Vietnam

Let's first imagine how this story might have unfolded, if the nuclear industry had its way. Construction would be underway on Vietnam's first nuclear power plant, and plans would be in train to build a total of 14 reactors by 2030. Russia would be building Vietnam's first reactor, giving it a foothold in south-east Asia (where it has nuclear cooperation agreements with seven countries). Japan and South Korea would also be gearing up to build reactors in Vietnam, a fillip for their troubled domestic nuclear industries and their ambitions to become major nuclear exporters. US nuclear vendors would also be heavily involved, salivating at the US Department of Commerce's estimate of US$50 billion (€47.4 bn) of contracts for nuclear plants in Vietnam by 2030.

It hasn't unfolded like that. On November 22, Vietnam's National Assembly voted in support of a government decision to cancel plans to build nuclear power plants. An immense amount of resources have been wasted on the nuclear program over several decades. Nuclear vendor countries will have to look elsewhere for business. They will continue to try their luck in south-east Asia but they are wasting their time: not a single power reactor is in operation or being built in the region and none will be built in the foreseeable future.

First, a brief history of Vietnam's nuclear program:¹

1958 Vietnam acquires a research reactor under the US Atoms for Peace program. It was dismantled by the US as the Vietnam / Second Indochina War escalated.

1976: Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission formed.

Early 1980s: Two preliminary nuclear power studies are undertaken.

1995: A study concludes that nuclear power should be introduced around the year 2015.

2006: The government announces that a 2 gigawatt (GW) nuclear power plant should be online by 2020. This target is confirmed in a plan approved by the government in August 2007, along with a target of 8 GW by 2025.

2008: An Atomic Energy Law is passed by the National Assembly.

2009: The National Assembly approves a resolution on investments for nuclear power plants in Ninh Thuan province.

2010: The government announces plans to build 14 nuclear reactors (15 GW) at eight sites in five provinces by 2030 (about 10% of total electricity generation), and outlines an aspiration to increase the nuclear share to 20‒25% by 2050.

2010: Vietnam signs an intergovernmental agreement with Russia for the construction of two reactors (later increased to four) in Ninh Thuan province. Construction is to begin in 2014 and the first reactor is to be commissioned and connected to the grid by 2020. Russia's Ministry of Finance will provide loans covering at least 85% of the cost (in November 2011, an agreement for a US$8 billion loan was signed). Progress is slow in the following years.

2010: An intergovernmental agreement with Japan is signed envisaging the construction of two reactors to come online in 2024‒25, also in Ninh Thuan province. The International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan consortium will build the reactors, and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will provide financing and insurance for up to 85% of the total cost. Progress is slow in the following years.

2011: The government issues a master plan envisaging eight reactors at the two plants in Ninh Thuan, one reactor coming online each year from 2020‒27, followed by two more in 2029.

2012: South Korea and Vietnam announce plans for a feasibility study for the construction of four Korean APR-1400 nuclear reactors, and sign an intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreement.

A nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2002, and since 2006, others have been signed with France, China, South Korea, Japan, the US and Canada.

Numerous utilities express interest in constructing reactors in Vietnam: Atomstroyexport (Rosatom / Russia), JINED (the Japanese consortium), Westinghouse (Japan/US), GE (US), EDF (France), KEPCO (South Korea), and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group.

2014: Ground breaking ceremony at the Ninh Thuan 1 (Russian) site. But the Vietnamese government says the project will be delayed for up to four years, due to continuing negotiations on technology and financing. By 2015, the start-up date for the first reactor has been pushed back another four years, to 2028.

Early 2016: A revised National Electricity Development Plan confirmed the 2028 delay for Ninh Thuan 1, and reduced the 2030 nuclear target from 10.1% of electricity generation in the original plan down to 5.7%.²

2016 cancellation

On November 10, Duong Quang Thanh, CEO of state-run Electricity of Vietnam, said the government would propose the cancellation of plans for reactors at the two Ninh Thuan sites to the National Assembly. He added that nuclear power was not included (or budgeted for) in the power plan which runs until 2030 and had already been approved by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc.^3,4 The National Assembly voted on November 22 to support the government's decision to abandon plans to build nuclear power plants.⁵

Energy analyst Mycle Schneider said: "Vietnam is only the latest in a long list of countries, including more recently Chile and Indonesia, that have postponed indefinitely or abandoned entirely their plans for nuclear new-build."⁶

The decision to abandon nuclear power was primarily based on economics. Duong Quang Thanh said nuclear power is "not economically viable because of other cheaper sources of power".⁴

Le Hong Tinh, vice-chair of the National Assembly Committee for Science, Technology and Environment, said the estimated cost of four reactors at the two sites in Ninh Thuan province had nearly doubled to VND400 trillion (US$18 bn; €17.9 bn). The estimated price of nuclear-generated electricity had increased from 4‒4.5 US cents / kwh to 8 cents / kwh. Vietnam has spent millions of dollars on the project so far, Tinh said, but continuing the program would add more pressure to the already high public debt.⁷

Another media report states that Japanese and Russian consultants said that the cost has escalated from the original estimate of US$10 billion to US$27 billion (€9.5‒25.6 bn). "The plants will have to sell power at around 8.65 cents a kWh, which is almost twice the rate approved in the project license and is not competitive at all," according to the VN Express newspaper.⁸

Vietnam's rising public debt, which is nearing the government's ceiling of 65% of GDP, was another reason for the program's cancellation, said Cao Si Kiem, a National Assembly member and former governor of the central bank.^8,9

Another factor is that electricity demand is growing but not as rapidly as previously estimated. Duong Quang Thanh from Electricity of Vietnam said: "The latest survey predicted that power growth rate will be at 11% in the 2016-2020 period and fall to 7-8% in the 2021-2030 period. So there will be no power shortage in the country in the near future."³

Safety concerns have also influenced the decision to cancel the nuclear program. Tran Huu Phat, former head of the Vietnam Institute of Atomic Energy, said that Vietnam was not ready for project implementation and that the Atomic Energy Law need amendments. He said: "The labor force is not prepared to ensure legal enforcement and operate a nuclear power plant. The Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety, the agency which plays the most important role in state management, has not been ready yet, at least for the next five years."¹⁰

Vuong Huu Tan, the head of Vietnam's nuclear regulator, the Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS), said in early 2016 that there remains much work to do, that Vietnam does not have clear regulations for agencies to inspect and examine the safety of nuclear power plants, and that nuclear power management was not licensed and was not an independent entity in accordance with international norms.¹¹

The World Nuclear Association notes that the regulator VARANS is under the Ministry of Science and Technology, as is the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission.¹

Michiko Yoshii, a professor at Mie University in Japan, said in 2014 that concerns about nuclear safety in Vietnam became much more deep-rooted after the Fukushima disaster. "The former head of the [Vietnamese] national nuclear energy research institute called for a 10-year delay in the construction plan from the standpoint of safety and the lack of human resources," she said. "Quan, the science minister, has also repeatedly said the development of human resources would not keep pace with the construction plans."¹²

The absence of any clear pathway for the disposal of nuclear waste also influenced the decision to abandon the nuclear program.^13,14 Le Hong Tinh from the National Assembly Committee for Science, Technology and Environment said: "Nuclear waste always poses environmental threats, even for developed countries which boast good technology for this waste treatment."⁷

Russia offered to accept spent fuel for reprocessing but separated wastes would be returned to Vietnam "eventually" according to the World Nuclear Association.¹

Opportunity costs

It's impossible to quantify, but large amounts of time and resources have been wasted on Vietnam's perpetually stalled nuclear power program over several decades. The opportunity costs are all the greater because Vietnam is a developing country that can ill-afford to waste money and human resources on a failed project.

One aspect of the wastage is that hundreds of students have been trained to prepare for the nuclear power program. In 2014, 344 Vietnamese undergraduate and graduate students were studying in Russia to prepare for the nuclear program, and 150 Vietnamese engineers were helping with the construction of the Rostov nuclear plant in Russia.¹ A much smaller number of students were sent to Japan.¹⁵

Le Hong Tinh from the National Assembly Committee for Science, Technology and Environment said that people trained for the nuclear program can be used for other power programs in Vietnam.⁷ Perhaps so, to some extent, but resources will nonetheless have been wasted. Commenting on the decision to cancel the nuclear program, Tinh said that "this is a big lesson for us in energy development planning and forecast."⁷

Vietnam's electricity mix

In 2013, Vietnam produced 127 terawatt-hours (TWh) gross of electricity, mostly from hydro (45%), gas (34%), and coal (20%).¹

There is some scope for new hydro plants, but many available sites are already being exploited. A March 2016 media report states that the government plans to reduce reliance on hydro following a review of hundreds of existing and planned hydro plants. The review came after media reports that in central Vietnam, crops and houses were damaged and floods were worsened by water released without notice from hydropower dams.¹⁶

In mid-2016, the government increased the target for non-hydro renewables from 5.6% by 2020 to 9.9%.¹⁷

In addition to existing small solar systems, Quang Nam Province is working with investors to build the country's first large-scale (100 MW) solar plant at an estimated cost of US$140 million.¹⁸

Wind power is growing, albeit from a low base.^19,20,21 Around 20 wind power plants are operating ‒ including a large plant in Binh Thuan province with 99 MW capacity ‒ and dozens more are planned. Vietnam's Ministry of Industry and Trade estimates the country's total land-based wind power capacity at 513 GW, which is 10 times greater than currently installed capacity from all sources.

A May 2016 report by WWF-Vietnam and Vietnam Sustainable Energy Alliance (VSEA) finds that 100% of Vietnam's power can be generated by renewable energy technologies by 2050.²² There are many available renewable power sources in Vietnam including solar, wind, geothermal heat, biomass and ocean energy. The report contrasts three scenarios: business as usual (with only modest growth of renewables), a Sustainable Energy Scenario (81% renewable power generation by 2050) and an Advanced Sustainable Energy Scenario (100%).

References:

1. Drawn from the World Nuclear Association and other sources. World Nuclear Association, July 2016, 'Nuclear Power in Vietnam', www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z...

2. Viet Phuong Nguyen, 9 Nov 2016, 'Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too Far?', http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/nuclear-energy-in-southeast-asia-a-bridge...

3. 10 Nov 2016, 'Government proposes nuclear power plant cancellation', http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/science-it/166736/government-proposes-n...

4. 10 Nov 2016, ' Vietnam ditches nuclear power plans', www.dw.com/en/vietnam-ditches-nuclear-power-plans/a-36338419

5. Reuters, 22 Nov 2016, 'Vietnam abandons plan for first nuclear power plants', www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-politics-nuclearpower-idUSKBN13H0VO

6. Aaron Sheldrick and Ho Binh Minh, 18 Nov 2016, 'Japan's nuclear export ambitions hit wall as Vietnam set to rip up reactor order', www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-vietnam-nuclearpower-idUSKBN13D0RK

7. P. Thao, 10 Nov 2016, 'Vietnam cancels nuclear power plant project', www.dtinews.vn/en/news/018/48049/vietnam-cancels-nuclear-power-plant-pro...

8. Vo Thanh, 9 Nov 2016, 'After long delay, Vietnam may finally back out on nuclear power project', http://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/after-long-delay-vietnam-may-finall...

9. Vu Trong Khanh, 10 Nov 2016, 'Vietnam Scraps Plans for Its First Nuclear-Power Plants', www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-scraps-plans-for-its-first-nuclear-power-pl...

10. Luong Bang, 15 Nov 2016, 'Will Vietnam say 'no' to nuclear power?', http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/science-it/166927/will-vietnam-say--no-...

11. 6 Feb 2016, 'Vietnam works on nuclear power framework', http://blog.vietnam-aujourdhui.info/post/2016/02/06/Vietnam-works-on-nuc...

12. 19 Jan 2014, 'Nuclear safety concerns in Vietnam could delay Japanese project', http://blog.vietnam-aujourdhui.info/post/2014/01/19/Nuclear-safety-conce...

13. 2 June 2015, 'Vietnam Has Nowhere to Put Its Nuclear Waste', http://saigoneer.com/saigon-development/4544-vietnam-has-nowhere-to-put-...

14. 24 May 2015, 'Call to establish radioactive waste management company', http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/environment/131281/call-to-establish-ra...

15. 30 May 2015, 'VN plans nuclear power expansion', vietnamnews.vn/opinion/271064/vn-plans-nuclear-power-expansion.html

16. Thanh Nien News, 19 March 2016, 'Vietnam eyes less dependence on hydropower', http://blog.vietnam-aujourdhui.info/post/2016/03/20/Vietnam-eyes-less-de...

17. 5 Aug 2016, 'Revised power plan: more renewable energy', http://vietnamnews.vn/society/300678/revised-power-plan-more-renewable-e...

18. 24 March 2015, 'Vietnam to Get Its First Solar Power Plant', http://saigoneer.com/saigon-technology/4105-vietnam-to-get-its-first-sol...

19. Hieu Le, 26 Sept 2014, '3 Reasons Why Wind Power Has A Strong Future In Vietnam', http://saigoneer.com/saigon-technology/2791-3-reasons-why-wind-power-has...

20. 14 July 2013, 'Developing wind power in Vietnam', http://english.vov.vn/economy/developing-wind-power-in-vietnam-262567.vov

21. 3 June 2013, 'Wind turbines to rotate across Vietnam', http://baodongnai.com.vn/english/scien-tech/201306/wind-turbines-to-rota...

22. WWF, 12 May 2016, 'Vietnamese power sector can reach 100% renewable energy by 2050, according to new study', http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?267471/new-study-vietnam-power-sector-and...

Nuclear power in south-east Asia ... or not

A 2015 International Energy Agency report anticipates that nuclear power will account for just 1% of electricity generation in south-east Asia by 2040.¹ The report states: "All countries in Southeast Asia that are interested in deploying nuclear power face significant challenges. These include sourcing the necessary capital on favourable terms, creation of legal and regulatory frameworks, compliance with international norms and regulations, sourcing and training of skilled technical staff and regulators, and ensuring public support. ... The limited role for nuclear can be explained by the high upfront capital costs, limited access to financing, and uneven and tepid public support in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. Public opposition has been especially evident in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand."

A June 2016 media article began: "Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear-energy agency, is bullish on the outlook of its business in Southeast Asia after the speedy development of a project in Vietnam and a range of agreements with every country in the region except Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei."² Nikolay Drozdov, director of Rosatom's international business department, said Rosatom is focusing a lot of attention on south-east Asia, reflected by the decision to establish a regional headquarters in Singapore.²

Russia has nuclear cooperation agreements with seven countries in south-east Asia ‒ Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. But not one of those seven countries ‒ or any other country in south-east Asia ‒ has nuclear power plants (the only exception is the Bataan reactor in the Philippines, built but never operated) and not one is likely to in the foreseeable future.^3,4 Nor are other nuclear vendors likely to succeed where Russia is failing.

Drozdov said that after the (stalled) nuclear power project in Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia would likely be the next countries in the region to develop nuclear power.² But Indonesia's situation is much the same as Vietnam's ‒ decades of wasted efforts with little to show for it (and the same could be said about Thailand). Malaysia's consideration of nuclear power is preliminary.

Why would Russia be making such efforts in south-east Asia given that nuclear power prospects in the region are so dim? The answer may lie with domestic Russian politics. Given Rosatom's astonishing industry in lining up non-binding nuclear agreements with over 20 countries ‒ 'paper power plants' as Vladimir Slivyak calls them ‒ we can only assume that such agreements are looked on favorably by the Russian government.⁵

Slivyak writes: "These "orders" are not contracts specifying delivery dates, costs and a clear timescale for loan repayments (in most cases the money lent by Russia for power plant construction comes with a repayment date). Eighty to ninety per cent of these reported arrangements are agreements in principle that are vague on details, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the contracts aren't worth the paper they're printed on. ... So it is clear that [former Rosatom head Sergey] Kirienko's team has been excellent at drawing up and signing non-binding nuclear agreements ... Actually building nuclear plants seems to be beyond them."⁵

References:

1. International Energy Agency, 'Southeast Energy Asia Outlook 2015', www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015_SouthEastA...

2. Achara Deboonme, 6 June 2016, 'Russian nuclear agency bullish on Asean outlook', www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Russian-nuclear-agency-bullish-on-Asea...

3. Sahara Piang Brahim, 20 March 2013, 'Southeast Asia not ready to go nuclear', www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/20/southeast-asia-not-ready-to-go-nuclear/

4. Viet Phuong Nguyen, 9 Nov 2016, 'Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too Far?', http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/nuclear-energy-in-southeast-asia-a-bridge...

5. Vladimir Slivyak, 19 Oct 2016, 'Russian government appoints new head of Rosatom', www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/832/nuclear-monitor-832-19-oct...

Children's lives after Fukushima

At the end of October 2014, I visited the Futaba area in Fukushima Prefecture, observed classes, met with the children and learned of the distress in the schools from teaching staff, including principals and assistant principals, and also from related officials such as the local superintendant of schools.

In April 2011 (April is the beginning of the academic year in Japan), a total of 70 schools in Fukushima Prefecture were temporarily closed because they were unable to restart, or had been temporarily relocated. Of these, 38 were elementary schools, 20 were middle schools, 11 were high schools and one was a special-needs school. With the exception of one elementary school, all of these temporary closures or relocations were due to the nuclear power station explosions. A total of 8,013 students and 1,582 school teachers and staff were affected.

Three years later, in April 2014, schools which are still not able to restart and remain temporarily closed are four elementary schools and two middle schools run by Namie Town. The teachers and staff have been reassigned to "additional posts" in different schools all across the prefecture. The number of Fukushima schools that have returned to the original location and have reopened is 15 elementary schools and eight middle schools. Besides these, 19 elementary schools and ten middle schools have borrowed classrooms in other schools, have been closed through amalgamation with other schools, or have reopened by relocating temporarily to private facilities.

Many of the schoolchildren who remained in Fukushima Prefecture are living in temporary housing and are spending an hour to 90 minutes each way in school buses getting to and from school. They leave their homes before 7 a.m. and return in the early evening or sometimes after nightfall. Fatigue is accumulating among the younger elementary school children. Sports activities are limited due to lack of or insufficient school yards. Moreover, the long commuting times mean that all kinds of activities cannot be carried out satisfactorily. Some of the teachers and school staff commute more than 70 km each way to their schools. This was supposed to happen for only one year, but already more than three years have passed. The teachers lamented the fact that there does not seem to be any end to this situation in sight.

− Yukio Yamaguchi, Co-director, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo). Abridged from Nuke Info Tokyo No. 164, Jan/Feb 2015, www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit164/nit164articles/01_fukushima.html

"New" Japan Atomic Energy Commission inaugurated

Revisions to Japan's Act for the Establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission were made in June 2014 and went into effect on December 16. That day, the chairman remarked, "We are launching new Atomic Energy Commission activities." Never mind that it is called "new," the three committee members it comprises were appointed and began their activities in April, prior to the revisions. This is a strange way to arrange affairs, but Japan's government has become more disorderly since December 2012, when the Abe administration came into power, so this is par for the course.

The Atomic Energy Commission was shrunk from five members to three, and its operations were downsized on the basis of reconsiderations made by the previous administration, which we explained in NIT 152. Even though the administration changed hands, legal revisions were made in accordance with the previous administration's views.

Two of the three commission members are clearly supportive of nuclear energy, and they make no effort to hide it. The third specializes in uses of radiation. While she does not actively promote nuclear power, she expresses her ideas poorly. The chairman, Yoshiaki Oka, is a nuclear engineer and is on record in "Chairman's Remarks" at the beginning of his term as saying, "It is important that the excellent nuclear technology our country has cultivated and the hard-earned experience gained from TEPCO's accidents in Fukushima be utilized not only in Japan, but worldwide. Japan should lead the world in the field of nuclear energy."

Instead of creating new general principles for nuclear policy as the previous commission did, the Atomic Energy Commission drafted "Basic Concepts." The "Observations Used in Drafting the Basic Concepts" presented by Chairman Oka at the December 24 meeting of the commission, contains the statement, "How about a motto of ‘Leading the World' (in top-notch R&D and world-class projects)?"

Vice-Chairman Nobuyasu Abe hails from Japan's foreign Affairs Ministry, with expertise in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, but he exhibits a surprisingly low level of awareness. At the annual meeting of the Japanese branch of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management on November 22, 2014, Vice-Chairman Abe blithely remarked, "It is said that the increasing amounts of plutonium are a problem, but even if money in a bank increases, the risk of theft stays the same. This is a makeshift solution, but the amount of plutonium in storage is tallied at the end of the year, so it would be okay to begin reprocessing in January and use the plutonium before the end of the year so that the amount is reduced by year end."

Reprinted from Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Nuke Info Tokyo No. 164, Jan/Feb 2015, www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit164/nit164articles/07_nw164.html

Areva's 2014 revenue down 8%

Areva says its 2014 revenue was €8.34 billion (US$9.5 billion), down 8% from the previous year.¹ The company is expected to post a 2014 loss of at least €1 billion, perhaps much more.² Areva CEO Philippe Knoche said: "The year of 2014, particularly the second half, was a hard time for Areva."³

Areva's mining group took the largest hit in 2014, with revenue down €420 million (US$479 million) on the previous year, with sales volumes down 28%. Revenue also fell at the back end of the nuclear cycle, with a 12.1% drop in the business area dealing with spent fuel and reprocessing.³

Areva warned that it expects to book significant write-downs of assets in its 2014 accounts. The company did not elaborate, but the troubled EPR reactor project in Finland is a likely candidate.¹

Areva is reportedly drafting a plan to let EDF take a stake in some of its units (namely reactor exports and spent fuel reprocessing), thus providing a capital boost. The French state has an 87% stake in Areva and 84.5% in EDF.⁴

1. www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/areva-results-idUSL6N0VC43B20150202
2. https://uk.news.yahoo.com/arevas-losses-last-could-over-3-billion-euros-...
3. www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Areva-revenues-down-in-2014-0402151.html
4. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/05/areva-edf-idUKL6N0VF38J20150205

EU court adviser says German nuclear tax compatible with EU law

A German nuclear fuel tax is compatible with EU law, a European court adviser said on February 3, in a preliminary decision that could thwart efforts by utilities to recover billions of euros. The provisions of EU law "are not against such a tax", the adviser to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) concluded. The Court follows the opinions of court advisers in a majority of cases.

Last year, a Hamburg court declared the fuel tax illegal in another preliminary ruling, but requested advice from the ECJ. So far, German utilities have paid about 4.6 billion euros ($5.2 billion) in nuclear fuel taxes.

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL6N0VD1J720150203

Vietnam delays nuclear reactor program, again

The government of Vietnam has pushed back the date for breaking ground on its first nuclear reactor by two years from 2017 to 2019. This delay comes on top of an earlier postponement that set the 2017 date. Other reports give a 2020−2022 start date.

Hoang Anh Tuan, head of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Agency, said the delay is necessary because the government isn't ready to manage the project, nor does it have a mature and independent nuclear safety and regulatory oversight agency.

Russia's Rosatom has a contract to build the first two of four planned 1200 MW VVER nuclear reactors at a Ninh Thuan, a coastal site. Most of the financing will be provided by a Rosatom loan. Vietnam also has an agreement with Japan Atomic Power to plan the development of a second 2200 MW power station in the same region.

http://neutronbytes.com/2015/02/01/slow-growth-for-nuclear-energy-in-jap...

http://blogs.wsj.com/frontiers/2015/01/23/vietnams-slowing-growth-and-sa...

Nuclear Resister

The latest issue of Nuclear Resister is out now, with information about anti-nuclear and anti-war related arrests and peace prisoner support. Stories featured in the latest issue include:

• Villagers and supporters on Jeju Island (South Korea) were arrested and injured during a crackdown and demolition of a protest site.
• On January 29, Eve Tetaz and Nashua Chantal stood trial before US District Judge Stephen Hyles in Columbus, Georgia. The two had crossed onto Ft. Benning during the annual demonstration to close the School of the Americas. Tetaz received a $5,000 fine while Chantal was sentenced to five years of probation.
• On January 5, four protesters were arrested inside RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire while protesting the continuing use of armed drones.
• Kathy Kelly, co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, turned herself in to the federal prison camp in Lexington, Kentucky on January 23. She will serve a three-month sentence for her June 1, 2014 protest of drone killings at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.
• On January 17, activists from the Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action blocked the main gate and staged a mock funeral to "mourn the death of the earth after nuclear annihilation" at the US Navy's West Coast Trident nuclear submarine base. Ten men and women were removed from the roadway and arrested. 
• On January 17, peace activists stood in front of the Lockheed Martin complex in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Five people blocked the main driveway entrance and were later cited for disorderly conduct by the police.
• On January 10, Witness Against Torture and Code Pink marked the 14th anniversary of the opening of Guantanamo Prison with a torture protest on Dick Cheney's lawn. Two protesters were arrested on trespassing charges.
• On January 16, a judge found Henry Stoever not guilty of trespass during a protest at the Honeywell nuclear weapons plant in Kansas City, Missouri. The plant makes, procures and assembles 85% of the non-nuclear parts of nuclear weapons.

To read more and to subscribe to the Nuclear Resister e-bulletin or the print edition, visit: www.nukeresister.org

Meanwhile, anti-militarists are organising a mass lockdown at the Burghfield nuclear arms facility in the UK on March 2. The blockade is part of the non-violent direct action and campaigning against a new nuclear arms program. British nuclear arms are produced, maintained and stored in an Atomic Weapons Establishment in the village of Burghfield, located near the city of Reading. AKL, the Union of Conscientious Objectors Finland, is organising a bus trip to the event from Finland, picking up passengers from various cities including Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hamburg and the Hague.

More information: toimisto@akl-web.fi, http://actionawe.org/burghfieldlockdown

Switzerland − Mühleberg NPP will be shut down early
Operator BKW FMB Energy will permanently shut down Switzerland's Mühleberg nuclear power plant in 2019 − three years ahead of the planned 2022 shut down. BKW chair Urs Gasche said the main factors behind the decision were "the current market conditions as well as the uncertainty surrounding political and regulatory trends." BKW said it will invest US$223 million to enable continued operation until 2019. The Swiss canton of Bern is the majority shareholder in BKW.[1]

The single 372 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. In 2009, the Swiss environment ministry issued an unlimited-duration operating licence to the Mühleberg plant. This decision was overturned in March 2012 by the country's Federal Administrative Court (FAC), which said the plant could only operate until June 2013. BKW subsequently lodged an appeal with the Federal Court against the FAC's ruling, winning the case this March and securing an unlimited-duration operating licence.[1]

In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the Swiss government adopted a nuclear power phase-out policy, with no new reactors to be built and all existing reactors to be permanently shut down by 2034, along with a ban on nuclear reprocessing.[2,3]

[1]www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Political-risks-prompt-early-closure-of-Swi...
[2] www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2013_CD/countryprofiles/Switzerland/Switzerland.htm
[3] www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Switzerland/

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US−Vietnam nuclear deal − fools' gold standard
A senior Republican senator wrote to the Obama administration in late October voicing concerns about a recently negotiated nuclear trade agreement with Vietnam that does not explicitly prohibit the country from developing weapons-sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology.[1]

Bob Corker (Republican-Tennessee.) wrote: "The administration's acceptance of enrichment and reprocessing [ENR] capabilities in new agreements with countries where no ENR capability currently exists is inconsistent and confusing, potentially compromising our nation's nonproliferation policies and goals. ... The absence of a consistent policy weakens our nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and sends a mixed message to those nations we seek to prevent from gaining or enhancing such capability, and signals to our partners that the ‘gold standard' is no standard at all. The United States must lead with high standards that prevent the proliferation of technologies if we are to have a credible and effective nuclear nonproliferation policy."[2]

Corker is requesting a briefing from the Obama administration prior to the submittal of the US-Vietnam trade agreement to Congress. Once the agreement is submitted, the legislative branch will be required within 90 days of continuous session to decide whether to allow, reject or modify the accord.[1]

Shortly after the October 10 signing of the nuclear trade agreement, a US government official told journalists that Hanoi has promised "not to acquire sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment, and processing". But unidentified US officials told the Wall Street Journal that Vietnam would retain the right to pursue enrichment and reprocessing.[3]

Prior to the October 10 signing, Vietnam repeatedly said it would not accept restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing in a formal agreement with the US. According to Global Security Newswire, Hanoi "may make some effort ... to reassure the nonproliferation community, outside of the agreement text".[4]

In short, the agreement does not meet the 'gold standard' established in the US/UAE agreement of a legally-binding ban on enrichment and reprocessing [5] − notwithstanding contrary claims from US government officials and many media reports. Instead, it applies a fools' gold standard − a non-legally binding 'commitment'. There are many parallels in nuclear politics, such as India's 'moratorium' on nuclear weapons testing while Delhi refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

US labour and human rights groups have urged President Obama to suspend free-trade negotiations with Vietnam because of its treatment of workers and government critics. Analysts say a sharp increase in arrests and convictions of government detractors could complicate the nuclear deal when it is considered by Congress.[9]

Vietnam has also signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, France, China, South Korea, Japan and Canada. Plans call for Vietnam to have a total of eight nuclear power reactors in operation by 2027. Russia and Japan have already agreed to build and finance Vietnam's first four nuclear power units − two Russian-designed VVERs at Ninh Thuan and two Japanese reactors at Vinh Hai − although construction has yet to begin.[7] Vietnam intends to build its first nuclear-power reactor in a province particularly vulnerable to tsunamis.[8]

Progress − albeit slow progress − is being made with an IAEA low-enriched uranium fuel bank in Kazakhstan, which IAEA member countries could turn to if their regular supplies were cut. The fuel bank is designed to stem the spread of enrichment capabilities.[6]

[1] www.nti.org/gsn/article/senior-gop-senator-concerned-us-vietnam-nuclear-...
[2] www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/corker-inconsistency-in-civ...
[3] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-vietnam-announce-new-atomic-trade-deal/
[4] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-vietnam-could-initial-nuclear-trade-pact-week...
[5] Nuclear Monitor #766, 'Sensitive nuclear technologies and US nuclear export agreements', www.wiseinternational.org/node/4019
[6] www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/02/us-nuclear-fuel-iaea-idUSBRE9910JJ201...
[7] www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Agreement_opens_US_Vietnam_nuclear_trade-1...
[8] www.nti.org/gsn/article/vietnam-nuclear-power-program/?mgs1=b5a1drpwr4
[9] www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/10/us-signs-nuclear-technology-...

---

Thousands protest against Areva in Niger
Thousands of residents of the remote mining town of Arlit in Niger took to the streets on October 12 to protest against French uranium miner Areva and support a government audit of the company's operations.[1]

The Nigerian government announced the audit in September and wants to increase the state's revenues from the Cominak and Somair mines, in which the government holds 31% and 36.4% stakes, respectively. The government is also calling on the company to make infrastructure investments, including resurfacing the road between the town of Tahoua and Arlit, known as the "uranium road".[1]

Around 5,000 demonstrators marched through Arlit chanting slogans against Areva before holding a rally in the city centre. "We're showing Areva that we are fed up and we're demonstrating our support for the government in the contract renewal negotiations," said Azaoua Mamane, an Arlit civil society spokesperson.[1]

Arlit residents complain they have benefited little from the local mining industry. "We don't have enough drinking water while the company pumps 20 million cubic metres of water each year for free. The government must negotiate a win-win partnership," Mamane said. Areva representatives in Niger and Paris declined to comment.[1]

Another resident said: "The population has inherited 50 million tonnes of radioactive residues stocked in Arlit, and Areva continues to freely pump 20 million cubic metres of water each year while the population dies of thirst."[2]

Areva is also developing the Imouraren mine in Niger, where first ore extraction is due in 2015.[3]

Meanwhile, four French nationals from Areva and contractor Vinci have been released after three years in captivity. They were kidnapped by Islamic militants near the Arlit uranium mine. Seven people were kidnapped on 15 September 2010 by what has been described as the Islamic Mahgreb Al-Qaida group; three were released in February 2011. In May 2013, a terrorist car bomb damaged the mine plant at Arlit, killing one employee and injuring 14.[4]

[1] www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/12/niger-areva-protest-idUSL6N0I20H22013...
[2] www.france24.com/en/20131012-thousands-protest-niger-against-french-nucl...
[3] www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-06/areva-urges-clients-to-buy-uranium-as-...
[4] WNN, 30 Oct 2013, www.world-nuclear-news.org/C_Hostage_relief_for_Areva_3010132.html

More information:

• Nuclear Monitor #769, 10 Oct 2013, 'Niger audits U mines, seeks better deal'
• Nuclear Monitor #765, 1 Aug 2013, 'Uranium mining in Niger'

The Obama administration, in advanced negotiations on nuclear-cooperation agreements with Jordan and Vietnam, has withdrawn a demand that these countries forgo their rights to produce nuclear fuel, senior U.S. officials said. The policy shift, adopted after an extensive interagency review, drew criticism from some U.S. lawmakers, who charged that it could ease the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.

A letter from senior US officials signals that the country will continue to seek nuclear trade agreements with conditions on enrichment and reprocessing implemented on a "case-by-case" basis. The letter from deputy energy secretary Daniel Poneman and undersecretary of state for arms control and international security Ellen Tauscher was sent to the administration of President Barack Obama on 10 January. The text of the letter was published by a Global Security Newswire article on 23 January.

The Obama administration in 2009 signed a nuclear-cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates that bound the Arab country not to enrich uranium domestically or reprocess spent plutonium fuel, the two technologies that can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

President Barack Obama cited the U.A.E. agreement as the "gold standard" for future nuclear-cooperation pacts. Washington has used the deal to press Iran over its nuclear program, arguing that Tehran should follow the Emirates and rely on the international market for nuclear fuel.

U.S. officials involved in the policy review said Washington risked losing business for American companies seeking to build nuclear reactors overseas, and could greatly diminish its ability to influence the nonproliferation policies of developing countries. And obviously the Obama administration concluded that most countries wouldn't be willing to follow the U.A.E. model, and that insisting on it would hurt American interests.

The fundamental justification for the decision is that insisting on the standard negatively impacts trade opportunities for U.S. companies, which in turn restricts the country's ability to set non-proliferation conditions: "Nuclear trade carries with it a critical nonproliferation advantage in the form of consent rights, along with other opportunities to influence the nuclear policies of our partners"

But the U.S. is pursuing a range of other tools (Nuclear Suppliers Group and fuel leasing arrangements), to ensure that developing countries seek to purchase nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers rather than developing the technologies needed to produce the fuel themselves.

In addition to negotiations with Jordan and Vietnam, the departments of State and Energy are beginning to renegotiate pacts signed in the 1970s with South Korea and Taiwan that will lapse in the coming years. The agreements, which are legally designated as treaties, require congressional approval.

South Korea is beginning to renegotiate its 1974 nuclear-cooperation agreement with the U.S. South Korean officials argue Seoul needs to use this method to safely dispose of the spent fuel coming from the country's growing nuclear-power industry. The 1974 U.S.-South Korean nuclear cooperation agreement requires U.S. consent if “any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America [are to be] altered in form or content.” As a matter of policy, South Korea requests that the United States agree to such activities even if U.S.-origin material is not involved. The cooperation agreement will expire in 2014, however, and South Korea wants to negotiate a new agreement that will give it the same programmatic permission that the United States has given the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and, with certain conditions, India.

Under the agreements with the European Union, India, Japan, and Switzerland, the United States has provided advance long-term consent for reprocessing. In India’s case, according to the Indian-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, this long-term consent does not go into effect until India has built and brought into operation “a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing material” under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the two countries have agreed on “arrangements and procedures under which reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility.”

U.S. officials fear such a move would undercut efforts to get North Korea to give up its nuclear-weapons program. An agreement with Vietnam that doesn't follow the U.A.E. model could make it harder for the U.S. to get Seoul to accept stringent terms.

U.S. lawmakers are focused on the Jordan negotiation (an agreement is expected at the end of this year), fearing an agreement that allows domestic nuclear-fuel production could have a cascading effect across the Middle East. This is also because the U.A.E.'s pact allows it to renegotiate if another country in the Middle East gains more favorable terms. Saudi Arabia has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. and has echoed Jordan's reservations about giving up its right to enrich uranium, senior Arab diplomats said.

Lawmakers and nonproliferation experts fear more lenient nuclear-cooperation agreements with Jordan and Vietnam could undercut the campaign to contain Iran's nuclear program. "If the U.S. lets Jordan, Vietnam or South Korea make nuclear fuel, you can kiss any attempt to persuade Iran or any other state to forgo fuel making goodbye," said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nuclear Policy Education Center.

Sources: Arms Control Today, Frank von Hippel, March 2010 / Nuclear Policy Education Center, 23 January 2012 / World Nuclear News, 25 January 2012 / Wall Street Journal, 25 January 2012 /

French revolution?
They have been talking about this for months, mostly behind closed doors; the French Parti Socialiste (social-democrats) and the French Greens have agreed upon a joint positionon the future of nuclear power. The Greens will support the PS candidate in return for his promise to cut France’s reliance on nuclear energy for its electricity from about 75 per cent to just half by 2025. If François Hollande, the socialist candidate wins over current President Sarkozy in the next spring’s presidential elections it will have profound implications for state-owned EDF, now making two-thirds of its operating profit domestically, mostly from its 58 atomic reactors.

EDF is in trouble anyway; the Fukushma disaster has lead to newly to-be implemented safety measures for the French nuclear fleet, with soaring costs as a to-be expected result. The shares have lost 35 per cent of their value in a year, even though profits were healthy and management won praise for cutting its net debt from 34.4 billion euro (US$46 bn) at the end of 2010 to 29.2 billion euro (US$ 39.2 bn) by June 30 of this year. EDF, the world’s leading supplier of nuclear power, has not officially responded to Mr Hollande’s plans for reasons of political propriety. But their lobby machinery was in full-swing, warning for instance that a cut to 50 per cent supply would create additional costs of 60 bn euro and that “1 million jobs are in peril” should the country abandon atomic power completely.

Of course there is always still a chance that Mr Sarkozy, a skilled campaigner, wins the elections or that Mr Hollande waters down his policy once confronted with the realities of office. The two opposition parties agreed to campaign for the shutdown of 24 nuclear reactors by 2025 and the immediate halt of the oldest plant at Fessenheim. The Greens favor a complete halt of France’s nuclear reactors, while the PS called for the lowering of France’s dependence on atomic power to 50 percent by 2025. Dispute between the parties is still ongoing over the question of the future of the reprocessing- and MOX fabrication plant in La Hague and the question whether the new EPR in Flamanville, currently under construction.

Anti-nuclear organizations criticized the accord as not going far enough. But considering the French history of massive support for nuclear power, also or even especially in for instance social-democratic and communist left-wing circles, the development can be seen as a serious breakthrough in the French political interrelations
Financial Times, 15 November 2011 / Bloomberg, 16 November 2011

Sellafield’s ‘Reassurance’ Monitoring.
Some road drains located on the main approach road to the village centre of Seascale (near Sellafield) have shown a significant rise in levels of Caesium-137 (Cs-137) and Americium 241 (Am-241) in 2010 compared to previous years. In 1988, following the cull of an estimated 2000 feral pigeons at Seascale that were found to be highly contaminated after roosting in Sellafield buildings overnight, radioactivity in the sediment of 18 Seascale road drains was assessed by Copeland Borough Council and the National Radiological Board. Since the cull and the wholescale removal of gardens and driveways to reduce contamination levels, subsequent annual reassurance monitoring of sediment in drains has been carried out by the Environment Agency and has  shown a decline and levelling off of radioactivity levels  – until last year.

For 2010, it is reported that in one drain on the Drigg Road, levels of Cs-137 have risen from 310 Becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) in 2009 to 1800 Bq/kg, and an increase in Am-241 from 31 Bq/kg to 130 Bq/kg. Elevated levels of Strontium 90 (Sr-90) and plutonium were also present in the drain sediment – with a second drain on the Drigg Road also showing raised concentrations of radioactivity.

An urgent explanation of this unprecedented hike in radioactive concentrations is required from Sellafield and the Environment Agency. Until then, there can be little public reassurance on the sudden appearance of these high levels being found in Seascale some 13 years after the effects of the Seascale pigeon saga were supposed to have been remediated. Put in context, the 2010 levels of Cs-137 in drain SS233 are some 500% higher than those reported for river estuary sediment around Ravenglass – an area known to be heavily contaminated by decades of Sellafield’s reprocessing discharges.
CORE Briefing, 20 November 2011

Japanese gov't reform body: cancel Monju and ITER.
A government body tasked with reforming public policy began a four-day review session Sunday, with ruling party lawmakers and private-sector experts proposing a sweeping review of long-running nuclear research programs in the wake of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 power plant. The review process conducted by the Government Revitalization Unit of the Cabinet Office is aimed at identifying government policies for medium- and long-term reforms and will cover 10 areas including science, education and telecommunications.

In the first such screening sessions under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, all seven members engaged in reviewing energy policy told an open-door screening session that a program to develop the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor needs radical revision. They recommended the cancellation of 2.2 billion yen (US$ 28.6 million, 21 million euro) of Monju-related spending included in the fiscal 2012 national budget request. According to press reports in September, the science ministry effectively froze research related to Monju  by cutting 70 to 80 percent of its current 10 billion yen budget for the next fiscal year from April.

The reactor project, on which the country has so far spent about 900 billion yen (US$ 11.7 billion or 8.6 billion euro), has been hobbled by a series of problems. The reactor first achieved criticality in 1994 but was shut down because of sodium coolant leakage and a resulting fire in 1995. On May 6 2010, Monju was restarted, after being shut down for over 14 years, but on August 26, 2010 when a 3-ton relay device used during replacement of fuel was being removed, it dropped back into the reactor vessel. Since then the reactor is closed again.

The screening body also urged the government to either halt, delay or cut spending for an international project known as ITER to build an experimental fusion reactor in southern France by holding negotiations with participating countries. ITER is a joint project being conducted by China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States.
Mainichi Daily News, 26 Septemebr 2011 and 20 November  2011 / CNIC file on Monju

Areva: jobcuts in Germany.
Things are not going well with Areva, as mentioned in the last Nuclear Monitor. According to German weekly Der Spiegel on November 20, Areva will cut 1,300 jobs in Germany and close down two of its sites. The firm will slash its workforce by around 20 percent at its main site in Erlangen in central Germany, as well as making cuts at other sites across the country. The extent of the job cuts would be nearly twice as high as the 800 redundancies cited in the French press. Extra jobcuts in Germany could well be seen as a kind of 'revenge' for it's decision to abandon nuclear power. The company is expected to announce the move on December 13 in Paris.
Der Spiegel, 20 November 2011

Vietnam to lend 9 bn from Russia to buy Russian reactor.
Russia agreed to lend Vietnam as much as US$9 billion (6.7 bn euro) to fund the construction of the nation’s first nuclear power plant. The lending period will be as long as 28 years, but the interest rate has not been disclosed. Vietnam said last year it plans to build as many as 13 nuclear power stations with a capacity totalling 16,000 megawatts over the next two decades. The announcement attracted interest from nuclear plant builders including Russia's Rosatom and China’s Guangdong Nuclear Power Group. Construction of the two 1,000 MW advanced light-water reactors (called Ninh Thuan 1) is said to start in 2014. It is very likely that Rosatom sings the contract for construction, if the project will develop, and in that case Vietnam is lending money from Russia to buy a Russian reactor.
Bloomberg, 22 November 2011

Axpo says no to uranium from Mayak. Swiss nuclear utility Axpo has instructed Areva, its fuel supplier, to exclude uranium processed at Russia's Mayak plant from its supply chain pending the completion of environmental investigations.
Axpo owns the Beznau nuclear power station as well as stakes in the Gösgen and Leibstadt plants. It has been carrying out investigations into the quality and safety credentials of the Mayak processing plant near Chelyabinsk and at the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) in Seversk following criticisms from environmental groups. In the process of its investigations, Axpo was given access to Seversk by the plant's operators and had been due to visit Mayak in June, but was denied access to the plant, which is in a military area, at the last minute.
The company now says it has been able to complete enough work to enable it to conclude that current production at both plants meets statutory requirements and does not pose an environmental threat. However, its failure to gain access to Mayak means that it has now instructed its fuel supplier Areva, to exclude uranium from Mayak from its supply chain until such time as the chain can be fully monitored. Instead, it will use fuel from the SCC plant in Seversk. Greenpeace Switzerland welcomed Axpo's move towards greater transparency but questioned its decision to continue to source uranium from Seversk.
World Nuclear News, 14 November 2011