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USA: NRC inspector warns of Diablo Canyon seismic risks

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#790
04/09/2014
Article

The former top Nuclear Regulatory Commission on-site inspector at the Diablo Canyon reactors in California, nuclear engineer Dr Michael Peck, has recommended to the NRC that those reactors be shut down until their ability to withstand earthquakes is fully assessed. This should have been the big news a year ago: Peck wrote his recommendation − in the form of a formal Differing Professional Opinion − in July 2013. But the NRC still hasn't taken action, or even responded to it.

There are several major earthquake faults around Diablo Canyon. And not only has our understanding of earthquakes evolved dramatically since construction of the first reactor at Diablo was authorized in 1968, but at least two major faults − the Hosgri and the Shoreline faults − hadn't even been discovered then.

According to the Associated Press: "The NRC says the Hosgri fault line presents the greatest earthquake risk and that Diablo Canyon's reactors can withstand the largest projected quake on it. In his analysis, Peck wrote that after officials learned of the Hosgri fault's potential shaking power, the NRC never changed the requirements for the structural strength of many systems and components in the plant."

And the NRC has done only a preliminary assessment of the possible effects of the Shoreline fault. Diablo's owner, Pacific Gas & Electric, claims the reactors would withstand any possible earthquake from any of the faults, but given that this is the same utility that built the second unit at Diablo in a mirror image of its blueprints, it doesn't hold a lot of credibility. Pacific Gas & Electric has not only been insisting that its two Diablo Canyon reactors are safe, but has filed with the NRC to extend the 40 year licenses given for their operations another 20 years − to 2044 for Diablo Canyon 1 and to 2045 for Diablo Canyon 2.

Peck, on the other hand, who still works for NRC but not at Diablo, does have credibility. In his Differing Professional Opinion, Peck writes: "The new seismic information resulted in a condition outside of the bounds of the existing Diablo Canyon design basis and safety analysis. Continued reactor operation outside the bounds of the NRC approved safety analyses challenges the presumption of nuclear safety."

Peck writes in NRC bureaucratic language, but what he is saying can easily be summed up in plain English: The NRC does not know whether Diablo Canyon could survive an earthquake, within the realm of the possible, at any of the faults around Diablo Canyon. And the reactors should shut down until the NRC does know one way or the other. Of course, if the reactors cannot survive a postulated earthquake, the obvious conclusion is that they must close permanently.

Peck asked that his Differing Professional Opinion be made public, but the NRC has not released it. And despite the NRC's requirement that Differing Professional Opinions are to be ruled on within 120 days of filing, the NRC has not ruled on Peck's July 2013 opinion.

Friends of the Earth has filed a petition with the NRC charging that the plant is in violation of its license and must be closed immediately pending public hearings to prove it is safe. The petition charges that despite having new information that earthquake faults surrounding Diablo Canyon are capable of ground motion far greater than the reactors were designed and licensed to withstand, both Pacific Gas and Electric and the NRC have failed to close the plant pending the completion of a rigorous safety analysis and licensing review required by the NRC's rules.

The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee has announced it will hold hearings into the NRC's suppression of Dr Peck's Differing Professional Opinion. Committee chair Sen. Barbara Boxer said: "The NRC's failure to act constitutes an abdication of its responsibility to protect public health and safety."

Michael Peck, July 2013, 'Differing Professional Opinion − Diablo Canyon Seismic Issues'

http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/5a/8/4821/Diablo_Canyon_Seismic_DPO.pdf

Associated Press, 25 Aug 2014, 'Hearings Planned After Call for Nuke-Plant Closure', http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/ap-exclusive-expert-calls-nuk...

Friends of the Earth petition to the NRC:

http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/26/5/4826/Friends_of_the_Earth_NRC_p...

Other sources:

http://safeenergy.org/2014/08/25/former-top-nrc-inspector-says-shut-diab...

www.foe.org/diablo

www.foe.org/news/news-releases/2014-08-nuclear-watchdog-petitions-federa...

www.foe.org/news/news-releases/2014-07-diablo-canyon-secret-document-det...

About: 
Diablo Canyon 1Diablo Canyon 2

Nuclear News

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#773
21/11/2013
Shorts

Radiation can pose bigger cancer risk for children − UN study
Infants and children are at greater risk than adults of developing some cancers when exposed to radiation, according to a report released in October by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and presented to the UN General Assembly.

Children were found to be more sensitive than adults for the development of 25% of tumour types including leukaemia and thyroid, brain and breast cancers. "The risk can be significantly higher, depending on circumstances," UNSCEAR said.

"Because of their anatomical and physiological differences, radiation exposure has a different impact on children compared with adults," said Fred Mettler, chair of an UNSCEAR expert group on the issue.

www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-nuclear-radiation-children-idUSBRE...

USA: Bad record keeping hindering clean-up of nuclear sites
The US government's decades-long effort to rehabilitate hundreds of sites around the country where nuclear weapons development and production has taken plan has been hampered by sloppy record-keeping. Documentation has been so uneven that the Energy Department says it lacks adequate records on several dozen facilities to be able to determine whether they merit clean-up. Additionally, in excess of 20 sites that were cleaned up and announced to be safe ended up needing more rehabilitation after lingering traces of nuclear contamination were found. The final price-tag of the clean-up effort is estimated to cost US$350 billion.[1]

Meanwhile, who − and what pot of money − would drive clean-up after a nuclear power plant incident is a question still left unanswered by the federal government, New York state officials said in a recent legal filing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the nuclear power industry's liability in the event of a catastrophe is limited, and in any case NRC officials said in 2009 that Price-Anderson money likely would not be available to pay for offsite clean-up − a revelation made public a year later when internal EPA documents were released under the Freedom of Information Act. Another three years have gone by and the federal government has yet to provide a clear answer, the New York Attorney General's office says. In 2012, NRC Commissioner William Magwood acknowledged that there "is no regulatory framework for environmental restoration following a major radiological release."[2]

[1] NTI Global Security Newswire, 30 Oct 2013, 'Bad Record Keeping Hindering Cleanup of Ex-Nuclear Sites: Report', www.nti.org/gsn/article/cleanup
[2] Douglas P. Guarino, 25 Sept 2013, 'New York Wonders Where Nuclear Cleanup Funds Would Come From', www.nti.org/gsn/article/new-york-wonders-where-nuclear-cleanup-funds-wou...
 

Areva signs uranium deal with Mongolian state
French utility Areva has signed a deal with Mongolia's state-owned Mon-Atom to develop two uranium mines in the Gobi desert. A company will be created, 66% owned by Areva, 34% Mon-Atom, and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation will take an equity interest. Areva said exploration had discovered two uranium deposits with estimated reserves of 60,000 tonnes.

Mongolian protesters had warned before the signing that a deal could lead to the contamination of water resources in the area. Selenge Lkhagvajav, a protest leader, said: "We are not against cooperation with France. But we just say 'no uranium exploration in Mongolia', as not having it is the best way to prevent radioactive pollution and contamination."

www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/french-energy-giant-signs/862604.html
http://news.yahoo.com/french-energy-giant-signs-uranium-deal-mongolia-14...

Scotland: Dundrennan depleted uranium protest
Campaigners held a walk-on at the Dundrennan range in protest at the test firing of depleted uranium (DU) weapons into the Solway Firth. It was part of an international day of action and followed concerns about serious health issues resulting from the use of such weapons in war zones. The last DU tests at the south of Scotland range were in 2008. DU Day of Action events were also held in Finland, Japan, Norway, Costa Rica and elsewhere.

www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-24835544
www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/6/11-day-of-action

UK: Inadequate nuclear regulation
The UK government's nuclear safety watchdog has named the five UK sites that need the most regulation because of the safety problems they pose. They are the reprocessing complex at Sellafield in Cumbria, the nuclear bomb factories at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire, the nuclear submarine base at Devonport in Plymouth and the former fast breeder centre at Dounreay in Caithness.[1]

These sites have been highlighted by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) in its 2013 annual report as requiring an "enhanced level of regulatory attention" because of the radioactive hazards on the sites, the risk of radioactive leaks contaminating the environment around the sites and ONR's view of operators' safety performances.[1]

Sellafield was rated unacceptable in one inspection because a back-up gas turbine to provide power to the site in emergencies was "at imminent risk of failure to operate" because of severe corrosion. "Failure would reduce the availability of nuclear safety significant equipment, and also potentially injure or harm the workforce," says ONR.[1]

At Aldermaston, corrosion in a structural steelwork was discovered in 2012, resulting in the closure of the A45 building which makes enriched uranium components for nuclear warheads and fuel for nuclear submarines.[1]

In May, AWE admitted one count of breaching the Health and Safety At Work Act 1974 in relation to an August 2010 accident and fire at Aldermaston. A worker was injured when the mixing chemicals in a bucket caused an explosion and a fire which led to the evacuation of staff and nearby residents. Bernard Thorogood, prosecuting on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive, said an investigation into the fire revealed a "constellation of failures" relating to health and safety regulations which put employees at risk.[2]

[1] Rob Edwards, 5 Nov 2013, www.robedwards.com/2013/11/five-nuclear-sites-with-most-safety-problems-...
[2] Basingstoke Gazette, 23 May 2013, www.basingstokegazette.co.uk/news/10436305._/

Italy: radioactive waste dumped illegally by Mafia blamed for cancer increase
The Italian Senate is investigating a possible link between buried radioactive waste and a rise of almost 50% in tumours found in the inhabitants of several towns around Naples. The illegal trafficking of hazardous waste came to light in 1997. A Mafia clan had run a profitable operation dumping millions of tonnes of waste on farmland, in caves, in quarries, on the edge of towns, in Lake Lucrino and along the coast.

Radioactive sludge, brought in on trucks from plants in Germany, was dumped in landfills, said Carmine Schiavone, who was involved in the illegal activities before becoming a whistle-blower. "I know that some is on land where buffalo live today, and on which no grass grows," he said.

Hannah Roberts, 1 Nov 2013, 'Toxic nuclear waste dumped illegally by the Mafia is blamed for surge in cancers in southern Italy', www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2483484/Toxic-nuclear-waste-dumped-ille...
 

UK: Dungeness power lines damaged by storms
EDF's Dungeness nuclear power station has been reconnected to the National Grid after power lines were damaged when storms battered southern Britain. The Kent power plant's two reactors were automatically shut down when electricity to the site was cut off on 28 October.[1] More than 60,000 homes and businesses were left without power.[2]

The Dungeness plant was in the media earlier this year when Freedom of Information documents revealed that ministers rejected advice from the Office for Nuclear Regulation to restrict development near nuclear plants. That advice was overridden when the government approved the expansion of Lydd airport, a few miles from the Dungeness plant. Dungeness was also in the news earlier this year when it was revealed that tritium leaks beyond the statutory limit had occurred.[3]

[1] BBC, 6 Nov 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-24838306
[2] Utility Week, 29 Oct 2013, www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/nuclear-plant-and-60000-customers-still-off-s...
[3] 'Dungeness Airport Threat & Tritium', May 2013, www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/nuclearnews/NuClearNewsNo50.pdf

Yellowcake submarines

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#771
02/11/2013
Article

The UK Office for Nuclear Regulation has issued an improvement notice on the Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth after a report revealed lapses. The naval base is operated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and government engineering contractors Babcock Marine. On 29 July 2012, the electric-power source for coolant to submarine reactors failed and then the diesel back-up generators also failed, according to a heavily redacted report from the MoD's Site Event Report Committee.[1]

Babcock launched an internal investigation after the incident, blaming the complete loss of power on a defect in the central switchboard and acknowledging that the event had "potential nuclear implications". Among a number of "areas of concern" uncovered by Babcock was what was described as an "inability to learn from previous incidents and to implement the recommendations from previous event reports".[1]

The Office for Nuclear Regulation issued an improvement notice for three alleged breaches of health and safety legislation, and of Section 24 of the Nuclear Installations Act – regarding "operating instructions".[1]

The MoD's Site Event Report Committee report notes that there had been two previous electrical failures at Devonport − the loss of primary and alternative shore supply to nuclear submarine HMS Talent in 2009, and the loss of "AC shore supply" to the nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar in 2011.[1]

Regarding the July 2012 loss of power incident, independent nuclear consultant John Large said: "It is unbelievable that this happened. It could have been very serious. Things like this shouldn't happen. It is a fundamental that these fail-safe requirements work. It had all the seriousness of a major meltdown – a major radioactive release." Large warned that if a submarine had recently entered the base when the failure occurred the situation could have been "dire" because of high heat levels in its reactor.[1]

The loss of power incident is one of 11 incidents in the past five years at two nuclear submarine bases, the MoD has revealed. Radioactive waste has been spilled, workers exposed to radiation, power supplies lost, safety valves wrongly operated and a bag of waste mistakenly dropped overboard. Six of the incidents happened at Faslane in Scotland, five at Devonport. The incidents have been admitted by UK defence minister, Philip Dunne, in response to a parliamentary question.[2]

According to the MoD, six incidents since 2008 at Faslane have been defined as "category B", the second-worst rating, involving "actual or high potential for a contained release within building or submarine or unplanned exposure to radiation". In 2008, valves on board a submarine were shut "in error" at Faslane, causing a loss of power. In 2009, there were two problems with cranes at Faslane being used more often than they should be without authorisation. In 2010, the melting of an ice plug caused by the failure of a liquid nitrogen supply resulted in radioactive coolant leaking into a submarine reactor compartment at Faslane. In the same year, a bag of potentially contaminated clothing fell overboard. Last year, maintenance workers entered an area next to a reactor compartment "without the proper radiological controls in place and hence received an unplanned exposure to a radiological dose," the MoD said.[2]

The five incidents at Devonport include a spillage of reactor coolant "into the environment" in 2008, the operation of two submarines without key safety valves in 2010 and an overflowing radioactive waste tank in 2011. The July 2012 loss of power incident is also included in the list. Although the MoD described what happened in 10 instances, it refused to give details of one event at Devonport because "disclosure would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces".[2]

UK Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator report

The 2012−13 report of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) revealed:[4,5,6]

  • Cracks in reactors and nuclear discharges, directly attributable to the Royal Navy's oldest Trafalgar Class SSNs (Ship Submarine Nuclear) remaining in service beyond their design date.
  • Faults with the new Astute Class submarines that will delay their entry into service, forcing the Navy to continue sailing the ageing and potentially dangerous Trafalgars.
  • The Atomic Weapons Establishment failed to notice or rectify corrosion to a nuclear missile treatment plant in Berkshire.
  • Nuclear-qualified engineers are quitting the Navy in droves over poor pay and conditions, creating a skills crisis.

 

DNSR head Richard Savage wrote: "Significant and sustained attention is required to ensure maintenance of adequate safety performance and the rating [Red] reflects the potential impact if changes are ill-conceived or implemented. The inability to sustain a sufficient number of nuclear suitably competent personnel is the principal threat to safety. Vulnerabilities exist in core skill areas, including safety, propulsion, power and naval architects."[4]

In March 2007, two sailors were killed on HMS Tireless when an oxygen generator exploded during an Arctic exercise. An inquest heard that there was a significant possibility the generator was salvaged from a hazardous waste depot in a cost-cutting bid by the MoD. HMS Tireless leaked radioactive coolant from its reactor for eight days in February 2013 including six days at the Devonport dockyard in Plymouth.[4,6]

The DNSR report states: "Inspection programmes have not been as comprehensive as regulators would expect. As an example, corrosion in the structural supports of a building was not identified as early as would be expected which resulted in the Office for Nuclear Regulation issuing a Safety Improvement Notice." AWE admitted corrosion had affected its uranium component manufacturing facility.[4]

Meanwhile, there are fears that two major naval bases (Devonport and Rosyth, Fife) sited near large British cities could become nuclear waste storage facilities by default after it was revealed the MoD proposes to remove low-level radioactive waste from the UK's nuclear submarine fleet. The first of Britain's fleet of 27 nuclear submarines is due to be dismantled within five years. But according to minutes of the Submarine Dismantling Project Advisory Group, there is "uncertainty running to several decades" over a long-term storage solution for radioactive waste. There are seven retired subs at Rosyth and eight at Devonport.[3]

Russia

A fire broke out on a Russian nuclear submarine undergoing repairs, according to news reports in September, but no injuries or radiation leaks were reported. Russian news reports said the fire on the Tomsk submarine at repair yards in the Pacific coast city of Bolshoi Kamen had been extinguished with foam on September 16. The Tomsk, capable of firing cruise missiles, has been undergoing repairs since 2010. Reports said all its weaponry had been removed and the reactor was shut down, although it was not clear if any nuclear material remained in the reactor.[7]

Large-scale Soviet nuclear tests, dumping of spent fuel and two scuttled nuclear-powered submarines are a major source of pollution in the Arctic ocean. There are 17,000 containers and 19 vessels holding radioactive waste submerged in the Kara Sea, as well as 14 nuclear reactors including five that still contain spent nuclear fuel, and 735 other pieces of radioactively contaminated heavy machinery. In addition, the Soviet nuclear submarine K-27 was scuttled in 1981 in the Kara Sea. The K-27, equipped with two nuclear reactors (and their irradiated fuel), was filled with bitumen and concrete before being sunk, to ensure that it would lie safely on the ocean floor for 50 years.[8,9,10]

As the Arctic thaws under the influence of global warming, oceanic currents in the region could hasten the spread of radioactive materials. But according to Bellona's Igor Kurdrik, an expert on Russian naval nuclear waste, the Russian state has another interest: "We know that the Russians have an interest in oil exploration in this area. They therefore want to know were the radioactive waste is so they can clean it up before they begin oil recovery operations."[10]

USA

The US Navy has decided to scrap the USS Miami instead of fixing the nuclear submarine, which a civilian shipyard worker set fire to in 2012. The submarine was commissioned in 1990 at a cost of US$900 million. It sustained US$450 million in damages after Casey James Fury, a shipyard worker, set the 23 May 2012 blaze.[11]

The fire damaged forward compartments including living quarters, a command and control centre and the torpedo room. Weapons had been removed prior to the fire, and the fire never reached the rear of the submarine, where the nuclear propulsion components are located. Fury said he was suffering from anxiety and having problems with his ex-girlfriend and set the fire in order to get out of work early. It took 12 hours and the efforts of more than 100 firefighters to extinguish the fire. Seven people were hurt. Fury is serving 17 years in federal prison.[11]

References:
[1] www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nuclear-scare-at-navy-submarine-...
[2] www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/workers-exposed-to-radiation-at-fa...
[3] www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/naval-bases-could-become-nuclear...
[4] www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2384224/Revealed-Shock-Code-Red-safety-...
[5] www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/04/ageing-nuclear-submarines-sailor...
[6] DNSR Annual Report 2012−13, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
[7] www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/16/fire-russian-nuclear-submarine-tomsk
[8] www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/nuclear-waste-lurks-beneath-arct...
[9] www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2012/rosatom_seminar
[10] http://earthfirstnews.wordpress.com/2012/08/30/russia-dumped-17-nuclear-...
[11] www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2386909/Nuclear-submarine-USS-Miami-set...

South Korea indicts 100 people over safety scandals

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#771
02/11/2013
Article

South Korea has indicted 100 people of corruption and forgery in the scandal over fake safety certifications for parts in its nuclear reactors, authorities said on October 3. The people are from Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co (KHNP − which operates the nation's 23 nuclear reactors), from parts suppliers, and from certifiers.[1] A vice president at Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) and a former KHNP chief executive face bribery charges.[2]

The scandal broke last November after the country's energy ministry ordered the shutdown of two reactors after admissions that eight unnamed firms that supplied parts had faked certificates covering thousands of nuclear power components from 2003 to 2012, affecting at least five reactors. Then in May, it was revealed that four other reactors had components (safety-related control cabling) with forged documentation, prompting the shut down of two reactors for about four months for replacements.[1] Currently, six of the country's 23 reactors are off-line either because of the scandal or scheduled outages.

According to the government's policy coordination ministry, 277 out of 22,000 documents of tests on components at 20 reactors were found to be forged. Of 218,000 documents examined for a further eight units, including five under construction, a total of 2,010 were found to be falsified.[3]

The scandal continues to widen. On October 16, KHNP revealed that control cables at two reactors under construction − Shin Kori 3 and 4 − failed a re-evaluation. Completion of these reactors has been put back by 6−12 months.[1]

Park Young-June, a former deputy minister in charge of energy, has been charged with accepting 50 million won (US$45,000) bribes in 2010 in return for favouring a constructor bidding for a nuclear reactor contract. He is also charged with taking money from Kim Jong-Shin, the one-time chief of KHNP.[4]

In late September, new KHNP chief executive Cho Seok issued a public apology. "Our domestic nuclear project is facing the utmost crisis," he said, adding that public trust had "hit the ground" because of Fukushima and the corruption issues in Korea.[3]

The Atomic Power Review website provides a useful summary of recent events:[5]

"In terms of "will parts with faked certificates actually work," the answer appears in at least one case to be "no," and "do parts supplied under these bribery-induced contracts meet specs," the answer also appears to be "no." Much else has developed in the interim. Let's detail developments in recent times, since it was announced that about 100 people had been indicted overall in the scandal ...

  • In early October, it was found that eight nuclear cable suppliers were price fixing; a fine was imposed and a case referred to prosecutors.[6]
  • The cable makers were found to have been paying very high dividends − and it was noted that the fine amount was insignificant to deter the practice when compared with the profit derived from a successful bid.[7]
  • A large number of faked testing results were discovered in connection with investigation into the corruption scandal, including 277 used to cover parts at operating plants.[8]
  • Suspect cables have failed inspections at two reactor plants.[9]
  • On October 17 it was revealed that the Korean Government would sue LS Group, which owns JS Cable − the major culprit in supply of suspect cables.[10]
  • Another piece hinted that LS Group might sue Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.[11]
  • On October 22, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power confirmed it would sue LS Group for very significant amounts in damages.[12]"

 

On October 13, a government working group recommended that nuclear power capacity be kept between 22−29% of total electricity generation by 2035, well below existing plans to grow the sector to 41% in less than 20 years. The government will hold public hearings to decide whether to back the recommendation before finalising its policy in December.[13]

References:
[1] www.powermag.com/s-korea-indicts-100-in-nuclear-graft-scandal-considers-...
[2] www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/us-korea-nuclear-idUSBRE99905O20131010
[3] www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Indictments_for_South_Korea_forgery_scanda...
[4] http://au.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/18870327/s-korea-ex-vice-minister-cha...
[5] http://atomicpowerreview.blogspot.com.au/2013/10/south-korea-cables-fail...
[6] http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/10/602_144114.html
[7] www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131020000200
[8] www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131010000797
[9] www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131017000948
[10] http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/10/602_144514.html
[11] http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/10/602_144640.html
[12] http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/10/602_144781.html
[13] www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/28/korea-energy-nuclear-idUSL3N0I70G8201...

See also Nuclear Monitor #765, 1 Aug 2013, 'South Korea: Nuclear scandal widens'

About: 
Shin-Kori-3Shin-Kori-4

Flooding of nuclear plants

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#770
24/10/2013
Article

The risks associated with flooding of nuclear plants are as follows [1,2]:

  • The presence of water in many areas may be a common cause of failure for safety related systems, such as the emergency power supply systems or the electric switchyard, with the associated possibility of losing the external connection to the electrical power grid, the decay heat removal system and other vital systems.
  • Considerable damage can be caused to safety related structures, systems and components by the infiltration of water into internal areas of the plant. Water pressure on walls and foundations may challenge their structural capacity.
  • The dynamic effect of the water can be damaging to the structure and the foundations of the plant as well as the many systems and components located outside the plant.
  • A flood may transport ice floes in very cold weather or debris of all types which may physically damage structures, obstruct water intakes or damage the water drainage system.
  • Flooding may affect the communication and transport networks around the plant site. The effects may jeopardise the implementation of safety related measures and emergency planning by making escape routes impassable and isolating the plant site in a possible emergency, with consequent difficulties in communication and supply.
  • Flooding can contribute to the dispersion of radioactive material to the environment.

 

A 2005 Greenpeace International report lists examples of flooding of nuclear plants[1]:

  • India, 2004: Kalpakkam-2, also known as Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS), was operating at nominal power when the December 2004 tsunami sent seawater into its pump house. Operators brought the unit to safe shut-down. The tsunami swept away 59 people from Kalpakkam town, including five employees of the nuclear plant.
  • France, 2003: EDF shut down two reactors at Cruas in December 2003 in response to torrential rainfall along the lower Rhone River, prompting French nuclear safety authority DGSNR to activate its emergency response centre. Filters on heat exchangers between the component cooling system and the essential service water system at Cruas 3 and 4 were clogged, hindering operation of the residual heat removal system. At the nearby Tricastin site, clogging of filters on the conventional site caused two more power reactors, Tricastin 3 and 4, to scram.
  • Ukraine, 2000: reactor 3 at Chernobyl was shut down due to flooding caused by a storm. Workers had to pump water out of the reactor building.
  • France, 1999: The electricity grid was hit hard by storms on December 27. One of many problems was the loss of auxiliary power for the four reactors at Blayais as well as a loss of the 400 kV power grid at Blayais units 2 and 4. The load shedding design that allows the units to self-supply with electrical power after disconnection from the grid failed. This led to an automatic shut-down of these two units. The diesel generators were started and functioned until the connection to the 400 kV power grid was restored, after about three hours. Furthermore, a flood resulted in the partial submergence of the Blayais site. Invading the site through underground service tunnels, water flooded the pumps of the essential service water system to unit 1, and one of the two trains (with two essential service water system pumps each) was lost because the motors were flooded. Other facilities were also flooded, including rooms containing outgoing electrical feeders (indirectly leading to the unavailability of certain electrical switchboards); the bottom of the fuel building of units 1 and 2 leading to the unavailability of safety-critical pumps (arising from a breach of French safety standards).
  • In July 1993, the operator of the Cooper nuclear power plant on the Missouri River, Nebraska, was forced to shut down the reactor as dykes and levees collapsed around the site closing many emergency escape routes in the region. Below grade rooms in the reactor and turbine buildings had extensive in-leakage with rising water levels. The NRC inspectors noted that plant personnel "had not established measures to divert the water away from important components".

 

Case Study: Fort Calhoun
A flood assessment performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2010 indicated that the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant in Nebraska "did not have adequate procedures to protect the intake structure and auxiliary building against external flooding events."[3]

In June 2011, Missouri River floodwaters surrounded the Fort Calhoun plant. The reactor had been shut down in April 2011 for scheduled refueling, and has remained shut down ever since for a variety of reasons.

A fire on June 7 caused electricity to shut off in the spent fuel pools resulting in 90 minutes without cooling, and resulting in a partial evacuation. NRC inspectors were concerned that faulty design and faulty maintenance contributed to the fire; workers were unable to quickly get into the electrical room; and plant operator Omaha Public Power District was slow to notify emergency officials.[4,5]

This was followed by allegations that an NRC manager tried to override inspectors' conclusions about the fire and that he misrepresented their findings, and further allegations that senior NRC management made only token efforts to address NRC staff concerns.[6]

On June 23, a helicopter contracted by Omaha Public Power District to survey transmission lines made an unplanned landing 2.4 kms from the plant; reports described it as an unplanned landing but photos showed it on its side in a field.[7]

On June 26, a water-filled rubber flood berm surrounding part of the plant was punctured by a small earth mover and collapsed, allowing flood waters to surround the auxiliary and containment buildings at the plant, and forcing the temporary transfer of power from the external electricity grid to backup generators.[8,9]

On June 30 one of the pumps used to remove seepage caught fire when a worker was refilling it with gasoline. The worker put the fire out with a fire extinguisher but was burned on his arms and face.[10]

NRC whistleblowers
Beyond Nuclear summarises several examples of NRC whistleblower revelations about inadequate protection against flood risks.[11]

In July 2011, with flood waters along the Missouri River rising around Nebraska's Fort Calhoun nuclear power station, David Loveless, a NRC Senior Reactor Analyst, concluded that the reactor would not survive the gross failure of the Oahe dam. Loveless cited analysis that a dam break would hit the reactor with a wall of water knocking out electrical power systems and water pumps vital for reactor cooling.[11]

In September 2012, Richard Perkins, an NRC engineer, accused the NRC of deliberately covering up information relating to the vulnerability of US nuclear power facilities that sit downstream from large dams and reservoirs, and failing to act to correct the vulnerabilities despite being aware of the risks for years.[11,12,13]

Perkins asked the NRC's Office of Inspector General to investigate his allegations that NRC "staff intentionally mischaracterized relevant and noteworthy safety information as sensitive, security information in an effort to conceal the information from the public" where "agency records that show the NRC has been in possession of relevant, notable, and derogatory safety information for an extended period but failed to properly act on it. Concurrently, the NRC concealed the information from the public."

Perkins, along with at least one other NRC engineer, suggested that the real motive for redacting information was to prevent the public from learning the full extent of the vulnerabilities and to obscure how much the NRC has known about the problems and for how long.[12]

Perkins was the lead author of July 2011 report, "Flooding of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Following Upstream Dam Failure". The report concluded that the failure of one or more dams sitting upstream from several nuclear power plants "may result in flood levels at a site that render essential safety systems inoperable." Floodwaters could undermine all power sources including grid power, backup generators, and battery backups. The report concluded: "The totality of information analyzed in this report suggests that external flooding due to upstream dam failure poses a larger than expected risk to plants and public safety."[12]

"My estimation," Perkins told The Huffington Post, "is that if people saw the information that we have, and if they knew for how long we've had it, some might be disappointed at how long it's taken to act, and some might be disappointed that, to date, we haven't really acted at all."[12]

Another NRC engineer told The Huffington Post that the Department of Homeland Security had signed-off on releasing the July 2011 report without redactions, undermining arguments made by some NRC officials that certain information should be withheld because upstream dam vulnerability could be exploited by terrorists.[12]

Several nuclear experts have expressed concern about the three-reactor Oconee nuclear plant in South Carolina, which sits on Lake Keowee, downstream from the Jocassee Reservoir. The plant would almost certainly suffer core damage if the Jocassee dam were to fail, according to redacted findings in the July 2011 report. "The probability of Jocassee Dam catastrophically failing is hundreds of times greater than a 51 foot wall of water hitting Fukushima Daiichi," an NRC engineer said.[12]

Nuclear engineer Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned Scientists notes that improvements have been made at some US plants in the aftermath of the flooding of the Fukushima plant in March 2011.[14] However he questions why the steps were not taken sooner:

"For decades, these design deficiencies left these reactors more vulnerable to floods than necessary. The Fukushima disaster prompted reactions in the United States that found and fix these longstanding impairments. That's good. But what if these reactors had experienced the flood prior to March 2011 that it was supposed to be protected against, but was not? ...

"Why weren't these design problems found in the 2000s, 1990s, 1980s, or 1970s? Lots of people spent lots of time allegedly looking for them. For example, the NRC has inspection procedure 71111.06 titled "Flood Protection Measures" that requires two plant areas to be examined each year. The procedure explicitly guides NRC inspectors to give priority to "Sealing of equipment below the floodline, such as electrical conduits" in "areas that can be affected by internal flooding, including water intake facilities." ...

"Again, why didn't these or other NRC inspections find at least some of these design problems in the 2000s, 1990s, 1980s, or 1970s? It's not a case of one NRC inspector having a bad week – it's a case of a regulatory agency having four bad decades. The NRC should review its inspection efforts in light of all these reports and make changes necessary to improve their effectiveness.

"And the NRC could take a complementary approach. ... The NRC has the authority to fine owners for violating federal safety regulations. The NRC should take its federal safety regulations seriously by sanctioning owners who have violated them for decades."

UK: 12 of 19 nuclear sites at risk of flooding
As many as 12 of Britain's 19 civil nuclear sites are at risk of flooding and coastal erosion because of climate change, according to an unpublished analysis by the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs obtained by the Guardian. Nine of the sites are vulnerable now, while others are at risk from rising sea levels and storms in the future. The sites include all of the eight coastal sites proposed for new nuclear power reactors, and numerous radioactive waste stores, operating reactors and defunct nuclear facilities.[15]

A 2007 study by the UK Met Office, commissioned by nuclear firm British Energy, said that "increases in future surge heights of potentially more than a metre could, when combined with wind speed increases, threaten some sites unless existing defences are enhanced."[16]

References:
[1] Hirsch, Helmut, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, 'Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century', Report prepared for Greenpeace International, www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards
[2] IAEA, 2004, 'Flood Hazard for Nuclear Power Plants on Coastal and River Sites Safety Guide', http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6731/Flood-Hazard-for-Nuclear-Po...
[3] NRC, 16 May 2011, 'Licensee Event Report 2011-003, Revision 1, for the Fort Calhoun Station', http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1113/ML111370123.pdf
[4] Nancy Gaarder, 11 May 2012, 'NRC staff criticizes official's handling of Fort Calhoun', www.omaha.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120511/NEWS01/705119889
[5] Ryan Tracy, 8 June 2011, 'Nebraska nuclear plant lost cooling system after fire', http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230477830457637401196302228...
[6] Ryan Tracy and Keith Johnson, 9 May 2012, 'NRC Manager Blocked Safety Concerns, Letter Says', http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230407030457739419248788652...
[7] Jodi Baker, 23 June 2011, 'No One Hurt In Emergency Helicopter Landing', www.wowt.com/news/headlines/124434274.html
[8] Matthew Wald, 27 June 2011, 'Nebraska Nuclear Plant's Vital Equipment Remains Dry, Officials Say', www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/28nuke.html?_r=2
[9] NRC, 'Event Notification Report for June 27, 2011', http://nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2011/201106...
[10] KETV, 30 June 2011, 'Worker Burned At Nuclear Plant', www.ketv.com/r/28412417/detail.html
[11] Beyond Nuclear, 11 Oct 2012, 'NRC whistleblowers warn of nuclear accidents caused by dam failures and effort to suppress disclosure', www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclear-power/2012/10/11/nrc-whistleblowers-warn-o...
[12] Tom Zeller, 14 Sept 2012, 'Flood Threat To Nuclear Plants Covered Up By Regulators, NRC Whistleblower Claims', www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/14/flood-threat-nuclear-plants-nrc_n_1885...
[13] Richard Perkins, 14 Sept 2012, Letter to the NRC Office of the Inspector General: Concealment of Significant Nuclear Safety Information by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/igletter.pdf
[14] Dave Lochbaum, 19 February 2013, 'Fission Stories #130: Fukushima's Dividends or Mea Culpas', http://allthingsnuclear.org/fission-stories-130-fukushimas-dividends-or-...
[15] Rob Edwards, 7 March 2012, 'UK nuclear sites at risk of flooding, report shows', http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/mar/07/uk-nuclear-risk-flooding
[16] Nick Mathiason, 13 January 2008, 'Nuclear plants 'need better flood protection'', The Observer, www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jan/13/nuclear.nuclearpower

Syrian crisis should re-energise broader disarmament efforts

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#768
27/09/2013
Cesar Jaramillo - program officer at Project Ploughshares (Ontario, Canada)
Article

Whatever the merits of the deal reached to defuse the tension in Syria, the use of chemical weapons in its civil war confirms a sobering reality: if weapons exist, they will sooner or later be used — no matter how immoral, indiscriminate or contrary to international norms.

Any use of nuclear weapons in a populated area would be far more catastrophic than the highest estimate of casualties from the use of chemical weapons outside Damascus on Aug. 21. However, while various nations seem to be scrambling to respond to the events in Syria within days, the international community has not been able to follow a road map for nuclear disarmament to its final destination after more than four decades.

Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons have this in common: their use is immoral and illegal — even in times of conflict. Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird sardonically called chemical weapons "a poor man's weapons of mass destruction." Even if true, the weapons of mass destruction of affluent countries are no more legitimate.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was designed to prevent non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons and to compel nuclear-weapon states to eliminate them. More than 40 years later, the former have by and large fulfilled their non-proliferation commitments. Yet those that hold nuclear weapons have resisted, avoided or ignored not only their treaty obligations, but the groundswell of support for nuclear abolition from all corners of the planet. Instead, there is a discouraging and well-documented trend to spend billions of dollars on modernising nuclear weapons, pushing the goalpost of nuclear abolition ever further away.

Only five states party to the nearly universal non-proliferation treaty possess nuclear weapons, but their combined arsenals of more than 17,000 warheads could destroy our planet many times over.

Certainly, Syria should sign on to the chemical weapons convention, which mandates the destruction of chemical arsenals. The possession of weapons of mass destruction of any kind is the obvious fundamental prerequisite for their use.

It is just as clear that nuclear-weapon states should begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. Until all nuclear weapons are eliminated, the threat remains that they will be used — by accident, miscalculation or design.

In his Sept. 10 televised speech to rally domestic support for eventual military intervention in Syria, U.S. President Barack Obama called the images of victims of chemical weapons "sickening" and stated that these weapons "can kill on a mass scale, with no distinction between soldier and infant." He was right. But the same is true for nuclear weapons.

He also stated that the United States belongs to the 98 per cent of nations that have signed the chemical weapons convention. This is roughly the same percentage of states that have refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the nuclear issue, however, the United States sits with the minority.

To be sure, Obama has spoken passionately in favour of nuclear abolition. In June, he acknowledged the grave danger posed by nuclear weapons and stated that "so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are not truly safe." In Prague in 2009, he said the United States would take "concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons."

But setting lofty goals has never been the problem. Nuclear abolition has been an international objective for decades, supported in theory even by states with nuclear weapons. It is implementing this goal that has proved difficult. No reasonable observer would conclude that nuclear-weapon states have taken meaningful steps to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament" as obligated by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Opportunities for engagement on this issue continue to develop. Just this year, a UN open-ended working group met in June and August with a mandate to "develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons." The five permanent members of the UN Security Council — also the sole possessors of nuclear weapons within the non-proliferation treaty — were asked to join the group. Every single one chose not to.

Another opportunity comes on Sept. 26, when the UN holds a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament. In October, states will have the chance to solidify any progress initiated at that meeting during sessions of the UN General Assembly's first committee on disarmament and international security. These diplomatic gatherings constitute key occasions for the five permanent members of the Security Council to show the international community that their talk of a world free of nuclear weapons is more than empty rhetoric.

Efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons, such as those currently in motion in response to Syria, are not only welcome, but indeed essential. The same arguments about the need to eradicate these weapons should apply, even more vigorously, to nuclear arsenals.

In Obama's televised address, the leader of the most powerful nation on Earth — and commander of its vast nuclear forces — spoke forcefully "of a world where we seek to ensure that the worst weapons will never be used."

If there can be a silver lining to the devastation in Syria, it might be in reminding the world that the only foolproof way to ensure that weapons of mass destruction — chemical, biological and nuclear — are never used is to completely eliminate them.

 

US intercontinental ballistic missile test
The US Air Force Global Strike Command test fired an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile on September 22. A second Minuteman III test-firing is scheduled for September 26. The US has an arsenal of 450 Minuteman III missiles. A Minuteman III test firing was postponed in April as the US did not want North Korea to "misinterpret" the missile test as a provocative act. Yet the timing of the September tests is also impolite − September 21 is the International Day of Peace, and a UN High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament takes place on September 26.

http://www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123364147
www.nti.org/gsn/article/air-forces-conducts-user-trial-minuteman-3-follo...

Nuclear aspects to the crisis in Syria

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#768
27/09/2013
Jim Green - Nuclear Monitor editor
Article

There are a number of nuclear threads to the unfolding situation in Syria:

  • Concerns are being raised about the potential consequences of a military strike on a small research reactor near Damascus, and about the radiological consequences of military strikes on other sites as well as the potential for nuclear materials to be lost or stolen;
  • Syria was probably constructing a larger research reactor but the site was hit by an Israeli military strike in 2007 and quickly demolished by the Syrian state;
  • Syria's failure to provide information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to allow comprehensive safeguards inspections adds another sorry chapter to the saga of the international nuclear safeguards system (while the 2007 military strike indicates that Israel has no faith in the safeguards system);
  • Even if the Syrian state was complying with IAEA safeguards requests (for access and information), it is near impossible to maintain a meaningful safeguards regime in the context of widespread conflict (in this case civil war);
  • Syria's repeated attempts to develop nuclear facilities over the decades have, for the most part, been thwarted by political pressure exerted by the US and Israel on potential nuclear supplier states such as Argentina, India and Russia; and
  • Syria may have been the first nation state to advance nuclear weapons ambitions under the guise of a purported interest in nuclear desalination − but it will not be the last.

Russia has warned that a missile strike on Syria could have catastrophic effects if it hits a research reactor near Damascus.[1] "If a warhead, by design or by chance, were to hit the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor [MNSR] near Damascus, the consequences could be catastrophic," a September 5 statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry said. The statement calls on the IAEA to "react swiftly" and present IAEA members with "an analysis of the risks linked to possible American strikes on the MNSR and other facilities in Syria". The statement said nearby areas could be contaminated by highly enriched uranium and that it would be impossible to account for the nuclear material after such a strike.

Ambassador Bassam Al-Sabbagh, a senior Syrian diplomat, said on September 10 that he had voiced his nation's "deep concern" to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano about the possible risks of a military strike on the MNSR. Al-Sabbagh said Syria "strongly" endorsed the Russian request for an assessment by IAEA: "I expressed our deep concern regarding the possible risks of any military attack on facilities under safeguards agreement."[2]

The US Ambassador to the IAEA, Joseph Macmanus, told an IAEA Board meeting on September 9 that such "comprehensive risk analyses of hypothetical scenarios are beyond the IAEA's statutory authority. The IAEA has never before conducted this type of analysis, and it would exceed IAEA's mandate, and have far-reaching implications that exceed IAEA capabilities and authorities."[3]

Amano said on September 9 that the IAEA was considering the Russian request.[4,5] He said that 1 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is contained in the MNSR.[6] The HEU fuel is enriched to nearly 90% according to an IAEA document.[4]

Mark Hibbs from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said the MNSR is a very small reactor but there could be "a serious local radiation hazard" if there was irradiated nuclear material in the reactor and it was dispersed by a military strike.[1]

Amano noted that additional radiological materials could be in storage at multiple Syrian medical and scientific facilities.[7] Former IAEA safeguards chief Olli Heinonen said Syria "should have substantial amounts" of atomic assets such as radioactive cobalt isotopes. Such holdings could be "of a greater concern, if they end up in wrong hands," Heinonen said. "Normally they are stored in protected vaults."[7]

2007 Israeli strike
On 6 September 2007, Israel bombed a desert site in Syria that US intelligence reports said was a partially completed 25MW(t) North Korean-designed gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactor, which would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year. Syria said the site was a conventional military facility.[12]

Echoing responses to Israel's strike on a research reactor in Iraq in 1981, then IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei said in response to the 2007 strike: "If a country has information that another country is developing a secret nuclear program, the IAEA should be contacted because we have the power to investigate the issue."[8]

The IAEA released its latest report on this matter in late August − though it adds little to previous reports.[9] The latest IAEA report states that:

  • In June 2008, the IAEA Director General informed the Board of Governors that the Agency had been provided with information alleging that an installation at the Dair Alzour site (a.k.a. Al-Kibar), destroyed by Israel in September 2007, had been a nuclear reactor that was not yet operational and into which no nuclear material had been introduced. Information subsequently provided to the Agency included further allegations that the reactor was a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor, that it was not configured to produce electricity, that it had been built with the assistance of North Korea and that there were three other locations in Syria that were functionally related to the Dair Alzour site.
  • By the end of October 2007, large scale clearing and levelling operations had taken place at the site which had removed or obscured the remains of the destroyed building. Syria maintained that the destroyed building was a non-nuclear military installation and that Syria had had no nuclear related cooperation with the DPRK.
  • In June 2008, the Agency visited the Dair Alzour site and requested supporting documentation concerning the past and current use of the buildings at the Dair Alzour site and at three other locations allegedly functionally related to that site. Since that visit, Syria has not engaged substantively with the Agency on the nature of the Dair Alzour site or the three other locations.
  • In his May 2011 report to the Board of Governors, the Director General provided the Agency's assessment that, based on all the information available to the Agency and its technical evaluation of that information, it was very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency. Concerning the three other locations, the Agency was unable to provide an assessment concerning their nature or operational status.
  • In June 2011, the Board of Governors voted in favour of a resolution which found that Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and failure to provide design information for the facility constituted non-compliance by Syria with its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The Board also decided to report Syria's non-compliance to the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. (China and Russia voted against the IAEA Board of Governors resolution and subsequently opposed any action against Syria at the Security Council.)
  • During a meeting with the IAEA in Damascus in October 2011, a proposal regarding possible future actions that focused solely on the Dair Alzour site was discussed, but the IAEA concluded that the proposal was not acceptable given the conditions placed by Syria on IAEA verification activities at the site and the omission of the three other locations from the scope of the proposal. The Agency subsequently proposed to Syria to hold further discussions. In a February 2012 letter to the IAEA, Syria indicated that it would provide a detailed response at a later time, noting the difficult prevailing security situation in the country.
  • Civil conflict has further complicated the situation. In June 2013, the IAEA informed Syria that the 2013 physical inventory verification at the MNSR would be postponed until the security conditions had sufficiently improved. The IAEA continues to monitor satellite imagery of the MNSR, the yellowcake storage area at the Homs Phosphoric Acid Pilot Plant and other locations of safeguards relevance.

Furthermore, IAEA inspectors discovered undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles at the MNSR in 2008 and 2009. The investigation is ongoing, but the most recent information provided by Syria indicates that the particles originated from previously unreported activities involving the conversion of yellowcake to uranyl nitrate in 2004.[10]

Historical pursuit of nuclear facilities
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Syria has consistently pursued more advanced nuclear technologies.[10] The military has been a stakeholder in Syria's nuclear program since the 1970s, and Damascus has both openly and covertly sought the assistance of numerous parties, including the IAEA, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to develop its nuclear program.

The NTI notes that Syria is a very long way short of a nuclear weapons capability: it has a weak industrial infrastructure; poor scientific capabilities; lacks the trained engineers and other personnel needed to run a major civilian or weapons-oriented program; the MNSR yields only tiny quantities of plutonium in its spent fuel, while its highly enriched uranium fuel is insufficient in quantity for a nuclear weapon; and Syria has not developed full nuclear fuel-cycle expertise and is not known to possess reprocessing technologies.

Previous efforts to procure nuclear technology include the following:[8,10,11]

  • In 1990, Argentina's state-controlled National Institute of Applied Research (INVAP) agreed to provide Syria with a 10 MW(t) research reactor and a hot cell lab for producing radioisotopes, but the Argentinean government vetoed the deal in 1995, allegedly after receiving strong pressure from both the US and Israel to block the deal.
  • India's offer to provide Syria with a 5 MW(t) reactor was shelved in 1991 under significant US pressure.
  • In 1991, US and Israeli officials claimed China was working with Syria on weaponisation projects.
  • In 1998, Russia and Syria signed a deal for the peaceful use of nuclear power, which included a desalination facility powered by a 25 MW light-water reactor. The project did not progress and is likely to have collapsed under US pressure.
  • In 2003, Syria signed a deal with Russia that included a nuclear power plant and a nuclear desalination facility, but the deal did not progress.
  • A 2004 CIA report found that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan may have provided Syria with nuclear information and equipment although the claim was rejected by then IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei.

Suspected fuel development site
A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) on September 12 said that ancillary facilities built to support the alleged Syrian reactor could still contain uranium and other material of potential value to terrorist groups or black-market profiteers. The Marj as Sulţān facility in Damascus may have been involved in developing reactor fuel for the reactor. The reactor would have needed about 50 tonnes of natural uranium fuel to operate.[13]

"The uranium could be anywhere within government controlled areas today, if it even remains in Syria," the ISIS report states. "Determining its fate must be a priority."

The report notes that any uranium fuel remaining in Syria is not weapons-grade and could not be used in nuclear bombs without further processing. While Syria's thousands of chemical weapons remain a higher priority, its nuclear assets "deserve significant attention". Syria also has radioactive sources and wastes which could be at risk of seizure, the ISIS report states, and these could cause greater radioactive harm than natural uranium.

Syria is not believed to have an active, secret nuclear program at this time, the ISIS report states, but it is believed to be actively hiding assets associated with its past, undeclared nuclear reactor effort. Both the Marj as Sulţān fuel development site and the (now demolished) reactor site have fallen under control of government opponents at times during the civil war. Rebels reportedly invited the IAEA to inspect the reactor site if they satisfied some unspecified conditions. The IAEA did not take up this offer, and it would have had no authority to do so, since its safeguards agreement is with the Syrian government. The UN would need to provide the IAEA with authority (and adequate protection) to inspect the site independent of the Syrian government, the ISIS report states.

References:
[1] http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/04/uk-syria-crisis-russia-nuclear-...
[2] www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-syria-crisis-reactor-idUSBRE9890HX...
[3] http://vienna.usmission.gov/130909safety.html
[4] www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-syria-crisis-reactor-idUSBRE9890HX...
[5] www.nti.org/gsn/article/un-agency-examining-russias-concerns-about-syria...
[6] www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=117429
[7] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-warns-iaea-over-assessing-nuclear-risks-syria...
[8] www.nti.org/analysis/articles/syria-candidate-nuclear-proliferation/
[9] http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/gov2013-41.pdf
[10] www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/nuclear/
[11] www.nti.org/media/pdfs/syria_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791
[12] www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/official-documents/
[13] http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Marj_as_Sultan_12s...

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#751
15/06/2012
Shorts

Nigeria signs agreement with Rosatom. Last issue we made a funny remark about Nigeria’s announcement that it selected two sites for the construction of nuclear power reactors, but only a few days later the country signed a cooperation accord with Russia’s Rosatom towards the construction of its first nuclear power plant. Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko signed a memorandum of understanding with the chairman of the Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission, Franklin Erepamo Osaisai. Its terms will see the two countries "prepare a comprehensive program of building nuclear power plants in Nigeria," including the development of infrastructure and a framework and system of regulation for nuclear and radiation safety.

Sergei Kiriyenko is quoted in Leadership newspaper to have said that  the contract would cover the building of nuclear power plant (1200MW) worth about US$4.5 billion (about N697 billion). In 2010 Nigeria said it aimed to have 1000 MW of nuclear generation in place by 2019 with another 4000 MW online by 2030. Although not all contracts Rosatom signed have materialized in the past, however, Nigeria is, one of the very few African countries pursuing a nuclear energy program.
World Nuclear News, 4 June 2012 / Leadership Newspapers (Nigeria), 13 June 2012


Fear nuclear safety is in stake in harsh competition for sales.
Nuclear-reactor makers are offering prices too low to cover costs to win orders abroad in a strategy that puts earnings at risk, according to Andre-Claude Lacoste, head of the French Autorite de Surete Nucleaire regulator. “Export contracts for nuclear plants are being obtained at pure dumping-level prices,” Lacoste fears that nuclear safety could be compromised in trying to win tenders. “Prices accepted by vendors and obtained by buyers are unsustainable,” he said. “There aren’t many tenders, which is why competitors are ripping each other off. It’s already a serious matter, and we need to make sure that there’s no dumping on safety on top of that.”
Bloomberg, 6 June 2012


Academic study on IAEA.
Just published: a new research report Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, by Trevor Findlay. The report is the outcome of the two-and-a-half year research project on “Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA” conducted by the CCTC and CIGI. The project aimed to carry out a “root and branch” study of the Agency to examine its current strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations for bolstering and, if necessary, reforming it. According to the preface this academic study of the Agency “is needed not just in the light of accumulating challenges to the IAEA’s future and the increasing demands made on it by its member states, but because the Agency itself is demanding more support and resources. At a time of financial stringencies, many of the countries that traditionally have offered such support seek proper justification for any increases.” Findlay concludes that the IAEA is irreplaceable: “like the United Nations itself, if it did not exist it would have to be invented”.

However, this report is a good source for general information about the Agency that was founded to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world,” while ensuring, “so far as it is able,” that this does not “further any military purpose”.
Unleashing the nuclear watchdog is available at: href="http://www.cigionline.org/iaea"www.cigionline.org/iaea


China: nuclear safety plan but no approval for new projects yet.
China has approved a nuclear safety plan and says its nuclear power plants meet the latest international safety standards, though some plants need to improve their ability to cope with flooding and earthquakes, state media said on May 31. But the government has not made any decision on when to start approving new nuclear plant projects.

China suspended approvals of new nuclear power plants in the wake of Japan's nuclear crisis in March 2011 following a devastating tsunami, and ordered nationwide safety checks on existing plants and construction sites. It also pledged to review its nuclear power development plan. The State Council, China's Cabinet, now approved a nuclear safety plan for 2011-2015 in a meeting chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. China also aims to enhance nuclear safety standards and lower the risks of nuclear radiation by 2020, the report said.

A nine-month safety inspection of China's 41 nuclear power plants, which are either operating or under construction, showed that most of China's nuclear power stations meet both Chinese and International Atomic Energy Agency standards, according to the report. However, some individual power plants need to improve their ability to prevent damage from serious accidents such as earthquakes, flooding or tsunami, it said.
Reuters, 31 May 2012


Switzerland: court rejects Mühleberg extension.
BKW, the operator of the Mühleberg nuclear power plant, must submit a full maintenance plan, or shut down the plant in June 2013. The Federal Supreme Court has rejected BKW’s request for an injunction, after earlier this year the Federal Administrative Court pulled Mühleberg’s right to an unlimited permit. Federal environment officials had reasoned BKW could have an indefinite operating permit so long as the Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate was monitoring site maintenance and safety issues. The court ruled BKW needed to submit maintenance and safety plans, especially with known concerns over the site’s cooling system, and cracks in the core shroud.
World Radio Switzerland, 29 May 2012


Lithuania opposes construction of N-plants close to its borders.
On May 28, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis blasted plans by Russia and Belarus to build nuclear power plants close to its borders, accusing both of lax safety and environmental standards and "bypassing international safety and environmental standards." "This is not just an issue for Lithuania... it should be a matter of concern to all countries in this region. We should do everything possible to make these two projects develop according to international standards. It is vital," Azubalis said, following talks in Riga with Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics. Rinkevics offered a cautious endorsement of Azubalis' concerns.  Asked by AFP what proof Lithuania had concerning the safety of the Russian and Belarusian projects, Azubalis said he had yet to receive satisfactory responses to written requests for information through official channels including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Espoo Convention Committee. The Lithuanian foreign ministry provided AFP with a document dated May 4 expressing "deep concern" over an alleged recent accident at Russia's Leningrad NPP-2 nuclear facility, which is still under construction. "The incident in Leningrad NPP-2 raises a number of serious questions about the safety of this and two other planned (plants) near Lithuanian borders and the capital Vilnius which are projected to be based on the same technology and possibly the same means of construction," the document states.

Lithuania and Latvia, together with Estonia and Japanese company Hitachi, have putative plans of their own to construct a joint nuclear power plant at Visaginas in northern Lithuania to replace the Soviet-era Ignalina facility which was shut down in 2009.
AFP, 28 may 2012


Flying into trouble at Sellafield
Unusual pathways by which radioactivity routinely escapes the confines of nuclear sites are well documented with one recent example to hit the headlines being the 6000 mile transportation of radioactive contamination by bluefin tuna from the polluted waters around the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant to the coasts of North America. An even more recent case has however turned up very much closer to home – at Sellafield.
No stranger to unusual pathways for radioactivity - as 2000 Cumbrian feral pigeons and a host of seagulls will know to their cost - the site’s latest victims have been identified as a number of swallows which, gorging on the mosquitos that flit over the waters of Sellafield’s radioactive storage ponds, have taken up residence in Sellafield’s transport section.  As confirmed by the Environment Agency last week to a meeting of the Environmental Health Sub-Committee of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group, the birds’ droppings from around their roost/nesting sites have been found to be radioactively contaminated. Whilst neither the contamination levels nor the number of swallows involved was provided, the Environment Agency told the Committee that measures were being taken by Sellafield Ltd to tackle the mosquito problem.
CORE’s spokesman Martin Forwood commented; “These much-loved and now radioactive birds and their offspring will unwittingly be carrying a highly toxic message from Sellafield when they migrate back to Southern Africa at the end of the summer - a distance at least equivalent to that recently undertaken by the bluefin tuna.”
CORE press release, 6 June 2012


U.K.: Chernobyl restrictions sheep lifted after 26 years.
Twenty-six years after the April 26, 1986, explosion at Chernobyl reactor 4, restrictions remained on 334 farms in North Wales, and eight in Cumbria. But as of June 1, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) regulations on these farms were lifted. In the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, when radioactive rain swept the UK, farmers saw their livelihoods and even their families threatened. Some 9,700 farms and four million sheep were placed under restriction as radioactive cesium- 137 seeped into the upland soils of England, Scotland and Wales.

Before June 1, any livestock for breeding or sale had to be assessed with gamma monitors by officials from Defra or the Welsh government. Sheep found to exceed the legal radiation dose (1,000 Becquerel per kilo) were moved to the lowlands before sale, and had the farmers wanted to move their flock, they had to seek permission.

The FSA said the restrictions had been lifted because “the current controls are no longer proportionate to the very low risk”. No sheep in Cumbria have failed the monitoring criteria for several years, and less than 0.5 per cent of the 75,000 sheep monitored annually in North Wales fail.  But not everyone agrees with lifting the restrictions. An anonymous farmer with a flock of 1,000 ewes, was quoted in the Independent saying: “The feeling I have is that it should still be in place. The food should be kept safe.”
Independent (UK), 1 June 2012


Australia: at last: Kakadu Koongarra victory.
The Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory is set to be expanded, with the inclusion of land previously earmarked land for uranium mining known as Koongarra. The Northern Land Council (NLC) has agreed for a 1,200 hectare parcel of land containing rich reserves of uranium to be incorporated in to the park. This looks like the final step in a long battle that Aboriginal traditional owner Jeffrey Lee has waged to protect his land from mining. The uranium-rich mining lease Koongarra was excised from Kakadu when the conservation area was established in the late 1970s. The lease is held by French company Areva, which wanted to mine the area for uranium. Two years ago, Mr Lee, the sole traditional owner of the land, called on the Federal Government to incorporate it in to Kakadu. The Government accepted the offer and referred the matter to the NLC. The NLC conducted consultations and its full council has agreed to endorse Mr Lee's wishes. The council and land trust will now move to enter an agreement with national parks to incorporate Koongarra into Kakadu. The Koongarra area includes the much-visited Nourlangie Rock (Burrunggui/Anbangbang) and is important in the Rainbow Serpent and Lightning Man stories.

In June 2011, the Koongarra site was added to the World Heritage List during a meeting of the Unesco World Heritage Committee in Paris. The French nuclear energy company Areva, had unsuccessfully asked the committee to remove Koongarra from its agenda.

It is not known if Areva will attempt to take any action over the decision to include Koongarra in the Kakadu national park
Nuclear Monitor, 1 July 2012 / ABC, 1 June 2012


Japan: Smartphone capable of measuring radiation.
On May 29, the Japanese company Softbank Mobile unveiled a smartphone capable of measuring radiation levels in a bid to respond to growing demand for dosimeters in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Users can measure radiation levels by pressing and holding a button on the phone, and the device can be set to a constant measurement mode or plot readings on a map, according to Softbank.

The Pantone 5 107SH, manufactured by Sharp Corp., is equipped with a sensor that can measure between 0.05 and 9.99 microsieverts per hour of gamma ray in the atmosphere. The product is aimed at ''alleviating as much as possible the concerns of mothers with children,'' the mobile operator said in a statement, adding it will go on sale sometime in mid-July or later.
Mainichi (Japan), 29 May 2012


Public acceptance – what holds back the nuclear industry?
“Multiple structural barriers inside the nuclear industry tend to prevent it from producing a united pro-nuclear front to the general public. Efforts to change public opinion worldwide must deal with these real-world constraints.” In an article called: Public acceptance – what holds back the nuclear industry? Steve Kidd (deputy director-general of the World Nuclear Association) is asking if “we have probably begun to reach some limits in employing a fact-based strategy to improve public acceptance of nuclear. Huge efforts have been made to inform people about nuclear by freely providing a lot of good information. But the message doesn’t seem to hit home with many.” He is explaining why and how to overcome this in an article in the May issue of Nuclear Engineering International.

In the next episode he will look at the possibilities of increasing public acceptance in more detail. 
The article is available at: www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=147&storyCode=2062367

Ukraine safety upgrade program: precondition for lifetime extension

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#745
04/04/2012
Antonia Wenisch & Patricia Lorenz
Article

In November 2010 the EBRD and the European Union's Euratom announced plans to finance what is called by Ukraine a safety upgrade project, but what is in fact a precondition for the lifetime extension of the reactors. European public money would therefore be used to expand the lifetime of Soviet-era nuclear reactors instead of investing in safe closure and decommissioning - costs which haven't been accounted for yet in Ukraine's plans.

An expert review of Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Program, that is to be financed by Euratom and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), shows that some of the measures included in the SUP are necessary for the lifetime expansion of the plants and not for their regular functioning until the initially planned term.

According to the ecological assessment (EA) report released in October 2011, the safety upgrade project (SUP) program costs around 1.34 billion euro, though EBRD estimates are upwards of 1.45 billion. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development intends to grant up to 300 million euro (US$ 400m) for the project, and 500 million euro (US$ 665m) is to be provided by the Euratom loan facility. Currently both institutions are preparing loans and the EBRD’s Board of Directors is scheduled to decide on this loan on 18 September, 2012 and Euratom in May 2012.

The EBRD and EC have requested a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for the SUP. However as early as the project’s scoping stage, the public was informed that EBRD staff and Energoatom agreed only to an ecological assessment (EA) for the project in line with procedures outlined in European SEA Directive 2001/42/EC regarding public participation.

SUP includes measures for the safe modernisation of all of Ukraine’s 15 operating nuclear reactors and should be implemented by 2017. Twelve of these reactors were designed to finish operations before 2020, and two units were supposed to be taken off the grid in 2010 and 2011 but received licenses to operate for additional 20 years. The SUP is therefore designed for nuclear reactors that face the end of their designed lifetime.

In 2005 Ukrainian nuclear power plants provided about 50 percent of the electricity produced in the country. According to Ukrainian energy strategy, this proportion of nuclear power should remain until 2030. This decision is justified by the presence of domestic uranium deposits, the stable operation of existing nuclear power plants and the high costs of constructing new nuclear power plants.

According to the Energy Strategy, by 2030 seven units will have received a license for a lifetime extension of 15 years, including Zaporizhia 3-6, Rivne 3, Khmelnitsky 1, South Ukrainian 3 and two units that started operation in 2004: the Khmelnitsky 2 and Rivne 4. In 2004 the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved the “nuclear reactors lifetime extension plan”, which foresees extending the lifetime of all operating nuclear reactors by an additional 15 years.

Prolonging the operation of the nuclear power plants from 30 to 45 years requires a huge effort in terms of modernisation and safety improvements in order to reach internationally-acceptable status. The EA SUP however concerns only the safety improvements, and this is only one side of the development. The other side is the material degradation of reactor components of which the most important is the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The RPV is the only component which cannot be replaced. Due to harsh conditions in the primary system (high temperature and pressure and high neutron flux), embrittlement, corrosion, cracks and abrasion weaken the primary cooling system material. A failure of primary system components could lead to a loss of coolant accident.

To prevent the development of a severe nuclear accident, so-called accident management measures are implemented. The SUP mentions such measures as guidelines for organisational activities and emergency measures.

Another important influence is from the European Union nuclear power plants “stress test” that Ukraine has agreed to participate. In its report the Ukrainian nuclear authority has already defined some measures that are to be completely implemented at the nuclear reactors, if the operators wish to apply for lifetime extension. The peer-reviewed results will not be known until May 2012 and may offer new insights and subsequently new safety measures to be required at the Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

In fact, Euratom and the EBRD have been asked to finance a program labelled only as ‘safety upgrades’, though it is impossible to argue this both technically and economically.

SUP precondition for lifetime extension
Proponent of the SUP, the Ukrainian state nuclear operator NEC Energoatom claims that SUP measures will address only safety measures and are not a precondition for the lifetime extension of reactors. However a new report shows this claim is misleading: SUP measures will be used to provide a sufficient safety level to extend operations and are not necessary for safely shutting down the reactors.

While the Ecological Assessment (EA) for the safety upgrade project claims that the planned safety upgrade measures are not part of extending reactor lifetime beyond their designed 30-year lifetime, this study shows that the safety measures for 15 reactors are in fact connected to the lifetime extension program. SUP measures like those related to component integrity are conditions for extending the lifetime of reactors. The reasons for this are as follows:

  • Measures to address only safety issues and not lifetime extension simply do not exist. The EA SUP explains that “security systems and other essential safety equipment are kept operating until the final stop and first phase of the decommissioning, i.e. until the unloading of the spent nuclear fuel.” The dates on which Ukraine’s reactors reach the end of their design lifetime are indicative of the need of reactor’s life-time extension one unit in 2012, two in 2014, two in 2015, two in 2016, two in 2017 and two in 2019.
  • Economic viability - both loans need to be repaid, and Euratom cannot grant loans without a statement from the European Investment Bank (EIB) showing that the loans can be repaid, likely to be based on the future operation of those nuclear power plants.

Officially these European institutions have been asked to finance the programs labelled as safety upgrades, though it is impossible to argue this technically or economically. This claim seems to have been chosen because:

  1. EBRD and Euratom financing conditions allow only for safety upgrade financing so the lifetime extension needs to be concealed;
  2. this avoid a discussion about ageing problems of Soviet-era nuclear power plants once the lifetime extension plans for all 15 reactors by 15 years would become known
  3. this avoids conducting an strategic environmental assessment (SEA); the SUP is not only called a safety upgrade program but also substitute sectoral policy by intending to modernise and prolong a whole nuclear power-producing sector; even pilot projects were run. A full SEA would require assessment of alternatives to reactors life-extension and transboundary involvement.

This report finds that no information about the SUP was provided outside of Ukraine, and it is probable that neighbouring states would demand full transboundary SEA and EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) for such a sensitive topic.

Instead only the EA designed solely for the SUP was conducted in Ukraine without any transboundary assessment. The report shows that this approach is far from best practice in the nuclear field and does not comply with international conventions like the ESPOO convention on transboundary impact assessments or the Aarhus Convention on access to environmental information, nor does it even come close to fulfilling EU legislation. The EU’s SEA directive would have to be applied to assess alternatives to safety upgrades and lifetime extension; instead the EA concludes that there are no alternatives to safety upgrades and claims those measures are needed even for safe closure.

We expect Euratom, the European Commission and EBRD to follow their guidelines and to enforce good governance, public participation and information disclosure and good practice with respect to international conventions like the strategic environmental assessment protocol, Espoo and Aarhus.

More broadly nuclear energy today is causing even more concern than before the nuclear accident at Fukushima. European institutions should encourage project applicants to inform the public about their projects in line with all available tools like Espoo contact points. It is unacceptable that a major, high-risk project is being considered for financing from European institutions without the public in EU member states being informed.

One year after the Fukushima accident, the European public would welcome information about the lifetime extension of nuclear power plants that are already three decades old.

The SUP was prepared prior to the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, and it is not acceptable that decisions on the program are taken before the stress tests are completed and the EU draws its first conclusions about reactor safety. We believe that these institutions will not finance Ukrainian reactor safety measures before the peer review of Ukraine’s stress test report has been prepared.

The EBRD and Euratom want to hide the fact that they are contributing both financially and politically to at least another 15 years of nuclear risk. The argument that Ukraine would go ahead and operate the reactors even without EBRD and EURATOM funding is troubling and implicitly alleges that the Ukrainian operator and regulator would act irresponsibly.

The Ukrainian authorities already licensed lifetime extensions at Rivne reactors 1 and 2 without first applying the Espoo Convention. The Espoo implementation committee is now inquiring about violations in this case. We expect both Euratom and the EBRD to withhold a decision about SUP pending a resolution to the Rivne 1 and 2 lifetime extension decision.

Some modernisation measures are “significant changes” e.g. the planned nuclear fuel exchange and call for EIA implementation. One of the first SUP objectives is the introduction of second generation fuel with improved cycles in order to reduce neutron fluence on the reactor vessel to mitigate embrittlement effects. The switch to longer fuel cycles is not mentioned in the SUP but is an objective of the energy strategy. High fuel burn-up increases the risk of accidents, because it accelerates the accident progression.

The reliability of the Ukrainian nuclear safety programs are cause for concern. A 2006 EBRD press statement says “…a modernisation programme for all nuclear power plants in Ukraine currently being implemented will upgrade all 13 nuclear reactors to internationally recognised nuclear safety level by 2010.“ Thus the question of why are new programs, including the SUP within the „Comprehensive Safety Upgrade Program,” necessary? This study provides an overview of the very non-transparent management of safety improvement programs in Ukraine. It seems that all safety measures not implemented by 2010 were merely incorporated into the SUP for the period 2010 to 2017.

Source: 'Critical Review of the “Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program” - Why the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and EURATOM should not finance the lifetime extension program of Ukrainian nuclear power plants'; March 2012 by Antonia Wenisch & Patricia Lorenz; Commissioned by CEE Bankwatch Network. Available at: http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine-SUP-review.pdf
Contact: David Hoffman, Na Rozcesti 1434/6, 190 00 Praha 9 – Liben, Czech Republic
Tel: +420 274 822 150
Email: david.hoffman[at]bankwatch.org
Web: http://bankwatch.org

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#740
13/01/2012
Article

India: nuclear lobbyist heads national solar company.
India's prime minister has appointed Anil Kakodkar, former head of the Atomic Energy Commission to be in charge of the national solar mission. The Solar Energy Corporation of India was recently set up as a not-for-profit company and will work under the administrative control of the New and Renewable Energy Ministry (NREM).  The move to appoint Kakodkar will likely create somewhat of a controversy, as India Today points out, calling the decision "a bizarre move that smacks of unfair public policymaking," and a "clear case of conflict of interest." His appointment as head of the solar mission is bound to upset anti-nuclear activists in the country who want the government to actively promote alternatives such as solar and wind while giving up investments in nuclear energy.

Ignoring this contribution of renewable sources of energy, Kakodkar has constantly projected nuclear energy as the "inevitable and indispensable option" that addresses both sustainability as well as climate change issues. But despite huge investments during the past half a century, nuclear power contributes just a fraction of India's energy needs. The total installed capacity of nuclear power in the country is 4,780 MW, while the total installed capacity of renewable sources of energy is 20,162 MW, according to data collected by the Central Electricity Authority.

In his new role, Kakodkar will be responsible for turning around the fortunes of the government’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM). The Solar Energy Corporation of India has been created to act as its executing arm. Although still in its infancy, its organization has already come under fire from both developers and politicians. In the first days of 2012 the findings of a Parliamentary panel were released, labeling the Ministry’s approach to the national solar mission as “disappointing” and “lackadaisical”. This research followed on from disappointing end-of-year installation figures, which saw just 400MW of the 1.2GW of installations forecasted by the government achieve grid connection.
India Today, 6 January 2012  / PV Tech, 6 January 2012


Netherlands: Borssele 2 delayed; EDF no longer interested.
Delta, the regional utility wanting to build a nuclear reactor at Borssele, delayed its decision about investing 110 million in a new license by at least half a year. Furthermore they announced that Delta will no longer be the leading company in the project. Although it is hard to find out what that exactly means, it is clear that Delta will not have a majority stake in the reactor if the project continues. Many people expect this is the end of the project. However, in a press statement Delta is repeating its commitment towards nuclear energy.

Another surprising outcome was that the French state utility EDF (which signed a Memorandum of Understanding about investigating the possibilities for a new reactor in the Netherlands with Delta in 2010) is not longer involved in the project. Delta CEO Boerma, a passionate but clumsy nuclear advocate, left the company, but that cannot be seen as the end of the nuclear interest in nuclear power, either. It is a sacrifice to reassure the shareholders he offended several times in the last months.

German RWE (via the Dutch subsidiary ERH Essent) is another interested partner for a new reactor at Borssele. ERH is in the process to obtain a licence and has the same decision to make as Delta to invest 110 million euro in obtaining a license. If RWE is still interested at all, it is more likely they will cooperate with a large share in the Delta project.

Public support in Zeeland for a new reactor is plummeting according to several polls early December. This is another nail in the coffin, because Delta is very keen to point out there is almost a unanimously positive feeling in the Zeeland province about the second nuclear power plant.

If Delta can not present solid partners for the project at the next stakeholders meeting planned in June 2012, those stakeholders will decide to pull the plug. 
Laka Foundation, 11 January 2012


US: Large area around the Grand Canyon protected from mining.
On January 9, 2012, after more than 2 years of environmental analysis and receiving many thousands of public comments from the American people, environmental and conservation groups, the outdoor recreation industry, mayors and tribal leaders, U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar withdrew more than 1 million acres (400,000 hectares) of land around the canyon from new mining claims for the next twenty years -the longest period possible under the law.

In the months immediately leading up to this landmark decision, many environmental organizations worked with conservation advocates and outdoors enthusiasts around the country to urge the Administration to halt toxic uranium mining around the Grand Canyon. Interior Secretary Salazar received comments from nearly 300,000 citizens urging him to withdraw one million acres of land from new mining claims.

The decision however would allow a small number of existing uranium and other hard rock mining operations in the region to continue while barring the new claims. In 2009 Mr. Salazar suspended new uranium claims on public lands surrounding the Grand Canyon for two years, overturning a Bush administration policy that encouraged thousands of new claims when the price of uranium soared in 2006 and 2007. Many of the stakeholders are foreign interests, including Rosatom, Russia's state atomic energy corporation.

The landscape is not the only thing at stake. Uranium mining in western states has an abysmal track-record. In Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona and Utah, uranium mining has had undeniable health impacts on miners and nearby residents, including cancer, anemia and birth defects. Even the Grand Canyon itself bears the scars of uranium mining. Radioactive waste has poisoned streams and soil in and around the canyon, while abandoned and active mines are scars on the Arizona landscape. Soil levels around the abandoned Orphan Mine inside Grand Canyon National Park are 450 times more than normal levels, and visitors to the park are warned not to drink from Horn Creek. The closest mine currently in operation, Arizona 1, is less than 2 miles from the canyon’s rim. “Mining so close to the Grand Canyon could contaminate the Colorado River, which runs through the canyon, and put the drinking water for 25 million Americans at risk,” added Pyne. “Uranium mining has already left a toxic legacy across the West -every uranium mine ever opened has required some degree of toxic waste clean-up- it certainly doesn’t belong near the Grand Canyon.”
Environment America, 9 January 2012 / New York Times, 6 January 2012


Finland, Olkiluoto 3.
August 2014 is the date that Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) expects to see power flow from its new reactor, Olkiluoto 3, according to a single-line statement issued on 21 December. The announcement brought a little more clarity to the unit's schedule compared with TVO's last announcement, which specified only the year 2014. The Finnish utility said it had been informed by the Areva-Siemens consortium building the unit that August 2014 was scheduled for commercial operation.

Construction started in May 2005. A few days after the October announcement that Olkiluoto cannot achieve grid-connection before 2014 the French daily was citing a report stating that the costs for Areva are expected to 6.6 billion euro (then US$ 9.1 billion). The price mentioned (and decided on) in Finnish Parliament was 2.5 billion euro, the initial contract for Olkiluoto 3 was 3 billion euro.
World Nuclear News, 21 December 2011 / Nuclear Monitor 735, 21 October 2012


France: 13 billion euro to upgrade safety of nuclear reactors.
In response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, French nuclear safety regulator ASN has released a 524-page report on the state of nuclear reactors in France. The report says that government-controlled power provider Electricité de France SA (EDF) needs to make significant upgrades “as soon as possible” to its 58 reactors in order to protect them from potential natural disasters. The ASN gave reactor operators until June 30 to deliver proposals meeting the enhanced security standards of sites they run. Costs for the upgrades are estimated at 10 billion euros (US$13.5 billion); previously planned upgrades to extend the life of the nation’s reactors from 40 to 60 years are now expected to cost as much as 50 billion euros. Modifications include building flood-proof diesel pumps to cool reactors, creating bunkered control rooms, and establishing an emergency task force that can respond to nuclear disasters within 24 hours. Andre Claude Lacoste, the Chairman of ASN, said, “We are not asking the operator to make these investments. We are telling them to do so.” French Energy Minister Eric Besson plans to meet with EDF and reactor maker Areva, as well as CEA, the government-funded technological research organization, on January 9 to discuss implementation of ASN’s recommendations. Seventy-five percent of France’s energy comes from nuclear power, more than that of any other country. Experts say that the cost of nuclear power in France will almost certainly rise as a result of the required upgrades. EDF shares are down as much as 43 percent in the last 12 months.
Greenpeace blog, 6 January 2012 / Bloomberg, 4 January 2012


Nuclear's bad image? James Bond's Dr. No is to blame!
James Bond movies are to blame for a negative public attitude to nuclear power, according to a leading scientist. Professor David Phillips, president of the Royal Society Of Chemistry, reckons that supervillains such as Dr No, the evil genius with his own nuclear reactor, has helped create a "remorselessly grim" perception of atomic energy. Speaking ahead of Bond's 50th anniversary celebrations, Phillips said he hopes to create a "renaissance" in nuclear power. In the first Bond film of the same name, Dr No is eventually defeated by Sean Connery's 007 who throws him into a cooling pool in the reactor. And Phillips claims that this set a precedent for nuclear power being sees as a "barely controllable force for evil", according to BBC News, since later villains hatched similar nuclear plots.
NME, 12 January 2012


North Korea: halting enrichment for food?
On January 11, North Korea suggested it was open to halting its enrichment of uranium in return for concessions that are likely to include food assistance from the United States, the Washington Post reported. A statement said to be from a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman urged the Obama administration to "build confidence" by including a greater amount of food in a bilateral agreement reportedly struck late last year shortly before the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Washington halted food assistance to the North after the regime carried out what was widely seen as a test of its long-range ballistic missile technology in spring 2009.

While rebuking the United States for connecting food assistance to security concerns, the statement was less bombastic than the proclamations that are typically issued by the Stalinist state. The statement marked the first time Pyongyang made a public pronouncement about the rumored talks with Washington on a deal for food assistance in exchange for some nuclear disarmament steps. Washington has demanded that Pyongyang halt uranium enrichment efforts unveiled in 2010 as one condition to the resumption of broader North Korean denuclearization negotiations that also involve China, Japan, Russia and South Korea (the socalled six-party talks).

The Obama administration has been exceedingly wary about agreeing to any concessions with Pyongyang, which has a long track record of agreeing to nuclear disarmament actions in return for foreign assistance only to reverse course once it has attained certain benefits.
Global Security Newswire, 11 January 2012


Support for nuclear is not 100% any more in CR and SR.
Both Czech and Slovak Republic until recently announced intentions of keeping nuclear power and even increasing capacity by constructing new nuclear power plants – more the less for export.  However, Fukushima and “nearby” Germany´s phase-out caused doubts.  Mr. Janiš, the Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Slovak Parliament said today: “I have not seen an objective study on the benefits of constructing a new nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice,” said Mr. Janiš. According to him it would be a wrong decision to make Slovakia into a nuclear superpower, when e.g. Germany and Switzerland are phasing out their plants. Mr. Janiš thinks that biomass and sun are the future. Contrary to him, the minister of economy Mr. Juraj Miškov still believes that the fifth unit in Jaslovské Bohunice has a future; the feasibility study will be ready by mid 2012. He is convinced that due to the phase-out in some countries, the electricity demand will increase and Slovakia might become an even more important electricity exporting country than until now.

This comes only days after the Czech Republic announced to downsize the Temelin tender from 5 to 2 reactors thereby losing the possibility to negotiate a 30% lower price. Also here a major question is: will Austria and Germany be interested in importing nuclear power?
www.energia.sk, 10 January 2012


Russia: 25,000 undersea radioactive waste sites.
There are nearly 25,000 hazardous underwater objects containing solid radioactive waste in Russia, an emergencies ministry official said on December 26. The ministry has compiled a register of so-called sea hazards, including underwater objects in the Baltic, Barents, White, Kara, and Black Seas as well as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. These underwater objects include nuclear submarines that have sunk and ships with ammunition and oil products, chemicals and radioactive waste. Hazardous sites with solid radioactive waste sit on the sea bed mainly at a depth of 500 meters, Oleg Kuznetsov, deputy head of special projects at the ministry’s rescue service, said. Especially dangerous are reactor holds of nuclear submarines off the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and a radio-isotope power units sunk near Sakhalin Island, he added.
RIA Novosti, 26 December 2011

IAEA seeks budget for nuclear safety

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#734
6172
07/10/2011
WISE Amsterdam
Article

On 22 September 2011, the IAEA 55th General Conference unanimously endorsed the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety that Ministers in their Declaration at the IAEA's June Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety requested. The plan, criticized by many for not going far enough towards more mandatory measures, outlines a series of voluntary steps aimed at improving reactor safety and emergency preparedness.

IAEA Director General Amano made clear the agency needed more money to turn the plan into reality, but did not give details. "Meeting new and expanding demands for assistance from member states in nuclear safety, as well as in other areas, will require an increase in the agency's resources," he said.

Even before Fukushima added to its workload, experts warned that budget austerity in member states may block funding required by the IAEA to deal with growing demand for atomic energy and the attendant risk of weapons proliferation. The bulk of money for the IAEA, which has more than 2 300 staff, comes from Western member states on a voluntary basis.

The IAEA 'Program and Budget for 2012-2013' was adopted by the General Conference in September. The total proposed budget for 2012 is 341.4 million euro (US$ 451 million) which represents a 2.1% increase, plus a 1.1% price adjustment. This differs from the Director-General’s original proposal to the Board of Gov­ernors of a 2.8% increase. Of this regular budget, 39% is allocated to nuclear verification. In addition, voluntary contributions can be made by member states to specific funds such as the Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Se­curity Funds.

The recently-published ‘Programme and budget for 2012-2013’ warns that ‘demands for the Agency’s services are growing at a rate beyond what can realistically be funded through the regular budget’. Therefore, some of the money will need to be delivered to the Agency on an extrabudgetary basis, and in support for specific projects. This is not without risk. The program and budget notes that these ‘are unpredictable, often tied to restrictive conditions and thus involve some risk for the program’.

Reasons mentioned by the IAEA for expanding the budget are:
• An increasing number of States are contemplating the establishment or enhancement of safe nuclear power programmes and look to the Agency for advice and assistance.
• Basic human needs in developing countries regarding health, water and food — areas where nuclear techniques are of proven benefit — increasingly call for Agency support.
• The Agency’s nuclear security activities remain extensively reliant on uncertain extrabudgetary contributions.
• With increases in the number of facilities and nuclear material the Agency’s verification responsibilities continue to grow.
• The interrelationship between complex global issues and the development needs of Member States, to be addressed by the Agency in a coordinated manner, is increasing.
• The Agency’s considerable infrastructure requirements have begun to be addressed, but much remains underfunded. Despite the establishment of a Major Capital Investment mechanism, there is a lack of funding to it that prevents fund accumulation. Meeting capital needs is therefore contingent upon the Agency’s receiving adequate extrabudgetary contributions.

As said, the General Conference of the IAEA agreed on a budgetary increase of no more than 2.1 per cent (plus a 1.1 per cent inflation increase) but the IAEA Secretariat will still have to try to deliver more services—which means that the IAEA has to deal with the challenges of both effective­ness and efficiency.

At a time of economic problems squeezing government finances, some European states have resisted budget hikes for the agency.

Sources: Trust & Verify, July-September 2011 / IAEA 'Programme and budget 2012-2013', at: www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/GC55Documents/English/gc55-5_en.pdf

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Nuclear lobby delaying enforcement safety requirements after 9/11

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#733
6169
23/09/2011
Greenpeace/UCS
Article

A decade ago, nineteen suicidal terrorists hijacked airliners and turned them into weapons by flying them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Since those horrific attacks, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the nuclear industry have repeatedly claimed that nuclear plants were not vulnerable to a similar attack.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Rather than reduce the risks posed by nuclear power plants and their deadly wastes, nuclear bureaucrats have trafficked in half-truths about the vulnerability to a 9-11-type attack.  When former NRC Chairman Dale Klein was asked what would happen if Al Qaeda flew a plane into a nuclear reactor, Klein's response was that, "in general…the plane would bounce off."

Unbelievable! Documents the NRC scrubbed from its own web site after 9-11 come to a very different conclusion. The report prepared by Argonne National Labs contradicts the NRC and industry claims of invulnerability and details accident sequences in which, “the core would most probably be headed for serious damage if not total meltdown.”

But the radiation from a meltdown of the reactor is not the only threat.  The waste pools that store the highly radioactive fuel rods are also at risk. According to NRC's own study, one third of U.S. nuclear reactors  “do not appear to have any significant structures that might reduce the likelihood of aircraft penetration [of the spent fuel pool].

The NRC has now dithered for a decade while suicidal terrorists have eye balled U.S reactors and their radioactive wastes as “nice targets.”

Rather than merely portray nuclear plants as hardened targets, the nuclear regulators should force the industry to move radioactive wastes into hardened on site storage and thereby reduce the potential consequences of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant.  Ten years after 9-11 both the Bush and Obama administrations have failed to do so and have failed to adequately protect the American people.

But how come?

Stonewalling after 9/11
A document recently made public by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sheds some light on the response of the U.S. nuclear industry to the vulnerabilities in nuclear power plant security and preparedness that became evident following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The vast majority of information on this subject is not available to the public. Although there is a legitimate interest in protecting information that could be useful to terrorists planning attacks, in our view the NRC cast an overly broad net over information related to nuclear power plant security after 9/11. This has inhibited the ability of the public to independently evaluate the claims made by the NRC and the nuclear industry that the security upgrades undertaken after 9/11 were implemented rapidly and were adequate in scope to deal with threat of radiological sabotage. 

The recently released document clearly illustrates how the nuclear industry uses secrecy to its advantage to engage in private conduct that was completely at odds with the image it presented to the public. The document, entitled The Evolution of Mitigating Measures for Large Fire and Explosions: A Chronological History From September 11, 2001 Through October 7, 2009 provides an extensive, detailed account of the delaying tactics used by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to prevent the NRC from enforcing requirements that it imposed on the nuclear industry soon after the 9/11 attacks. This is one of the most substantive public documents on post-9/11 activities by the NRC and the industry that we have seen. The document had been marked “Official Use Only—Security Related Information,” but those markings have now been crossed out.

The bottom line revealed in this document is that the NRC issued orders on February 25, 2002 to all nuclear plant licensees to immediately upgrade security in a number of areas by August 31, 2002. Among those areas was Section B.5.b of the order, which required “licensees to adopt mitigation strategies using readily available resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities to cope with the loss of large areas of the facility due to large fires and explosions from any cause, including beyond design-basis aircraft attacks.”

However, the lack of specificity in this requirement, including the meaning of “readily available,” led to differing positions between the industry and the NRC as to what, if anything, was actually required by B.5.b. As a result of extensive arguments on these points and others, it took nearly five years before the NRC and NEI came to agreement on what actually was required and how those requirements could be met.

These final requirements appear to have been significantly watered down from the NRC’s original proposal. One key issue is that the industry succeeded in avoiding the requirement that the B.5.b measures be incorporated into the site security, emergency, and guard-training plans. As a result, the B.5.b measures were never integrated into the overall plant emergency and security response plans.

The legacy of this has now been revealed by the NRC’s post-Fukushima inspections of B.5.b measures, which found multiple gaps and weaknesses. Without integration of the B.5.b procedures into the other emergency procedures, it is unclear how and when the measures would actually be carried out during an emergency, and if the measures might actually conflict with other important emergency procedures. As a result, many of the measures could be essentially worthless in practice.

After the NRC and NEI reached agreement on the B.5.b requirements, it then took another two years before the licensees complied with the finalized requirements and the NRC completed its inspections. Thus, it took more than six years after the initial compliance date of August 31, 2002 before the requirements of the orders were actually implemented and inspected.

But in April 30, 2009, the staff reported that there were still a range of unresolved issues resulting from the site inspections.

Another interesting fact revealed by this document is that behind the scenes, the NRC apparently worried much more about the risks to spent fuel pools than it was willing to admit publicly. The NRC apparently made mitigation of risks to spent fuel pools more of a priority than mitigation of risks to reactors and containment buildings, and reordered the development of B.5.b measures to address spent fuel pools first. The document cites this change as a “response to heightened public and congressional interest in the potential vulnerability of the SFPs. This heightened interest stemmed from the January 31, 2003, paper by Robert Alvarez and Ed Lyman, called Reducing the hazards from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States.

Of particular note in the document is the partial resolution of a mystery that has long plagued us here at UCS: the failure of the NRC to follow through on its decision to impose a new regulation on pressurized-water reactors with ice condenser containments and on boiling-water reactors with Mark III containments to ensure there would be backup power to hydrogen igniter systems in the event of a station blackout.

In 2000, Sandia National Laboratories found that the probability of containment failure from hydrogen explosions at these types of plants following a station blackout (such as what happened at Fukushima) was very high—up to nearly 100 percent for certain plants. The reason is that these plants have relatively small and weak containment systems that could be ruptured by hydrogen explosions, and therefore they require hydrogen igniter systems to burn off hydrogen during a severe accident before it builds up to an explosive concentration. However, these systems require AC power to operate—power that would not be available in a station blackout.

In 2003, the NRC conducted a cost-benefit analysis of this issue and determined that the cost of requiring these plants to add additional backup AC power was less than the benefit. This means that the NRC could proceed with imposing a new regulation that would compel these plants to install additional backup AC power for the igniters.

But this regulation was never implemented. According to the NRC, the reason was that the licensees all promised to install such backup power as a “voluntary” commitment. Even so, it was highly irregular for the NRC to reverse its decision to impose a new regulation, and it was never clear why this happened. Substituting voluntary commitments not enforceable by the NRC for regulatory requirements generally leads to inadequate outcomes—a fact that has become apparent post-Fukushima, as NRC reviews of the nuclear industry’s voluntary procedures for coping with severe accidents have revealed major problems.

Now we know from the recently released history that behind the scenes the NRC was engaged in a major conflict with NEI over this issue. It turns out that because this was a security as well as a safety issue, the NRC apparently decided in 2006 to “promptly require” BWR Mark III and PWR ice condenser reactors to obtain additional power supplies for the igniters, and directed the staff to issue orders to that effect. However, NEI did not believe such requirements were appropriate, and responded by requesting a private meeting between the NRC Commissioners and the Chief Nuclear Officers of the affected plants. While the record does not show whether this meeting ever occurred, one can surmise that this concerted effort by the industry to derail the requirements ultimately prevailed.

The legacy of NEI’s stonewalling is now apparent in the report of the NRC Fukushima Task Force. Many issues identified as safety weaknesses at nuclear plants today stem from the compromises that the NRC made during the development of B.5.b requirements.

Thus, the fact that nuclear plants are neither as safe nor as secure as they need to be today is a direct result of NEI’s strategy of fighting the B.5.b requirements tooth and nail.

Sources: Blog Greenpeace.org, 9 September 2011 / All Things Nuclear, Ed Lyman Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 September 2011
Contact: Ed Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC, Office, 1825 K St. NW, Ste. 800. Washington, DC 20006-1232, USA
Tel: +1 202 223-6133
Web: http://allthingsnuclear.org

Russian reactors fail safety hopes - and worse, leaked report reveals

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#729
6148
01/07/2011
Charles Digges and Maria Kaminskaya
Article

A report stunning in its candor prepared for Russian President Dmitry Medvedev by the county’s state nuclear monopoly in the wake of Japan’s Fukushima disaster reveals that Russia’s atomic reactors are grievously under-prepared for both natural and man-made disasters ranging from floods to fires to earthquakes or plain negligence.

The report of the first round of stress tests on Russia’s nuclear reactors, prepared by Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom, was obtained by Bellona Web and other environmental groups and distributed to Norwegian and Russian media. In the report, 31 serious flaws that make Russia’s nuclear industry extremely vulnerable to natural disasters are catalogued.

As such, the report is one of the few documents to surface in recent history that actually flatly contradicts Russia’s own rosy assessment that its reactors are safe – a propaganda campaign that was kicked into high gear by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Medvedev after the March 11 quake and tsunami hit Fukushima Daiichi, causing three meltdowns.

Bellona nuclear physicist Nils Bøhmer called the Rosatom report “shocking.” “It makes for dramatic reading with a view to the fact that the report comes from the owner of the nuclear plants,” he said, describing it as “the most serious description of the status of Russian nuclear plants I have ever seen from Rosatom.”

Report confirms long-held fears
The two Russian nuclear power plants that are closest to Finland and Norway – Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Kola NPP, respectively – are of the most concern to the international community. Both are in close proximity to Western Europe.

“The report reveals deficiencies which have never before been mentioned publicly, nor reported internationally,” chief engineer Ole Reistad of the Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology (IFI) told Norway’s NRK television.

Of particular concern at the Leningrad NPP (LNPP) is its use of the fatally flawed Chernobyl-type RMBK-1000 reactors. LNPP operates four RMBK-1000s, while the Kola NPP runs four aged VVER-440 reactors, two of which received engineering life span extensions in 2003 and 2004.

The Rosatom report, stating what many have asserted since Chernobyl, detailed “flaws and defects” in the design of the RMBK-1000 series that could lead to severe accidents - specifically, problems with control rod mechanisms, which are necessary to keep the nuclear reaction in the reactor under control.

The report’s revelations have alarmed the government of Norway. Norwegian State Secretary Erik Lahnstein of the Foreign Ministry, who received an overview of the report, told Aftenposten he wanted a full copy of the report sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency, saying “this confirms what Norwegian authorities have claimed for a long time.”

He stressed that Russia should shut down its oldest reactors. The Rosatom document said four reactors have been in shutdown mode for 20 years, and no decommissioning plans have yet been set in motion. This would arguably present difficulties in decommissioning other aged reactors in Russia.

Ole Harbitz, head of the crisis commission for the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, said of the report that it showed Russia was rethinking the vulnerability of its nuclear reactors to natural phenomena in the post-Fukushima era.

The dangers have been proven before: In the 1990s a severe storm knocked out primary and back-up power supplies to Kola NPP and Norway had to deliver enormous power generators to keep coolant flowing. In 2006, another power outage threatened coolant systems at the plutonium reactor at the Mayak Chemical Combine.

In Finland, Keijo Valtonen, an official at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Finland (STUK) somewhat soft-pedalled the dangers posed by Russia’s reactors, particularly those at Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants.

Valtonen told Helsingen Sanomat that most of Russia’s nuclear plants meet Western safety standards, but that new threats might arise in inspections made after the catastrophe at Fukushima.

But Valtonen has an agenda of his own: By some estimates, some 30 to 40 percent of power produced at Leningrad NPP is exported to Finland, and annual inspections of the plant by representatives of STUK consistently give it high marks, despite environmental dangers that are regularly revealed and confirmed there.

What the report said
Among the more critical safety failings relayed to Medvedev in the report, Rosatom found that Russia’s plants do not have relevant regulations in place for personnel to know how to deal with large-scale natural disasters or other serious contingencies; protective shelter for workers would not accommodate the largest teams on any given shift in the event of an accident, and Rosatom does not keep records of previous accidents, meaning workers do not have the benefit of learning from previous mistakes or improving remedial measures, among other shortcomings.

Elsewhere in the report, Rosatom points out that electrical and safety-significant systems do not receive the attention they need, resulting in a lack of required protection.

The Rosatom document also questioned the capability of reactors to remain safe for extended periods of time if cooling systems fail. There is no guarantee that power backup systems will be effective should this happen - the primary difficulty that beset Fukushima Daiichi when the quake and tsunami hit.

Additionally, key equipment involved in the cooling process suffers from metal fatigue and welding flaws – yet another problem that was ignored at Fukushima Daiichi’s reactor No 1 when regulators there agreed to give it a 10-year operational life span extension – which contributed to a total failure of cooling at the reactor.

Hydrogen control systems also do not correspond to regulations, meaning Russian reactors are vulnerable to the kinds of hydrogen explosions that tore through three reactor buildings at Fukushima Daiichi.

Most importantly, in light of the Fukushima disaster, the report also said that the risk of earthquakes has not been considered as a safety factor for Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, not all of Russia’s reactors have automatic shutdown mechanisms like the Fukushima Daiichi plant, should an earthquake occur.

Nor are there currently clear guidelines or sufficient infrastructure for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management, leading to fears of SNF leaks during a disaster – as also happened in Japan. With respect to Russia’s RBMK-1000 reactors, spent fuel is simply allowed to accrue in onsite storage because of lack of space to store it and because no technologies have been developed to reprocess it. Solid and liquid waste facilities across Russia are filled to at least 60 percent, and these facilities at Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk NPPs – all of which run RBMK 100 reactors – are filled to 85 percent capacity.

Reactor buildings at many of Russia’s nuclear power plants are also aged and susceptible to structural failure - meaning the buildings could collapse without the help of mother nature.

Further, the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear oversight, or Rostekhnadzor – Russia’s nuclear industry watchdog – lacks safety inspectors, and there is a shortage of qualified maintenance workers at NPPs across the country.

Rosatom Chief Sergei Kiriyenko was quick to comment on the report once Norwegian news outlets and Russian environmentalists had publicized its findings, saying it was just a matter of money to fix Russia’s shortcomings in the area of back-up power and coolant system deficiencies.

In the Vedomosti business daily, he cited a figure of 5 billion rubles (US$986 million) to bring Russia’s reactors up to specifications by enhancing their back-up power and coolant systems. To counter cost overruns, Kiryenko told the paper, Rosatom would rely on the government.


No stress test for Russia. According to Kirill Kormarov, deputy general director for global business development at Russian state energy corporation Rosatom, Russia has no plans to submit its nuclear reactors directly to EU-style safety stress tests. "We've done tests already", he said. The EU agreed common criteria in May for safety tests to be carried out on all 143 EU reactors starting June 1 (see Nuclear Monitor 728, June 17, 2011: 'Little Stress With Stress Test').

The European Commission has also pushed for the EU's neighbors to agree to a similar nuclear safety review, but currently there is only a "joint declaration to contribute to transparency and to participate in the peer review [a review of national safety reports at an EU level by the European nuclear regulators' group Ensreg]." The declaration was signed on June 23 by the EC and Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.
Platts, 28 June 2011


Source and contact: Charles Digges and Maria Kaminskaya, Bellona Foundation, 21 June 2011.
Web: www.bellona.org

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#729
01/07/2011
Shorts

Invitation to the 2011 Nuclear Heritage Network-meeting Czech Republic.
The first international anti-nuclear networking gathering in Europe after the Fukushima disaster organized by activists of the Nuclear Heritage Network will take place from August 1-5, 2011 in Ceské Budejovice (Budweis) in the Czech Republic close to the Austrian border and near to the controversial Temelín nuclear power plant.

As part of the gathering anti-nuclear activists from several countries will also meet with Czech and Austrian activists who cooperate in a unique cross-border network, which is partly coordinated and funded by the Upper-Austrian regional government. We will visit a group of Lower-Austrian activists, who have been organizing for years now so called "energy-meetings" and have become pioneers in using and making renewable energies popular.

The gathering is also supposed to get to know each other in person, to share experiences in the anti-nuclear field, and to develop mutual projects and campaigns. Goal is to improve the international anti-nuclear cooperations and to discuss how to  provide more resources by the Nuclear Heritage Network as well as by activists and organizations out of the network for international anti-nuclear activities. Thus, the initiatives are supposed to strengthen the anti-nuclear movement as well as to face various obstacles within and outside the movement.

As the logistic frame of our meeting is limited, please announce your participation to us as early as possible, and not later than July 20: falk@nuclear-heritage.net or b.riepl@eduhi.at.


Swiss police clear Mühleberg protest camp.
On June 21, police cleared the protest camp against the Mühleberg nuclear power station which was set up in the city of Bern at the beginning of April. The city government issued a statement saying the decision to clear camp outside the headquarters of BKW Energy, which operates Mühleberg, had been taken after the activists had refused to dismantle the tents despite lengthy discussions. It said it would have been prepared to allow a permanent vigil, but had made it clear from the beginning that it would not tolerate a camp with a permanent population. It added that it had now withdrawn its permission for a vigil and would not allow the area to be re-occupied.
The Mühleberg Abschalten (Switch off Mühleberg) association accused the Bern city government of taking the side of the nuclear lobby after the cantonal parliament decided last week not to do anything to take Mühleberg out of the grid. But it said the protest would continue until the power station was switched off. Only a few hours after the eviction, about 200 people gathered around the site for a lunchtime protest picnic with flags and placar. In the evening of the same day, several hundred demonstrators marched through Bern peacefully to protest the clearing of the camp.
World Radio Switzerland, 21 June 2011 / Swissinfo.ch, 21 June 2011


Threats to nuclear reactors in US.
In July, the United States' Nuclear Regulatory Commission will release the final results of its 90-day reactor safety review. The NRC will claim that nuclear reactors in the United States are safe. But the report will leave out critical information that exposes that claim as a myth.

We've already seen in Japan the catastrophic combination of inadequate regulations, aging reactors and unpredictable weather. What will be missing from the NRC report?

*As severe weather becomes more frequent, nuclear reactors have become more vulnerable and less reliable. Flood waters have knocked out power at the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station in Nebraska. On June 27, the barrier intended to keep water from immersing the reactor grounds was breached. The plant is now reportedly running on emergency generators to maintain the cooling systems. But floods are not the only weather phenomena to threaten reactors; extreme heat and droughts also force reactors offline. Nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy technology. In recent summers, water rationing due to heat waves in the southeast has required shutting down nuclear plants in Tennessee and Florida. Current regulations - amazingly - fail to account for possibility of a single weather event or natural disaster knocking out electricity from both the grid and emergency generators.

*U.S. nuclear reactors are being pushed well beyond their operational design and the resulting deterioration undermines their safety. In the U.S., reactors were designed and licensed for 40 years, but 66 of the 104 operating units have been relicensed to operate for 20 more years. In fact, the NRC has never denied a renewal - not even for the Vermont Yankee plant, where problems like groundwater contamination from leaking tritium led the state senate to vote against renewing its license. Corroded underground piping in aging plants is responsible for radioactive tritium leaks at 75% of U.S. commercial nuclear power sites.

*Federal regulators are far too cozy with the nuclear industry. Together they are maintaining the illusion that the nation's aging reactors operate within safety standards by repeatedly weakening those standards or simply failing to enforce them. According to a recent investigation by The Associated Press, NRC officials have - time after time, and at the urging of the industry - decided that original regulations were too strict and argued that safety margins should be eased.

Immediate steps can and must be taken to strengthen the regulation of nuclear reactors. But ultimately, we need to shift away from nuclear to renewable, safer and more efficient power choices. 
Public Citizen's Climate & Energy Program, 28 June 2011


Jellyfish block Torness.
Two reactors at the UK Torness nuclear power station have been shut down after huge numbers of jellyfish were found in the sea water entering the plant. The jellyfish were found obstructing cooling water filters. The plant's operator, EDF Energy, said the shutdown was a precautionary measure and there was never any danger to the public. A clean-up operation is under way, but according to the utility it could take a week to re-start again. Torness has two Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors but also relies on supplies of sea water to ensure it operates safely. It has filters which are designed to prevent seaweed and marine animals entering the cooling system. If these are blocked, the reactors are shut down to comply with safety procedures. Staff at the plant took the decision to shut down the reactors in the afternoon on June 30.  In February 20101 one of the two reactors was also shut down following a technical failure which affected the transformer, causing an automatic shutdown.
BBC Scotland, 30 June 2011

The EPR in crisis

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#719-720
6100
12/11/2010
Professor Steve Thomas, Business School, University of Greenwich
Article

Much has been written in the Nuclear Monitor in the past few years about the European Pressurised water Reactor. Now a new study by Professor Steve Thomas (Business School, University of Greenwich, London) describes the history, failure, and outlook of this reactortype: 'The EPR in Crisis', published November 10. An important report, since the EPR is one of the most mentioned reactor types in the hype of the nuclear renaissance and is planned to be built in a number of countries. With kind permission of the Steve Thomas, we publish the entire report. Please note that this report is copyright material.

Content:
Introduction
The roots of the EPR design
Marketing of the EPR
USA
Future prospects
UK
Italy
India
Other markets
Construction experience
Olkiluoto
Flamanville
Taishan
Safety assessment
Instrumentation and Control
Core catchers
Economic issues
The Roussely Report
Conclusions
Annex 1: Letter STUK to Areva
Endnotes

The European Pressurised water Reactor or EPR (*1) was to have been the demonstration of a new generation of nuclear reactors, so-called Generation III+, first talked about in the late 1990s. The difference between ‘III+’ and the earlier ‘III’ designs is that III+ designs are said to rely more on ‘passive’ rather than ‘engineered’ systems.(*2)

Introduction
The rationale for the Generation III+ plants was that they would be an evolution of existing designs but would be designed from the start with the lessons from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents fully incorporated. They would rely more on natural processes rather than engineered systems for their safety – so-called passive safety. As well as being safer, they would also be more ‘buildable’, cheaper to build and operate, and easier to decommission. In short, they would address the issues that had led to ordering of earlier designs to a near halt from about 1990 onwards.

The Olkiluoto order, placed in 2003, should have been on-line in 2009 and should have been a demonstration of the qualities of Generation III+ designs in general and the EPR in particular. However, by 2010, the EPR appeared to be in crisis. The two orders on which significant construction work had been completed had gone seriously wrong, obtaining safety approval from regulators in Europe and the USA was proving far more difficult than had been expected, estimated construction costs had increased by a factor of at least four in the past decade and the EPR had failed to win orders in bids for tender for nuclear capacity. Relations between the two state-controlled French companies at the heart of the development of the EPR, Areva, the vendor and Electricité de France (EDF), the utility appeared at breaking point. EDF was reportedly contemplating designing two new reactors in competition with those offered by Areva.(*3)

In this report, we examine the roots of the design, existing and potential orders for the reactor, experience with construction of the EPR, issues arising from the safety assessment of the design, and economic issues. We examine the report by the Roussely Commission, a report commissioned by the French government and headed by a former Chief Executive of the French utility, Electricité de France (EDF), and its implications for the EPR.

The roots of the EPR design
In 1989, Siemens, the main German nuclear vendor and Framatome, the French nuclear vendor formed a joint venture company, Nuclear Power International (NPI) to design a new Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). Siemens and Framatome had both been licensees of Westinghouse for their PWR technology. Design work was partly funded by German utilities and Electricité de France. This design would be based on Siemens’ and Framatome's most recent PWR designs, the ‘Konvoi’ design and the N4 respectively. By 1992, NPI was claiming that the conceptual design of the EPR was nearly complete, (*4) although the conceptual design was not actually completed until 1994. The EPR would have a thermal output of 4250MW giving an electrical output of about 1450MW. The containment was drawn mainly from the N4 design, while instrumentation was expected to be drawn from the Konvoi. A particular feature of the design was the inclusion of a ‘core catcher’ so that in the event of a core melt, the core would be retained within the containment. There was some uncertainty about what type of external hazards would be guarded against, with the French requiring protection only against a light aircraft, such as a Cessna, while the Germans required a military jet, like a Phantom.

In March 1995, the basic design phase was started with the expectation that EDF would order the first unit before 2000 and have it in service by 2006. However, there was then already so much nuclear capacity in France that EDF had more than enough nuclear power capacity to meet base-load. This meant that ‘series’ ordering, that is ordering at a predictable rate of several units per year, would not be needed before 2005.(*5) The French programme had always been premised on an assumption that a nuclear power programme only made sense if series ordering was expected. The issue of aircraft protection was not fully resolved but the French containment was approved by both the German and French regulators. By November 1995, there were concerns, especially amongst EDF officials, about the cost of the design, then expected to be more than US$2000/kW. (*6) The basic design work was not completed on time and in August 1997, after further concern about costs, the output of the plant was increased to 1800MW. (*7)

In September 1999, the head of DSIN (the French safety regulatory body later renamed DGSNR), Andre-Claude Lacoste, stated he expected to issue an interim safety verdict on the EPR within ‘a few weeks to a few months’ with a final design certification, reported to be equivalent to NRC’s design certification for advanced reactors. (*8) The output of the reactor had been reduced back down to about 1500MW. However, by 2003, the final certification had not been issued and Andre-Claude Lacoste, the head of the French regulatory body,, stated the process carried out up till then did not correspond to US design certification and that to achieve this would take 2-3 years more. (*9)

In August 2000, Framatome and Siemens agreed to a new joint venture formally merging their nuclear activities into a new company called Framatome ANP, subsequently renamed Areva NP. Framatome would hold 66 per cent of the stock and Siemens the rest.(*10)

Marketing of the EPR
Continued delays to EDF’s order led Areva NP to switch to Finland as the focus for its marketing. In May 2002, the Finnish Parliament approved the construction of a fifth nuclear unit in Finland. Three designs were short-listed from a list of seven for an order to be placed by the Finnish utility, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). The Finnish safety regulator, STUK, had already stated that it saw no difficulties in principle in licensing any of the seven initial candidates. (*11) The three short-listed reactors were the EPR, a Russian design and a Boiling Water Reactor design also offered by Areva NP. TVO was widely reported to be looking for a ‘turnkey’ (fixed price) contract. Westinghouse chose not to bid overtly on the grounds that a turnkey offer would not be profitable. (*12) However, there were also claims by Areva that Westinghouse’s AP1000 would not have met the requirements on aircraft protection because its containment was not strong enough. (*13) The AP1000 does not have a core-catcher and the head of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen has stated that on these grounds, the AP1000 would not have been acceptable in Finland. (*14)

In December 2003, TVO signed a turnkey deal with Areva NP for a 1600MW EPR at a cost, including interest during construction and two fuel charges of €3bn. The Finnish regulator was by then in close contact with the French regulator, DGSNR, which was expecting that an order for France would be placed in 2004. STUK expected to complete its review of the design within a year of the placing of the order.

By December, STUK and DGSNR had agreed to opt for different approaches so that construction in Finland did not have to wait until demonstrations of safety features that were expected to reduce costs had been carried out.(*15) In January 2005, STUK approved construction of Olkiluoto 3. (*16). In September 2004, DGSNR completed its review of the EPR and in October, the French government issued design approval for it, claimed to be equivalent to NRC design certification.(*17) In December 2004, Areva NP wrote to the US NRC asking it to begin a review of the EPR design for the US market. (*18) It expected completion of the review in 2008.

Approval by the French regulator came just after the opening of a call for tender from China in October 2004 and with further delays in ordering in France, Areva NP’s marketing efforts switched to China. China’s decision on the tender was delayed several times and it was not until December 2006 that it was announced that it had been won by Toshiba/Westinghouse’s offer of four AP1000s. One of the factors behind Areva NP’s failure to win the initial tender was reported to be its reluctance to transfer the technology as quickly and as fully as the Chinese wanted. (*19) China wanted quickly to be in a position to be able to build reactors of the design it chose without any input from the original vendor and in 2010, it was planning to start placing orders for plants of the AP1000 design without major involvement from Westinghouse. (*20) There were reports that Areva NP had failed to match Westinghouse’s offer to ‘sell the Chinese the blueprints.' (*21) However, reportedly in the interests of relations with France, China subsequently ordered two EPRs in November 2007 for the Taishan site in a deal reportedly worth €8bn. It is not clear what the terms of the contract were or what it covered so it is difficult to compare this deal with others. EDF took a 30 per cent stake in the company, Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (GNPC), building the reactors.

In the meantime, EDF finally ordered its first EPR to be built at its Flamanville site in 2005. At that time, EDF expected the reactor to cost €3.3bn, although the reactor would produce 1700MW, 100MW more than the Olkiluoto order. Construction of the reactor (first structural concrete) did not start until December 2007 and it was expected to take five years to build, a year more than Olkiluoto. Unlike Olkiluoto where Areva NP carried out the architect engineering, EDF itself carried out the architect engineering, as it has done with the 58 previous reactors it had bought from Framatome.

The next tender was for South Africa launched in January 2008 calling for 3200-3600MW of new capacity from Areva NP and Toshiba Westinghouse. The tender was in two parts: the first with specific proposals for the 3200-3600MW of capacity and the second the development of a 20,000MW nuclear fleet to be in place by 2025.. The first part of the bid would require either two EPRs of 1600MW or three AP1000s each about 1200MW. (*22) It was reported that the bids were in the order US$6000/kW (*23) and in November 2008, it was reported that Areva had won the contest, although the scale of 20,000MW programme was to be scaled back.(*24)However, in December 2008, Eskom cancelled the tender citing ‘the magnitude of the investment.'(*25)

In February 2009, Areva NP bid for two reactors to be constructed in Ontario.(*26) Other bidders were Toshiba-Westinghouse (AP1000) and the Canadian vendor, AECL offering a new Candu design.(*27) The commissioning body was Infrastructure Ontario a state-owned agency. In June 2009, the Ontario government suspended the tender citing concerns about pricing. It was reported that Areva NP’s bid for one EPR was US$21bn. This was denied by Areva NP but they did not reveal the actual figure.(*28)

In February 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began the assessment of bids for 5000MW of new nuclear capacity. In addition to a bid from Areva NP for three EPRs, it was reported that there were bids from General Electric-Hitachi and Toshiba/Westinghouse. (*29) The EPR bid initially involved Areva NP, GDF Suez, Bechtel and Total. Subsequently, at the request of the French government, EDF was persuaded to join the EPR bid. In July, three bids were selected for assessment including a bid from GE-Hitachi for a boiling water reactor (BWR) and one from a Korean group offering its Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), the APR-1400. (*30) In December 2009, it was announced that the tender had been awarded to the Korean consortium for four APR-1400 units at a price of US$20bn. According to Korean media reports, the Korean bid was almost 30 per cent lower per kW than the EPR bid, while the GE Hitachi offer was said to be higher than the French bid. The failure to win this bid led to much criticism of the French nuclear industry, in particular the lack of unity in the French bid. EDF, which has acted as architect engineer for all the PWRs built in France, had been unwilling to act as architect engineer for foreign bids and had only been persuaded by the French government in December to lead the bid as the UAE utility, ENEC, had requested. (*31)

USA
The USA is potentially the largest nuclear market (along with China) in the world and Areva and EDF have made a major financial commitment to open up this market. EPR is one of five designs being assessed by the US safety authorities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and is a candidate for Federal subsidies including Federal loan guarantees. Subsidies for new nuclear reactors were first mooted in 2002, when President Bush launched an initiative aimed at re-starting commercial ordering for nuclear reactors using the Generation III+ design in the USA, the Nuclear Power 2010 programme: no reactor order, not subsequently cancelled, had been placed since 1974 in the USA. The Bush government believed that nuclear technology was competitive and that a handful of subsidised demonstration plants were needed to show that the new designs had overcome the problems of earlier designs.(*32) The publicity for the programme claimed: ‘New Generation III+ designs ... have the advantage of combining technology familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs.'(*33)

This programme has evolved considerably since it was first announced and although nominally Nuclear Power 2010 is due to end at the end of fiscal year 2010, the effort by the Federal government to re-start nuclear reactor ordering will almost certainly continue. Nuclear Power 2010 originally had the goal of having new reactors online by 2010. Time-scales have slipped substantially – the first unit is unlikely to be on-line before about 2018 if there are no more delays.

The programme was to take advantage of new licensing procedures, already passed into law in the 1992 Energy Policy Act, so that a combined Construction and Operating License (COL) license would replace the existing procedure of separate construction and operating licenses. The proposed Energy Policy Act of 2003 (EPACT 2003) offered the prospect of Federal loan guarantees for new reactors covering up to 50 per cent of the cost of the projects. When the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)(*34)looked at the cost implications of this bill, it assumed that loan guarantees would be offered for six reactors. The CBO assumed that the reactors would be of 1100MW, each costing US$2.5bn (US$2300/kW) and that they would be financed by 50 per cent debt and 50 per cent equity. This meant that the guarantees required would be worth about US$7.5bn. It asserted the risk of default would be ‘well above 50 percent’ but that over the plant’s expected operating lifetime, its creditors (which could be the federal government) could expect to recover a significant portion of the plant’s construction loan so the net cost to taxpayers would be about 25 per cent of the sum guaranteed.

EPACT 2003 was not passed, but a successor bill, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) was passed and contained much more generous levels of support for new nuclear reactors. EPACT 2005 included provisions to cover cost overruns due to regulatory delays,(*35) and a production tax credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour for the first 6,000 megawatt-hours from new nuclear reactors for the first eight years of their operation, subject to a $125 million annual limit.(*36)

However, the biggest incentive was the provision of loan guarantees under Title XVII of that bill. While the loan guarantees would only be available for technologies that were not ‘commercial’, the number of units that would be eligible was not precisely specified. The US Department of Energy stated: ‘DOE has defined “commercial technologies,” which are not eligible for loan guarantees under this program, as “in general use if it has been installed in and is being used in three or more commercial projects in the United States in the same general application as in the proposed project, and has been in operation in each such commercial project for a period of at least five years.” Given that new reactors will take at least five to ten years to build, a large amount of loan guarantees for the same design could be offered before the design is considered “commercial”.(*37)

The potential scale of the loan guarantees programme has escalated dramatically since 2003. Let us assume that these were now available for only three units of each of the five designs being assessed by the US NRC and for up to 80 per cent of the total cost. Since the CBO made its estimate in 2003, the estimated cost of new reactors has increased to at least US$6000/kW and their average size has increased to 1200-1600MW making the cost (without finance costs) of an EPR nearly US$10bn.

Under these assumptions the programme would be able to provide loan guarantees worth more than US$100bn. In July 2008, the US DOE announced it was ready to accept applications for loan guarantees, but Congress authorized only up to US$18.5bn.(*38) Congress believed this might be sufficient to cover four projects (seven to eight reactors), but using more realistic cost assumptions, this seemed likely to be able to only allow three or four reactors at most. The Obama Administration asked for an additional US$36bn in loan guarantees in February 2010 , but the appropriations process was held up by election-year politics, so by November 2010, it was not clear how much the additional funds would be. There is also the issue of the fee that should be charged to borrowers for the loan guarantees. This should be an economic fee, in other words, one that reflects the risk involved. . The fees are assessed by the federal Office of Management and Budget and are supposed to reflect the risk of default for that project. As has become clear with the Calvert Cliffs project, discussed below, if the risk of a loan is assessed to be high, the fee could be more than the developers are prepared to pay.

The subsidies on offer under EPACT 2005 did stimulate utilities to announce plans for more than 30 new reactors, seven of which were for EPRs. However, a significant proportion of these never got beyond the early planning stage and by June 2010, only 27 had made applications to the NRC for COLs. Four of these were for EPRs (see Table 1) including two to be built by UniStar, a 50-50 joint venture created in 2005 between EDF and the US utility, Constellation. UniStar is a partner in the other two projects with PPL for the Bell Bend project and with Ameren UE for the Callaway reactor. By June 2010, of these 27 reactors, one application had been withdrawn and the owners of four others, two of which were for EPRs, had asked for the process to be suspended. Of the remaining 22, two were EPRs and the developer of one of these, PPL, stated that it was still ‘several years from a final decision on whether to build Bell Bend.'(*39) The future of the EPR therefore seemed highly dependent on the one EPR project still being actively pursued, the UniStar Calvert Cliffs project.

Table 1 EPR’s proposed in USA

Plant

Owner

COL application

Loan Guarantee

Calvert Cliffs 3

UniStar

COL 3/08

Shortlist

Callaway 2

AmerenUE

Suspended 4/09

Applied

Nine Mile Pt 3

UniStar

Suspended 1/09

Applied

Bell Bend

PPL

COL 10/08

Applied

Source: Author’s research

The presence of EDF in the UniStar joint venture, with its vast experience of building and operating PWRs supplied by Areva – 58 units in service in France – was seen as a major advantage. Constellation owns about 3.9GW of existing nuclear power plants at three sites (Calvert Cliffs, Nine Mile Point and Ginna).(*40) In September 2008, EDF tried to take over Constellation but were outbid by MidAmerican Energy Holdings, a private company controlled by Warren Buffet. It was reported that the rival bid for Constellation could derail EDF’s nuclear ambitions in the USA if MidAmerican did not support new nuclear build. In December 2008, EDF announced an agreement with Constellation to take a 49.99% holding in Constellation’s nuclear subsidiary, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group. The deal was done through the EDF subsidiary, EDF Development Inc, and cost US$4.5bn.(*41) Mid American Holdings amicably withdrew its offer. The UniStar joint venture remains separate from this deal.

Whether the purchase of the stake in Constellation’s nuclear assets made any sense without the new build reactors is far from clear. However, it is apparent that EDF regards it as part of its bid to build new reactors and expand the scope of its operations into plant design and construction. Nucleonics Week reported: “EDF Chairman/CEO Pierre Gadonneix defended the decision to buy what some in France are calling ‘old’ US nuclear plants as a ticket to what will be ‘the world's largest nuclear market tomorrow’."(*42) In summer 2009, Gadonneix was replaced by Henri Proglio, who has been reportedly much less enthusiastic about EDF’s nuclear expansion outside France.

The Calvert Cliffs reactor was forecast to cost US$7.2bn in 2008. (*43) UniStar ordered forgings and other long lead-time reactor components for Calvert Cliffs in 2006 and 2007. A partial construction and operating license application (COLA), mainly the environmental report, was submitted in July 2007 and was docketed by the NRC in January 2008. The remainder of the COLA was submitted in March 2008 and was docketed on June 4, 2008. As of November 2010, there was no schedule for issue of the COL because of the problems with certifying the design. (*44) Part 1 of the application for federal loan guarantees was submitted in September 2008 and Part 2 in December 2008. In 2009, the US Department of Energy short-listed four projects for loan guarantees, including Calvert Cliffs. The first loan guarantee was offered to another project in February 2010 and an offer to Calvert Cliffs was widely expected to follow soon after. However, by August 2010, no commitment had been made and Constellation began to cut back drastically on expenditure on the Calvert Cliffs project. How far this was due to the delays in granting loan guarantees and how far it was due to deterioration in the economics of the new reactor is not clear.

The CEO of Constellation stated: ‘market signals to build a baseload plant of any kind, let alone nuclear, have suffered significantly since we started the project four years ago.’ He said Constellation will abandon the project if it does not receive a conditional loan guarantee for the project. The poor market signals included low natural gas prices and the short- and long-term power price outlooks.(*45) EDF, in its report for the first half of 2010 published in July 2010, made a provision of €1.06bn (about US$1.45bn) related to financing delays on nuclear projects in the United States.(*46)

By September, signs of strain between EDF and Constellation were clear. A particular issue was that under the terms of the purchase of the stake in Constellation’s nuclear assets, Constellation could require EDF to US$2bn worth of Constellation’s natural gas, coal and hydropower plants by end 2010.(*47) There was speculation in September 2010 that these problems could lead to EDF selling its stake in the nuclear assets and dissolving the UniStar joint venture.(*48) In October 2010, Constellation unilaterally withdrew from negotiations with the US Department of Energy for loan guarantees for the Calvert Cliffs project. It was reported that the fee to provide loan guarantees for 80 per cent of the forecast cost of the plant (US$9.6bn) was initially proposed at US$880m, or 11.6 per cent of the amount borrowed.(*49) When Constellation rejected that offer, DOE proposed a 5 per cent fee, but with conditions including that Constellation fully guarantee construction and commit to sell 75 per cent of the power through a Purchase Power Agreement (PPA), presumably through its subsidiary Baltimore Gas & Electric. The Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) would have had to approve a PPA.

Subsequently Constellation sold its 50 per cent stake in UniStar to EDF for US$140m. In addition, Constellation transferred to UniStar potential new nuclear sites at Nine Mile Point and R.E. Ginna in New York as well as Calvert Cliffs. The agreement requires EDF to transfer 3.5 million of the shares it owns in Constellation and to give up its seat on Constellation's board and in exchange, Constellation gave up the option to require EDF to buy Constellation’s fossil fuel capacity.(*50)

EDF was reported to be keen to proceed with the Calvert Cliffs project but US law does not allow US nuclear reactors to be owned, controlled or dominated by foreign companies or governments, so EDF would need to find a new partner to proceed. It is not clear whether loan guarantees could be offered to UniStar in advance of a new US partner being agreed and whether the fee would be the same.

While the political wrangling about how much Congress will be prepared to allow the US DOE to offer in loan guarantees, the deteriorating prospective economics for new nuclear reactors and the economic risk they pose to their owners may mean that relatively few loan guarantees are granted. The projects most likely to go ahead are those with the ‘belt and braces’ of Federal loan guarantees and a state regulatory body that commits to allowing the utility to recover its costs from consumers. Calvert Cliffs and Bell Bend would be exposed to the PJM electricity market and therefore could expect no support from the state regulator. If the Calvert Cliffs project does collapse and an existing project, such as Bell Bend cannot be brought in to replace it, it is hard to see how the EPR could survive in the USA. This would be a severe blow to EDF and Areva, both of which have invested a large amount of cash and their credibility in opening up the US market to the EPR.

Future prospects
The EPR is competing in a number of other markets where Areva NP hopes it will be the basis for series ordering, in particular the UK and Italy.

UK
The UK government’s program is based on very different underlying assumptions than that of the United States. The UK government did not claim that nuclear power would be directly competitive with fossil fuels, but if a carbon price of €36/tonne was assumed, it would be competitive. Both the Labour government up to May 2010 and the successor Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition seem heavily committed to reviving nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom. However, all three parties have stated that orders should only be placed if they do not involve public subsidies. Ordering would therefore take place without subsidy, provided a few non-financial enabling decisions were taken, particularly on planning processes and certification of designs. In 2008, when the government revisited nuclear economics, it assumed the construction cost was £1,250/kW ($2,000/kW).

The government’s nuclear regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), started to examine four separate designs in 2007 including the Areva NP EPR and the Toshiba/Westinghouse AP1000. The rationale was that up to three designs would be finally certificated, thus giving utilities a choice of designs. In fact, the other two designs were quickly withdrawn leaving just the EPR and AP1000.

Three utilities have made significant commitments to UK ordering: EDF, RWE, and E.ON – the latter two in a consortium called Horizon. EDF took over the UK nuclear generation company, British Energy, for about €15 billion in 2008, while RWE/E.ON have purchased sites in 2009 adjacent to existing nuclear power plants for several hundred million Euros. Both EDF and the RWE/E.ON consortium expect to order 4 units, for a total of 10 to 12 GW of capacity. EDF is expected to order the EPR, while the RWE/E.ON consortium has yet to choose its supplier.

EDF heavily committed itself to nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom with its purchase in 2009 of British Energy. The price seemed far above the value of the assets being acquired and only has any logic if new nuclear orders are placed. British Energy went bankrupt in 2002 because its operating costs, then about £16/MWh, were marginally higher than the price it received for electricity. Since then, operating costs have grown every year and by 2008/09, the operating costs had risen to £41.3/MWh. British Energy only remained solvent because of the extremely high wholesale electricity prices that prevailed in that period – British Energy received £47/MWh in that period. If operating costs continue to rise and/or wholesale electricity prices fall (by the end of 2009, they were well below the 2008 peak), British Energy will be at risk of collapse again.

The RWE/E.ON consortium had invested a few hundred million pounds in options to buy sites, but if it did not take up these options, it could walk away from a British nuclear program at little cost. By the start of 2010, the UK was still 3-4 years from completing safety assessment of the design and getting planning permission for specific sites – the point when a firm order could be placed.

Italy
In 1987, a referendum led to the closure of the four operating nuclear power plants in Italy and the abandonment of work on construction of another nuclear station. The Berlusconi government has introduced legislation that would pave the way for the reintroduction of nuclear power in Italy. Four 1650 MW EPRs could be built, with construction starting as early as 2013, under an agreement signed in February 2009 by the French utility, EDF, and the largest Italian utility, ENEL. ENEL has not selected the sites for these units yet. It has said the cost would be about €4-4.5 billion each or $3,600-4,000/kW.(*51) There has been speculation about other competing bids to build nuclear power plants – for example, a consortium led by A2A, the Milan-based utility offering AP1000s – but these projects are much less advanced than those of ENEL. (*52)

India
It has been reported that a memorandum of understanding (MOU), including the intention to build two EPRs, would be signed in February 2009 between Areva and the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited.(*53) Even if this MOU is signed, it is far from being a firm order and many MOUs come to nothing, for example, if financing cannot be arranged.

Other markets
President Sarkozy has announced that a second EPR in France will be ordered in 2011 for the Penly site. It is unlikely there will be scope for many further orders for France given that France already has more baseload electricity capacity than it can readily use and with plans to operate existing reactors for up to 60 years instead of the earlier expectations of 40 years, it will not be till after 2035 when the existing reactors begin to be retired. The Penly plant was to be built by EDF, which would have a 50 per cent stake in it, with the other stakes being held by the other major French utility, GDF Suez (25 per cent) and ENEL (the main Italian utility), E.ON (a large German utility and the oil company, Total, each with 8.33 per cent. However, in September 2010, GDF Suez, which was disappointed not to have been given the job of building the plant, announced their withdrawal from the project.(*54) There were reports that GDF Suez was hoping to lead construction of a reactor at another site, using the Areva ‘Atmea’ design (see below).(*55)

The Finnish Parliament has voted to allow construction of two additional nuclear reactors by two different consortia. Both consortia have named the EPR as one of three or four options they might choose. It is far from certain whether these orders will be placed, and if they are, whether the EPR will be chosen, especially given the poor performance of the EPR at the Olkiluoto site. In July 2010 in the Canadian province of New Brunswick, Areva, the New Brunswick government and New Brunswick Power announced that they would examine the feasibility of building a light-water nuclear reactor in the province by 2020. However, in September 2010, the incoming Premier for the province announced the agreement would go on the back-burner.(*56)

Construction experience
While utilities and governments will be interested in the theoretical attractions of new designs, it will be actual experience of building and operating these new designs that will be crucial in determining their success. By October 2010, no EPR was yet in service but four were under construction, one in Finland (Olkiluoto), one in France (Flamanville) and two in China (Taishan).

Olkiluoto
The Olkiluoto-3 reactor order of December 2003 was the first nuclear order in Western Europe and North America since the 1993 Civaux-2 order in France and the first order outside the Pacific Rim for a Generation III/III+ design. The Finnish electricity industry had been trying to get Parliamentary approval for a new nuclear unit since 1992. This was finally granted in 2002. The Olkiluoto-3 order was a huge boost for the nuclear industry in general and Areva NP in particular. Industry anticipated that, once complete, the plant would provide a demonstration and reference for other prospective buyers of the EPR.

The contract price for Olkiluoto-3 was reported in 2004 to be €3bn for a 1600 MW reactor.(*57) Subsequently, the price was reported to be €3.2bn(*58) or €3.3bn.(*59) Safety approval was given by the Finnish regulator, STUK, in March 2005 and substantive work on-site started in August 2005. At the time the contract was signed, the value was equivalent to about US$3.6-4.0bn (depending on the contract price) or about $2250-2475/kW (€1=US$1.2). This cost included financing and two reactor cores, so the cost per kW in overnight terms would have been somewhat lower, although given the very low rate of interest charged (2.6%), finance costs would be low.

Although the total cost was well above the nuclear industry‘s target of US$1000/kW of only a few years previously, it was still regarded by many critics as a ‘loss-leader’. Areva NP had been trying to persuade either EDF or one of the German utilities to place an order for an EPR since the late 1990s(*60) and there were fears that if an order for the EPR was not placed soon, AREVA NP would start to lose key staff(*61) and the design would become obsolete.(*62) Areva NP also needed a ‘shop window’ for EPR technology and Olkiluoto-3 would serve as a reference plant for other orders. As an additional incentive and at the request of the customer, Areva NP offered the plant on ‘turnkey’ or fixed price terms. It also took responsibility for the management of the site and for the architect engineering, not just the supply of the ‘nuclear island’. This was not a role it was accustomed to. For the 58 PWRs Areva NP’s predecessor, Framatome, had supplied for France, as well as for the foreign projects including those in China and South-Africa, it was EDF that had provided these services.

The Olkiluoto project has gone seriously wrong since construction started. By August 2010, Areva NP acknowledged that the estimated cost had reached €5.7bn (an additional €367m was acknowledged in the 2009 accounts), which at the prevailing exchange rate of €1=US$1.35 represented a cost of US$4800/kW.(*63) The contract is also the subject of an acrimonious dispute between Areva NP and the customer, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). Areva NP claims compensation of about €1bn for alleged failures of TVO. TVO, in a January 2009 counterclaim, is demanding €2.4bn in compensation from Areva NP for delays in the project.(*64)

Table 2 Timetable of problems at Olkiluoto 3

Date

Event

4/04

STUK: ‘We are getting the documents late. They (Areva) aren’t reserving enough time for our review and they don’t have all the information required by our guides.'(*65)

10/05

Pouring of base slab delayed by concerns about strength of concrete. Manufacturing of reactor pressure vessel and steam generators "a few weeks" behind the original schedule(*66)

2/06

Problems with qualifying pressure vessel welds and delays in detailed engineering design put construction more than six months behind schedule(*67)

3/06

STUK opened an investigation into manufacturing and construction problems(*68)

5/06

Despite measures including two shifts on site and three shifts at Areva's component manufacturing plant, work is eight to nine months behind schedule(*69)

7/06

TVO acknowledges delay now 1 year. STUK investigation: An extremely tight budget and timetable, supplier inexperience, poor subcontractor control and regulators’ difficulty in assessing information have caused confusion and quality control problems that have delayed the Olkiluoto-3 project(*70)

10/06

Areva takes provision of ca €300m for Olkiluoto project71 3 out of 4 ‘hot legs’ not made to specification. 72 Project manager replaced(*73)

12/06

Delay estimated at 18 months(*74)

1/07

Areva NP: Areva-Siemens cannot accept 100 % compensation responsibility, because the project is one of vast co-operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 % compensation principle’ TVO: ‘I don’t believe that Areva says this. The site is in the contractor’s hands at the moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible of what happens at the site. But the realisation of the project is Areva’s responsibility'(*75)

5/07

TVO and Areva agree design not complete enough when contract signed. STUK: ‘a complete design would be the ideal. But I don't think there's a vendor in the world who would do that before knowing they would get a contract. That's real life(*76)

8/07

Problems meeting requirements to withstand an airplane crash mean delay 2 years(*77)

9/07

Steel containment liner repaired in 12 places to fix deformations and weld problems(*78) Areva acknowledges further financial provisions for losses but does not quantify them. Independent estimate €500-700m(*79)

6/08

TVO site manager replaced(*80)

10/08

Delay now estimated at 3 years.(*81) Manufacturer of containment liner failed to obey an order to stop welding after a STUK-TVO inspection discovered that an incorrect welding procedure was being used.(*82) Areva initiates arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce over ‘a technical issue'(*83)

12/08

Areva announces further loss provisions. Independent estimates €1.3bn(*84)

12/08

Letter from STUK Director General top CEO Areva: ‘I cannot see real progress being made in the design of the control and protection systems.’ ‘This would mean that the construction will come to a halt and it is not possible to start commissioning tests.’ ‘the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons who speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make progress in resolving the concerns'(*85)

1/09

Delay acknowledged to be 3.5 years.(*86) Siemens announces withdrawal from Areva NP.(*87) Areva-Siemens file a second arbitration proceeding against TVO.(*88) Areva asking for €1bn in compensation. TVO counterclaiming for €2.4bn for ‘gross negligence’.(*89) TVO expects arbitration to take several years(*90)

3/09

Areva admits cost over-run now €1.7bn(*91)

06/10

TVO reports further delay till 2013 to completion of the plant.(*92) Delay confirmed by Areva NP(*93)

07/10

Areva booked €367m in new charges on expected losses with Olkiluoto.(*94)

Sources: As per endnotes

It seems unlikely that all the problems that have contributed to the delays and cost-overruns have been solved (see Table 2); the final cost could be significantly higher. The result of the claim and counter-claim arbitration between Areva NP and TVO will determine how the cost over-run will be apportioned. It is far from clear that TVO could survive financially if it had to shoulder a significant proportion of these costs. Even Areva, despite it being controlled by the French government had its credit rating reduced to BBB+, partly because of these problems(*95) and it would hardly be good for business if its customer was put out of business by the purchase of an EPR.

Flamanville
EDF finally ordered an EPR reactor in January 2007, to be located at their Flamanville site. This reactor was rated at 1630 MW(*96) and construction commenced in December 2007.(*97) In May 2006, EDF estimated the cost would be €3.3bn.(*98) At that time (€1=US$1.28), this was equivalent to US$2590/kW. This cost however did not include the first fuel or finance costs, so the overnight cost, which conventionally includes fuel but not finance costs would have been somewhat higher.

EDF did not seek a turnkey contract and chose to manage the contracting, for example, letting contracts for the turbine generator and the architect engineering. How far these decisions were influenced by the poor experience at Olkiluoto and how far they were influenced by the need EDF saw to maintain in-house skills is not clear.

In May 2008, the French safety regulatory authorities temporarily halted construction at Flamanville because of quality issues in pouring the concrete base mat.(*99)Delays had led the vendor, Areva NP to forecast the reactor would not be completed until 2013, a year late, but in November 2008, EDF claimed the delays could be made up and the reactor finished by the original schedule of 2012.(*100) EDF did admit that the expected construction costs for Flamanville had increased from €3.3 billion to €4 billion.(*101) This was then equivalent to US$3,265/kW (€1=US$1.33), substantially more than the Olkiluoto contract price, but far below the levels being quoted in the USA and the current cost of Olkiluoto. An Areva official suggested that the cost of an EPR will now be at least €4.5bn, although it was not specified whether this was an overnight cost.(*102) In January 2010, French unions reported that the project was then running at least two years behind schedule.(*103) These reports, originally denied by EDF, were confirmed by them in July 2010, when it also acknowledged that costs were by then running at €1.7bn over the original €3.3bn budget.(*104) In October 2010, Le Figaro reported a further delay of a year at Flamanville citing ‘several’ sources. EDF have denied this report. (*105)

Table 3 Timetable of problems at Flamanville 3

Date

Event

5/06

EDF decides to proceed with Flamanville 3(*106)

7/06

Site work commenced. Target construction time 54 months, construction cost €3.3bn excluding finance and fuel(*107) (*108)

1/07

NSSS ordered from Areva NP(*109)

4/07

French government issues construction license(*110)

12/07

First concrete poured(*111)

3/08

ASN asks EDF to improve work in several areas involving in particular quality control and organization.(*112) Inspection had revealed several problems in the civil construction work, including errors in installation of steel reinforcing bar in the concrete and "inconsistency" between rebar blueprints and the concrete pouring plan. organization for preparing concrete pouring was "insufficient"(*113)

5/08

ASN requires EDF to stop concrete pouring on May 26 (ban lifted June 17). Problems ‘show insufficient discipline on the part of the licensee and insufficient project organization’. Welding anomalies found in one of the four bottom pieces of the steel liner of the containment building (*114)

10/08

ASN told Areva to improve its oversight of forgings after procedures used by Italian subcontractor Societe della Fucine were found not to conform to standards(*115)

12/08

EDF acknowledges cost had increased to €4bn due mainly to inflation, and technical & regulatory changes.(*116) Construction schedule claimed still to be achievable

01/10

Unions claim construction is at least 2 years behind schedule(*117)

07/10

EDF confirms delay and announces expected costs are €1.7bn over budget(*118)

08/10

ASN asks EDF to modify the architecture of the non-safety instrumentation and control system(*119)

10/10

Le Figaro reports a further year delay(*120)

Sources: As per endnotes. Note: ASN = Autorité de sûreté nucléaire

Taishan
Under the terms of the contract Areva NP won to supply two EPRs to China, the company is only supplying the nuclear island and the contract is not turnkey. EDF is involved in the management of this project and has an equity stake in the reactors.(*121) Little reliable, independent information comes out of China on nuclear construction. The IAEA reported that work started on the first Taishan unit in November 2009 and on the second unit in April 2010. In July 2010, the South China Morning Post reported that work on the ‘second phase’ the Taishan units would not start in the third quarter of 2011 as expected.(*122) No reason for the delay was given by the plant owners, but there has been speculation that China was not comfortable with the fact that delays at Olkiluoto and Flamanville meant that the Taishan units would probably be the first EPRs to enter service.

Safety assessment
As mentioned previously, there was some confusion about the level of assessment of the EPR that had been carried out by the Finnish and the French regulators when construction started at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville plants respectively. It is now clear that neither had carried out a comprehensive generic safety review.

In August 2007, the UK safety regulator, the HSE launched its Generic Design Assessment (GDA) for the EPR (and three other designs). The timetable called for completion of the generic review in June 2011. There are three possible conclusions to this process: (*123) (1) if the regulators are fully content, they will issue an HSE Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC); (2) if they are largely content, they will issue an HSE Interim Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Environment Agency Interim Statement of Design Acceptability and identify the unresolved GDA Issues; and (3) if the regulators are not content no Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Statement of Design Acceptability will be issued. By August 2010, the HSE had acknowledged the first and third outcomes were implausible.(*124) In the case of the second outcome, the proposer would have to submit a Resolution Plan. However, once an interim DAC has been given, issues not covered by the Resolution Plan would not be considered. The HSE has recognised that it will probably be the first regulator to complete a generic assessment of the EPR and this would leave it in an invidious position if its requirements are seen as less stringent than those of other regulators. The HSE stated in July 2010:(*125)

We had originally hoped that the safety assessment of AP1000 and EPR by their ‘home’ regulators would be complete well before we completed GDA Step 4 in June 2011 so that we could fully consider their conclusions during our own assessment. However, we now understand that there is significant ongoing safety assessment by the home regulators for both AP1000 and EPR. This is a significant regulatory process concern for us, the implications of which are being considered at present, together with ways of ensuring the best possible international cooperation on and harmonisation of assessment outcomes.’

The HSE claims it will complete the GDA in June 2011, but ‘interim’ approvals, which would not suffice for construction of the reactors to begin in the UK, appear at the moment to be ‘more likely’ than final approvals for both designs for the June 2011 timeline.(*126)

Areva submitted a Standard Design Certification Application to the NRC in December 2007 more than 3 years after Areva NP began discussions with the NRC. At that time, Areva expected that the NRC would complete its technical review in two years, and finish the rulemaking that certifies the design the following year, 2010.(*127) This proved over-optimistic and in March 2010, after a number of delays, the NRC stated the final certification would not be before June 2012.(*128)

Instrumentation and Control
Table 2 shows that there were conflicts between Areva and STUK, the Finnish regulator even before construction started. The extent of these was illustrated by a leaked letter from the head of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen, to the CEO of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon in December 2008 (see Annex 1). In April 2009, the HSE classified Instrumentation & Control (I&C) as a ‘Regulatory Issue’, a particular feature of the design that might not meet UK regulatory standards.(*129) In July 2010, the I&C issue remained a Regulatory Issue and while HSE stated in July 2010 that it anticipated that an acceptable solution could be found, it had not received details of the modification proposed. The specific issue raised here, the level of redundancy in the I&C systems was subsequently taken up in a joint statement by the UK, French and Finnish regulators in November 2009.(*130) In August 2010, the HSE reported that while they believe that an ‘acceptable position can be reached for GDA’, this would depend ‘on timely and quality responses from EDF and AREVA and we have already noted difficulties with delivery on other C&I issues.’(*131)

The US and Chinese regulators were not party to this process, but in July 2010, it was reported that the US NRC had found that the I&C was too complex and interconnected to meet US regulations. The issue was described by an NRC spokesman as being ‘a critical path issue that is going to have to be resolved’.(*132) Whether this resolution would delay completion of the review beyond June 2012 is not clear. However, the I&C systems for UK, France, Finland and the USA will now all differ from each other because it is too late to make some changes to the French and Finnish designs.(*133)

Core catchers
A particular bone of contention has been the need of a ‘core-catcher’. In the event of a failure of the emergency core cooling system, this would ‘catch’ the core if it breached the reactor pressure vessel. There is no international agreement on the need for this feature: it is widely seen as essential for mainland Europe, but not the USA and other countries like Korea. However, this is an expensive system and Anne Lauvergeon blamed the extra cost of this as one of the factors behind the loss of the contract for UAE to a Korean design that does not have a core-catcher.(*134) Lauvergeon claimed that safety enhancements designed to prevent any offsite radiological impact — like the core catcher and the reinforced containment made the EPR 15 per cent more expensive than a Generation II PWR.(*135)

Economic issues
When a ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ was first mooted, a key element was the use of so-called Generation III+ designs, which would be safer, simpler, cheaper and easier to build than earlier designs. This, it was claimed, would overcome the problems that had led to the dramatic reduction in ordering from the mid-80s onwards. Particularly strong claims were made on costs with vendors claiming their new designs could be built for US$1000/kW. As noted above, cost was a particular issue from the start with the EPR and cost claims for it were not as aggressive as for some of the other designs. Nevertheless, in 1998, NPI claimed reactors could be built for US$1415/kW.(*136) In 2001, A US executive of Framatome claimed the EPR could be built in the USA for US$1320/kW.(*137)

In 2003, TVO’s studies for Olkiluoto envisaged that it would be able to buy a nuclear reactor for US$1800/kW or less. EDF’s studies from the same year assumed a cost of €1275/kW, then about US$1450,(*138) while the French government was even more optimistic in September of that year, assuming €1043/kW.(*139) These forecasts were revealed to be hopelessly unrealistic when it emerged that the winning bid for Olkiluoto was actually €3bn equivalent to €1875/kW or US$2300/kW.

In May 2006, when EDF ordered Flamanville, the cost estimated by EDF was reported to be €3.3bn, essentially the same as for Olkiluoto given inflation and the higher expected output (1630MW).(*140)

Costs at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville plants escalated rapidly, but it was not clear how far this was due to an underlying underestimate of costs and how far it was due to specific errors. Initial cost estimates for US EPRs were no less unrealistic with Areva and Unistar claiming overnight costs of US$1600-2000/kW in 2005.(*141) By 2008, Unistar was still estimating only US$2400/kW (2005 dollars).(*142) However by August of that year, the Unistar CEO, Mayo Shattuck suggested that the cost would be at the mid- to upper-end of the range US$4500-6000/kW (US$7.2-9.6bn).(*143)

Reports of bids for international contests produced even higher projected costs. In South Africa, Eskom expected a construction cost of US$2,500/kW. In January 2008, Eskom received two bids in reply to its call for tenders from November of the previous year for 3200 to 3400 MW of new nuclear capacity in the near term and up to 20,000 MW by 2025. One bid was from Areva for two EPRs (plus 10 more for the long-term) and the other from Westinghouse for the three AP1000s (plus 17 more in the long term).(*144) Both claimed their bids were “turnkey,” but whether they were really turnkey in the fixed price sense or whether they were simply for the whole plant is not clear. It was later reported that the bids were for around $6,000/kW – more than double the expected price.(*145)

In 2007, Ontario Power Authority (OPA), the public body responsible for planning the Ontario power system, had assumed nuclear power plants could be built for about C$2,900/kW.(*146) In June 2008, the Canadian government announced Darlington in Ontario as the site for a two-unit new build project and on May 20, 2009, information leaked that the Ontario government had chosen AECL as the leading bidder over Areva and Westinghouse to start building the first new nuclear plants in Canada in 25 years. Two new reactors were projected to start operating by 2018. However, the provincial government reportedly conditioned any go-ahead on financial guarantees by the federal government to cover the financial risks involved. Three bids were received, one from Areva and one from AECL, although only the AECL bid complied with the requirement that the vendor assume the construction risk. There was a press report on the size of the bids. This suggested that Areva’s non-compliant bid was C$23.6 billion (US$21 billion) for two EPRs (1600 MW each) or C$7,375/kW (US$6,600/kW). AECL and Westinghouse’s bids were higher. Ontario decided to suspend the tender. Subsequently, Areva disputed the published bid price, but they were not willing to supply the actual price they bid.

In December 2009, the UAE ordered four nuclear reactors from Korea using AP1400 technology, beating opposition from consortia led by EDF (including GDF Suez, Areva, and Total with the EPR) and GE-Hitachi.(*147) The contract is with Korean Electric to build and operate the reactors, the first coming on-line at an unspecified site in 2017 and the last by 2020. The terms of the deal and what is included are not clear, although the contract is reported to be worth $20.4 billion. The Korean bid was reported to be $16 billion lower than the French bid.(*148)

The response from Areva to this failure was particularly vitriolic. The CEO , Anne Lauvergeon, blamed the extra safety features required by the European market, particularly the core-catcher and a steel-lined double concrete containment that the EPR includes, whereas the winning bid, the Korean APR-1400 has no core-catcher and a single steel containment structure. She seemed to propose that Areva could offer previous generation models (for example, the 1000MW design sold to China in 1980) for export to third world countries.(*149)

The Roussely Report
The French government belatedly realised that commercialisation of the EPR was going badly and in October 2009 commissioned a former CEO of EDF, Francois Roussely, to examine the French nuclear industry. His report was given added point by the failure to win the tender for the UAE in December 2009. This failure was widely seen in France as due to the lack of an integrated offer including engineering, construction, fuel and waste, as well as equipment supply. The report, ‘The Future of the French Civilian Nuclear Sector’ was published in July 2010.(*150)

Roussely identified two major problems:

• The credibility of the EPR had been seriously damaged by problems at Olkiluoto and Flamanville;

• The capacity factors [reliability] of reactors in France have deteriorated sharply whereas elsewhere in the world, these have improved significantly.

He makes 15 recommendations, 12 described as ‘structural’ and 3 as ‘emergency’. Most of the structural measures seem to be aimed at creating a ‘Team France’, which would ensure France could offer a unified and comprehensive package for export markets in emerging countries. He recommends that the extension of reactor operating life to 60 years is supported and that further optimisation of the EPR from the feedback of the four reactors under construction and of past achievements be carried out. This optimisation should be carried out jointly by EDF and Areva.

On the problems at Olkiluoto and Flamanville, he recommends only that these reactors be completed with a few delays and as little cost over-run as possible. Lessons from this should be fed back into the construction of the Penly unit and any units ordered for the UK. The issue of poor reliability does not appear to be addressed directly by any of the recommendations. He does recommend that a charter setting out the conditions of employment applicable to all employees of nuclear power in France be introduced and that the mission of the Agence Securité Nucleaire (ASN) be reviewed, but it is not clear how this would address the issue of poor availability.

Of most interest is his diagnosis of the problems with the EPR. He attributes the problems squarely to ‘complexity’:

The complexity of the EPR comes from design choices, notably of the power level, containment, core catcher and redundancy of systems. It is certainly a handicap for its construction, and its cost. These elements can partly explain the difficulties encountered in Finland or Flamanville.’

He recommends:

The EPR should therefore be further optimised based on feedback from reactors under construction and past achievements. This optimisation would be lead jointly by EDF and Areva, in conjunction with ASN, with a view to make the detailed design as safe [as the current design].’

This recommendation does not seem realistic. The EPR was designed over a long period with the specific objective of rationalising the features of earlier designs. To assume that it would be a simple and quick process to just go through the design again to simplify it seems totally unrealistic. This is well illustrated by the issue of the I&C system noted above, which, ironically, was seen as not having enough redundancy. This problem was first identified in 2008; yet more than two years later, a detailed solution to the problem still has not been presented to the regulators. Any redesign that was comprehensive enough to significantly reduce complexity and costs would almost certainly be so extensive as to require the regulators to make a very full re-evaluation of the design.

This was the case with the problems with the AP1000 in the USA. This design received generic approval from the US regulator in 2006; yet in 2008, the supplier, Toshiba/Westinghouse, put in extensive design revisions that the US regulator is not expected to be able to approve before 2012. If we assume that this process of rationalization could be done in two years starting in 2011 and the regulators took a further four years to assess the design, this would mean that the design would not be ready to order before about 2017/18, after the Penly unit in France is expected to be on-line and at about the same time as EDF is claiming it will have the first UK EPR on-line.

Roussely recommends that the international French nuclear offering be ‘diversified’ with a smaller design, the Atmea, that could be brought to market quickly as a design more suitable for markets that would struggle to accommodate a reactor as large as the EPR. The Areva-Mitsubishi joint venture to develop Atmea was first announced in 2007.(*151) Atmea was described as being Generation III (rather than III+). A company spokesman said Atmea would be based on ‘proven technologies’ with ‘no technical breakthroughs or revolutionary innovations’. The design was reportedly to be submitted to the French regulator, ASN, in June 2010.(*152) The target for ASN to complete its review by fall 2011 seems unrealistic. Designs of this size from Areva or Mitsubishi are now more than 30 years old and given new features such as a core catcher and aircraft crash protection, the design must be substantially new. This either suggests that a highly optimistic timetable has been adopted or that the ASN review will not be a full generic assessment. Realistically, the Atmea design is highly unlikely to be available to order for 4-5 years and it is far from clear who the customers might be. GDF-Suez has expressed interest in building one in France but given that France already has serious over-capacity in nuclear, this would make no sense. Other customers, such as Jordan, are still some way from placing an order and for a country with no nuclear experience to order a first-of-a-kind unproven design would be seen as a massive risk.

It is particularly interesting to note the things that Roussely is entirely silent on. He fails to mention the prohibitively high prices bid by Areva on Ontario and South Africa, about double what the relevant governments expected. He also says a great deal about the Atmea design but nothing about the Kerena design, a BWR design that Areva has been working on for about as long as it has been working on the Atmea. The Kerena design is one of the options if another nuclear reactor is built in Finland.

The question that Roussely should have but utterly fails to address is whether the EPR is salvageable. Given the difficulties at construction sites, dramatically soaring construction cost estimates and difficulties of getting generic safety approval, this is surely the question that begs to be asked. It may be that the consequences to France’s nuclear strategy if the answer is that it is not are so severe that the question is politically impossible for an inquiry commissioned by the French government.

The fallout from the Roussely report seems set to continue with efforts by the French government to create a ‘Team France’ and the two key companies, EDF and Areva jockeying for position. It was reported in September that EDF was being pressed to increase its direct stake in Areva from 2.4 per cent to 15 per cent.(*153) EDF was making clear its dissatisfaction with Areva. It was reported in September 2010 that EDF was contemplating a partnership with a Chinese nuclear vendor or a Russian nuclear vendor to offer their designs to South Africa(*154) and that EDF was planning to develop nuclear reactors of its own design in competition with Areva.(*155) Neither proposal seems realistic: the Chinese design is essentially a 1970s design imported from France, which in turn imported it from the USA; the history of the EPR suggests that the time taken from start of conceptual design to the point when the reactor could be ordered is likely to be in the order 10-15 years. A more likely explanation is that EDF is trying to ensure that in any new configuration for the French nuclear industry, it is very much in the lead.

Conclusions
The EPR design is in crisis.

• Construction has gone dramatically wrong at the two sites in Europe where it is being built;

• The prices it is being offered at are so high that all contests where the EPR has been bid have either been abandoned (South Africa and Canada) or the contract has gone to a much lower bid from a competitor (UAE);

• Potential markets such as USA, UK and Italy all look problematic and reactor orders, if placed at all, will be much later than expected

• The process of obtaining safety approval in France, UK and USA is incomplete and, even if successful, the features needed to achieve regulatory approval may add significantly to costs.

The two sites in Europe where EPR is under construction, Olkiluoto and Flamanville, have gone dramatically wrong from the start of construction. It might have been argued that the problems at Olkiluoto were due to the lack of experience of the utility and the inexperience of Areva NP in carrying out the architect engineering. However, the fact that EDF, the most experienced nuclear utility in the world seems to be doing no better at Flamanville suggests the main problems are more related to the buildability of the design itself than to specific issues at Olkiluoto.

The promise for Generation III+ plants that they would: ‘have the advantage of combining technology familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs’(*156) has clearly not been fulfilled. The Chief Executive of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, acknowledges: ‘the cost of nuclear reactors has "always" gone up with each generation, because the safety requirements are ever higher. "Safety has a cost,"’(*157). Francois Roussely, former CEO of EDF stated: ‘The resulting complexity of the EPR, arising from the choice of design, specifically the level of power, the containment, the core catcher and the redundancy of the security systems is certainly a handicap for its construction and therefore its cost.’(*158)

The intuitively plausible notion that a new generation of nuclear reactors, starting without a blank sheet of paper could easily come up with a more rational and cheaper, yet safer design of reactor has been shown to be an illusion by the lengthy and still incomplete process of gaining safety approval. The Finnish and French authorities’ decision to allow construction to start before full generic approval had been given looks particularly ill-judged

As early as 1995 and again in 1997, there were concerns about the cost of the EPR then expected to be US$2000/kW but when other vendors began to claim they could build plants for US$1000/kW, Framatome seems to have felt obliged to follow suit. While it did not claim US$1000/kW was possible, it did claim reactors could be built for less than US$1500/kW in 1998 and 2001, less than a quarter of the prices it is now offering a decade later. At US$6000/kW or more, it seems unlikely that EPR will be affordable except where huge public subsidies are offered and/or there is a strong likelihood of full cost recovery from consumers, no matter what the cost is.

As the reality of these high costs hits home, it is likely that even markets in which government support for new nuclear orders has been strongest, such as the USA and UK, will find it difficult to support the costs.

From a business point of view, the right course for EDF and Areva seems clear. They must cut their losses and abandon the EPR now. In the short-term this will require some painful write-offs, for example, of investments in the UK and the USA, but in the long-term, the losses will be much greater if they continue to try to make the EPR work. Areva’s main business is its reactor servicing and fuel activities and these would be little affected by the abandonment of the EPR. EDF already has too much nuclear generating capacity in France, so not ordering more reactors will save it from unnecessary capital expenditure at a time when it acknowledges its debts are too high.(*159)

However, from a political point of view, France has invested so much political and financial capital in being the world leader in nuclear technology, such a decision to abandon the design will be politically too painful until it becomes unavoidable. However, for the governments of countries like the USA and the UK, which have invested little political capital in the French nuclear dream, the sensible course is clear: stop all investment of public money in the doomed EPR technology.


Annex 1 Letter from Jukka Laaksonen to Anne Lauvergeon

December 9, 2008

Dear Mrs. Lauvergeon,

With this letter I want to express my great concern on the lack of progress in the design of Olkiluoto 3 NPP automation.

The construction of Olkiluoto 3 plant seems to proceed generally well but I cannot see real progress being made in the design of the control and protection systems. Without a proper design that meets the basic principles of nuclear safety, and is consistently and transparently derived from the concept presented as an annex to the construction license application, I see no possibility to approve these important systems for installation. This would mean that the construction will come to a halt and it is not possible to start commissioning tests.

I expressed my concern on this already in spring 2008, in a meeting with Mr. Xavier Jacob and TVO's management. After that Areva organised a workshop at professional level in Erlangen on April 23-25, 2008. The goal of the workshop was to clarify the open technical issues. I was told afterwards that it was a successful event where our concerns were conveyed to your experts and were well understood by them. It was especially encouraging to hear that after the workshop a group led by an expert of high repute, Dr. Graf, was given a task to make sure that the issues be addressed promptly.

Since then there have been several meetings among our experts but we have not seen expected progress in the work on Areva side. The systems with highest safety importance are to be designed by Areva NP SAS but unfortunately the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons who speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make progress in resolving the concerns. Therefore, evident design errors are not corrected and we are not receiving design documentation with adequate information and verifiable design requirements. This is unfortunate because I am convinced that within your organisation there is enough competence to resolve all open issues. I wonder how this competence is actually being used in this project and whether an input by Dr. Graf and his group has been actually utilised.

I sincerely hope you could initiate some action in this area, in order to ensure bringing the construction of Olkiluoto 3 to a successful end.

With my best regards, Jukka Laaksonen, Director General, STUK


Endnotes

 (*1) European Pressurised water Reactor or Evolutionary Pressurised water Reactor for the US market.

(*2) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, Mitsubishi introduce mid-size 'Atmea 1' PWR design’ Sept 6, 2007, p 1.

(*3) Agence France Presse ‘France's EDF designs reactor to challenge Areva: report’ September 28, 2010.

(*4) Nuclear News ‘Joint Franco-German design partly unveiled’, Aug 1992, p 52.

(*5) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR basic design goes forward: EDF to build first unit by 2000’ Mar 2, 1995, p 5.

(*6) Nucleonics Week ‘France-German advanced reactor may be too expensive to buy’ Nov 16, 1995.

(*7) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR becoming 1,800-MW plant to meet competitive targets’ Aug 21, 1997, p 5.

(*8) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR design certification expected in mid-2000: interim opinion sooner’ Sept 13, 1999, p 11.

(*9) Inside NRC ‘Lacoste says licensing advanced PWR in France would take 2 to 3 years’ Dec 30, 2002.

(*10) Nuclear News ‘Siemens/Framatome nuclear merger completed’ Aug 2000, p 109.

(*11) Nuclear News, ‘Proposal for fifth reactor should fulfill licensing reqs’ Apr 2001, p 46.

(*12) Nucleonics Week ‘Westinghouse will sit out bid for single unit in Finland’ Nov 14, 2002, p 1.

(*13) Nucleonics Week ‘Framatome claim AP1000 couldn’t win Finnish bid on economics is denied’ Apr 10, 2003.

(*14) Nucleonics Week ‘ENEC says it considered designs with core catchers for new reactors’ January 28, 2010, p 1.

(*15) Inside NRC ‘French and Finnish EPRs will march to different regulatory drums’ Dec 13, 2004, p 10.

(*16) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK okays Olkiluoto-3, sets limit on initial fuel burnup’ Jan 27, 2005, p 1.

(*17) Nucleonics Week ‘EPR wins design approval from French government’ Oct 14, 2004, p 6.

(*18) Inside NRC ‘Areva ready for NRC to start design review process for EPR’ Feb 7, 2005, p 1.

(*19) Xinhua Economic News Service ‘China Focus: China, France sign 8-bln-Euro nuclear energy deal’ Nov 27, 2007.

(*20)TendersInfo ‘China : Shaw Signs Contract to Support Additional AP1000 Nuclear Power Plants in China’ August 22, 2010.

(*21) Nucleonics Week ‘Westinghouse may win China bid as Areva balks at tech transfer’ March 16, 2006, p 15.

(*22) Nucleonics Week ‘French consortium to submit bids to build two EPRs in South Africa’ Jan 24, 2008, p 5.

(*23) Nucleonics Week ‘Big cost hikes make vendors wary of releasing reactor cost estimates’ Sept 14, 2008.

(*24) Nucleonics Week ‘Eskom to build initial reactors, but long-term plan to be curtailed’ Nov 20, 2008.

(*25) Nucleonics Week ‘Eskom cancels tender for initial reactors’ Dec 11, 2008, p 1.

(*26) Nucleonics Week ‘AECL, Areva, Westinghouse submit bids for new reactors at Darlington’ Mar 5, 2009, p 3.

(*27) The Candu reactor uses heavy water as moderator rather than light water as in the PWR.

(*28) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva disputes EPR cost figure as Canadians grapple with risk issue’ Jul 23, 2009, p 1.

(*29) Nucleonics Week ‘UAE starts selection process for multi-unit nuclear program’ Feb 12, 2009, p 3.

(*30) Nucleonics Week ‘Three consortia submit bids to UAE to build new reactors’ Jul 9, 2009.

(*31) Nucleonics Week ‘Bidders said to be making last-ditch efforts to supply reactors to UAE’ December 10, 2009, p 1.

(*32) The US Department of Energy commissioned a cost study from the University of Chicago, which was published in 2004 and concluded that nuclear power was competitive with power from coal and natural gas. Office of nuclear energy, science and technology (2004) ‘University of Chicago: "Nuclear Power Competitive With Coal & Natural Gas"’ Press Release, September 20, 2004. http://nuclear.gov/home/09-20-04.html

(*33) http://nuclear.gov/home/11-21-03.html

(*34) Congressional Budget Office (2003) ‘Congressional Budget Office cost estimate: S14 Energy Policy Act of 2003’ Congressional Budget Office, Washington. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/42xx/doc4206/s14.pdf

(*35) Up to $500 million each for the first two new nuclear reactors, and half of the overruns due to such delays (up to $250 million each) for the next four reactors. See http://www.ne.doe.gov/energypolicyact2005/neepact2a.html

(*36) http://www.irs.gov/irb/2006-18_IRB/ar07.html

(*37) http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2008/janqtr/pdf/10cfr609.2.pdf

(*38) http://lpo.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/NuclPowerSol7-11-08Amen...

(*39) Inside NRC ‘NRC extends US EPR design review by six months; COL delays not expected’ Mar 1, 2010, p 5.

(*40) Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, undated ‘Fact Sheet’. Accessed on Jan 27, 2009 at

http://www.constellation.com/vcmfiles/Constellation/Files/Press-Kit_Corp...

(*41) Nucleonics Week, 2008 ‘EDF to acquire nearly half of Constellation's nuclear business’ Dec 18, 2008, p 1.

(*42) Nucleonics Week, 2008 ‘In France, EDF/CEG deal draws fire, but seen as key to EPR series cost’ Dec 25, 2008.

(*43) Electric Utility Week, 2008 ‘Regulators back expansion of Calvert Cliffs, but environmentalists ask for preconditions’ Dec 1, 2008, p 28.

(*44) http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/calvert-cliffs/review-sched...

(*45) SNL Coal Report ‘Optimism fades to frustration on Constellation's nuclear expansion’ Aug 9, 2010.

(*46) http://shareholders-and-investors.edf.com/fichiers/fckeditor/Commun/Fina...

(*47) Washington Post ‘Constellation, EDF in purchase dispute’ September 25, 2010.

(*48) Baltimore Sun ‘Daily Briefing’ September 28, 2010.

(*49) International Herald Tribune ‘EDF partner sees impasse in plan for U.S. reactor: Cost of loan guarantee dooms joint project, Maryland utility says’ October 11, 2010, p 15

(*50) EDF (2010) ‘Constellation Energy Group, Inc’ Form SC 13D/A. Filed 10/28/10 with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

(*51) Nucleonics Week, ‘Enel Targets 2020 for Operation of First Italian EPR Unit,’ Oct 8, 2009.

(*52) Nucleonics Week, ‘Milan Utility A2A Could Become Hub of AP1000 Consortium for Italy,’ Oct 22, 2009.

(*53) The Hindu, 2009. ‘Areva to sign MoU with NPCIL; to set up two reactors’ January 22, 2009. Accessed on

Jan 27, 2009 at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/006200901221224.htm

(*54) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘Penly project less certain after GDF SUEZ pullout’ September 24, 2010.

(*55) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘GDF SUEZ may seek partner for new French nuclear unit’ September 27, 2010.

(*56) The Telegraph-Journal ‘Alward to shelve Areva deal; Generation Premier-elect says he plans to put future nuclear plans with Areva on ice and concentrate on the ongoing completion of Point Lepreau power plant refurbishment’ September 29, 2010.

(*57) Project Director Martin Landtman stated: ‘The value of the whole Olkiluoto 3 investment including the Turn-key Contract is about EUR 3 billion in year 2003 money. No other figures are published’, personal communication, e-mail to Mycle Schneider, dated 8 Oct 2004.

(*58) Nucleonics Week, ‘EC probing claims Olkiluoto loan guarantees were state aid’, 26 Oct 2006.

(*59) Nucleonics Week, ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’, 5 Mar 2009, p 1.

(*60) Nucleonics Week, ‘Giant EPR said to be competitive: EDF to decide on order next year’, 6 Nov 1998, p 1.

(*61) Petroleum Economist, ‘France mulls nuclear future’, Mar 2001.

(*62) Nucleonics Week, ‘EPR safety approval won‘t last beyond 2002, regulator warns’, 6 Mar 1997.

(*63) Agence France Presse ‘Areva reports profit surge from sale of asset’, July 30, 2010.

(*64) Agence France Presse, ‘Setbacks plague Finland's French-built reactor’, 30 Jan 2009.

(*65) Nucleonics Week ‘Problems in getting information could delay review of Olkiluoto-3’ Apr 1, 2004, p 4.

(*66) Nucleonics Week, ‘Olkiluoto-3 base slab pour delay not expected to impact end date’ Oct 20, 2005, p 4.

(*67) Nucleonics Week ‘Construction of Olkiluoto-3 behind schedule’ Feb 2, 2006, p 1.

(*68) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK begins investigating construction delay at Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 2, 2006, p 8.

(*69) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 containment liner set in place, but project still lags’ Mar 2, 2006, p 8.

(*70) Nucleonics Week ‘Host of problems caused delays at Olkiluoto-3, regulators say’ Jul 13, 2006, p 1.

(*71) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 delays lower Areva nuclear profits by Eur 300 million’ Oct 5, 2006, p 4.

(*72) Nucleonics Week ‘Problems found with Olkiluoto-3 hot legs’ Oct 19, 2006, p 1.

(*73) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva puts star engineer in charge of Olkiluoto-3 project’ Nov 2, 2006.

(*74) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 commercial date slips to late 2010 at earliest’ Dec 7, 2006, p 1.

(*75) Finnish Broadcasting Company TV news, 30 Jan 2007.

(*76) Nucleonics Week ‘Lack of complete design blamed for problems with Olkiluoto-3’ May 17, 2007, p 4.

(*77) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva: Plane crash requirements to delay Olkiluoto-3 construction’ Aug 16, 2007, p 1.

(*78) Nucleonics Week ‘Regulator requires repairs to welds on Olkiluoto-3 containment liner’ Sept 20, 2007, p 1.

(*79) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, TVO at odds over resolution of Olkiluoto-3 cost overruns’ Sept 6, 2007 p 9.

(*80) Nucleonics Week ‘Second top TVO executive leaving Olkiluoto-3’ June 26, 2008, p 1.

(*81) Nucleonics Week ‘Target date for operating Olkiluoto-3 again delayed, this time until 2012’ Oct 23, 2008.

(*82) Nucleonics Week ‘STUK finds more problems with Olkiluoto-3 liner, forgings’ Nov 13, 2008, p 3.

(*83) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO CEO sees improved workflow, potential for problems at Olkiluoto-3’ Nov 20, 2008, p 11.

(*84) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto costs weigh on Areva 2008 profits; TVO rejects blame’ Dec 25, 2008, p 9.

(*85) Letter from Jukka Laaksonen to Anne Lauvergeon, Dec 9, 2008.

(*86) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO: Olkiluoto-3 operation delayed to June 2012’ Jan 15, 2009, p 1.

(*87) Nucleonics Week ‘Siemens' departure seen putting Areva under financial stress’ Jan 29, 2009, p 14.

(*88) Nucleonics Week ‘TVO: Olkiluoto-3 operation delayed to June 2012’ Jan 15, 2009, p 1.

(*89) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 5, 2009, p 1.

(*90) Nucleonics Week ‘Olkiluoto-3 arbitration could last 'several years,' TVO says’ Mar 19, 2009, p 9.

(*91) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva reveals 47% cost overrun on contract for Olkiluoto-3’ Mar 5, 2009, p 1.

(*92) TVO ‘Finland: Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant to start operation in 2013’ Press Release, June 7, 2010.

(*93) Business Wire ‘AREVA: Olkiluoto 3 project: nuclear operation to start end of 2012’ June 7, 2010.

(*94) Associated Press ‘Areva net profit soars despite new EPR charge’ July 30, 2010.

(*95) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘Embattled AREVA suffers ratings downgrade’ June 29, 2010.

(*96) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF orders Flamanville-3 EPR NSSS, with startup targeted in 2012’, 5 Jan 2007, p 1.

(*97) Nucleonics Week, ‘Flamanville-3 concrete pour marks start of nuclear construction’ 6 Dec 2007, p 3.

(*98) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’, 11 May 2006, p 1.

(*99) Nucleonics Week, ‘Concrete pouring at Flamanville-3 stopped after new problems found’, 29 May 2008, p 18.

(*100) Nucleonics Week, ‘EDF confirms target of starting up Flamanville-3 in 2012’, 20 Nov 2008, p 1.

(*101) Associated Press Worldstream, ‘EDF to lead up to euro50B in nuclear plant investment’, 4 Dec 2008.

(*102) Nucleonics Week, ‘Areva official says costs for new EPR rising, exceeding $6.5 billion’, 4 Sept 2008, p.1.

(*103) French Business Digest ‘Unions confirm 2-yr delay at EDF's nuclear project in N France – report’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*104) Agence France Presse ‘EDF announces 2-year delay, cost hike at new reactor’ July 30, 2010.

(*105) Le Figaro, October 27, 2010, p 17.

(*106) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’ May 11, 2006, p 1.

(*107) Nucleonics Week ‘Site preparation work for EPR at Flamanville gets under way’ July 13, 2006, p 9.

(*108) Nucleonics Week ‘Cost estimate for Flamanville-3 unchanged, EDF official says’ Sept 7, 2006, p 9.

(*109) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF orders Flamanville-3 EPR NSSS, with startup targeted in 2012’, Jan 25, 2007, p 1.

(*110) Nucleonics Week ‘On brink of election cycle, French government licenses EPR’ Apr 19, 2007, p 6.

(*111) Nucleonics Week ‘Flamanville-3 concrete pour marks start of nuclear construction’ Dec 6, 2007, p 3.

(*112) Nucleonics Week ‘ASN asks EDF to improve quality, organization at Flamanville-3’ Mar 27, 2008, p 1.

(*113) Nucleonics Week ‘Regulator seeks EDF's response to QA findings at Flamanville-3’ Apr 3, 2008, p 5.

(*114) Nucleonics Week ‘Concrete pouring at Flamanville-3 stopped after new problems found’ May 29, 2008, p 14.

(*115) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva tasked to prove quality of EPR forgings’ Oct 30, 2008 p 1.

(*116) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF: Flamanville-3 cost rise due to inflation, technical/regulatory changes’ Dec 11, 2008.

(*117) French Business Digest ‘Unions confirm 2-yr delay at EDF's nuclear project in N France – report’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*118) Agence France Presse ‘EDF announces 2-year delay, cost hike at new reactor’ July 30, 2010.

(*119) Nucleonics Week ‘ASN asks EDF to make changes to Flamanville-3 I&C system’ August 5, 2010, p 10.

(*120) Le Figaro, October 27, 2010, p 17.

(*121) European Daily Electricity Markets ‘EDF's past efforts pay off with two EPR deals sealed in China’, 15 Aug 2008.

(*122) South China Morning Post ‘Hold-ups in construction of Taishan nuclear power plant; Atomic plant first in China to use latest European technology’ July 31, 2010, p 3.

(*123) Health and Safety Executive (2010) ‘ New nuclear power stations Generic Design Assessment: Guidance on the management of GDA outcomes’ HSE, London.

http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/management-gda-outcomes.pdf

(*124) Inside NRC ‘Areva and Westinghouse unlikely to get 'clean' UK design reviews’ Sept 14, 2009.

(*125) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q1-10.pdf

(*126) Nucleonics Week ‘UK reviews of AP1000 and EPR might not be fully closed by 2011’ June 24, 2010, p 1.

(*127) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva files application with NRC for certification of US-EPR design’ Dec 13, 2007, p 5.

(*128) Inside NRC ‘NRC extends US EPR design review by six months; COL delays not expected’ Mar 1, 2010, p 5.

(*129) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q2-09.pdf

(*130) Health and Safety Executive (2009) ‘Joint Regulatory Position Statement on the EPR Pressurised Water Reactor’ HSE, London. http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2009/hse221009.htm

(*131) http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q2-10.pdf p 12.

(*132) Inside NRC ‘Areva must modify I&C for US-EPR design, says NRC’ July 5, 2010, p 3.

(*133) Inside NRC ‘I&C designs will differ for Finnish, French, UK and US EPRs’ July 5, 2010.

(*134) Nucleonics Week ‘Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features’ Jan 14, 2010, p 1.

(*135) Nucleonics Week ‘Atmea 1 design to be submitted to French regulators for safety review’ Apr 1, 2010, p 3. 25

(*136) Nucleonics Week ‘Giant EPR said to be competitive: EDF to decide on order next year’ Nov 6, 1998, p 1.

(*137) Nucleonics Week ‘Framatome offers turnkey plant as US nuclear competition entry’ Dec 20, 2001, p 1.

(*138) Nucleonics Week ‘Bids give TVO a range of choices for fifth Finnish reactor project’ Apr 3, 2003, p 1.

(*139) Nucleonics Week ‘French government study sees EPR at overnight cost of 1,043 euros/KW’ Sept 11,2003, p 7.

(*140) Nucleonics Week ‘EDF to build Flamanville-3, says first EPR competitive with CCGT’ May 11, 2006, p 1.

(*141) Nucleonics Week ‘Constellation sites 'reserved' for part of U.S. EPR fleet’ Sept 22, 2005, p 1.

(*142) Public Utilities Fortnightly ‘Financing New Nukes; Federal loan guarantees raise hopes for new reactors planned by affiliates of Constellation and NRG.’ February 2008, p 19.

(*143) Nucleonics Week ‘Loan guarantee sought for Calvert Cliffs-3’ Aug 7 2008, p 1.

(*144) Nucleonics Week “Eskom Gets Bids for Two EPRS, Three AP1000s, Bigger ‘Fleet,’” Feb 7, 2008.

(*145) Nucleonics Week ‘Big Cost Hikes Make Vendors Wary of Releasing Reactor Cost Estimates’ Sept 11, 2008.

(*146) Toronto Star ‘Nuclear Bid Rejected for 26 Billion: Ontario Ditched Plan for New Reactors over High Price Tag That Would Wipe Out 20-Year Budget’ July 14, 2009.

(*147) Korea Herald ‘Korea Wins Landmark Nuclear Deal’ Dec 28, 2009.

(*148) Right Vision News ‘UAE: Middle East Leads Rally in Nuclear Plant Orders’ Jan 12, 2010.

(*149) Nucleonics Week ‘French regulatory chief rejects idea of tailoring reactor safety to market’ Jan 21, 2010.

(*150) For an English translation, see http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/roussely-report-france-nucl... Quotes used are from this translation.

(*151) Nucleonics Week ‘Areva, Mitsubishi introduce mid-size 'Atmea 1' PWR design’ Sept 6, 2007, p 1.

(*152) Nuclear News ‘The safety of the Atmea1 reactor will be reviewed’ July 2010.

(*153) Agence France Presse ‘France pushes EDF to raise stake in Areva: report’ September 27, 2010.

(*154) http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE68E03220100915

(*155) Agence France Presse ‘France's EDF designs reactor to challenge Areva: report’ September 28, 2010.

(*156) http://nuclear.gov/home/11-21-03.html

(*157) Nucleonics Week, ‘Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features’ January 14, 2010, p 1.

(*158) http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/roussely-report-france-nucl...

(*159) For a detailed analysis of the business prospects for EDF and Areva, see S Thomas (2009) ‘Areva and EDF: Business prospects and risks in nuclear energy’ Greenpeace, Amsterdam. http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/files/pdfs/nuclear/Areva_EDF_Final.pdf  

Contact: Professor Steve Thomas, Business School, University of Greenwich, London, U.K. PSIRU (www.psiru.org),
Email: stephen.thomas@gre.ac.uk

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