM URL, often Bure is not even referred to) was initially until the end of 2006, but was extended on 23 December 2006 by the Government until the end of 2011. Therefore ANDRA has filed an application to renew it until 2030. The public inquiry was held from October 26 to November 30 and the licensing decree was granted on December 20, 2011.(*19) By making retrievability compulsory and to commission longer research, the French Government is circumventing the 1991 Nuclear Waste Act.

In early 2012 ANDRA signed a six-year contract with Gaiya as main contractor to project manage the conceptual and front-end phases of the Centre Industriel de Stockage Géologique project, dubbed “Cigeo”. The first conceptual study phase is to be conducted in 2012 and will lead on to a public consultation that will take place in 2013. The storage facility will be developed on a depth of 500 meters, and will exploit the properties of the Bure clay formation as a “geologic barrier to prevent any potential spread of radioactivity”. Although Cigeo will be designed to accommodate the wastes permanently, French law requires that storage can be reversible for at least 100 years.(*20)

References:

China
*01- World Nuclear Association: China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle, March 2012
*02- Hui Zhang: On China’s Commercial Reprocessing Policy, paper presented at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 50th Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, July 12-16, 2009
*03- Nucleonics Week: EDF, AREVA Finalize Joint Ventures with Chinese Nuclear Companies, 24 December 2009
*04- People's Republic of China: National Report for Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, September, 2008, p.13
*05- World Nuclear Association, March 2012
*06- Yun Zhou: China spent fuel management and reprocessing, Working paper, March 2011
*07- Qiang Wang, China Needing a Cautious Approach to Nuclear Power Strategy, Energy Policy, Vol. 37 (2009)
*08- Nuclear Fuel: CNNC Favors Remote Site for Future Reprocessing Plant, 7 April 2008
*09- Ju Wang: High-level radioactive waste disposal in China, update 2010, Journal of Rock Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering. 2010, 2 (1): 1–11
*10- Zheng Hualing and Ye Guo’an: The Status and Prospect of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Back–End in China, paper presented at the Atalante 2000 Conference on Scientific Research on the Back-End of the Fuel Cycle for the 21st Century, October 2000. p.9
*11- People's Republic of China, September, 2008, p.34-38

Czech Republic
*01- RAWRA: Basic Information, Company website
*02- Wolfgang Neumann, Nuclear Waste Management in the EU, October 2010, p. 38-40
*03- Wolfgang Neumann, October 2010
*04- Czech Republic: National Report under the Joint Convention on Safety in Spent Fuel Management and Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, March 2011, p.90
*05 -RAWRA: Government moratorium ends; RAWRA intends to resume repository siting research, Press release 17 December 2009
*06- RAWRA: Working Group for Transparency of the Site Selection Process of a Deep Geological Repository was established in the Czech Republic, Press release 26 November 2010
*07- Czech Republic, March 2011, p.91
*08- World Nuclear Association: Nuclear Power in Czech Republic, March 2012

Finland
*01- Nuclear Monitor, Russian import of spent fuel imports stalled, 16 July 2004
*02- Posiva Oy: company website, visited 6 April 2012
*03- Posiva Oy Selecting the Site: the Final Disposal at Olkiluoto, company website, April 2012
*04- Mark Elam en Göran Sundqvist: The Swedish KBS project: a last word in nuclear fuel safety prepares to conquer the world?, In: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, December 2009, p. 969–988
*05- Posiva Oy, General Time Schedule for Final Disposal, website, April 2012
*06- NEA/OECD, Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning in Finland, 2011
*07- YLE (Finnish TV), 19 April 2010 and 25 May 2010.
*08- YLE: Posiva: No room for Fennovoima waste in nuclear cave, 4 October 2011
*09- World Nuclear News: No room at the repository, 9 March 2012. www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-No_room_at_the_repository-0903127.html
*10-  Swahn quoted in: House of Commons: Memorandum submitted by the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates to UK Parliament, January 2010
*11- Mainpost: Endlager in Bergstollen statt unter der Erde (Repository in mountain tunnels, in stead of underground), 25 February 2011
*12- YLE: Posiva: No room for Fennovoima waste in nuclear cave, 4 October 2011
*13- IceNews: Finland set to become long-term nuclear waste dump, 29 August 2009

France
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*02- Greenpeace: Nuclear Waste Management: The lesson from the CSM disposal site, 30 May 2006
*03- ANDRA: The French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency, May 2010, p.3
*04- International Panel on Fissile Materials: Managing spent fuel from nuclear reactors, 2011, p.38
*05- Yannick Barthe: Framing nuclear waste as a political issue in France, in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, p.941 – 954, December 2009.  *06- Republique Francaise: Law no.91-1318 of December 30, 1991 on Radioactive Waste Management, 30 December 1991, French version and English translation.
*07- Nuclear Fuel: French waste negotiator takes up Pilgrim's staff, 18 January 1993, p.14-15
*08- Nuclear Fuel, Citing pressure, Mayor of potential HLW laboratory site commits suicide, 31 January 1994, p 5 en 6.
*09- Nuclear Fuel: France okays work on HLW lab sites, ending four year stay, 17 January 1994, p 15-16
*10- Nuclear Fuel: French court rejects request aimed at halting search for waste labs, 29 December 1997, p.9-10
*11- Nuclear Fuel: Eastern Mayors fight to keep ANDRA from building waste labs, 22 September 1997, p.10
*12- Nucleonics Week: French localities' vote vary on nuclear waste lab siting, 24 April 1997, p. 13-14
*13- Nuclear Fuel: French government gives itself a year to decide on waste labs, 22 September 1997, p. 8-9
*14- Nuclear Fuel: French committee signals shift in approach to long-term storage, 13 July 1998, p. 11-12
*15- Nuclear Fuel: ANDRA gets license for waste lab, court challenge from Greens, 23 August 1999, p.14-15
*16- Nuclear Fuel: French ministers okay waste lab at Bure but call for new granite site, 14 December 1998, p.3-4
*17- Email Markus Pflüger to Herman Damveld, 5 December 2009.
*18- Republique Francaise: The 2006 Programme Act on the Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials and Wastes, 28 June 2006
*19- ANDRA, ASN, CEA, IRSN: Radioactive Waste Management Programmes in OECD/NEA Countries: France, March 2012, p.16
*20- World Nuclear News, Next phase for French geological disposal, 5 January 2012

Brazil

The National Nuclear Energy Commission (Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, CNEN) is responsible for management and disposal of radioactive wastes. Legislation in 2001 provides for repository site selection, construction and operation for low- and intermediate-level wastes. A long-term solution for these is to be in place before Angra 3 is commissioned. Low and intermediate level waste is stored on site of Angra nuclear complex and on other sites where it is produced.(*01)

A location for a national waste repository for llw and ilw waste is due to be chosen in 2011 (but delayed again) (*02) and planned to start operation in 2018. Two options are being considered: the construction of a repository exclusively for waste from Angra or a facility that would accept material from all nuclear and radioactive installations in Brazil. (*03)  Used fuel is stored at Angra pending formulation of policy on reprocessing or direct disposal. (*04)

HLW disposal: when, where and how unknown
Currently, there is no decision about the way of final storage of the waste. Brazil has not defined a technical solution for spent fuel or high-level waste disposal. Spent fuel is not considered radioactive waste. Therefore, the policy adopted with regards to spent fuel is to keep the fuel in safe storage until an international consensus and a national decision is reached about reprocessing and recycling the fuel, or disposing of it as such.(*05)

High-level wastes, after been stored on site would then be moved to an interim storage location for 500 years. This interim site is expected to begin operation in 2026; a proposed plan was due to be finished by 2009, and a prototype validated by 2013, according to Eletronuclear.(*06) For final disposal a deep geological facility has been foreseen, but a timeframe has not been developed.(*07)

Opposition to nuclear power and waste storage is strong in Brazil. Even CNEN admits that "political and psycho social aspects related to the subject of radioactive waste disposal (“Not in my backyard syndrome”) contribute enormously to the difficulties faced by the Brazilian Government in the establishment of a national waste management policy." (*08)

Bulgaria

The State Enterprise Radioactive Wastes (SE-RAW) is responsible for much of the waste management. On October 25 2011, a contract was signed drafting technical aspects and safety analysis for a low- and intermediate level waste interim storage facility near Kozloduy. A tender is expected mid 2012 and the facility is planned to go into operation in 2015. (*01) In 2009, a search for a location of a near-surface repository for low and intermediate level waste has been started. Four locations are taken into account.(*02)

Keep options open
In 1988, spent fuel from VVER-440 units (Kozloduy 1-4) was returned for the last time to Russia under the old contract conditions (free of charge), since then it is transferred to the wet spent fuel storage facility (WSFSF) for temporary storage, awaiting transfer to Russia or interim storage. WSFSF is in operation since 1990 on site at Kozloduy to take fuel from all the units. It is a standalone facility and is used as interim storage. Currently spent fuel is regularly transported to Russia under contracts signed in 1998 and 2002.(*03)

Under a 2002 agreement, Bulgaria has been paying Russia US$ 620,000 per ton used fuel for reprocessing in the Mayak plant at Ozersk, though some has also been sent to the Zheleznogorsk plant at Krasnoyarsk.(*04)

In March 2011 a dry spent fuel storage facility (DSFSF) construction was finished. At the DSFSF the fuel from the closed units 1-4 (VVER-440) should be stored for a period of 50 years. In July 2011 an application for commissioning was submitted and is currently under review. (*05)

The dry spent fuel depot will allow the country to store spent nuclear fuel for the long term in case it is unable to ship it abroad, its radioactive waste strategy said. Bulgaria is to decide by 2013 whether to build a deep-burying waste dump.(*06)

The principles of radioactive waste and spent fuel management were declared in the national Strategy for Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management, 2004, later confirmed and developed further in the Strategy for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management until 2030, adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2011. It states that, accounting for the global and general European consensus for deep geological repository, this is presumably the most suitable option.

The SE-RAW implements activities related to the preliminary study of the possibilities for construction of deep geological repository. As a result from these activities a preliminary zoning of the country is made and three regions of interest are identified. In those regions 5 potential areas are localized and for every of the perspective areas an analysis of the geology-tectonic, geo-morphologic, neo tectonic, seismic, hydro-geological and engineer-geological and sociological economical characteristics is performed. On this base 6 potential geological blocks are localised, that can be additionally investigated. The potential host media are thick clay mergels and granites. (*07)

Canada

The plans for storage of nuclear waste has not yet led to a choice for a location. In 2009, a new dialogue process began with the population. It is anticipated that an underground disposal facility will not be in operation before 2035. Meanwhile, all spent fuel is stored at reactor site in pools and dry storage.

Public debate
In Canada the search for a repository for nuclear waste has taken place since at least 1977.(*01) It is standing policy that the local population should accept the storage. In 1992, the government proposed that in addition to technical issues, also ethical and societal issues must be recognized in the debate on nuclear waste storage.(*02) As departure points for a siting process it was further accepted that the population has to think the chosen procedure is honest, it should have access to all information and the population should have the opportunity to really influence the choice of location.(*03) This discussion model had the consent of both "proponents" and "opponents" of storage and should make a meaningful discussion about the pros and cons of  disposal of nuclear waste possible.(*04)

Low-level radioactive waste
The public debate about low-level radioactive waste started in 1988.(*05) 850 town councils were asked whether they would be interested, of which 21 responded positively. In these 21 towns a referendum was held, and only three voted in favor of it.(*06) But in 1994, Deep River in Ontario was the only municipality to respond to the government's program to find a community willing to accept the low-level waste. At a referendum in September 1995 a large majority of the population voted in favor of storage of low-level radioactive waste, if the government would give job guarantees for 2,300 people at the local Chalk River nuclear research center for 15 years. (*07)

However, funding negotiations for job guarantees broke down in January 1997 (*08) and in early 1998, the Canadian government announced it had no success completing the deal. As a result, the option of storage of low-level radioactive waste at Deep River is off. (*09)

High-level radioactive waste
With the disposal of spent fuel elements from nuclear power plants the Canadian government has also not made any progress.(*10) Awaiting final disposal of high level waste, all spent fuel is stored at reactor site in pools and dry storage.(*11)

In August 1977, the Federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources released a report which became known as the Hare report, after its Chairman F. K. Hare. It recommended burying the spent fuel at depths of 800 to 1000 meters in the Canadian Shield, a large area of ancient igneous rock in eastern and central Canada and called for an “effective interchange of information and ideas” among the public, industry, and government.(*12) Ten years later, in 1988, the concept of a storage mine, which had become known as the AECL-concept, was referred for a full–scale environmental review. Estimated costs in 1991 was between 8.7 and 13.3 billion in 1991 Canadian dollars.(*13)

The Environmental Assessment Panel held hearings in the 1990s and in March 1998 it's  report was published. The main conclusion was that there is no public support and that many ethical questions are still open: Broad public support is necessary to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes; Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social; From a technical perspective, the safety of the AECL concept had been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it had not; the concept for deep geological disposal did not have the required level of acceptability.(*14) The committee recommended to work on the social and ethical issues first, and, for the time being, not to search for a concrete repository.(*15) In a March 13,1998, statement the Canadian government announced  that, while "the safety of the concept has been adequately demonstrated (…) it does not have broad public support, nor the required level of acceptability to be adopted" and that it will not proceed with siting efforts for a deep geological disposal. (*16)

Four years later, in 2002, the Canadian government created a new organization for the storage of nuclear waste: the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO). This organization is paid for by the operators of the 22 nuclear power plants in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. Instead of an organization independent from the operators of nuclear plants, now operators will have the say. Therefore  Greenpeace Canada, for instance, wondered to what extent the NWMO will really involve the population in decision making.
The NWMO has held hearings from 2002 to 2005. In May 2009, it initiated a nation-wide dialogue with interested organizations and individuals to establish a procedure for selecting a site.(*17) The dialogue lasted until early 2010, after which the NWMO began with the search for a final repository on 4 June 2010. According to the NWMO it is about an underground disposal facility at 500 meters depth in a rock formation, located in an informed and willing community, securing economic benefits for the residents and to "build confidence that the program is being carried out fairly and the end result will be safe."(*18) According to a November 13, 2009 NWMO-document, the geological facility for disposal of spent fuel will not come into operation before 2035, at the earliest.(*19)

Sofar (January 2012) nine communities, scattered across Saskatchewan and Ontario, have volunteered to host the country's spent fuel. The towns are a combination of native reserves, old mining and lumber towns and cottage enclaves. Many have spent the past decade watching their populations shrink and economies crater, and are desperate for an economic boost - even if it is deep geological disposal of nuclear waste for eternity.(*20)

References:

Brazil
*01- IAEA, Brazil country report: 2006
*02- we can find no information that suggests a location has been chosen –March 2012
*03- Nuclear Engineering International: Nuclear power in Brazil, 1 June 2010
*04- World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Brazil, November 2011
*05- CNEN: National report of Brazil 2011, for the fourth review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, October 2011
*06- Nuclear Engineering International
*07- CNEN, 2011
*08- CNEN, National report of Brazil 2008, for the third review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, October 2008

Bulgaria
*01- Sofia Echo: Bulgaria selects consultant for radioactive waste depot, 26 October 2011
*02- Wolfgang Neumann: Nuclear Waste Management in the EU, October 2010, p 35
*03- Republic of Bulgaria: Fourth national report on fulfillment of the obligations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, October 2011, p.8-9
*04- World Nuclear Association: Nuclear Power in Bulgaria, March 2012
*05- Republic of Bulgaria, October 2011, p.49
*06- Reuters: Bulgaria opens dry spent nuclear fuel depot, 12 May 2011
*05- Republic of Bulgaria, October 2011, p.52, 75

Canada
*01- M.A. Greber, E.R. Frech and J.A. Hillier: The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: Public Involvement and Social Aspects, AECL Research, Whiteshell Laboratories, Pinawa, Manitoba, July 1994 (AECL-10712 COG-93-2); this report of 260 pages contains a detailed description of the debate in Canada until mid-1994
*02- C.J. Allan and M.A. Greber: Social and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste - A Canadian Perspective, AECL Research, Whiteshell Laboratories, Pinawa, Manitoba, 1995 (Technical Record TR-705 COG-95-405)
*03- Fred Roots: Radioactive Waste Disposal - Ethical and Environmental Considerations - A Canadian Perspective, in: Nuclear Energy Agency: Environmental and ethical aspects of long-lived radioactive waste disposal, Proceedings of an International Workshop organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency in co-operation with the Environment Directorate, Paris, 1-2 September 1994, p 71-93
*04- Kevin R. Ballard and Richard G. Kuhn: Developing and Testing a Facility Location Model for Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste, in: Risk Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1996, p 821-832
*05- Robert Morrison and Peter Brown: Radioactive Waste Manage­ ment in Canada, Proceeding of the Uranium Institute Annual Symposium 1991,  September 1991, London, 1992
*06-  PJ Richardson: A Review of Benefits Offered to Volunteer Communities for Siting Nuclear Waste Facilities, prepared for Dr. Olof Soderberg, Swedish National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Waste Disposal, March 1998, p 4
*07- Nucleonics Week, 28 September 1995, p 3 en 4
*08- Nucleonics Week, 9 January 1997, p 4 en 5
*09- Nucleonics Week, 22 January 1998, p 9
*10- Darrin Durant: Radwaste in Canada: a political economy of uncertainty, In: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12, Issue 7 & 8, December 2009, p. 897 – 919.
*11- International Panel on Fissile Materials: Managing Spent Fuel From Nuclear Power Reactors, September 2011
*12- A. M. Aikin, J. M. Harrison, and F. K. Hare, The Management of Canada’s Nuclear Wastes, Report of a Study Prepared under Contract for the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 1977.
*13- Nucleonics Week, 19 March 1998, p 8
*14- Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel: Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, February 1998; published on 13 March 1998.
*15- Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Press release: Government Releases Report of Panel Studying the Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste, Ottawa, 13 March 1998.
*16- Nucleonics Week, 19 March 1998, p 8 en 9.
*17- NWMO: NWMO ‘Learn More’ Program, 13 November 2009. www.nwmo.ca/news?news_id=107&uniqid=2635
*18- World Nuclear News: Search for Canadian Nuclear Waste Site, 4 June 2010
*19- NWMO: NWMO ‘Learn More’ Program - The Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel in Canada, 13 November 2009
*20- The Globe and Mail: Towns vie to be nuclear waste burial sites, 14 January 2012

Argentina

The April 1997 National Law of Nuclear Activity assigns responsibility to the National Atomic Energy Commission CNEA (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, founded in 1950) for radioactive waste management, and created a special fund for this purpose. Operating nuclear power plants pay into this. Awaiting final disposal interim storage of spent fuel takes place at cooling ponds on site, and some interim dry storage at Embalse.(*01) No reprocessing has taken place.

Final disposal
Final disposal of low-level waste takes place in engineering enhanced surface semi containment systems at the Ezeiza Radioactive Waste Management Area (AGE), operated by CNEA. For intermediate level wastes a monolithic near surface repository is foreseen, similar to those in operation in L’Aube, France and El Cabril, in Spain. (*02) Especially after a scandal in 2005 on high levels of water contamination with uranium in Ezeiza and Monte Grande, near the atomic center, doubts have risen about the conditions of and safety procedures at the AGE. The response from the CNEA and the government to the obvious contamination did not help to calm citizens’ worries, as it was marked by obscuring and silencing the real impact. A few years later the provincial government was forced to acknowledge the contamination values measured by independent laboratories, although official reports stated, that there was no contamination from nuclear waste but just high radioactive background level.(*03)

In 1994, during the nation's constitutional reform, a broad Argentinean environmental movement won a momentous victory to make Article 41, which bans the import of toxic and radioactive waste, part of the national constitution.(*04)

The Argentine Strategic Plan has provided three types of technological systems for final disposal:

• Engineered Surface System, for LLW requiring isolation periods of up to 50 years.
• Monolithic Near-Surface Repository, for ILW  requiring isolation periods of up to 300 years.
• Deep Geological Repository, for HLW and SF requiring isolation periods in excess of 300 years.

With regard to spent fuel originating from research or radioisotope production reactors, the strategy considers two alternatives: Shipping them back to the country where they were originally enriched, if possible, or conditioning for final disposal.(*05)

The Strategic Plan, updated in March 2006, at present covers the period from 2006 through 2095.

The deadline to adopt a decision on the possible reprocessing or final disposal of spent fuel is subject to the completion of the studies for the siting of the Deep Geological Repository which have to be concluded at the latest by 2030. At such time the installation of the underground geological laboratory must have been started, which allows the design and construction of a deep geological repository, which must be operative by the year 2060. (*06)

Armenia

The Government of Republic of Armenia established state regulatory authority for nuclear and radiation safety (ANRA). ANRA’s task is the state regulation of nuclear energy, including the safe management of radioactive waste. ANRA regulates the nuclear and radiation safety of Armenian NPP, dry spent nuclear fuel storage facility, ionizing radiation sources, RADON radioactive wastes storage facility, and of other facilities where practices with nuclear materials are implemented.(*01)

Spent fuel is stored in spent fuel pools. After five years of storage the spent fuel is placed into dry spent fuel storage (DSFS) and are placed into horizontal concrete storage modules (HSM). After Unit-1 shutdown its spent fuel pool is used as a temporary storage facility for spent fuel. (*02) DSFS started operation on 1 August 2000. The license validity is 20 years. DSFS consists of 11 horizontally placed concrete modules for storage of 616 spent fuel assemblies. In 2005 the National Assembly based on proposal from the government made decision to extend the DSFS. It will enable storing 1890 fuel assemblies at least 50 years.(*03)

Belgium

In Belgium, after many years of discussion, a storage location has been selected for low-level and medium-level radioactive waste. It will take until 2070/80 before disposal of high-level radioactive waste will begin in clay layers.

Storage in sea
In Belgium, NIRAS (National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials) has been responsible for the storage of all nuclear waste. NIRAS, established in 1980, is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. From 1960 to 1982 Belgium dumped low-level radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean(*01) –described by NIRAS as "sea disposal at great depths".[*02] Since then NIRAS is studying the disposal of all types of nuclear waste aboveground or underground.

Low- and medium-level radioactive waste
In April 1994, NIRAS published a report on the aboveground storage of low-level radioactive waste. In all 98 mentioned suitable locations (in 47 municipalities), the report led to motions in town councils, in which storage was rejected.(*03).The government ask NIRAS if it would be possible to store the waste on one of the 25 military bases no longer in use. In June 1997, NIRAS published a report which "ultimately had only been a preparatory exercise, based on bibliographic data,"(*04) but nevertheless gave rise to concern again. Only the town council of Beauraing, where the military base Baronville is situated, was in favour of storage, but on 28 June 1998, in a local referendum 94 percent voted against.(*05) This brought embarrassment to the government, and as it often goes in politics, the government came with a woolly policy to work towards "a final solution or a solution with definite, progressive, flexible and reversible destination."(*06) According to this decision the low- and medium-level radioactive waste can be stored either close to the surface as well as in deep geological clay formations.(*07) The government no longer points to any sites, but puts the emphasis on public support and it assumes public support can be found at existing nuclear zones. These are Doel and Tihange (nuclear power stations), Mol (Center for Nuclear Energy Research), Dessel (manufacture of fuel elements) and Fleurus (Institute for radio-elements). But towns may present themselves also voluntarily.(*08) NIRAS adopted the government's policies and stated in 1998: "To strive for a real partnership from the beginning, rather than merely an exchange of arguments, means a modernization for the nuclear waste sector."(*09)

In 1999, after much deliberation, NIRAS signed a partnership agreement with Dessel and Mol, and on June 23, 2006 the choice fell on Dessel. In 2004, the population of Dessel had already voted in favour of the so-called surface disposal, which is planned to start in 2016.(*10) The waste (appr. 70,000m3) will be stored in what ultimately will be a hill of 160 by 950 meters and 20 meters high. Barrels put in boxes filled-up with concrete (monoliths), will be placed in modules and covered with mutiple layers. Taking into account the additional buildings, the storage requires 74 acres (30 ha). After 50 years, the storage is completed, and then it can be decided whether the roof is replaced by a definitive cover. It should be possible to retrieve the monoliths in the first 200-300 years when there will be active monitoring of the waste.(*11)

High-level radioactive waste
Since the early 1970s, Belgium has plans to store high-level radioactive waste in clay layers. From 1974 to 1989 research and construction of an underground mine (at a depth of 230 meters) into the clay under Mol in the Kempen region took place. This is a particular type of clay, the so-called “Boomse klei” (Boom clay), which is also present in some parts of the Netherlands. According to NIRAS, Belgium opted for clay because there was data available. The choice fell on Mol ("Apart from its intrinsic qualities, the Boom clay has the advantage of being located under the nuclear site at Mol-Dessel.") because this town is hosting the national Center for Nuclear Energy Research with the (closed) Eurochemie reprocessing plant: "to have available a local solution for eventual disposal of reprocessing waste from the Eurochemic plant".(*12)

Between 1990 and 2000 methods to assess the safety and the properties of clay for the long term were studied. One of the important questions what would happen if nuclear waste is leaking from the barrels and ends up in the clay? The NIRAS 2002 SAFIR (Safety Assessment and Feasibility Interim Report) 2 report states that many questions about the safety of storing nuclear waste in clay remain unanswered: until 2017, therefore eleven issues have to be examined with priority.

Until 2017, NIRAS will show the feasibility of the studied solution and demonstrate how the nuclear waste has to be disposed of. Then construction of the storage mine may start. In the complicated words of NIRAS: "Without frustrating the basic choice of the Boom clay, at this moment there still remain important questions unanswered, therefore it is premature to make a definitive statement today on the technical feasibility of storage in this formation or on the operational and long-term safety of such disposal."(*13)

Keeping in mind there is still no decision on disposal of high-level radioactive waste in clay yet),  the NIRAS' Board of Directors adopted a 'Waste Plan' on 23 September 2011.(*14) "Now the legal procedure for the Waste Plan is completed and the dossier is ready to be delivered to the government which then will have all the ingredients to make a decision. With a basic decision of the government clarity will be obtained which direction further work has to be done on how long-term safety can be guaranteed. The basic decision will be the first step in a gradual, lengthy decision-making process in which the society will be involved. The process leading to the implementation of a long-term management option will take several decades. Currently, it is not about selection of a location. That choice, at which the local population will be 'closely involved', will be made at a later stage in the decision-making process.”(*15) If the government opts for storage in clay, it will take until 2070-2080 before the disposal of high-level radioactive waste can begin.(*16)

References:

Argentina:
*01- World Nuclear Association: Nuclear Power in Argentina, November 2011
*02- Republica Argentina: Third National report Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 2008, section B-7
*03- Michael Alvarez Kalverkamp: Argentina: Uncertainty about the nuclear future, Heinrich Boell Foundation, 18 April 2011
*04- Greenpeace: Argentina next nuclear dump for the world?, 8 November 2002
*05- IAEA: Country profile: Argentina
*06- Republica Argentina, Section B-1

Armenia
*01- ANRA: ANRA Regulatory Activity, Installations subject to Regulation and Legal Bases, website, April 2012.
*02- ANRA: Convention on Nuclear Safety, Fifth national report of the Republic of Armenia, September 2010.
*03- ANRA: Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility, website, April 2012

Belgium
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*02- NIRAS: Het beheer van het radioaktieve afval, vouwblad 7: De berging van het radioaktieve afval, (The management of radioactive waste. Folder 7; the disposal of radioactive waste), Brussels, no date.
*03- Erik van Hove: Accounting for Socio-economic Effects in Nuclear Waste Disposal Projects, in: Nuclear Energy Agency, "Informing the Public about Radioactive Waste Management", Proceedings of an NEA International Seminar, Rauma, Finland, 13-15 June 1995, Paris, 1996, p 161-171
*04- NIRAS: press release, Brussels, 16 March 1998, p 3
*05- TV België-1: journaal (national TV-channel news) 19.00 hr, 28 June 1998
*06- NIRAS: Informatiefiche, Brussels, 2 March 1998
*07- Nuclear Energy Agency: Radioactive Waste Management Programmes in OECD/NEA Member Countries, Belgium, Paris, 25 May 1998
*08- NIRAS: Informatiefiche, Brussels, 2 March 1998, p. 11
*09- NIRAS: Partnerschap staat centraal in nieuw werkprogramma van NIRAS, (Partnership is central issue in new working program of NIRAS), press release, Brussels, 16 March 1998, p. 3-4
*10- NIRAS: Het langetermijnbeheer van categorie-A afval  (2006) (The long-term management of Category-A waste)
*11- NIRAS: Final report De berging, op Belgisch grondgebied, van laag- en middelactief afval met korte levensduur, 2006 (The storage, on Belgian soil, of short lived low and intermediate level waste)
*12- NIRAS: SAFIR Syntheseverslag (SAFIR Synthesisreport), Brussels, June 1989, pp. 7 and 8
*13- NIRAS: Naar een duurzaam beheer van radioactief afval (Towards a durable management of nuclear waste), SAFIR 2 and it's context, report NIROND-2001-07N, 4 February 2002.
*14- NIRAS: Press release Afvalplan (Wasteplan) Brussels, 23 September 2011
*15- ONDRAF/NIRAS, Executive summary Afvalplan voor het langetermijnbeheer van geconditioneerd hoogradioactief en/of langlevend afval en overzicht van verwante vragen, September 2011. (Waste plan for long term management of conditioned high-level waste and/or long-living waste and overview of relevant questions) report NIROND 2011-04.
*16- Sigrid Eeckhout (NIRAS), email to Herman Damveld on 8 December 2009, 15.51 hr.

„Taking into account the results already achieved, the expected technological developments in the coming years, and above all the existence of a well-established basis for the assessment in numerical terms of radiation hazards, the group are convinced that the optimum development of nuclear energy need not be impeded by radioactive waste management problems which will have to be dealt with".

This quote is from the OECD report  „Radioactive waste management practices in Western Europe". It is not from the most recent report, although the wording would be the same, but from a report in 1972!

Since the beginning of nuclear power the major claim is that there will be a solution for  nuclear waste soon, that the waste problem really is not a technical problem but a social problem, but, anyway, we are near a solution. So there is no reason to stop producing it or endanger the future of nuclear energy.

But as the authors describe in this worldwide overview, non of the roughly 34 countries with spent fuel (reprocessed or not) from nuclear power reactors have a final disposal facility, be it in deep geological formations or (near) surface. A very large majority of those countries are not even close. Some postpone the need for final disposal by long term interim storage of up to 100 years; and other countries use (the future option of) reprocessing as an alibi for postponing that decision.

As this worldwide overview of the state of affairs shows, siting radioactive waste repositories is seen as one of the main problems due to socio-political circumstances. Almost without exception, all radioactive waste management programs state that this generation must solve its own problems and not lay the burden of solving the waste problem on the next generations. But those same programs propose, again almost without exception, to postpone a decision on final disposal and/or reprocessing into the far-future, and consider interim storage.

Fact is that the problem of final disposal of high-level radioactive waste and/or spent fuel has not been solved, more than half a century after the first commercial nuclear power plants entered into operation and used fuel was unloaded from the reactors.

Although we briefly describe the storage and disposal of low and intermediate level waste, the focus of this report is clearly on spent (or 'used') fuel from nuclear power plants. Waste from uranium mining is not even mentioned. It is also not about fuel from research reactors, which is mostly returned to the country of origin.

Because the limitations of the number of pages of the Nuclear Monitor, this is only a brief overview of the state of affairs, but some important historic developments are covered.

We have included many references, which should make it easier to search for more information. We did not include the url's of the references, because they tend to change frequently (and not much so annoying as dead links). Instead, we described the source as best as we could. Therefore it should be relatively easy to find it on the internet when the description is copied in a search engine. Of course, not all information used is available online. If there are questions about a reference (or something else), please do not hesitate to contact us.

Tabel 1:
Final disposal repository for HLW or SF; expected start of disposal.